पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Marathas—Gopalrao Barves raid on Oudh—Delay to the end of December—Veni bahadur guards Oudh in Shuja's absence, 76, Barve's lightning campaign of a fortnight—He takes Bhojapur, Dalmau and Nawabganj—Veni bahadur descends upon him with a big force— The Zamindars allied with the Marathas run away—The Maratha army dispersed—Barve returns to Korah, 77, Panipat locality not favourable to the Marathas—Maratha manners give scope to mischievous elements, 78, Bhau created a tremendous impression and is still remembered in this locality—Legends about Bhau in the surrounding area—Bhau fort near the village of Isapur, 79, No correct information about it available—The imperial canal flowing to the west of Panipat, 80, The canal water stopped at the head led to the scarcity of water—The existence of the canal need not be doubted 81, The numbers and the Sardars in the Maratha army—Abdalis forces at the beginning of July 1760—Latter additions and subtractions, 82, The final figures engaged in the last battle—Sir Jadunath's estimate tallys with ours—The number of camp followers capable of building the armis in the Afghan camp 83, The number of camp followers—The composition of the Maratha camp, pilgrims and candidates, priests and tradesmen—Women in the Maratha camp— Exaggerated accounts, 84, The chronicles of the 18th century, both Persian and Marathi have no sense of direction and no visualization of the shape of land due to want of maps— • Sir Jadunath misses this point and so is led astray—He has no sense of correct time also from which his description of the battle suffers—He does not understand the lunar calendar and so miscalculates the period of moon light, 85 CHAPTER VI THE BATTLE (14th January 1761) 86-105 ' The Maratha army marches out early in the morning—Their arrangement—The dis tribution of the various captains—The hollow square formation—The arrangement of the Afghan army, 86, The battle begins—Ibrahim khan Gardi leads the vanguard and at tacks the Ruhelas—The Maratha cavalry appointed to support Ibrahim Khan—Acts rashly and out marches of Gardi infantry—Meets with sharp fire and runs back broken in spirit —The aim of the march was to reach the Jamuna and not to offer battle, 87, The orders not understood or followed by the Maratha captains—The Maratha ammunition wasted, the whole responsibility at the front falls on Ibrahim Khan's musketeers—The superiority of the Ruhela fire—The Maratha cavalry fails to take the advantage of the gap created by