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[SŪ. 1. 1. 1. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 17 lotus, on Brahman, supreme and adorable, free by nature from all faults, and one mass of infinite auspicious qualities, and having the vyūhas ¹ as His limbs' (D Ś 4). The mutual differences among these (three) substances, viz the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman are taught by the texts contained respectively in the different chapters (treating of these three) and indicating the respective peculiarities of their qualities and nature. The non-difference of the sentient and the non-sentient is taught in the following texts — '"Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Ait. 1.1.1), 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3, 6.12.31; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3, 6.16.3), 'This soul is Brahman' (Bṛh. 4.4.5), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'I am you, verily, O reverend Deity', 'Then he knows the self alone "I am Brahman"'. In this way, the two kinds of texts being both authoritative in their primary and literal import, the sentient and the non-sentient, though of different natures (from Brahman), yet are non-different from Brahman, because they have their existence and activity under His control,—just as the sense-organs, though of different natures (from the vital-breath) are yet non-different from the vital-breath, because they are under its control, as is well-known from the dialogue between the vital-breath and the sense-organs in the Chāndogya: 'Verily, they are not called speech, eyes, or mind, but called the vital- breath alone' (Chānd. 5.1.15). Hence the view of the author of the aphorisms is that Brahman, the object to be enquired into, is both different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient. For that very reason, there is no necessity for enquiring into the two realities (viz. the sentient and the non-sentient), and the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all ² fits in well. As has been said: 'Hence, all knowledge concerning all objects is true, since they, as declared by Scripture and Smṛti, have Brahman

¹ The vyūhas are Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vide V.R.M., pp. 47–49, for details. ² Vide Chānd 6.1 ff The sense is that the sūtras recommend an enquiry into Brahman alone, and not into the sentient and the non-sentient, not because these two are unreal, but simply because by enquiring into Brahman, the Cause. we come to know of the sentient and the non-sentient too, the effects, and hence no separate enquiry is necessary. 2

[SŪ. 1. 1. 1. 18 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.] for their essence,—this is the view of those who are versed in the Vedas, and the Trinity of Reals too is established by Scripture and aphorisms' (D.Ś.7) The following aphorisms may be referred to: 'A part, on account of the mention of variety, and otherwise, some even read the status of a fisherman, a knave and so on' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42), 'But on account of the mention of both, as in the case of a snake and its coil' (Br. Sū. 3.2.27), 'Or, like the substratum of light, because of being light' (Br. Sū. 3.2.28) and so on. Detailed explanations may be seen further on. Since this aphorism (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), ascertaining the meaning of Scripture, is of the nature of an introduction, the indispensable factors (in the study of a particular subject) are also mentioned virtually by it, with a view to encouraging people with insight to (the study of) Scripture. These are the person entitled (to the study), the topic, the relation and the purpose¹ Among those, one who is desirous of release and possessed of the stated marks² is the person entitled (to the study of the Vedānta). The topic is the Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, denoted by the term 'Brahman' and the rest, omnis- cient, the substratum of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes and powers persisting as long as He Himself does, the Controller of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, matter, atoms, time, karma, and Nature, who is absolutely untouched by faults and who is the substratum of a natural difference—non-difference from the sentient and the non- sentient. The relation is that between a topic and what treats of the topic³ The purpose here is salvation, characterized by attaining the state of the Lord Here ends the section entitled 'The enquiry' (1). Comparison of Nimbārka's reading and interpretation with the readings and interpretations of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva.⁴ Śaṁkara Interpretation different. According to Nimbārka, the term "atha" (=then) signifies: 'after the study of the Veda and the Pūrva- ¹ Adhikārin, viṣaya, sambandha, prayojana ² See above, pp. 11–14. ³ See above, p. 9 of the book and footnote 5 there. ⁴ Only the points of differences will be noted.