वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 1. 1. 4 32 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.] ‘That’, ie Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) “samanvayāt ” is to be explained thus. “Sama- nvaya” means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on account of that—“samanvayāt” Or else, because there is concord- ance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in brief It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge ¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments, and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,— by way of generating a desire for knowledge ² This is ascertained from the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³ If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not injunctive. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the Vedas cannot be maintained. Hence, the Vedānta-texts too must be taken as not establishing Brahman, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts. ¹ That is, the proper function of karmas is simply to purify the mind, and thereby create a desire for knowledge. Karma, thus, is a means and not an end, the way to truth and not truth itself Hence the Vedānta-texts, dealing as they do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere karmas. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.26. ² I e. knowledge is not an aṅga of karma, on the contrary, karma is an aṅga of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8. ³ Viz Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 33 rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹ the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā ³ and so on, as well as among those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case, the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz. Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the rest, refer to the very same topic (viz Brahman).⁸ Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins). 1 Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1, Chānd 3.14.1–4. 2 Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1 1. 3 Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section), Chānd. 3.1–11. 4 Vide e g Brh. 5 7–9, etc.; Chānd 3 18–21, 7.1–12, etc. 5 The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on Brahman directly as the self, others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on. 6 That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols, are to be understood as directly referring to Brahman, i.e. to be interpreted literally, and not as referring to Brahman indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately before that some texts are direct and primary, some indirect and secondary, and takes all to be equally direct and primary. 7 Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on. 8 That is, the view that all texts are concerned with Brahman directly in no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned with Brahman equally.

34 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been said that Lord Krsna, the substratum of great qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection, viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purport- lessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ¹). Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purport- less, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda as His sole proof? The term "but" disposes of the (above) prima facie view. "That", i e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world, has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concord- ance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained as follows:) "Samanvaya" means 'Concordance in point of entirety of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or Lord Krsna, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation, the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualties like omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning, One only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

¹ P. 36, vol 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 35 Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘There was verily, Nārāyaṇa alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: “I am Brahman”’, ‘From Him arose all this’, ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Ait. 1.1.1), ‘From this self, verily, the ether originated’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘The word which all the Vedas record’ (Kaṭha 2.15), ‘That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of man’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1.2 ²), ‘To whom all the gods bow down’, ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’ (Tait. 2 9), ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Bṛh. 3 9 28), ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘The self that is free from sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst’ (Chānd. 8.7 1.3), ‘Who is omniscient, all-knowing’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), ‘Brahman, verily, is all this’ (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times) and so on. (Prima facie view.) An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collec- tion of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, ‘One, who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma ⁴ sacrifice’ and so on, are injunctive texts. ‘A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ and so on, are prohibitive texts. ‘The wind, verily, is the quickest deity’ (Tait. Saṁ. 2.1.1 ⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. ‘Oblation to you’ (Tait. Saṁ. 1.1.1 ⁶), ‘O, heavens, having the fire as your head’ (Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; ⁷ Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a ⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ. ‘Jyotiṣṭoma’,⁹ ‘Aśva-medha’ ¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: ‘Then, ¹ P. 19. Reading: ‘Yatrārkaḥ’. ² P. 181. ³ Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya. ⁴ Name of a Soma-sacrifice, consisting divisions, Agniṣṭoma and the rest. M.W., p. 427. ⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol 1. ⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1. ⁷ P. 132, line 7. ⁸ P. 163, line 16. ⁹ See footnote 4, above. ¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What- ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows: We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e. has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that 'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not 'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve- dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho- ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion: 'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1. ² P. 3, vol. 1. ³ That is, the inference is as follows:— Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action. A religious duty has the Veda for its proof. ∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and prohibitions. ⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1. ⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 37 purport’ (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2 7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative ‘through having glorification as their purport’, i.e. by way of glorifying the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,— which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts) admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the ‘that’ (viz. Brahman) and ‘thou’ (viz. the individual soul)² glorify the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act, and the knowledge concerning it (viz. the ‘that’) called the ‘higher knowledge’,³ glorify the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are con- cerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordi- nate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original prima facie view.⁴) (Author’s conclusion.) To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, in- vented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘The Brāhmaṇas desire to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through penance, through fasting’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the statement ‘They desire to know through sacrifice’, there be a direct connection of the instrument, viz. ‘sacrifice’, with the meaning of the root,⁶ as in the sentence ‘He desires to go by the horse’, then the sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge (i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1. ² Cf the famous text ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc) ³ Vide e.g. Mund 1.1 4-5. ⁴ It began on p. 35. ⁵ The correct conclusion begins here ⁶ Viz. ‘vid’=to know.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. 38 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹ there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism 'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26). It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit, teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation. If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya ² sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1 ³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge), so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be referring to works,— (We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just, as here, the world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6 ⁴) is of a greater force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one, and because it is improper to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'. ² See footnote 2, p. 5 ³ P. 1, vol. 1. ⁴ Correct quotation: 'Karma-cita' and not 'karma-jita', which is translated here. Vide Chānd. 8 1.6, p. 415.

[Sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39 texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha 6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text: ‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non- permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:— ‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go, O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’ (Gītā 8.16). If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1) and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with Brahman?— (We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone. Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman, directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified, by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord; ¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent. ² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness. The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too, refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern- ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,² by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text: 'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh 4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance (with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage: 'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br 2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being concerned with His divine body. Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷ ¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds are obligatory. ² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest. ³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1. ⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26. ⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd. 1 6.6, p. 43. ⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41 Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person, omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers, the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage : ‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15). The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of these. Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4). Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra. Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’. (Sūtras 5–12) SŪTRA 5 “BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”, i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes, powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ- khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1) and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the aphorisms is now refuting this view. Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no “word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason. If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con- tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent. He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’ (Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter- mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There- fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the Veda. It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro- priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of ¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the pradhāna.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 43 ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),— it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with another, (and not by itself), because such a view is utterly negligible; and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term 'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural, inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on. COMPARISON Śaṃkara Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is mithyā through and through.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non- sentient constitutes the body of the Lord ³ Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴ 1 That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the sattva-guṇa, then prior to creation, all the guṇas being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge can arise in pradhāna. 2 Ś.B 1.1.5, p. 203. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1. 4 G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 6. 44 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] SŪTRA 6 "IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀN- DOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary". Why? "On account of the term 'self'." Vedānta-kaustubha Anticipating the objection, viz.— As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is about to fall',¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: 'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages. 'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here. If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is "secondary", (we reply.) "No." Why? "On account of the term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self' which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self' (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4, 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6 15.3; 6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6 2.1), 'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non- sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the ¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger' (āśaṅkā), in accordance with K.V S 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

[sū. 1. 1. 7. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 45 Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction, it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord, to refer to pradhāna Hence, to say that the perception is even meta- phorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical ¹—this is the sum and substance. COMPARISON Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'If it be said (that the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman, connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term "self"'. That is, the term 'self' has been used in Scripture in connection with the creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.² SŪTRA 7 "(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM 'SELF',) BECAUSE SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brah- man's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the meaning of the terms 'existent', 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest,— so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz in that case, let the term 'self' stand equally for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term 'light' ³ which ¹ That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: 'That Divinity thought:— "Come, let me enter these three divinities" (i.e, fire, water and food)' and so on. (Chānd. 6.3 2 ) ² G B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.). ³ Jyotis.

46 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 7. ADH. 5.] denotes equally a sacrifice ¹ and fire; hence, no inconsistency is in- volved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here: The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term 'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on Him" i. e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called 'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e with regard to one who is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and who is the creator of fire, water and food ² Thus, after having taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the effect as consisting of the Cause (viz Brahman) in essence, in the text: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7, 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6 11.3; 6 12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3, 6 16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)' (Chānd. 6 14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person, who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded, being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain' should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with Vedic use. If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self' is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'. Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul, His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum. ¹ Viz. Jyotiṣṭoma. ² This explains the compound: 'tan-niṣṭhasya'

[sū. 1. 1. 8. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 47 Although the individual soul is different from Brahman, in nature, it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference. Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation, one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature (from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him; because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3 1 3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached, while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence, Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest COMPARISON Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of the world is not the Saguna Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman ¹), for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguna Brahman)'.² SŪTRA 8 “AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS 'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO (SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching ³ ought to have been pointed out 1 For the explanation of the terms Saguna and Nirguna, see G.B. 2 G B 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1. 3 That is, if pradhāna be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of pradhāna, since Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 8. 48 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like. Vedānta-kaustubha If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well- wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3, 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating the purpose of such a teaching. COMPARISON Śamkara Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a teaching', Śamkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹ Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second reason.³ Bhāskara Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara inter- prets this sūtra exactly after Śamkara, taking the term "ca" to mean 'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴ 1 Vide Chānd. 6.1. 2 Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1. 4 Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

[sū. 1. 1. 9. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 49 Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)' That is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguna objects, or objects connected with the gunas of prakrti, viz. all worldly objects. Hence, if the Saguna Brahman were the creator of the world, then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be rejected.¹ SŪTRA 9 "(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposi- tion" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the know- ledge of all ²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right. Vedānta-kaustubha Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural text "'Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?'" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir ?"" (Chānd. 6.1 2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although, through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established, since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna). ¹ G B. 1.1 8, pp 50-51, Chap. 1. ² Vide Chānd 6 1. 4

50 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 10 ADH. 5.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous sūtra. Baladeva This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well. SŪTRA 10 "(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF (DURING DEEP SLEEP)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term 'existent', viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep. When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent' (Chānd. 6.8 1¹), can be understood as a non-sentient cause,² it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha On account of the (soul's) "entrance", i.e. dissolution, into "itself",³ i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text: ‘"The existent alone, my dear!"’ (Chānd. 6 2 1), Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, and not pradhāna. If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz. ¹ Ś.R. Bh. Śk. ² A slightly different reading is given in the C S S ed.—which, when translated, is as follows:—As the 'entering', which relates to a sentient being and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by the term 'existent'—viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, . . .' is possible in the case of Brahman alone, etc. (P. 3.) ³ This explains the word 'svāpyayāt'.

[sū. 1. 1. 11. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 51 ‘ ‘ “ When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence they say of him “ He sleeps ”, for he has entered into his own ” ’ (Chānd 6 8 1) There is also another scriptural text, viz. ‘ Just as a man, when embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing external or internal ’ (Bṛh. 4.3.21). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. ‘ Svāpyāt ’. Interpretation too different, viz. ‘ (The creator of the world is not the Saguṇa Brahman), because the Creator merges into himself, (not so the Saguṇa Brahman, who merges into something other than himself) ’ ¹ SŪTRA 11 “ (BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term ‘existent’, viz. on account of the universality of ‘ knowing ’, i.e. apprehending. One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads, the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object be understood by the term ‘existent’, the multitude of texts, speaking of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted. ¹ G.B. 1 1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.