द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

312 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE over their internal affairs and will have a further hand in working the Federal machinery. There will be no provision in the new Constitution for a democratic or popular or con- stitutional government in the Indian States. Moreover, the Indian States will enjoy special concessions or exemptions in the matter of Federal taxation and in the Federal Legislature they will have representation far in excess of their population. In spite of these baits thrown out by the British Government, many of the Indian rulers are fighting shy of the constitutional innovation. According to the White Paper, the offices of the Viceroy and the Governor-General will be separated, though the two offices will be held by the same person. The Governor- General will be the executive head of the Federation and will have the supreme command of the military, naval and air forces of India as well, while the Viceroy will be the represen- tative of the British Crown and will exercise the powers of the Crown in relation to the Indian States and all other matters outside the scope of the Federal Constitution. The Governor- General will himself direct and control the administration of certain Reserved Departments—namely, Defence, External Affairs and Ecclesiastical Affairs. In this administration he will be assisted by not more than three Counsellors, who will be appointed by himself and will be ex-officio members of both the Legislatures, without the right to vote. For the purpose of aiding and advising the Governor-General in the exercise of other powers, there will be a Council of Ministers. The Ministers will be appointed by the Governor-General, will hold office during his pleasure and must be members of one or other Chamber of the Federal Legislature. The Counsellors will be responsible to the Governor-General alone—but the Ministers will be responsible to the Legis- lature, subject to such control as the Governor-General will exercise over their departments. In regard to administration, the Governor-General will make, in his discretion, any rules which he regards as requisite to regulate the disposal of Government business and the procedure to be observed in its conduct. He will also be empowered in his discretion to appoint a Financial Adviser to assist him in his special

THE WHITE PAPER 313 responsibility for financial matters. The salary of the Financial Adviser will be fixed by the Governor-General and will not be subject to the vote of the Legislature, nor will he be responsible to the Legislature. Apart from his exclusive responsibility for the reserved departments, the Governor-General will be declared to have a 'special responsibility' in respect of the following matters: (a) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of India or any part thereof. (b) The safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Federation. (c) The safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities. (d) The securing to the members of the public services of any rights provided for them by the Constitution Act and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests. (e) The prevention to commercial discrimination. (f) The protection of the rights of any Indian State. (g) Any matter which affects the administration of any department under the direction and control of the Governor-General. It will be for the Governor-General to determine in his discretion whether any of the 'special responsibilities' here described are involved by any given circumstances. In the Instrument of Instructions which will be issued to the Governor-General by the King-Emperor, it will be provided that in the administration of the departments under the direction and control of the Governor-General on his own responsibility and of matters committed to his discretion —he will be under the control of the Secretary of State for India. Though in other matters the Governor-General should ordinarily be guided by the advice of his Ministers, he may not accept their advice if it is considered by him as inconsistent with the fulfilment of a special responsibility entrusted to him by law and in such a case the Governor- General may take such action as he will judge requisite, subject to the directions of the Secretary of State for India. It will

314 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE be clear that in such matters the responsibility of the Ministers to the Legislature is non-existent. The Governor-General will have the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for a period of six months and renew them for a second period if at any time he is satisfied that it is necessary for the requirements of the reserved departments or any of his 'special responsibilities.' He will also have the power of making and promulgating Ordinances for the good Government of British India or any part thereof, if at a time, when the Federal Legislature is not in session, his Ministers are satisfied that an emergency exists. Both kinds of Ordinances while in operation will have the force and effect of Acts of the Legislature. Further, in the event of a breakdown of the Constitution, the Governor-General will be empowered at his discretion, by Proclamation, to assume to himself all such powers vested by law in any federal authority as appear to him to be necessary for the purpose of securing that the Government of the Federation shall be carried on effectively. The Federal Legislature will consist of two Chambers to be styled the Council of State (Upper House) and the House of Assembly (Lower House). Each Council of State will continue for seven years and each House of Assembly for five years, unless sooner dissolved. The Council of State will consist of no more than 260 members, of whom 150 will be elected from British India, not more than 100 will be appointed by the Rulers of the Indian States and not more than ten will be nominated by the Governor-General in his discretion. Out of 150 British Indian seats, 136 will be filled by election by means of the single transferable vote by the members of the Provincial Legislatures, the bigger provinces being entitled to 18 seats and the smaller to 5 seats each. Out of the remain- ing 14, Europeans, Indian Christians and Anglo Indians will be entitled to 7, 2 and 1 seats respectively—while Coorg, Ajmer, Delhi and Beluchistan will be entitled to one seat each. One-third of the British-Indian seats in the Council of State will be reserved for the Moslem community, though their population is approximately only one-fourth of the entire population of British India. The House of Assembly will

