भारतकोश
द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

The Indian Struggle 1920-1934 by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose

नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished339 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 81, कुल 339 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 81

THE STORM BREAKS 83 That year was drawing to a close: Barely a fortnight was left and within this short period something had to be achieved in order to save the face of the Congress and fulfil the Mahatma’s promise regarding Swaraj. The offer of the Viceroy had come to him as a godsend. If a settlement was made before December 31st and all the political prisoners were released, it would appear to the popular imagination as a great triumph for the Congress. The Round Table Con- ference might, or might not be a success, but if it failed and the Government refused to concede the popular demands— the Congress could resume the fight at any time and when it did so, it would command greater prestige and public confidence. The above logic was irrefutable and I felt convinced. Under the joint signatures of Deshbandhu Das and Moulana A. K. Azad, a telegram was sent to Mahatma Gandhi recom- mending for acceptance, the proposed terms of settlement. A reply came to the effect that he insisted on the release of the Ali brothers and their associates as a part of the terms of settlement and also on an announcement regarding the date and composition of the Round Table Conference. Unfor- tunately, the Viceroy was not in a mood for any further parleying and wanted an immediate decision. All that the Deshbandhu could do in the circumstances was to send for his friends who were then outside prison and urge upon them that they should use all possible means to get the Mahatma to agree. These friends did so and many telegrams passed between Calcutta and Sabarmati, the usual residence of the Mahatma near Ahmedabad. Ultimately the Mahatma did come round, but by then it was too late. The Government of India, tired of waiting, had changed their mind. The Desh- bandhu was beside himself with anger and disgust. ‘The chance of a lifetime, he said, had been lost. The feeling among the political prisoners, as also among the Congress rank and file, was that the Mahatma had com- mitted a serious blunder. Only a minority, who had blind faith in him, refused to pass any judgment. However, since the opportunity had been lost, there was no option but to make the best of a bad situation. The Deshbandhu had been