भारतकोश
द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

The Indian Struggle 1920-1934 by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose

नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished339 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 128, कुल 339 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 128

130 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the height of his glory and was expected to achieve great things for his country. While in memoriam meetings and processions were going on in the country, the British Cabinet in London made up their mind as to what they should do. Their arch-enemy was dead; therefore, things would settle down now for a while. They would accordingly not decide anything in a hurry but would watch developments. But it had already been announced that Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India on July 7th, 1925. Therefore, the announcement carefully prepared on behalf of the Cabinet had to be entirely suppressed and in its place Lord Birkenhead, on the previously announced date, made an uninteresting speech. Besides talking about plati- tudes, he merely endorsed Lord Reading's panacea for India's ills in the form of development of industry and the stabilisa- tion of finance. The death of the Deshbandhu on June 16th, 1925, was for India a national calamity of the first magnitude. Though his active political career consisted of barely five years, his rise had been phenomenal. With the reckless abandon of a Vaishnava devotee, he had plunged into the political move- ment with heart and soul and he had given not only himself but his all in the fight for Swaraj. When he died, whatever worldly possessions he still had, were left to the nation. By the Government he was both feared and admired. They feared his strength, but admired his character. They knew that he was a man of his word. They also knew, that though he was a hard fighter, he was none the less a clean fighter and further, he was also the man with whom they could bargain for a settlement. He was clear-headed, his political instinct was sound and unerring and unlike the Mahatma he was fully conscious of the rôle he was to play in Indian politics. He knew more than anyone else, that situations favourable for wresting political power from the enemy do not come often and when they do come, they do not last long. While the crisis lasts, a bargain has to be struck. He knew also that to sponsor a settlement, when public enthusiasm is at its height, needs much courage and may involve a certain amount of unpopularity. But he was nothing if not fearless. He was