THE WHITE PAPER 315 consist of not more than 375 members of whom 250 will be elected from British India and not more than 125¹ will be appointed by the Rulers of Indian States. The number earmarked for British India will be allocated to the several communities and interests as follows: Depressed Classes (Hindus), 19; Sikh, 6; Moslem, 82; Indian Christian, 8; Anglo-Indian, 4: European, 8; Women, 9; Commerce and Industry, 11 (of whom approximately 6 will be Europeans²); Landholders, 7; Labour, 10; General (Hindus and others), 105. The Depressed Classes seats will be filled up in the manner prescribed in the Poona Pact adopted after the fast of Mahatma Gandhi in September 1932. Bills will be introduced in either Chamber, but Money Bills and Votes of Supply will be initiated only in the Assembly. No Bill will become law until it has been agreed to by both Chambers and has been assented to by the Governor-General, or in the case of a Reserved Bill until His Majesty in Council has signified his assent. Any Act assented to by the Governor-General will within twelve months be subject to disallowance by His Majesty in Council. The Governor-General will, however, have the power to enact at his discretion as a Governor-General's Act any Bill which is not passed by the Chambers within a specified date in spite of a message from the Governor-General that that Bill should become law by that date. A Governor-General's Act will have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature. The Governor-General will be further empowered in his discretion, in any case in which he considers that a Bill introduced or proposed for introduction or any clause thereof or any amendment to a Bill moved or proposed, would affect the discharge of his responsibility, to direct that the said Bill, Clause or Amendment shall not be further pro- ceeded with. It will thus be seen that the Governor-General has been vested with extraordinarily wide powers in the matter of modifying any legislation under consideration, ¹ With a population less than one-fourth of India, the Indian States will have 33⅓ per cent. of the seats in the assembly and more than 38 per cent. of the seats in the Council of State. ² The European population in India is 168,134 out of a population of about 352 millions. Nevertheless, they are to have 14 seats in the Assembly and 7 seats in the Council of State.

316 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE withholding legislation completely and enacting fresh legis- lation. Such powers he does not possess even to-day. The White Paper further says: 'Apart from the Reserved Departments and the 'special responsibilities' of the Governor- General outside the sphere of those departments, there is a third category of matters in which the Governor-General will not be under any constitutional obligation to seek or having sought, to be guided by ministerial advice. For this purpose certain specified powers will be conferred by the Constitution on the Governor-General and will be expressed as being exercisable 'at his discretion.' In this category of 'dis- cretionary powers' . . . His Majesty's Government anticipate that the following matters will be included: (a) The power to dissolve, prorogue and summon the Legislature. (b) The power to assent to, or withhold assent from Bills or to reserve them for signification of His Majesty's pleasure. (c) The grant of previous sanction to the introduction of certain classes of Legislative measures. (d) The power to summon forthwith a joint session of the Legislature in cases of emergency where postponement till the expiration of the period to be prescribed by the Constitution Act might have serious consequences. With regard to Legislative procedure the Governor- General will be empowered to make rules: (a) Regulating the procedure of and the conduct of business in the Chamber in relation to matters arising out of, or affecting, the Administration of the Reserved Departments or any other special responsibilities with which he is charged. (b) Prohibiting, save with the prior consent of the Governor-General given at his discretion, the dis- cussion of or the asking of questions on:

1. Matters connected with any Indian State other than matters accepted by the Ruler of the State in his Instrument of Accession as being Federal subjects, or
2. Any action of the Governor-General taken in his discretion in his relationship with a Governor.

