पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE BATTLE 91 nihilation of their five Gardi troops, nor could they succeed in reinforcing Ibrahim Khan in his time of need and distress The right centre under Bhau also could not, or rather would not, reap a tactical advantage, being encumbered with the women folk. There was a distance of about a mile between Ibrahim Khan's vanguard troops at the left of the Maratha line and the centre under Bhau It is not clear from the scanty descriptions of the actual battle whether a line of communication was maintained from the one end of the line to the other, whether Bhau knew the condition of Ibrahim Khan's corps or the behaviour of Vitthal Shivdeo and others Had he with his remaining victorious troops galloped at full speed for one mile to the left and stood behind Ibrahim Khan's hard pressed mus keteers confronting the broken Ruhelas, it is certain that he would have suc ceeded in creating a breach there, and run behind the Ruhela camp Had he cared to save his life together with that of Vishwasrao and his nearest women folk, he would have possibly taken such a line of action, and escaped along the river Jamuna past the Abdali camp But that would have meant a breach of promise he had entered into with Ibrahim Khan The previous night he had told on oath to Ibrahim Khan that he would under no circumstances flee away from the battle field forsaking the Gardi infantry under Ibrahim Khan, but would rather stand as if entrenched behind him and take the risk of being cut to pieces rather than leave the field Secondly, it would have meant a break of the marching square formation, leaving the non combatants, camp followers and the bazar people to the tender mercy of the Afghan troops Looking to the result, however, it seems as if that would have been a better alternative, because, after all, the camp was left to be looted and slaughtered by the Afghans at the end of the day By it the Maratha defeat would have been felt less, as it would have resulted in the survival of politi cally and militarily the most important people in the army The behaviour of the Maratha rear guard under the Shinde and Holkar contingents is not known When, actually, Malharrao Holkar and the cap tains in the Shinde cavalry left the field is not recorded But we take it that they never came in contact with the enemy throughout the main period of the battle from 9 A M to 3 P M Exception must, however be made for the • personal troops under Janakoji, Tukoji and Mahadji Shinde They kept their eye on the movements of the centre under Bhau and after Vishwasrao's accidental death ran to his rescue It was an unfortunate necessity of the plan that these veteran troops practically did nothing in this final battle They merely neutralised the opposite camps under Shah Pasand Khan, and Shuja But many of them escaped the last slaughter by taking to their heels just in time to get their way westwards The main difference in the position of the two armies was created by the necessity of the Marathas They had, if they wished to move from Pani pat, to come out in a body all together, leaving no base with reserves behind Ahmad Shah's position was the reverse He stood on his ground well en- trenched He was not out to carry his bag and baggage with womenfolk past