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 1, ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 19 mīmāṁsā'. But according to Śaṁkara, this is not the case. He points out that the study of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā is by no means an essential pre-requisite to the study of Brahman ¹ There is no essential connection between the enquiry into religious duties and that into Brahman On the contrary, there is an absolute difference between them as regards the result and the object of enquiry.² The result of the former is the attainment of worldly and heavenly enjoyment, which is something to be accomplished, while the result of the latter is salvation, which is not something to be accomplished, being eternal and ever-accomplished This being so, the essential pre-requisite to the enquiry into Brahman is not the enquiry into religious duties, but the acquisition of the four qualifications ³,–viz (1) discrimination between eternal and non-eternal objects, (2) aversion to the enjoyment of the objects of sense, here or hereafter, (3) possession of self-restraint, tranquillity and the rest ⁴ and (4) the desire of emancipation.⁵ Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same, only much more elaborate. Rāmānuja points out that the two Mīmāṁsās—viz. the Karma- mīmāṁsā and the Brahma-mīmāṁsā constitute one connected whole, the first naturally leading to the second,⁶ and criticises at length, in this connection, the Śaṁkarite view that the enquiry into Brahman does not necessarily presuppose the enquiry into religious duties.⁷ Bhāskara Literal interpretation same, but import different. Bhāskara develops here his peculiar doctrine of jñāna-karma-samuccaya, or ¹ Ś B. 1.1 1. 'Dharma-jijñāsāyāḥ prāg api adhīta-Vedāntasya Brahma- jijñāsopapatteḥ', p. 71 ² Ś.B. 1 1.1. 'Dharma-brahma-jijñāsayoh phala-jijñāsya-bhedācca' (p. 74). ³ Sādhana-catuṣṭaya. ⁴ I e. śama (control of the internal organ, viz the mind), dama (control of the external sense-organs), uparati (indifference to worldly pursuits), titikṣā (endurance of the opposite extremes, like heat and cold, pleasure and pain, etc.), śraddhā (faith in the scripture and the spiritual teachers), and samādhāna (deep concentration). ⁵ Ś.B. 1.1 1. 'Nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, ihāmutrārtha-phalabhoga-virāgaḥ, śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat, mumukṣutvañ ca', ⁶ Śrī. B. 1.1.1. 'Vakṣyati ca Karma-brahma-mīmāṁsayor aikaśāstryam', etc., p. 2, vol. 1 (Madras ed.). ⁷ Op. cit., pp. 5–13, vol 1.

[sū. 1. 1. 1. 20 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 1.] combination of knowledge and work. Thus, according to both Nimbārka and Bhāskara, the enqury into Brahman should be under- taken after an enquiry into religious duties, but for different reasons. According to Nimbārka, the prior study of the Karma-mīmāṁsā convinces us of the transitory nature of the fruits of karmas, and this naturally leads us to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā, with a view to attaining a permanent fruit therefrom, viz salvation. For this reason, we study first the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, and then the Uttara- mīmāṁsā or the Vedānta. But according to Bhāskara, we enquire into Karmas before enquiring into Brahman for quite different reasons, viz. (1) We do not enquire into Karmas first and then into Brahman, because the former are transitory, the latter not, but we enquire into both Karmas and Brahman, for the very same reason, viz. because we know that they both play an equal part in the attainment of salvation. Salvation can be obtained through a proper combination of knowledge and works, and unless we first know the nature of the works themselves, we cannot possibly decide which kinds of works are to be resorted to and combined with knowledge, and which kinds to be avoided and not to be so com- bined. It is for this reason, that we first study the Karma-mīmāṁsā, and then the Brahma-mīmāṁsā, and combine the obligatory works with knowledge, avoiding those that are undertaken for selfish ends. (2) Further, the Vedānta deals with various kinds of meditations on the subordinate parts of sacrifices—, e.g. the meditation on the udgītha and so on. But unless we are first acquainted with the nature of those sacrifices themselves, such meditations are not possible. It is for this reason also that we first study the Karma-mīmāṁsā, and then the Brahma-mīmāṁsā.¹ Bhāskara also criticises here the Śāṁkarite interpretation of the term "atha".² Śrīkaṇṭha Literal interpretation same, but import different. That is, Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha both agree that the Brahma-mīmāṁsā is to be studied after the study of the Karma-mīmāṁsā, but the reason for this, as given by Śrīkaṇṭha, is different from that given by Nim- bārka. We have already seen the reason given by Nimbārka. But

¹ Bh. B. 1. 1. 1, p. 2. ² Op. cit., pp. 3–5.

