पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

110 PANIPAT 1761 yond the Ganges The original plan of Bhau when proceeding towards Kunj pura in October was frustrated by Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna at his back This fact changed the strategy in such a manner that Bhau had to fall back on Govindpant s support because he found it impossible to return to Delhi in the face of Abdali Herein Bhau was completely non plussed Abdalis daring could have been met only by a counter daring on the part of the Marathas Bhau's original plan was to proceed farther north from Kunj pura and replenish his army He expected Abdali to follow him towards the north in a parallel line across the Jamuna through the Doab, as his calcula tion for the subsidence of the Jamuna waters made him believe When he heard on his way to Kurukshetra that Abdali had begun crossing above Bagh pat, he should have proceeded farther north and crossed over into the Doab by the Budhia Ghat as first intended Instead, he returned by the same path and found to his dismay that it was impossible to pass by Abdali towards Delhi or to defeat him by direct attack in an open pitched battle Because he re- ceived this first check, he had to fall back on Panipat and dig trenches there so as to follow a different mode of warfare to suit Ibrahim Khan's Gardi troops Looking historically, it seems that in this Bhau took a wrong decision. Once taken, the only strategy which remained open was to make Abdali at tack him in his strong, almost impregnable, entrenched position, but who was to make Abdali attack? No single valiant captain could have succeeded in the move So Bhau expected hunger to do the work If somebody in the rear could cut off Abdali's supplies he would have to move and either attack the Mara thas as Bhau wanted him to do or return to Afghanistan without offering a battle Placed in such straits, Bhau was found urging Govindpant to do the needful Govindpant came into the rear as ordered and tried his luck He lost his life in the attempt, proving that the work was beyond his strength and that Abdali was a far more consummate general than Bhau imagined him to be. This discussion should prove that Govindpant cannot be charged with not obey ing orders and doing his best We believe that any other captain would have met the same fate and could not have succeeded in cutting off the supplies, as the Ruhelas in that region were well organised and vigilant The charge of not sending the sums called for stands on a different level There is no evidence available on the point of Govindpant's ability to pay As a Kamavisdar of thirty years' standing, the public as well as the Peshwa probably took him to be a rich man Whether he had funds at his disposal when Bhau called for them is a moot point We suspect that the ideas about his riches were ill founded Like all other mamlatdars of the time, he was also very cautious in money matters and would not easily part with money But there is no external evidence, as in the case of Naro Shankar, for Govind pant's having spent money lavishly on any work or in any matter There are no temples or ghats or forts built by him, which would prove his ever having been an opulent man On the other hand, complaints about non realisation of Government dues in his rented Mahals is a theme found repeated through out the period under discussion We do not suggest that Govindpant was above board in all his money dealings But the Peshwas estimates about his vast riches seem to be ill founded Nor do we think him to be an efficient mam