द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER XI THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER (1931) TOWARDS the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931, the atmosphere was once again favourable for an understanding between the Government and the Congress. In the first place, the Labour Party was in power and Capt. Wedgwood- Benn was at the India Office. Secondly, Mahatma Gandhi by his very absence had exerted a great influence on the Round Table Conference. Talking and discussing with non-descripts and self-appointed leaders while the only representative party in India was engaged in a bitter struggle with their Government, the British politicians had felt the unreality of the first Round Table Conference. Hence the determination of the Labour politicians to come to a com- promise with the Congress, if only the latter would not ask for too much. Thirdly, Lord Irwin was the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and he was far-sighted enough to realise that if an understanding was to be arrived at between the Government and the Congress, it was desirable to do so while the Mahatma was the leader of the latter body, for according to sane Britishers, ‘Gandhi was the best policeman the Britisher had in India.’¹ The third factor was undoubtedly the most important. If there had been an intransigent Viceroy at the helm of affairs in India, no understanding with the Congress would have been possible, however sympathetic might have been the attitude of Whitehall at the time. But why was Lord Irwin so agreeable to an understanding with the Congress? No doubt his vision was broader than that of the average British politician and he had an innate sense of fairness and justice, so characteristically lacking in the latter. The late Moulana Mohammed Ali had once described him as ‘that tall thin Christian.’ A true Christian ¹ This was the opinion expressed by Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Ex-M.P., after her visit to India in 1932 as a member of the India League Deputation. 225 P