THE WHITE PAPER : 317 3. Any matter affecting relations between His Majesty or the Governor-General and any foreign Prince or State. In the event of conflict between a rule so made by the Governor-General and any rule made by the Chamber, the former will prevail and the latter will, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. From the above it will be clear that in order to nullify the effect of ‘responsibility of the executive to the Legislature’ —not only have numerous reservations been made in the matter of responsibility, but the powers of the Legislature have been severely curtailed. The net result is that the Federal Legislature will be more helpless than the Indian Legislature of to-day and the Governor-General of the future will be more powerful than the Governor-General of to-day. The Governor-General will cause a statement of the estimated revenue and expenditure of the Federation, together with a statement of all proposals for the appropriation of those revenues, to be laid, in respect of every financial year, before both Chambers of the Legislature. Proposals for appropriation of revenues will not be submitted to the vote of either Chamber of the Legislature if they relate to heads of expenditure like—Interests, Sinking Fund Charges, Expenditure fixed by the Constitution Act, etc., salary and allowances of the Governor-General, of Ministers, of Coun- sellors, of the Financial Adviser, etc., expenditure required for the Reserved Departments, etc., salaries and pensions of the Judges of the Federal or Supreme Court, etc., salaries and pensions payable to, or to the departments of, certain members of the Public Services, etc.¹ The statement of proposals for appropriation will specify those additional proposals whether votable or non-votable, which the Governor- General regards as necessary for the discharge of any of his special responsibilities. The proposals for the appropriation ¹ In the light of legislative experience, the expectation or rather ap- prehension is that the non-votable items will cover about 80 per cent. of the total expenditure. The White Paper provides that the Governor-General will decide which item is non-votable as falling under one of these heads.

318 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE of revenues, other than proposals relating to heads of expen- diture enumerated above and proposals made by the Governor-General in discharge of his special responsibilities, will be submitted to the vote of the Assembly. The Council of State, by a motion duly passed, may require that any demand which is reduced or rejected by the Assembly shall be brought before a joint session of both Chambers for final determination. At the conclusion of the budget proceedings, the Governor-General will authenticate by his signature all appropriations, whether voted or non-votable. In the appropriation so authenticated, the Governor-General will be empowered to include any additional amounts which he regards as necessary for the discharge of any of his special responsibilities—provided that the total amount authenticated under any head is not in excess of the amount originally laid before the Legislature under that head in the statement of pro- posals for appropriation. Thus if any grant is refused by the Legislature, the Governor-General will be empowered to re- store it. The respective legislative fields of the Centre and of the provinces will be defined in terms of the subjects which will be scheduled in the Constitution Act. It is proposed further to include in the provincial list a general power to legislate on any matter of a purely local and private nature in the province. But in order to provide for the possibility that a subject which in its inception of a purely local or private character may subsequently become of All-India interest, it is proposed to make that power subject to a right of the Governor-General in his discretion to sanction general legislation by the Federal Legislature on the same subject-matter. With regard to the position of the Federal Ministers, the White Paper says that 'the number of ministers and the amounts of their respective salaries, will be regulated by Act of the Federal Legislature.’¹ Nevertheless, there is a further provision that the salary and allowances of the Federal Ministers will not be submitted to the vote of either Chamber of the Federal Legislature.² (There are similar provisions with regard to the Provincial Ministers.) ¹ Paragraph 15 of the White Paper Proposals. ² Paragraph 49 of the Proposals.

