द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

92 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE The English Judge, Mr. Broomfield, sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. The resignation of Mr. Montagu was an indication of the growing power of the Conservatives in the Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George, the Premier. Under pressure from the Tory members, Mr. Lloyd George delivered in August his famous 'steel-frame' speech in which he described the Civil Service as the steel-frame of the Indian administration which must remain British, no matter what other changes may overtake India. This speech caused widespread resent- ment in India, because people were looking forward to the day when the power and the emoluments of the Civil Service would be curtailed and the people given thereby a due place in the administration of their country. About this time, Lord Winterton, the new Under-Secretary of State for India, visited India. One of the purposes of his visit was to herald a new policy with regard to the Indian Princes and Ruling Chiefs. The year before, when the Prince of Wales visited India, he had noticed a great difference between his reception in British India and in the Indian States. In British India, his visit had been boycotted by the public, whereas in the States he had no such unpleasant experience. Since that moment, the British Government were led to adopt a new attitude towards the Princes—an attitude of greater friendship and cordiality. The Princes, on their part, utilised the occasion for persuading the Government of India to introduce legislation with a view to suppressing hostile agitation and propaganda conducted against the Princes from British India. Accordingly in September 1922, a Bill was introduced in the Assembly called the Indian States (Protection against Dis- affection) Bill. The Bill was thrown out by the Assembly but the Viceroy 'certified' it as urgent and necessary and it became law. It is noteworthy in this connection that the new Under-Secretary of State for India, Lord Winterton, in his conferences with the Viceroy and the Governors of Bombay, Madras and Bengal, advocated this new attitude towards the Princes and after his visit, representatives of the Government of India began to sing praises of the Princes whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself.

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 93 In October there was a General Election in England. The Coalition Government broke up and the Conservatives came into power with Mr. Bonar Law at their head and with Viscount Peel and Lord Winterton as Secretary and Under- Secretary of State for India respectively. The next month, Sir Basil Blackett was sent out to India as the Finance Member to the Government of India. The current of reaction began to grow stronger and stronger in India. The Indian Liberal leaders, who under the influence of Mr. Montagu had been led to work the Constitution and to accept office as Ministers, found their position increasingly difficult. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had already resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council in April, following the resignation of Mr. Montagu in March. And in March 1923, when the situation became unbearable for him, Mr. Chintamani, the Minister of Education in the United Provinces, resigned. During the whole of 1922 the only decent acts which the Government did was to concede the demands of the people in Midnapore district in Bengal and of the Akali Sikhs in Punjab. In Midnapore, the new Village Self-Government Act, as a protest against which the no-tax campaign had been started, was withdrawn, and in Punjab a new law was passed under which all the Sikh shrines were taken out of the control of the Mohants and handed over to popular committees. We must now interrupt our narrative and enquire as to what the leaders had been doing in the meantime. In the first week of December 1921, Lala Lajpat Rai and most of his principal colleagues had been rounded up by the police at a meeting of the Punjab Congress Committee. A few days later, Deshbandhu Das and most of his colleagues, including the Secretary of the Bengal Congress Committee, Mr. B. N. Sasmal and myself had been placed under arrest. Following this, Pandit Motilal Nehru and most of the important Con- gressmen in the United Provinces had been clapped into prison. According to the rules of non-co-operation, no Con- gressman could put up a defence before a British Court of Law. Consequently, everywhere the prosecution had an easy task. Most of the trials would not last more than a few minutes and the same magistrate would dispose of hundreds

