पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE BATTLE 95 emergency. In one sense they were in a position to act better than others, having a first-hand experience of the Abdali tactics. This time they were acting accordingly, never breaking their line and never acting impetuously as in a Maratha charge. It means they obeyed the orders of the Commander- in-Chief and would not offer battle themselves unless attacked. Najib could gain only one and a half kos, i.e., not more than two miles in four hours by this method, according to Kashiraj's measure. By one o'clock, he came within the firing distance of the Shinde contingent and began his attack on it. This had the effect, it seems, of pushing the front ranks of the Shinde line to its left towards the centre and separating them from their rear. The news of Vish- wasrao's fall by this time had created terror in the Shinde contingent also. Janakoji and Tukoji, as the most intimate and loyal servants of the Peshwa, pushed themselves to Bhau's side to see what had happened and rally the cen- tre. Sabaji and Mahadji turned back towards Holkar's contingent and thus created a gap in the line through which Najib's Ruhelas pressed forward. Shah Pasand Khan, who was to the left hand side of Najib and had been ordered to support the flank attack of the Ruhelas on that side, followed close at the heels of Najib so as not to allow the Marathas to run that way. It is not known when the Holkar and Shinde contingents, which fled away from the field of battle, actually left the field. Certainly it was not before the news of Vishwasrao's fall became known, i.e., 2 P.M. But after that they seem to have soon taken to their heels,⁹ and never once came into direct contact with the Afghans or the Ruhelas. We have no faith in the widely expressed belief that Malharrao had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape unscathed. He had, perhaps, selected his own position in the rear, or Bhau had wisely and knowingly placed him there. Fortunately for him, the opposite side under Shah Pasand Khan would not leave their original position at the front astride the Mughal Grand Trunk Road near the village of Siwa. Had Shah Pasand Khan left his place he would have allowed a clear passage to the Maratha troops at the rear along the easiest road. Shah Pasand Khan could not break the battle array, and Malharrao would not swerve to the right and break the marching square. But after 1 P.M., when Ahmad Shah ordered simultaneous flank attack on Bhau's centre to aid the frontal attack of the Wazir, Shah Pasand Khan naturally swerved obliquely to the right. As Najib had also by this time advanced systematically on the flank of Shinde, there was no problem for Shah Pasand Khan to break the fighting line and create a gap for the Marathas to escape, though its natural result was to free the Maratha right rear from the watch of Shah Pasand Khan's flank advance. Malharrao's whole life philosophy was based not on honour and prestige but on profit and escape. The Marathi adage which says that 'if the head remains whole, one can have eighty five turbans to wear," seems to have been old Malharrao's guiding principle which he naturally followed at this juncture. Half the Shinde contingent under Sabaji Shinde, Khanaji Jadhav and Janrao Wable, which had separated itself from Janakoji and Tukoji, also joined Holkar in his flight. Unless they had a clear start of two hours, it is difficult to believe that they could have escaped unhurt to the extent they did. Malharrao was ⁹RAJ. 6.409