THE WHITE PAPER 319 With regard to the Federal Judiciary, the White Paper provides for a Federal Court and a Supreme Court. The Federal Court will have an original and an appellate juris- diction and will deal with all disputes involving the inter- pretation of the Constitution Act or any rights or obligations arising thereunder. An appeal will lie to His Majesty in Council from a decision of the Federal Court in any matter involving the interpretation of the Constitution Act. There will also be a Supreme Court for India, which will be a Court of Appeal from High Courts in British India. An appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council will be allowed in civil cases only by leave of the Supreme Court. In criminal cases no such appeal will be allowed. After the publication of the White Paper, while giving evidence before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, Sir Samuel Hoare stated that the idea of having a separate Supreme Court might be abandoned and provision might be made enabling the Legislature, if and when it was thought desirable, to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Court—so as to make it the one final Court of Appeal, subject always to the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. According to the White Paper, the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Federal Court (as also of the Supreme Court if it comes into being) will be appointed by His Majesty and will hold office during good behaviour. Their salaries, pensions, etc., will be fixed by Order in Council and will not be subject to the vote of the Legislature. After the commencement of the Constitution Act, the present Council of the Secretary of State for India will be dissolved. The Secretary of State will then appoint not less than three and not more than six persons, who will form his Advisory Council. Persons appointed by the Secretary of State to any of the Services before the commencement of the Constitution Act will continue to enjoy all Service rights possessed by them at that date. After the commencement of the Constitution Act, the Secretary of State will continue to make appointments to the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police and the Ecclesiastical Department and the conditions as to pay and allowances, pensions, discipline and conduct of

320 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE such persons will be regulated by rules, made by the Secretary of State. Every person appointed by the Secretary of State will continue to enjoy all service rights existing at the date of his appointment. 'At the expiration of five years from the commencement of the Constitution Act, a statutory inquiry will be held into the question of the future recruitment for those services except the Foreign Department and the Eccle- siastical Department. The decision on the results of this inquiry, with which the Governments in India concerned will be associated, will rest with His Majesty's Government and be subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament.'¹ Thus the important services will continue to be under the control of the Secretary of State for India in London, in spite of the so-called responsibility granted to India. The Federal and Provincial Ministers will have as subordinates, officials over whose destiny they will have no control and against whom they will not be able to take any disciplinary measures. As for the other services, the Federal and Provincial Govern- ments respectively will appoint and determine the conditions of service of all persons in the Federal and Provincial services respectively. For conducting competitive examinations for appointments to the Federal and Provincial services respec- tively, there will be a Federal Public Service Commission and Provincial Public Service Commissions. The members of the Federal Public Service Commission will be appointed by the Secretary of State and of the Provincial Public Commission by the Governor. The emoluments of the members of all Public Service Commissions will not be subject to the vote of the Legislatures. Thus the Public Service Commissions will be quite independent of the popular will. Some other provisions have been made to safeguard the interests of Britishers. The Indian Reserve Bank² already ¹ White Paper Proposals, para. 189. ² An announcement has been made by the India Office, London, on 4th October, 1934 saying that the Indian Reserve Bank Bill will be con- stituted early in 1935. The Governor, Deputy-Governors and the Central Board of the Bank will of course be appointed by His Majesty's Govern- ment. As a matter of fact, some appointments have already been made. Sir Osborne Smith has been appointed Governor of the Bank; Mr. J. B. Taylor, first Deputy Governor and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (some time Acting Governor of the Punjab) second Deputy Governor.

THE WHITE PAPER 321 referred to, which is a condition precedent to the inauguration of the Federation—will manage currency and exchange according to the dictation of London. To administer the Indian railways with their vast resources, there will be a Statutory Railway Board which will be so composed, as 'to perform its duties on business principles and without being subject to political interference.' In the composition of the Railway Board, the people will have no voice whatsoever. Lastly, there is a very important provision meant to preserve intact the vested interests of the British Mercantile com- munity. The Federal Legislature or the Provincial Legis- lature will have no power to make laws subjecting any British subject domiciled in (or company incorporated in) the United Kingdom to any disability or discrimination in the exercise of certain specified rights—for instance—the right to enter, travel and reside in any part of British India; to hold property of any kind, to carry on any trade or business in, or with the inhabitants of, British India and to appoint and employ at discretion agents and servants for any of the above purposes. Such restrictions on legislation do not exist even to-day. The Indian Legislative Assembly to-day, for instance, can enact laws giving Indians special advantages in the matter of business and trade though they could be subsequently vetoed by the Governor-General. It appears that the British Government want to prohibit altogether legislation like the Indian Coastal Shipping Bill, which sought to reserve the coastal trade of India for Indian Shipping Com- panies. With regard to the 'fundamental rights' which Indian public opinion so strongly demanded, the White Paper says: 'His Majesty's Government see serious objections to giving statutory expression to any large range of declarations of this character, but they are satisfied that certain provisions of this kind such for instance as the respect due to personal liberty and rights of property and the eligibility of all for public office, regardless of differences of caste, religion, etc., can appropriately, and should, find a place in the Constitution Act.' There is no mention in this connection of such elemen- tary rights as freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc. X