[sū. 1. 1. 1. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 21 according to Śrīkaṇṭha, we must first study religious duties and then Brahman, because the two stand in a relation of worship (ārādhanā) and the worshipped (ārādhya),¹ cause (hetu) and effect,² means (sādhana) and end (sādhya) ³. The proper performance of Karmas purifies the mind. But unless we first know the nature, etc. of Karmas, we cannot perform them properly, i.e. choose the right ones (nitya and naimittika ones) and avoid others (kāmya ones), and unless we perform karmas properly, our mind is not purified, and unless our mind is purified, there can be no rise of knowledge in it. It is for this reason that we should first study the Karma-mīmāṁsā and then the Brahma-mīmāṁsā.⁴ Like Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the Karma-mīmāṁsā and the Brahma-mīmāṁsā form one and the same treatise.⁵ Baladeva Interpretation different. According to Baladeva also, the word "atha" means 'immediate sequence', but he points out that it cannot be said that the study of the Karma-mīmāṁsā is an essential pre- requisite to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṁsā, for it is often found that even one who knows the Karma-mīmāṁsā by heart, but who is deprived of the company of the good, has no desire to enquire into Brahman, while one who does not know the Karma-mīmāṁsā, but is purified by truthfulness, prayer, etc. and associates with the good, has a natural inclination to enquire into Brahman. It cannot be said also that the term "atha" means that the enquiry into Brahman can be undertaken only after the acquisition of the four-fold qualifica- tions, viz. discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal and the rest, as held by Śaṁkara, for these cannot be acquired unless one first associates with the good and the holy.⁶ Hence, what the term "atha" means is as follows:—A man who has properly studied the Veda and has understood its meaning in a general way, who has faithfully performed the duties incumbent on 1 ŚK B 1. 1. 1, p 34, Part 1. 2 Op. cit., pp. 37, 39, Part 1. 3 Op. cit., pp. 39, 43, Part 1. 4 ŚK.B. 1.1.1, pp. 33, 39, 43, 50, 68, 70, Part 1. Of course Śrīkaṇṭha is not a Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vādin like Bhāskara. 5 ŚK.B 1.1.1, p. 33, Part 1. 6 G B 1. 1. 1, pp. 24-25, chap 1.

22 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 2. ADH. 2.] his own stage of life, who is truthful and so on, whose mind has become purified by the performance of duties in a disinterested spirit and who has come into contact with a knower of truth, should then commence an enquiry into Brahman, for then he is convinced that the fruits of works undertaken with selfish ends in view are but transitory, while Brahman alone is the cause of eternal happiness.¹ Thus, the five pre-requisites to the enquiry into Brahman are:— (1) Study of the Veda (2) Proper performance of the duties incum- bent on one's own stage of life. (3) Purification of the mind by such performance of works in a disinterested spirit. (4) Association with the good and the holy (5) The consequent acquirement of the faculty of discriminating between the permanent and the non-permanent, disgust for non-permanent worldly objects and desire to know the permanent in details All the commentators agree in holding that the word "ataḥ" means 'because the fruits of Karmas are transitory, while the know- ledge of Brahman alone leads to eternal bliss'. Adhikarana 2: The section entitled 'The Origin'. (Sūtra 2) SŪTRA 2 "(BRAHMAN IS THAT) FROM WHOM (ARISE) THE ORIGIN AND THE REST OF THIS (WORLD)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Now, with regard to the characteristics of Brahman, the author states the correct conclusion: That very Lord—the substratum of infinite attributes like omniscience, etc. and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva time and the rest,— from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution "of this", i.e. of the universe,—endowed with manifold combinations, the abode of innumerable peculiarities of names and forms and the like; and the form of which is inconceivable,—is Brahman, the object of the above statement (viz. Sū. 1.1.1)—this is the meaning of the characterizing text. ¹ Op. cit., pp. 19-20, chap. 1.