94 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE of cases in one afternoon. In the case of Deshbandhu Das, however, the trial dragged on for two months and since Mr. Sasmal and I had been made his co-accused in the same case, we had to suffer the agony of a uselessly long trial. It was freely talked about at the time that in view of the prestige and influence commanded by the Deshbandhu, the magistrate was unwilling to convict him without some show of legality. Time was therefore given again and again to the prosecution to collect evidence to prepare their case against him. The prosecution case rested on certain notices, alleged to have been signed by him, which were in violation of the Govern- ment proclamation, banning as illegal all volunteer organi- sations. Those who worked in the office of the Bengal Con- gress Committee knew as a matter of fact, that these notices had not been signed by him. Nevertheless, the official expert in handwriting gave evidence on oath that the signatures were genuinely of the Deshbandhu and on the strength of this so-called expert evidence, he was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. These as well as other illegalities relating to his arrest were pointed out in a statement made by him before the court towards the end of his trial, in the course of which he sought to prove that the Government never hesitate to break the law when it suits their own purpose. Before sentence was passed, a message was sent on behalf of the prosecution saying that if he accepted the Bardoli resolution, regarding the suspension of civil dis- obedience, the Government would set him free at once, but he refused to entertain any such proposal. Soon after our conviction we were transferred to another prison in Calcutta, the Alipore Central Jail, where we had an opportunity of meeting representatives from all the districts in Bengal. Except among the orthodox followers of the Mahatma who were in a minority, the general feeling was one of resentment at the Bardoli decision. This feeling was directed more against the Mahatma, since he was the Dictator of the All-India Congress Committee and the Bardoli resolu- tion had been passed at his instance. Accepting the Bardoli retreat as an accomplished fact, the Deshbandu tried to devise means for rousing public enthusiasm once again by a change

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 95 in tactics. He thus conceived of his plan of non-co-operation within the legislatures. According to this plan, Congressmen, instead of boycotting the elections, would stand as candidates at the polls and after capturing the elected seats, would carry on a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent opposition to the Government. The boycott of the legislatures, as conceived by the Calcutta Congress in 1920, had proved to be a failure. While the nationalists had kept away from the legislatures, undesirables had captured those bodies. These people, instead of assisting the popular movement in the country, had lent their support to the Government. Through their help the Government was able to demonstrate to the world that in their policy of repression, they had the support of the elected members of the legislatures. According to the Deshbandhu, in a revolutionary fight, the points of vantage should not be left in the hands of the enemy. Therefore all elected seats in the legislatures, as also in all public bodies (namely municipalities, district boards, etc.), should be cap- tured by Congressmen. Where there was room for doing any solid constructive work, they could do so. But failing that, they could at least keep up a systematic opposition to the members and agents of the Government, and thereby prevent them from doing mischief. Further, the election campaign would give the Congress an occasion and an opportunity for doing its own propaganda simultaneously all over the country. The adoption of this new policy did not imply that they were to abandon any of the other activities of the Congress, but simply meant an extension of those activities to include capture of the elected seats in the legis- latures and all public bodies. Discussions regarding this new plan were carried on vigorously from day to day in the Alipore Central Jail. It soon appeared that in all these discussions the main contention of the opponents was that the Government of India Act, 1919, hardly left any room for useful opposition within the legislatures. Owing to the presence of Britishers and of other members nominated by the Government, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the elected members to secure a majority either in the Indian Legislative Assembly (the Central Legis-

96 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE lature) or in the Provincial Legislatures. Further, the Viceroy, in the case of the former and the Governors, in the case of the latter, had powers of veto and certification, whereby they could always override the decision of the legislatures. The reply to this was that even if the elected members did not have a majority, they could still keep up a continuous opposition against the Government and thereby strengthen the agitation outside the legislatures. Secondly, it would be possible for the elected members to secure a majority in at least some of the legislatures and if the Viceroy or the Governor set aside the decision of any legislature, the Government would stand condemned before the bar of public opinion, both inside India and outside. Lastly, under the existing constitution, a vote against the Ministers or their departments could not be overridden by the Governor of any province, and if the provincial legislature voted down the salaries of Ministers, they would automatically be thrown out of office and the working of the diarchical constitution would have to be suspended. As these discussions went on for some weeks, two parties crystallised among the political prisoners in the Alipore Jail and they proved to be the nuclei of the future 'Swaraj' and 'No-Change' parties. In May 1922, the annual conference of Congressmen in Bengal, called the 'Provincial Conference,' was held in Chittagong. Mrs. C. R. Das was elected President of the Conference because of the gallant part she had played in last year's movement. In her presidential speech, she stated that the Congress might have to consider a change in tactics and suggested, among other things, that the policy of non-co-operation within the legislatures was worth considering. It was not difficult to guess who had inspired her speech and taking it as a feeler sent out by her husband, a storm of controversy was at once let loose all over the country. It was clear therefrom that the orthodox fol- lowers of the Mahatma would not think of any deviation from the plan that he had laid down before his arrest and that a stiff fight would take place before the new plan could be adopted by the Congress. This prospect, far from dis- couraging us, helped to whip up our enthusiasm. The Desh- bandhu had frequent discussions with his supporters in