322 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE —nor is there any assurance given that the scanty rights to be conceded will be made altogether inviolable.¹ According to the White Paper the powers of the Governor in relation to his ministers, to the Provincial Legislature and to the Provincial Administration will be an exact replica of those enjoyed by the Governor-General at the centre. Hence it is not necessary to repeat all those provisions. The only difference will be that in the Provinces there will be no 'reserved departments' managed by 'Counsellors' but cor- responding to them there may be 'Excluded Areas' or 'Par- tially Excluded Areas' the administration of which will be beyond the control of the Legislature. Most of the provinces will have only one Chamber—but in Bengal, the United Provinces and Bihar there will be two Chambers. The term of the Lower House—the Legislative Assembly—will be five years, and that of the Upper House—Provincial Council —will be seven years. The Provincial Council will be con- stituted partly by nomination by the Governor and partly by direct election from constituencies for Moslem and for non- Moslem voters. In Bengal and Bihar a certain number will also be elected by the Provincial Assembly by the method of the single transferable vote. And in Bengal one member will be elected by qualified European voters. The constitution of the Provincial Legislative Assembly has been explained below. The Franchise Scheme embodied in the White Paper is based on the Lothian Committee's Report, the Prime Minister's Communal Award and the Poona Pact. Talking, generally, the present provincial franchise has been made the franchise for the Lower House of the Federal Legislature. The present ratio of women to male voters will remain unchanged. The existing franchise in all the provinces is essentially based on property. The White Paper proposes to supplement property qualification by an educational qualification common to men and women. There will be a differential franchise in the case of the Depressed Classes in order to enfranchise about 2 per cent. of their population. The White Paper proposes to ¹ For instance, it is not clear that imprisonment without trial will be be rendered impossible in India as has been done in Great Britain owing to the Habeas Corpus Act.

THE BENGAL SITUATION 335 people to say that the revolutionary movement is the result of unemployment among middle-class youths. At the outset it should be pointed out that the revolutionary movement is not an anarchist movement, nor is it merely a terrorist movement. The revolutionaries do not aim at creating anarchy or chaos. While it is a fact that they do occasionally resort to terrorism, their ultimate object is not terrorism but revolution and the purpose of the revolution is to install a National Government. Though the earliest revolutionaries studied something about revolutionary methods in other countries, it would not be correct to say that the inspiration came from abroad. The movement was born out of a conviction that to a Western people physical force alone makes an appeal. It is not generally realised by Britishers, that it is they who have been primarily responsible for teaching the Indian people the efficacy of physical force. Two or three decades ago (and even till to-day in some cases) the average Britisher in India, especially when he was a member of the army, or of the police, was so haughty in his general behaviour towards Indians, that no Indian with a grain of self-respect could help feeling the humiliation of being under a foreign government. In the street, in the railways, in the tram-cars, in public places and in public functions, in fact everywhere, the Britisher expected the Indian to make way for him and if he refused to do so, the Indian would be assaulted. In such cases of friction, the forces of the Government were always on the side of the Britisher. Cases frequently happened in which Indians of the highest position and rank—even Judges of the High Court— would be insulted in this way. Even during the Great War, when India was fighting on the side of England, such cases of friction between Indians and Britishers would constantly occur in the tram-cars in Calcutta,¹ No legal or constitutional remedy could be found for such insults for neither the police nor the subordinate Law Courts would venture to do justice. Then the time came when Indians began to hit back and when they did so, the effect was immediate and remarkable. Ever since then, in proportion as they have been able to hit ¹ The writer has had personal experience of many such cases.