[sū. 1. 1. 2. ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 23 Vedānta-kaustubha Brahman, called Lord Kṛṣṇa, great in qualities, powers and nature, has been established in the previous section. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What are His characteristics?—the same Being (viz. Brahman) is being demonstrated, as having the qualities of 'being the agent of the origin and the rest of the world', 'being omniscient', 'being true' and so on. Here the words "of this" denote the effect, viz. the world; and the words "from whom" denote the cause. The word 'Brahman' is to be supplied here from the previous aphorism. And, there being an universal correlation between the terms 'yat' and 'tat', the term 'tat' too must be supplied here.¹ (Next the compound "janmādi" is explained—) 'That of which "origin" is the beginning'—is "janmādi", i.e. creation, sub- sistence, dissolution and salvation. This is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna type.² That "from whom",—i.e. the Lord, the Highest Person, the Lord of all, omniscient, omnipotent, the supreme cause and the ruler of all,—arise the origination, subsistence, dissolution, and salvation "of this", i.e. of the world, which is manifested by names and forms connected with enjoyers (viz. the souls) divided variously; which is the constant abode of the enjoying of place, time and fruits; and the composition of which is beyond the grasp of reasoning—is Brahman. He alone is to be enquired into by those who desire for salvation,— this is the construction of the words in the aphorism. ¹ Thus the construction of the sūtra is:—'Janmādy asya yataḥ Brahmaṇaḥ tataḥ'. ² There are two kinds of Bahuvrīhi, viz. tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna and atad-guṇa- saṃjñāna. In the former case, the compounds, the noun (viśeṣya) has direct connection with and implies the words compounded (viśeṣaṇas), e.g. when it is said 'Bring the man with long ears' (Lamba-karṇaṃ ānaya), the bringing of the man implies the bringing of his attribute, viz the ears, as well and the man (viśeṣya) and his ears (viśeṣaṇas) are directly connected. In the latter case, there is no such direct connection between the compound and the words compounded, e g when it is said 'Bring the man who has seen the sea' (Dṛṣṭa-sāgaraṃ ānaya), the bringing of the man does not imply the bringing of his attribute, viz the sea, and there is no direct connection between the two. Now, 'Janmādi' is a Bahuvrīhi of the first kind and hence it includes in its meaning 'janma' too.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 2. 24 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.] There are scriptural texts to this effect,—beginning:—'Bhrgu, the son of Varuna approached his father, (with the request) "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (Tait. 3 1), and continuing:—' "From, whom, verily, all these beings arise, by whom they, so born, live and to whom they go forth and enter,—enquire into that, that is Brahman" ' (Tait 3.1), 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. (The meaning of the first of the above two texts is:—) 'From whom', i.e from Lord Purusottama, 'all these beings', i.e all objects from the mahat down to a tuft of grass, 'arise',—hereby the origination (of the world from the Lord) is indicated. 'By whom, they, so born, live',—hereby the subsistence (of the world in Brahman) is indicated. 'They enter',—hereby the dissolution (of the world into the Lord) is shown. 'To whom they go forth',—meaning—'whom they attain after the destruction of all karmas',—hereby salvation (of the souls) is indicated. Here 'origination' means the expansion of the manifold consciousness of the sentient being, due to its connec- tion with a body and the rest; and 'dissolution' means its entrance into the Cause (viz Brahman), resulting from the contraction of its consciousness. This will be made clear under the explanations of the two aphorisms, viz. 