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 97 prison and he chalked out his future line of action in great detail. Among the measures that he contemplated was the starting of daily papers in English and in the vernacular— and out of this speculation came the birth of his paper Forward, which was started in 1923 and soon attained dis- tinction as one of the leading nationalist papers of India. During 1922 conflicts between political prisoners and the prison authorities took place in many prisons in India. Matters came to a head in two prisons in Bengal—at Barisal and Faridpur. Political prisoners in these prisons demanded decent treatment at the hands of the authorities and refused to submit to the humiliating treatment generally meted out to prisoners in Indian Jails. The authorities were stubborn and resorted to flogging, but even that could not break the backbone of the political prisoners. Meanwhile, intense public indignation was roused by the news of the flogging. Even the tame Bengal Legislative Council was stirred to action and within the Government itself, differences of opinion broke out. The Member in charge of Jails, Sir Abdur Rahim, dis- approved flogging of political prisoners, but he could not carry the Government with him. As a protest he resigned the portfolio of Prisons which was taken up by the then Home Member of the Bengal Government, Sir Hugh Stephenson. After the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi in March, the Congress Working Committee was at a loss to decide what to do. Thereupon, a committee was appointed, called the 'Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee,' for the purpose of touring the country and reporting on the possibility of starting civil disobedience again. The general feeling among the members of this committee was that it was not possible to start civil disobedience so soon. But the point that it was difficult to settle was what the Congress should do in the meantime. Should the Congress be content with carrying on its peaceful constructive work or should it adopt the new plan suggested by the Deshbandhu? The committee made an extensive tour of the country and submitted a report after some months. The members of the Committee were equally divided in their conclusions. Hakim Ajmal Khan (Delhi), Pandit Motilal G

98 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Nehru (Allahabad) and Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel (Bombay) were in favour of adopting the Deshbandhu's plan of entering the legislatures and Dr. M. A. Ansari¹ (Delhi), Mr. K. R. Iyengar (Madras) and Mr. C. Rajagopalachari (Madras) were against it. As the report was published shortly before the Gaya session of the Congress to be presided over by Deshbandhu Das, his hands were strengthened by the report. Towards the end of September 1922, there were unexpected floods in the northern districts of Bengal. Though floods and famines are of frequent occurrence in the India of to-day, the floods of 1922 were of an unprecedented magnitude. Four large districts of Bengal were affected, crops were destroyed, houses washed away and cattle killed. As a result of the floods, there were several cases of death also. The whole countryside was one vast expanse of water. The Congress organisations throughout the province promptly responded to the appeal for relief and I was among the first batch to arrive at the flooded area for the purpose of organising relief. Thanks to the efforts of Sir P. C. Roy, the famous chemist and the President of the Relief Committee and to the generosity of the public, a fund of more than 400,000 rupees was raised, besides large contributions in cloth, foodstuffs and fodder (for the cattle). On this occasion the Government of Bengal contributed a sum of 20,000 rupees and in justifying the niggardliness of the Government, the Maharaja of Burdwan, a member of the Governor's Executive Council, stated that the Government was not a charitable institution. The relief operations con- ducted by the public, without any aid from the Government were so successful that they added greatly to the prestige of the Congress, whose members were largely responsible for them. In fact we had the good fortune to be complimented on our work by the Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, personally when he inspected the flooded areas. Since then, the Congress has always taken a leading part in organising relief operations on the occasion of floods and famines. Between August and December two other noteworthy events took place. The first was the meeting of the All-India Trade) ¹ In the light of this fact it is surprising that Dr. Ansari should be one of the sponsors of the Council-entry proposal in 1934.