336 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE back, Indians have been able to move about in their own country without losing their self-respect. Even in the colleges in Calcutta, British members of the staff would often be guilty of insulting behaviour towards Indian students and the fact that to-day such cases are not frequent, is because Indian students also made use of physical force in upholding their self-respect. This then is the psychology behind the revolutionary movement; but a further explanation is necessary to show why Bengal has, comparatively speaking, become its strong- hold. The trouble began with Macaulay. When he was out in India as a member of the Government, Macaulay wrote a scathing denunciation of the Bengalis and called them a race of cowards. That calumny went deep into the hearts of the Bengali people. Simultaneously the Government took the step of excluding the Bengalis from the army on the ground that they were not sufficiently warlike or brave. The climax came when the Grand Moghul, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, attempted to crush the Bengalis by partitioning their province. The people at first retorted with the help of Swadeshi and boycott. But when brute force was used—as at Barisal in 1906—to break up peaceful processions and meetings, the people felt that peaceful methods would not suffice. In sheer despair, young men took to the bomb and the revolver. The effect was immediate. The behaviour of the Britisher began to improve. The impression gained ground that for the first time the Bengali was being respected by the Britisher. Many of the revolutionaries were hanged but they were able to demonstrate that the race to which they belonged was not a race of cowards. They were therefore regarded as martyrs in many a Bengali home and they had the silent homage of the Bengali race. On this soil and in this manner has grown up the revolu- tionary movement in Bengal. What is the remedy for it? Two courses are open to the Government—firstly, to demon- strate to the people that for winning political freedom it is not necessary to resort to revolutionary methods and secondly, to give individual revolutionaries a chance of serving their country along peaceful and constructive lines. With regard

THE BENGAL SITUATION 337 to the first, the short-sighted policy of the Government has served to strengthen the arguments of the revolutionaries. The reforms introduced at the end of the Great War were so meagre as to cause widespread discontent. The revolutionary who came out of prison at the end of the war after years of confinement, found that the promised liberty was an empty dream and there was no opening for serving his country along peaceful and constructive lines. Nevertheless, in response to the appeal made by Mahatma Gandhi and Deshbandhu C. R. Das, they promised to eschew the path of violence and give a trial to the new method of non-violent non-co-operation and it must be admitted that the vast majority did keep their promise. But what did the Government do? On the plea that some stray acts of violence had been committed in a corner of a great province, the Government rounded up a large number of men from all over the province in 1923 and again in 1924, and kept them in prison for a number of years without trial. The public feeling at the time was that there were over-zealous officers in the Intelligence Branch of the Bengal Police who in order to justify their existence and the existence of their department, imagined more than they actually saw. And it was even believed that agents provocateur were employed for the purpose of entrapping innocent young men. It will not do to ignore such complaints with an official sneer, for if one really desires to go to the root of the problem, he should investigate all such complaints with an open mind. After some years, that is in 1927 and 1928, the Government again began to release the détenus. But as in 1919-20, so also in 1927-28, a real amnesty did not take place. Both before and after his release, every détenu was harassed so much by the police that the release instead of producing a sense of relief, left bitterness in his mind. If the releases had been ordered as a stroke of generous-hearted statesman- ship, the effect would have been quite different. The 1930-34 phase of the revolutionary movement in Bengal could have been possibly avoided if some special circumstances had not cropped up. Firstly, the attitude of Mahatma Gandhi at the Calcutta Congress had a very unfavourable effect on the minds of the youths. It gave them the impression that the Y