'Dependent on the movable and the immovable' (Br. Sū. 2.3.16) and so on. The distinction (between the sentient and the non-sentient) is that the non-sentient is more primary, having a different form at the beginning of creation ¹ The meaning of the second text, on the other hand, is that Brahman possesses the attributes of truth, knowledge and infinitude. Here, the word 'truth' distinguishes the Lord from what is not true, the word 'knowledge' from the group of the non-sentient, and the word 'infinite' from the group of the sentient And, thus it is established that the characteristic mark of Brahman is that He, being the one non-distinct material and efficient cause of the universe, is possessed of truth and the rest He is the material cause ² in the sense of being the manifestor, in a gross form, of His own ¹ That is, the non-sentient is more primary than the sentient in the sense that it is prior to the sentient in point of time. Right in the beginning of creation, the individual soul does not exist, in the sense that there is nobody with which it may be connected, but pradhāna does, though not in the form of particular non-sentient substances like stones and houses, etc., and the body comes to be evolved later on. Cf Sāṁkhya theory of evolution. ² Upādānatva.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 2. ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 25 natural powers, denoted by the terms ‘higher’, ‘lower’ and so on, and reduced to a subtle state, as well as of the effects, existent and inherent in them respectively. He is the efficient cause ¹ in the sense of bringing about a union of the sentient beings,—whose attribute of knowledge is in a state of absolute contraction being under the in- fluence of the past impressions of their own karmas which are begin- ningless, and is, thereby, unfit for bringing about the recollection (in their minds) of the retributive experiences (to be undergone in the present birth),—with their respective karmas, and the respective instruments for experiencing them, through manifesting (in them) knowledge, enabling them to experience the fruits of karmas ² There is a Smṛti passage too, conformable to the text dealing with the topic in hand, (i e. the above Taittirīya text, 3.1) in the Mokṣa-dharma ³ It begins. ‘The Scripture which was mentioned by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked’ (Mahā. 12.6769b ⁴), and con- tinues. ‘“He, verily, is the Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inner Soul of all beings, and difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self, who is the creator of the principle of egoity for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here”’ (Mahā 12.6784b– 6786a ⁵). ¹ Nimittatva. ² The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non- sentient into gross effects That is, during dissolution, the entire universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient (cit- śakti and acit-śakti), developing them into grosser effects and producing, thereby, the universe of names and forms. And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective karmas, the results of these karmas, and the instruments for experiencing them—that is, the Lord is the efficient cause in the sense that He regulates the destinies of individual souls in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless im- pressions of past karmas get dimmed and confused; and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past works Vide V.R M., p. 63. ³ ‘Mokṣa-dharma’ is the name of a section of the twelfth book of the Mahā-bhārata, from adhyāya 174 to the end. ⁴ P. 604, line 7, vol. 3. ⁵ Op. cit., lines 22–24.