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 99 Union Congress at Lahore, which was presided over by Deshbandhu Das. In his presidential speech he made a striking declaration to the effect that the Swaraj he was striving to win was not for a section of the people—but for the masses who comprised 98 per cent. of the population. Before and after this meeting, he always took a keen interest in the trade union movement and was for some time the President of the Labour Association of the Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur. The other event was the meeting of the Young Men's Conference in Calcutta which was the precursor of the youth movement in the province. This Conference revealed the desire on the part of the youth to have a movement and an organisation of their own, quite apart from the Indian National Congress. Towards the end of November, a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee was held in Calcutta at which there was a trial of strength between the supporters of Deshbandhu and of the Mahatma. This was a prelude to the annual session of the Congress. In the last week of December in an atmosphere tense with excitement the plenary session of the Indian National Congress assembled at Gaya. According to preliminary forecasts, Mr. Das's plan was likely to be defeated. But no one could tell at the time how the voting would go. It was clear, however, that Mr. Das would have influential support from all the provinces, especially from Bengal, the United Provinces, Punjab, Central Provinces and Maharashtra (part of Bombay Presidency). After stormy debates in the Subjects Committee, the matter came up for voting before the open session of the Congress. Mr. Srinivasa Iengar, a prominent leader from Madras, who was the leader of the Madras Bar and had resigned the post of Advocate-General of Madras, moved an amendment to the effect that represen- tatives of the Congress should contest the elections but should not participate in the work inside the legislatures. On this amendment the principal voting took place and resulted in a big majority for the supporters of the Mahatma. Great was their enthusiasm and the hero of the day was the Madras leader, Mr. Rajagopalachari, who stood up before the Congress as the apostle of Gandhiism.

100 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE The position of Mr. Das became rather anomalous. He was the President of the Congress, but the plan he advocated had been rejected. To settle his future course of action, he summoned a meeting of his supporters. It was decided that he should resign the presidentship of the Congress and organise his party under the name of the 'Swaraj Party.' The next day when the All-India Congress Committee met for the purpose of laying down the programme of work for the next year, that is 1923, Pandit Motilal Nehru stood up to make an announcement about the formation of the Swaraj-Party. The announcement came as an unexpected blow and cast a shadow on the jubilant faces of the Mahatma's supporters. Most of the outstanding intellectuals were on the side of the Deshbandhu and there was no doubt that without them, the Congress would lose much of its strength and importance. The announcement first made by Pandit Motilal Nehru was confirmed when Mr. Das in winding up the deliberations, submitted his resignation of the office of president, since he desired to work in opposition to the official resolutions, with the object of persuading the country to accept his plan of work. The supporters of Gandhiji left Gaya satisfied at their victory but not happy, because of the split that had taken place. The Swarajists parted with a sense of defeat, but with the determination to fight and win.

CHAPTER IV THE SWARAJIST REVOLT (1923) THE Swarajist leaders returned from Gaya to their own provinces with a stiff programme of work before them. The general understanding was that Deshbandhu Das should conduct the propaganda in Bengal, Central Provinces and South India; Pandit Motilal Nehru in Upper India and Mr. Vithalbhai Patel in Bombay Presidency. The Nationalist Press as a whole was anti-Swarajist. Therefore the Swarajists had to depend mainly on lecturing as a means of propaganda. In Calcutta we published a daily paper of four pages, called Banglar Katha, to supplement our propaganda and I had to become editor overnight under the orders of the leader. In Madras, Mr. A. Rangaswami Iyenger, afterwards editor of Hindu, was very helpful. His paper, Swadesamitram, a Tamil daily, became an exponent of the Swarajist policy and he also started an English weekly under the same name, to help our propaganda. In Poona the extremely influential Marathi paper, Kesari, became a champion of our cause. After Loka- manya Tilak’s death, Mr. Kelkar had been the editor of Kesari and as he became a staunch supporter of the Swaraj party, the resources of his paper Kesari were placed at the disposal of the party. When the Deshbandhu returned to Bengal after the Gaya Congress, he found his position considerably weakened. The Congress machinery had passed into the hands of our political opponents, who now came to be known as “No- Changers,” because they were against any change in the existing plan and programme of the Congress. When we first took stock of our following, we found that we were in a minority. It was difficult for us at first to raise funds because we had rebelled against the official programme of the Con- gress. Nevertheless, we were a disciplined and determined band of workers and with unbounded enthusiasm, we

