पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

88 PANIPAT 1761 enemy would not allow them passage in their march, the cavalry was to charge and press forward, beating the enemy back so as to break their order As at the very beginning this breach of order occurred, it had a disastrous moral ef- fect on the frontal troops The first cause of the break in the ordered march was due to the heaviness of the Maratha guns which, on account of their long range, fired their shots in a faulty manner so as to fall at the back of the enemy Thus their ammunition was wasted without gaining the desired ef- fect of breaking the enemy line of battle and creating a gap in it for the troops to advance Ibrahim Khan had then to cease fire and order his infantry to march with bayonets in their hands to break the enemy line and make a breach The Telinga infantry under Ibrahim Khan was formed of well trained corps with experience of such battles Their resolute advance made the Ruhelas fall back, leaving few soldiers with the chiefs as stated above But in this ef- fort Ibrahim Khan lost half his troops in killed or wounded, and then the preponderating number of Ruhelas began to tell The Ruhelas were in the proportion of three to one of Ibrahim Khan's musketeers Their match locks fired heavier bullets and were even more effective on account of their steady aim due to their long barrels Their range also exceeded that of the com- paratively light muskets of French make used in Ibrahim Khan's infantry If, at this psychological moment of apparent stale mate, the Maratha cavalry had advanced again, galloping to support him, there would have been no further slaughter amongst them, and the battle would have been carried on in the intended order But, as said above, the cavalry ordered for his support had foolishly advanced first, and then coming back stationed themselves behind the chained heavy guns, with their strength exhausted and spirits broken Damaji Gaikawad who was to the left of the Maratha thrust—thus adjoining Barkhurdar Khan's out flanking cavalry—behaved better than Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar He supported the two corps left by Ibrahim Khan to meet the enemy on that side As there was no infantry facing them, they repulsed the Ghilzais on that side as often as they advanced with their scathing fire But Damaji was himself wounded in the action and he also returned to stand in the company of Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar Until now we have said nothing about the Maratha centre under Bhau He was standing to the right of the (middle) centre of the Maratha march Behind him to the left were standing the non combatants and camp followers The attack on Bhau's side seems to have been begun not by Bhau himself but by the Durrani Wazir who advanced farther than the main line, firing his camel swivels manned by Persian bombardiers ³ The Maratha light artillery placed on the right of their march and facing the Durrani line obliquely was gradually receding back from the Durrani line Its fire would not reach the Durrani line at all, except at the front under Ibrahim Khan At nine o'clock the dis- ance between Bhau's right hand side and the Durrani Wazir's front was a mile or so According to the Maratha plan, Bhau would not swerve to his right unless it was attacked by the enemy The Wazir on whom naturally the main responsibility fell and who was stationed at the centre, advanced him ³ MUNDY p. 215 (note)