26 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 2. ADH. 2.] If it be objected:—'In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a multitude of causes is spoken of in the passage: 'Time, nature, destiny, accident, elements and the Person should be known as the Cause' (Śvet. 1.2), so what authority is there for separating specifically Vāsudeva, the Highest Person alone as the cause of the world?—(then we reply:) Listen. A multitude of scriptural and Smṛti passages is our authority for specifying the cause of the world. Compare the following:— 'He, the One, who governs all these causes, connected with time and soul' (Śvet. 1.3), 'He who is a knower, the Time of time, possessed of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2), 'Of whom there is neither a creator, nor a lord' (Śvet. 6.9), 'Verily, Nārāyaṇa was One' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts', 'From Nārāyaṇa is born Brahmā, from Nārāyaṇa is born Rudra' (Nār. 1), 'From the forehead of this being, wrapt up within himself in meditation, was born the Person, with three-eyes, trident in hand' (Mahā. Up. 1.7), 'Kṛṣṇa, the One, the ruler, moving everywhere, is an object of worship, He who, though one, yet appears as many'. '"Ka' is the name of Brahman, I am the 'Īśa', i.e. the Lord, of all beings. We two have sprung up from your body, hence you have the name 'Keśava'", 'I, Brahmā, the primary Lord of people, am born from Him, and you have sprung up from me', 'Kṛṣṇa alone is the source of the worlds, and of their dissolution too', 'Being created by Kṛṣṇa the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient has originated'. 'In the Veda, and in Rāmāyaṇa, verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end, and in the middle' (Hari V. 16232 ¹). '"I am the origin of the entire world, dissolution similarly"' (Gītā 7.6), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"I am the source of everything, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8) and so on. The terms 'Hiraṇyagarbha' and the rest, which we find sometimes in certain texts concerning the origin and so on of the world, should be known to be referring to Brahman. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the Soul of all, the Lord of all, the one topic of all the Vedas, is the cause of the world. Here ends the section entitled 'The Origin' (2). 1 P. 1002, vol 4.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 27 COMPARISON Śaṃkara Reading and interpretation same. Of course, consistently with his doctrine, Śaṃkara must hold that here the term 'Brahman' denotes 'Īśvara' or the lower Brahman. Adhikaraṇa 3. The section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source'. (Sūtra 3) SŪTRA 3 “BECAUSE (BRAHMAN HAS) SCRIPTURE FOR HIS SOURCE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha With reference to the enquiry: What is the proof of His existence? The author states the correct conclusion:— Of Whom “Scripture” alone is “the source”, i.e. the cause of knowing,¹—that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks, is denoted by the term ‘Brahman’. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning enquiry² that Brahman is the object to be enquired into, and it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning characteristic mark³ that the characteristic mark of Brahman is to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world and possess truth, etc. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What is the proof with regard to Him—the proof is being stated. On the doubt, viz. whether Brahman, having the stated marks, is to be arrived at through inference, or has the Veda alone for His proof,—the prima facie view being that He is to be arrived at through inference, since we know from the scriptural text: ‘From whom speech turns back’ (Tait. 2.4, 2 9) that Brahman cannot be known through speech (i.e. texts),— ¹ This explains the compound ‘śāstra-yoni’. ² Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.1. ³ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2.

28 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3.] (We reply) Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, but has the Veda for His proof. Why? "Because (Brahman has) Scripture for His source". That means "Scripture", i.e. the Veda, is the "source", i.e. the cause, the informant, the proof, with regard to whom,—that object is "Śāstra-yoni"; and "Śāstra-yonitva" is the state of being "Śāstra-yoni"—on account of that, i e. on account of having Scripture for His proof 1 The correct conclusion is that Brahman has the Veda alone for His proof. If it be said. For the sake of simplicity, it is well-said that Brahman has Scripture for His source, and thus to say that Brahman has Scripture for His source, i e. has the Veda for its proof, serves our purpose, (i e. is not in conflict with our view),—(we reply.) No, Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, because the phrase : "Because (He has) Scripture for (His) source" indicates a reason which excludes any other proof except Scripture. If it be said: How is it known that He cannot be arrived at through inference?—(we reply) There has been some room for the suspicion that Brahman can be arrived at through inference, since the middle term (or the reason), viz. 'the state of being an effect' 2, stated above, proves the world to be due to a creator.3 With a view to removing it, that significant word 4 is used here (in this sūtra), in accordance with the following scriptural texts.—Viz. : 'The word which all the Vedas declare' (Kaṭha 2 15), 'That with regard to which all the Vedas become one' (Tait. Ār. 3 11 1 5), '"I ask you about Brahman, set forth in the Upaniṣads"' (Bṛh. 3 9.26 6), 'He who does not know the Veda, does not know Him, the great' (Tait Br. 3.12.9 7 7) and so on, and the following Smṛti passages: '"By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known"' (Gītā 15 15), '"In the Veda, in the Rāmāyaṇa, 1 This explains the compound 'śāstra-yonitvāt'. 2 Kāryyatva. 3 That is, it has been laid down in Sūtra 1.1 2 that the world is an effect. This suggests the inference :—Whatever is an effect has a creator. The world is an effect. ∴ the world has a creator (viz. Brahman). This suggestion is negatived by Sūtra 1.1.3, which explicitly says that the Brahman has Scripture alone for His proof, and never inference. 4 Viz. 'śāstra-yoni' 5 P. 19. Reading 'yatrarkam'. 6 Correct reading : 'pṛcchāmi'. 7 P. 202, vol. 3.