102 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE addressed ourselves to our task. One of the tactics we fol- lowed at the time, consisted in summoning frequent meetings of Congress organisations throughout the country and asking for a reversal of the resolutions passed at the Gaya Congress. At first our party used to be defeated at such meetings but we gradually made headway and when our party was able to secure a majority in one place, the news would encourage our fellow-workers in other places. After preliminary propaganda had been done all over India, the first Swarajist Conference was held in March at Allahabad at the house of Pandit Motilal Nehru. The constitution and plan of campaign of the Swaraj Party was drawn up at the Conference. When the constitution was being discussed, a controversy arose with regard to the ultimate aim of the Swaraj Party. Was Dominion Status to be the goal of the Party or Complete Independence? On this point the constitution of the Congress was not clear. It merely stated that Swaraj was our goal but did not define what was meant by Swaraj. As the Swaraj Party was more practical, it wanted to define clearly what Swaraj meant, but a complete agreement was not possible on the question, because there were two groups among the Swarajists. It was therefore decided, as a compromise, to declare in the con- stitution that the 'immediate' objective of the Party was the attainment of Dominion Status. Thus was the conflict between the young and the old settled for the time being. The Swarajist Conference over, Mr. Das set out on a long tour in South India. It was a tremendously uphill work. The Madras Presidency was at the time one of the strong- holds of Gandhiism and Mr. Das deliberately undertook to storm that citadel first. In spite of the grilling heat of a South Indian summer he had a very successful tour. His success there had repercussions in other parts of the country. On his return to Calcutta he undertook the direction of the propaganda in Bengal with very good results. About this time the party decided to requisition frequent meetings of the All-India Congress Committee. At each successive meeting it was found that the votes of the Swarajists were increasing. By the middle of the year 1923, such progress was made

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 103 that the Working Committee (the Cabinet of the Congress) composed entirely of 'no-changers,' could no longer command a majority in the All-India Congress Committee and had therefore to resign. But though the 'no-changers' were not strong enough to hold office, neither was the Swaraj Party. So a third party, which in the absence of a better name may be called the 'Centre Party,' came into office. This party did not accept the Swarajist plan but they were not die-hard Gandhiists either. They advocated some sort of under- standing between the two rival groups in the Congress. About the same time the 'no-changers' were also defeated in Bengal and in the Bengal Congress Committee, a Centre Party, which was under the influence of the Swarajists, came into office. Under this arrangement, Moulana Akram Khan became the President of the Bengal Congress Committee. But the former Secretary, Dr. P. C. Ghosh, refused to hand over office. Therefore, two rival Congress Committees began to function simultaneously, each claiming to be the represen- tative body. Some months elapsed before the constitutional question was settled by the Working Committee, when a decision was given in favour of the Committee of which Moulana Akram Khan was the president. In most provinces, especially in Bengal, feelings between the two parties were exceedingly bitter, though their aim was a common one, namely to win Swaraj for India. The prevailing bitterness made responsible Congressmen think seriously as to how they could bring about some sort of compromise between the warring groups. Then came the suggestion to hold a special session of the Congress in Delhi in September, 1923. This decision was a blow for the sup- porters of Gandhiji, because the Swarajists were sure to press their plan at the Delhi Congress once again and with better chances of winning than they had at Gaya. Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, one of the most intelligent and distinguished Mohammedan leaders, was elected President of the Delhi Congress and in his presidential speech he advocated the Swarajist policy of contesting the elections and carrying on the fight within the legislatures. Shortly before the Delhi Congress, Moulana Mohammed

