पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE JUDGMENT 117 gap in the weak infantry under the trans Ganges Ruhelas. Their duty was silently to wait for some two hours, though keeping themselves ready on horse- back for any eventuality. Had this order been properly carried out, Bhau and the magnificent Hujrat cavalry which was behind them would have had no occasion to offer a front battle to the Durrani Wazir. They would themselves have followed the rushing cavalry of these three sardars into the gap created by the Gardi fire. Bhau's generalship failed not because his strategy was in- correct, but the tactics were not properly understood by his captains and they seem to have acted as if it was only a cavalry battle. Bhau had till then fol- lowed "the school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the manœuvre has failed, the seizure of the strategic position is the first defence of the armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically superior."² Now when all these alternatives had been tried and failed, Bhau was following Fredric in his new doctrine "to act on the principle that noth- ing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and the destruction of the enemy, not the weakning of the enemy, is the right object of war,' knowing that 'even a successful defence weakens the victor." Unfortunately for Bhau he was possibly the only person in the Maratha camp who had understood this principle and the overwhelming majority of his lieutenants were trained in different tactics. They thought Bhau almost a madman to follow this method, their heart was not in it and they deviated from the order of the bat- tle at the first shock and followed their own mind in the later half of the day. Those who were loyal and devoted died with the Commander in Chief, while the rest fled back from the field as soon as it was possible for them to quit the field unnoticed by Bhau. NOT INDIVIDUALS BUT THE SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PANIPAT DISASTER Pānipat was a national disaster. A national disaster exhibits all the weak points together with some of the good points of a nation. A national war fought for the prestige of a nation is like an examination for a student. Though the examination lasts for less than a week it is supposed to show the preparation of a year. The physical, the intellectual and the moral capacities all have their play in an examination. Weakness on any of these sides is likely to prove fatal. There are good students who fail in the nick of time or are too weak to complete a paper. There are clever students whose intellect often fails them at the proper time. There are nervous students who have shown their capacity throughout the year but still are found leaving the examination hall all of a sudden. War is a similar test for a state. All the weak points ex- hibited in the Panipat campaign had not cropped up all of a sudden, but were inherent in the Maratha system under the best of the Peshwas. These inherent defects have been very convincingly pointed out by a deep student of Maratha history, Vasudev Vamanshastri KHARE in his invaluable introduction to the 2 Ibid, p. 293.