338 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Mahatma was a spent force and that a mass movement under the leadership of the Congress was highly improbable. Owing to this feeling a section of the youths began to prepare for independent action on their own behalf on revolutionary lines. Thus it was that the Chittagong Armoury Raid took place. This activity was, however, restricted to a very small area and when the Mahatma launched his movement early in 1930, the youths all over the province were drawn towards it. For the subsequent development of the revolutionary move- ment in Bengal, and for the repeated acts of terrorism, the Government themselves were to blame more than anyone else. Whether in Midnapore or in Dacca or in Tipperah District, in each case atrocities committed by the agents of the Government and the failure of the public to secure any redress by constitutional means were responsible for provok- ing people to acts of terrorism as a retaliation. Even the subsequent acts of terrorism in Chittagong District should be attributed not to a desire to work up a revolution in the country but to a desire to retaliate against what the revolu- tionaries regarded as acts of official terrorism. The question arises here—Is it possible in the circumstances to come to an understanding with the revolutionaries? Yes, it is, provided the approach is made in the right way and the intentions are really sincere. A broad mind is required for an understanding of the problem and courage is needed for solving it. A direct negotiation with the Party is indispensable. This necessity would not have arisen if Mahatma Gandhi or any other public leader had volunteered to be their spokes- man. Since that is not possible, direct negotiation is the only alternative. It is generally urged by police-officers, that the revolu- tionaries are out for the severance of the British connection and that they are altogether irreconcilable. There is no doubt that the revolutionaries stand for independence; but so also does the Indian National Congress. If an understanding could be attempted with the Congress, it could be equally done with the former. In 1931, the then Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson, thought it desirable to make the attempt and he used the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta as an intermediary.

THE BENGAL SITUATION 339 The result was not altogether hopeless. That the negotiations then proved to be abortive was due entirely to the fact that the Government did not comply with the request of the state prisoners in Buxa Detention Camp that the negotiations should be conducted directly with them and not through any police-officer. There are two conditions essential to the success of an attempt of this sort. Firstly, the Government should really be able to demonstrate by their own liberal policy that it is possible for the Indians to win their political rights without any resort to violence. If their policy, however, be to resist for all time the Indian demand for freedom, then no under- standing will ever be possible. Secondly, the Government must see to it that those who are to give up revolutionary methods, are given other opportunities for serving their country along peaceful and constructive lines. Merely to find some employment for them will not be enough. It is foolish to suggest, as many have done in order to please the Govern- ment, that middle-class unemployment is the cause of the revolutionary movement. If that had been the case, well-to-do people would never have been drawn into the movement. But while it is true that middle-class unemployment is not the cause of the revolutionary movement, it is of course true that if opportunities for public service had been open to young men in Bengal, then the attempts of the revolutionaries to obtain recruits would have failed. The present temper and policy of the Government whereby every young man is regarded as a potential revolutionary and treated as such, and the present conditions in the province, whereunder it is quite hopeless to win Swaraj by working along constructive lines, are among the most fruitful causes of the revolutionary movement. Revolutionary methods are in their ultimate analysis, an expression of utter despair. If this despair is once removed, an understanding with the revolutionaries is certainly possible. That will not mean that they will cease to be patriots or that they will give up serving their country. It will only mean that they will direct their activities along other channels. Whether an understanding could be reached in the near 2Y

340 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE future depends largely on the personality of the present Governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson. Before he went out to India, he made statements to the effect that he was going out not merely to suppress the revolutionary movement but with a view to understanding the deeper causes of it in order to effect a reconciliation. Unfortunately since his arrival in Bengal, he has hardly done anything towards a genuine reconciliation. Nor has he given any proof of his desire to understand the deeper causes of the movement, though in the meantime he has done everything that a zealous police-officer could hope to do. Sir John Anderson has the reputation of being a strong man and that reputation is not without founda- tion. Only a strong man can tackle a problem of this sort which has baffled so many people. The diehards in the Indian Civil Service and in the Indian Police Service are not- the people who would welcome an understanding with any party in the country—much less with the revolutionary party. Therefore it is not unfortunate that the Governor of Bengal is a strong man. It is only to be hoped that he will show his strength of mind and firmness of resolve to better purpose than in the past during the remaining years of his office.