104 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Ali, the younger and more influential of the Ali brothers and Dr. Kitchlew, the well-known Punjab leader, were released from prison. Their arrival was welcomed by the 'No-Change' Party whose policy and action they supported. Nevertheless, the Swarajists had made so much progress that nothing could hamper them any more. Deshbandhu Das attended the Congress at the head of a large contingent of delegates and the Bengal votes served to turn the scales. As soon as it was clear that the Swarajists would win the day, the 'No-Change' Party agreed to a compromise. Moreover, Moulana Moham- med Ali claimed to have received some secret message (which he called 'wireless message') from the Mahatma, asking him to bring about a compromise between the rival Congress groups. Therefore, without much wrangling, a compromise resolution was passed at the special Congress in Delhi in September, 1923, to the effect that Congressmen were per- mitted to take part in the forthcoming elections and carry on a uniform, continuous and consistent opposition against the Government within the legislatures, but the Congress as an organisation would have no responsibility in the matter. The Swarajists left Delhi overjoyed. After nine months of hard and untiring work in the teeth of opposition and in the face of considerable unpopularity, they had won the day. But they could not rest on their oars. They had barely two months' time to prepare for the forthcoming elections. And they had a tough fight in front of them. Luck, however, favours the brave. So it did the Swarajists. In spite of gloomy forecasts they had remarkable success. In the Central Provinces, the election returns were excellent and it was clear that by their obstructive tactics the Swarajists would be able to paralyse the work of the Local Legislative Council. The election returns for Bengal were also encourag- ing and for the Indian Legislative Assembly a strong con- tingent of Swarajists was returned. By mutual agreement it was arranged that Pandit Motilal Nehru would lead the Swaraj Party in the Assembly, while the Deshbandhu would lead the Party in the Bengal Legislative Council, where he was hopeful of bringing about a constitutional deadlock.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 105 The success of the Swarajists in capturing the elected seats in the central and provincial legislatures was followed by similar success in other directions. The elections to the local bodies (municipalities and district boards) in the United Provinces were held in 1923 and under the direction of Pandit Motilal Nehru the Swaraj Party in that province had con- siderable success and as a result, many of the municipalities and district boards came under Swarajist control. In the field of journalism, too, the Swarajists made much progress. In Calcutta, the Deshbandhu launched his daily paper Forward in October, soon after his victory at Delhi. As some of the organisers of the paper were suddenly put into prison without trial, I was entrusted with the organisation of the paper. Though the launching of the paper entailed very hard work on our part, success followed rapidly and in its career, the paper was able to keep pace with the growing popularity and strength of the Party. Within a short time Forward came to hold a leading position among the nationalist journals in the country. Its articles were forceful, its news service varied and up-to-date and the paper developed a special skill in the art of discovering and exposing official secrets. During 1923 the movement was on the whole of a con- stitutional nature with the exception of a civil-disobedience (or Satyagraha) campaign in Nagpur. The authorities in Nagpur prohibited the carrying of national flags along certain streets in Nagpur. As a protest against this order, processions were sent into the prohibited area with flags, etc. The cam- paign went on for some months and a large number of people were sent to prison. The issue soon became an All-India one, because the order in question was regarded as an insult to the National Flag and people began to pour in from all parts of the country in order to defy the order and court imprisonment. Ultimately, better counsels prevailed in Government House and a compromise was arrived at, whereby the demand of the people in this connection was substantially conceded. It should be observed in this connection that the above campaign—generally known as the Nagpur Flag Satyagraha Campaign—was run by the orthodox Gandhiists