[sū. 1. 1. 3. ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 29 verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end and in the middle' " (Hariv 16232 ¹), 'We bow down to that wherein lies the eternal basis of all speech' and so on. If it be said. On the ground of the inference: 'All objects having parts, like the earth and the rest, have a cause, because they are effects, like pots and the rest', Brahman is established to be the cause of the world, since none else can be such a cause, and this being so, why trouble about the Veda?-(we reply·) no, because, the very fact that the elements like the ether and the rest have an origin being not known by anyone without the Veda, that they are effects is not estab- lished, and hence the reason ² is itself unestablished.³ It cannot be said also that the origin of the elements is to be known through the Veda, and the fact that they are effects being proved through this, the reason ⁴ is not unestablished—, for, in that case too, Brahman, the cause of the world being known through the Veda alone, the inference becomes futile, and you virtually come to our side. Thus, even in the case of well-known effects like a house or a shoot, Brahman cannot be inferred from the reason 'producibleness', it being possible to suppose the earth, the seed, water, men and so on to be their causes, and unreasonable to imagine an unseen cause (viz. Brahman). This should be understood here: wherever something is found to be an effect, there it is possible also to arrive, by means of inference, at an individual soul, corresponding to effect, as the agent. But that the entire universe is an effect is not known without the help of the Veda. Hence, the creator of the world, too, can be known through the Veda alone, and never through a thousand inferences. Further, Brahman cannot be known through the evidence of perception, since the ordinary sense-organs are incapable of grasping Him, as declared ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ P. 1002. ² Viz Kāryyatva or state of being an effect ³ That is, it has been argued .— Whatever is an effect has a cause. The world is an effect. ∴ the world has a cause Now, we cannot know that the world is an effect, unless we have recourse to Scripture, and hence Scripture is needed even here too. ⁴ Viz. Kāryyatva or producibleness.

30 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3.] by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' ' "This knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest!¹ It leads to proper knowledge only being told by another" ' (Kaṭha 2 9). That is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby. 'Told' by 'another', i.e by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On account of reasoning having no ground' (Br Sū. 2 1.11); by the Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover, who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world, who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known through inference. It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) and so on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism: 'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū. 3.2.22). (An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound "Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too, the very same meaning is arrived at.¹ The resulting meaning is that Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text, viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur- veda and the Sāma-veda' (Bṛh. 2.4.10; Maitrī. 6 32). And, on this interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negatived, for what we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural ¹ Cf. Ś B. 1.1.3.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH 4 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 31 and Smṛti passages, viz : 'By means of speech, which is devoid of form and eternal' (Ṛg. V 8.75.6 ¹, Tait Sam. 2 6 11 2 ²), 'Speech, without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial, was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities' (Mahā. 12 8534 ³). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him ⁴ This we shall explain later on.⁵ Hence, it is established that Brahman has the Veda as His sole proof. Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source' (3) Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concord- ance'. (Sūtra 4) SŪTRA 4 "BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta- texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts ⁶ are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of estab- lishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture as His sole proof ? ⁷—the correct conclusion is as follows: ¹ P 162. ² P. 241, vol 1. ³ P. 666, line 22, vol. 3 ⁴ That is, if Brahman were to breathe forth the Vedas, He must have a body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is non-material, since when He breathes forth the Vedas, there is no matter. ⁵ See V.K 1.3 28–30. ⁶ An artha-vāda is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism. ⁷ The sense of the objection is: All Vedas set forth injunctions or prohibitions with regard to action But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set forth the above, there are in the Vedas some texts which are merely indicative,