CHAPTER XVIII A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE As the life of the present British House of Commons will come to an end in '1936, the Constitution Bill for India will certainly be put through Parliament before the next General Election. There is at present a keen controversy going on in England between the supporters of the White Paper and the Conservative Diehards led by Mr. Winston Churchill. For India, the controversy has no interest whatsoever. As we have already seen, the White Paper contains precious little and few people in India will be sorry if the scheme is whittled down further, as seems likely, or suffers complete shipwreck. What really interests India in connection with the White Paper is the fact that it leaves no room for co-operation for those who may feel tired of the prolonged struggle and would like to settle down to some useful, constructive work. The policy of the Government, therefore, will help to keep up the present opposition. The Government hope to stifle or ignore the Nationalist opposition in the country with the help of the minorities— the Moslems, the Depressed Classes, the Indian Christians and the Anglo-Indians. But will they succeed? It is probable that for a time a large section of the different minority com- munities in India will be under official influence. This will be their return for the concessions made to them in the Communal Award. But this position cannot last long. The Communal Award has at best given these communities better representation in the Legislatures under the new Constitution. But the new Constitution will give no power to the Indian people as a whole or to any section of them. It will not therefore take the representatives of the different com- munities in the Legislatures long to realise that though the Government gave them seats, they did not give them power. Seats in the Legislatures are only meant for a few. These 341

342 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE few can retain their hold over the general public, only if they can do something for the betterment of the entire community. That will not be possible, since no power will be actually transferred to the people. When the different communities realise that their representatives are not able to do anything for them, they will cease taking any interest in the Legislatures and popular discontent against the Constitution will begin to grow. This discontent will be further augmented by the economic crisis in India—and even if an improvement takes place in Great Britain or in any other country, it will not have any repercussions in India. The Indian economic crisis is only partly an effect of the world crisis. It is also an indepen- dent phenomenon, being due to a large extent to exploitation of India's resources and of the Indian market by foreign, and especially British industries and also to her inability to modernise her industrial system, in order to cope with foreign competition. An improvement in the Indian economic situation will necessitate, therefore, not only an improvement in the world economic situation, but also a modernisation of India's industrial system. There are other reasons why the help of the Indian minority communities will not be of much avail to Great Britain. Firstly, among the Moslems there is a large and influential section who are Nationalists and who are as anti-Government as the Nationalist Hindus. Their influence is not likely to suffer eclipse, but will probably increase in the days to come. Secondly, among the Depressed Classes, the majority even to-day are supporters of the Congress. The Congress propaganda to abolish untouchability altogether will certainly bring more members of the Depressed Classes into the fold of the Congress. Thirdly, the Indian Christian community can no longer be labelled as pro-Government. In their annual conferences they have repeatedly condemned separate electorate and advocated joint electorate. In recent years there has been a remarkable change of feeling among the younger generation of Indian Christians. On the religious side they have begun to resent the domination of European Christians and they demand a national church for themselves. On the political side, the younger generation of Indian Chris-

A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE 343 tians is becoming rapidly pro-Congress. In 1930, when the writer was in prison in the Alipore Central Jail in Calcutta, among his fellow-prisoners there was a fine set of young Indian Christians who had joined the civil-disobedience move- ment and they were typical of the new awakening in their community. Fourthly, so far as the Anglo-Indians are con- cerned, a distinct change is visible. Till recently they were the loyal supporters of the Government and the henchmen of the British. They looked upon England as their spiritual home and themselves as British in everything except in the pigment of their skin. The Government, too, gave them special facilities and privileges—not granted to Indians. But things are changing now. Anglo-Indians have been made statutory natives of India under the law of the land. The leader of the community, Lieut.-Col. Sir H. Gidney, addressed an appeal to his community the other day asking them to look upon India as their home and to feel proud of India. Feeling is steadily growing in the community that they should no longer try to hobnob with Britishers, but should throw in their lot with the children of the soil. Fifthly, so far as the non-official Britishers are concerned, they can hardly do anything more for the Government in suppressing the Nationalist movement. There has long been close co-operation between the Government and the non-official British community in this matter—but in spite of that, the Nationalist movement has been making headway. In the days to come, the influence of the non-official British community is likely to diminish rather than increase. In Bombay, for instance, business supremacy has already passed into the hands of the Indians. In 1932, the British firms in Bombay had to pass a resolution, expressing sympathy with the Nationalist movement in order to save themselves from a crushing and effective boycott. The Ottawa Pact and the Indo-British Textile Agreement represent the last attempt of the non- official British community to maintain the status quo—but how long can they stem the rising tide of Nationalism? Thus, according to human calculation, it appears certain that the Government will not be able to permanently weaken the nationalist forces in India by placating the minorities.