106 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE who were anxious to demonstrate that the Gandhi method had not become sterile and was still capable of stirring up the country. While the Swarajists represented the main body of rebels against orthodox Gandhiism in 1923, the same year saw the birth of another revolt against Gandhiism which was to acquire greater importance in the years to come. Being dis- satisfied with the Gandhian ideology, a small group in Bombay under the leadership of Mr. Dange,¹ took to study- ing Socialist literature. They had a club of their own and published a weekly journal for preaching Socialism. Among the Congress leaders the only patron they had at the time was the late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel. They soon took up labour organi- sation in Bombay and before many years elapsed, they became the first group of Communists in India. Following Bombay, a similar group was started some time later in Bengal under the name of the "Workers and Peasants' Party"—but it was never able to acquire as much importance or make as much headway, as the Bombay Group. The reason is not far to seek. Bengal, of which Calcutta is both the heart and the brain, has for a very long time been one of the strongholds of the nationalist movement. There the movement is based on an influential and patriotic petit-bour- geois class. Moreover, Bengal does not possess an indigenous and influential capitalist class, as does Bombay. Consequently, class-differentiation has never appeared in Bengal in that sharp and acute form in which it has appeared in Bombay. The petit-bourgeois element is not so strong or influential in Bombay as it is in Bengal and the national movement there is of more recent growth than in Bengal. In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual revolt against Gandhiism in Bombay should take a Socialist or Communist turn. In Bengal, on the other hand, the revolt against Gandhiism took a revolutionary more than a Communist turn. This phenomenon we shall consider in a later chapter on 'the Bengal Situation.' ¹ Mr. Dange was convicted in 1925 in connection with the Cawnpore Bolshevik Conspiracy Case and again in connection with the Meerut Communist Conspiracy Case in 1933, after a trial lasting nearly four years.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 107 We have already seen in the previous chapter that when in March, 1922, Mr. Montagu resigned from the Cabinet, the forces of reaction got the upper hand both in England and in India. The Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George soon came to an end and a General Election took place in October 1922, which brought the Conservatives into power. In November 1922, Sir Basil Blackett was appointed Finance Member to the Government of India. One of his first deeds was to double the Salt Tax in February, 1923, when he produced his first budget. Now the Salt Tax is traditionally unpopular in India—partly because the people are prevented by law from making salt out of the soil or the water given them by nature and partly because the Salt Tax hits the poor hardest. The doubling of the Salt Tax therefore, was the worst move which the Government could have taken. The Indian Legislative Assembly promptly threw out this provision of the Finance Member but the Viceroy, Lord Reading, as promptly restored it by virtue of his power of certification. In June, the Government gave further offence by appointing a Commission—called the Lee Commission—to inquire into the status, position and grievances of the All-India services which are manned mainly by Britishers. Everyone felt at the time that the only result of the appointment of this com- mission would be to enhance the pay and emoluments of Britishers in India.¹ Thus, while the Government showed a readiness to incur more expenditure in order to please Britishers—they showed reluctance in curtailing unnecessary expenditure, though the Inchcape Committee had made several useful recommendations in this behalf.² In addition to this measure, the Government of India took another step which was severely criticised at the time and which roused resentment in certain parts of the country. This was the deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha from his throne (or Guddee). Though the Government made certain allegations ¹ This apprehension was fully justified when the Lee Commission sub- mitted its report and the Government of India gave effect to the recom- mendations in a lavish manner. ² A Retrenchment Committee presided over by Lord Inchcape had been appointed by the Government for suggesting possible lines of economy. This Committee submitted its report in March, 1923.

108 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE against the Maharaja as a justification for their action—the popular feeling in the country was that the Maharaja was neither better nor worse than the general run of Maharajas in India and that he was deposed solely because of his avowedly nationalistic views. Since the Maharaja was a Sikh and he was reported to have cherished sympathy for the Akali movement, his deposition roused a great deal of indignation among the Sikh community. While the forces of reaction were gaining in strength in official circles and the Swarajists were preparing their great onslaught on the bureaucratic citadel, the Indian Legislative Assembly, even without the nationalists, was neither tame nor inactive. During the year, resolutions demanding a speedy constitutional advance were passed twice. Moreover, towards the end of its term, the Assembly passed a Reciprocity Bill which was introduced by Dr. (now Sir) H. S. Gour. This Bill was aimed at the Dominions and Colonies of the British Empire where Indians were not given equal rights and it provided for retaliation against all those countries, which placed disabilities on Indians, inflicting on their nationals in India the same disabilities which Indians had to suffer there. This Bill was the result of the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. In Kenya where the Indian settlers outnumbered the white settlers by three to one, the latter wanted to usurp all political power and exclude the former altogether. In the Kenya legislature they had a law passed giving the vote to all white settlers above twenty-one. They refused at first to extend the vote to Indian settlers, but ultimately offered them a separate electorate with a more limited franchise. This offer was declined by the Indians because it would put the stamp of second-class citizenship on them. The Kenya Indians appealed to India for help and in April 1923 the Rt. Hon. V. S. Sastri¹ led a deputation to England to plead their cause before the authorities at Whitehall. A fairly satisfactory agreement was drawn up between the India Office and the Colonial Office . ¹ Mr. V. S. Sastri who became the head of the Servants of India Society after Mr. Gokhale's death had been made a Privy Councillor, while Mr. Montagu was Secretary of State for India.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 109 —called the Wood-Winterton¹ Agreement but the Tory Cabinet did not give effect to it. Mr. Sastri therefore had to return disappointed. After his return to India, the Recipro- city Bill was introduced in the Assembly by Dr. H. S. Gour. The above picture of India in 1923 would not be complete without reference to some of the communal dissensions which appeared in 1923 and which were to assume a more ugly shape in the years to come. Punjab was the scene of most of the troubles in 1923. Early in the year there was a Hindu-Moslem riot at Multan and this was followed by a similar riot in Amritsar, near the scene of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in 1919. About this time, Mr. (now Sir) Mian Fazli Hussain became a minister in the Punjab and his extreme partiality for Moslems in the matter of appointments to public services caused considerable heart-burning among Sikhs and Hindus. Later in the year, a movement was started among Indian Moslems in opposition to the Indian National Congress—called 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh'—which aimed at organising the Moslems as a strong and virile community. This movement gained adherents for some time but before long it fell into disfavour and was replaced by communal or sectarian organisations of a different kind. While the above movement was going on among the Moslems, the Hindus were not altogether idle. Their communal organi- sation—called the Hindu Mahasabha—sought to strengthen itself by deciding at its annual meeting in August to admit the depressed classes to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by high-caste Hindus. Corresponding to the 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh' movement among the Moslems, a 'Sangathan' move- ment was started among the Hindus. Further, in order to reclaim those Hindus who for some reason had left the Hindu fold in the past, the 'Suddhi' (or Purification) movement was started. By performing the Suddhi ceremony, it was made possible for a non-Hindu to become a Hindu. The apostle of this movement was Swami Shraddhananda,² a highly- ¹ The Hon. Edward Wood, better known as Lord Irwin and now as Lord Halifax was the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies—while Lord Winterton was the Under-Secretary of State for India. ² Swami Shraddhananda was subsequently murdered by a Moslem fanatic probably out of his resentment at the Suddhi movement.

