पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)
Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary
टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा
पृष्ठ 110, कुल 197 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ेंPANIPAT 73 free, now recovered Kunjpura with Atai Khan's help and made it impossible for the caravans to move on that side Added to this, fire started, either pur- posely or by random cannon shot, and destroyed the big haystacks heaped in the Maratha camp 39 This misfortune turned the situation from bad to worse and finally into utter helplessness As a result of this mishap, twenty thousand followers issued from the Maratha camp one night to gather firewood and fodder in the neighbouring woods, but they were overtaken, surrounded and massacred piece-meal by a body of five thousand horse under Shah Pasand Khan who was patrolling that area After this slaughter, terror struck the Maratha camp and nobody seems to have ventured out In the terrible cold of December and January, the Marathas, with their scanty clothing meant only for the cold in the Deccan, suffered terribly in addition to the want of sufficient quantities of good food and firewood As if this was not enough, it rained heavily that winter, generating biting winds in their wake 40 Thousands of bullocks, horses, mules and even men died of this calamity The unburied animals and corpses on the intervening battle field putrified the air 41 The crowded camp where within a small area men had to perform all their physical duties made it terribly dirty and full of noxious air Nana Fadnis vividly describes these conditions in his auto- biography Such was the condition of the Maratha camp and the state of the men and animals who were to offer battle to the strong, stalwart, efficient and un- perturbed Afghans who were well supplied with necessities and fully inured to these climes and circumstances As we have said above, we are completely in the dark as to Bhau's aim in not sallying out for battle three weeks earlier when he received the news of Govindpant's death Such a step would have appreciably reduced the suf ferings which the Maratha camp had to endure in the last period The men and animals would have been found in better condition for a march or a fight, before their reduction by starvation and misery for three weeks more Even their morale would have been found better and still Bhau would not take such a step A casual remark in the Bakhar (p 136) also supports the view that "had the Marathas started the next day after the heavy massacre of the Ruhelas in the intervening daily fights, the Afghans had no strength then to overpower the Marathas" "But," so remarks the chronicler, "the fate had ordained otherwise and so the Marathas remained inactive, carrying on the waiting game!" We do not know whether this was a case of fortune first taking away the wit and then striking hard afterwards Our wonder increases still more when we find the chronicles reporting the discussion in the Maratha camp previous to the battle While Bhau, judging that the army could not pull on even for a day more, wanted to offer battle the next day, Malharrao and Janakoji were proposing to postpone the 39 RAJ 6 406 40 Sardesai Commemoration Volume p 259 41 BDCRI 4 181