[sū. 1. 1. 4 32 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.] ‘That’, ie Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) “samanvayāt ” is to be explained thus. “Sama- nvaya” means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on account of that—“samanvayāt” Or else, because there is concord- ance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in brief It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge ¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments, and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,— by way of generating a desire for knowledge ² This is ascertained from the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³ If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not injunctive. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the Vedas cannot be maintained. Hence, the Vedānta-texts too must be taken as not establishing Brahman, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts. ¹ That is, the proper function of karmas is simply to purify the mind, and thereby create a desire for knowledge. Karma, thus, is a means and not an end, the way to truth and not truth itself Hence the Vedānta-texts, dealing as they do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere karmas. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.26. ² I e. knowledge is not an aṅga of karma, on the contrary, karma is an aṅga of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8. ³ Viz Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 33 rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹ the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā ³ and so on, as well as among those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case, the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz. Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the rest, refer to the very same topic (viz Brahman).⁸ Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins). 1 Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1, Chānd 3.14.1–4. 2 Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1 1. 3 Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section), Chānd. 3.1–11. 4 Vide e g Brh. 5 7–9, etc.; Chānd 3 18–21, 7.1–12, etc. 5 The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on Brahman directly as the self, others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on. 6 That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols, are to be understood as directly referring to Brahman, i.e. to be interpreted literally, and not as referring to Brahman indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately before that some texts are direct and primary, some indirect and secondary, and takes all to be equally direct and primary. 7 Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on. 8 That is, the view that all texts are concerned with Brahman directly in no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned with Brahman equally.

34 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been said that Lord Krsna, the substratum of great qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection, viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purport- lessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ¹). Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purport- less, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda as His sole proof? The term "but" disposes of the (above) prima facie view. "That", i e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world, has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concord- ance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained as follows:) "Samanvaya" means 'Concordance in point of entirety of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or Lord Krsna, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation, the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualties like omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning, One only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

¹ P. 36, vol 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 35 Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘There was verily, Nārāyaṇa alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: “I am Brahman”’, ‘From Him arose all this’, ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Ait. 1.1.1), ‘From this self, verily, the ether originated’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘The word which all the Vedas record’ (Kaṭha 2.15), ‘That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of man’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1.2 ²), ‘To whom all the gods bow down’, ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’ (Tait. 2 9), ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Bṛh. 3 9 28), ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘The self that is free from sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst’ (Chānd. 8.7 1.3), ‘Who is omniscient, all-knowing’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), ‘Brahman, verily, is all this’ (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times) and so on. (Prima facie view.) An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collec- tion of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, ‘One, who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma ⁴ sacrifice’ and so on, are injunctive texts. ‘A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ and so on, are prohibitive texts. ‘The wind, verily, is the quickest deity’ (Tait. Saṁ. 2.1.1 ⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. ‘Oblation to you’ (Tait. Saṁ. 1.1.1 ⁶), ‘O, heavens, having the fire as your head’ (Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; ⁷ Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a ⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ. ‘Jyotiṣṭoma’,⁹ ‘Aśva-medha’ ¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: ‘Then, ¹ P. 19. Reading: ‘Yatrārkaḥ’. ² P. 181. ³ Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya. ⁴ Name of a Soma-sacrifice, consisting divisions, Agniṣṭoma and the rest. M.W., p. 427. ⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol 1. ⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1. ⁷ P. 132, line 7. ⁸ P. 163, line 16. ⁹ See footnote 4, above. ¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What- ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows: We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e. has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that 'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not 'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve- dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho- ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion: 'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1. ² P. 3, vol. 1. ³ That is, the inference is as follows:— Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action. A religious duty has the Veda for its proof. ∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and prohibitions. ⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1. ⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.