110 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE respected leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, through whose influence thousands of non-Hindus, including Moslems and Christians, were converted to Hinduism. About this time, the Swami was endeavouring to reconvert the Malkana Rajputs who had originally been Hindus but had subsequently embraced the Islamic faith and this attempt caused annoyance to many of the Moslem leaders. While the communal storm was brewing in India, the Ali brothers remained true to their nationalist creed. Moulana Mohammed Ali, the younger brother, was elected to preside over the annual session of the Congress at Coconada in Madras Presidency. There was no heated controversy as at Gaya and the deliberations took place in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. There was, however, a breeze over the Hindu-Moslem question which fortunately did not develop into a storm. Deshbandhu Das had drawn up a Hindu- Moslem Pact for settlement of the communal question in Bengal and he desired the Congress to put the seal of approval on it. The Coconada Congress, however, did not do so and the Pact was rejected on the alleged ground that it showed partiality for the Moslems and violated the principles of Nationalism. Another Pact which had been drawn up by Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. M. A. Ansari for the settlement of the communal question was referred by the Coconada Con- gress to the All-India Congress Committee for consideration. These pacts indicated that the better minds among the Con- gress leaders had begun to realise the possibility of a communal rift and the necessity for making some sort of settlement before the breach widened. But sufficiently speedy or suffi- ciently drastic action was not taken, with the result that the differences did become more acute and grave and the country had to face a communal storm as soon as the political tension created by the Swaraj Party subsided after the death of Deshbandhu Das in June, 1925. From the Nationalist point of view, the year 1923 had begun badly but it ended well. In January, there was division and depression. In December, there was hope and confidence. Despite signs of communal disturbance here and there, the political barometer had once again begun to rise. In England

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT III too, the forces of reaction had received a temporary setback. In May, 1923, Mr. Baldwin replaced Mr. Bonar Law as Premier and in November of the same year he appealed to the country on the issue of Protection versus Free Trade. The Conservatives were thrown out of office as a consequence and the beginning of 1924 saw a Labour Government installed in office for the first time in British History. The Near East policy of the previous cabinets had failed. Before the end of 1922, Mustapha Kemal Pasha had succeeded in driving the Greeks out of Anatolia. Before the end of 1923 he succeeded in driving the Allied troops out of Constantinople. And by March 1924, he felt sufficiently strong to abolish the Khalifate altogether and bring into existence a new and powerful Turkey.