उपदेशसाहस्री (आदि शङ्कराचार्य - गद्य व पद्य भाग)

252 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII 112. If you are of opinion that the intellect proximate to the Witness¹ is the hearer it cannot be regarded as deriving any benefit from the Witness as from a piece of wood. बुद्धौ चेत्तत्कृतः कश्चिन्नन्वेवं परिणामिता । आभासेऽपि च को दोषः सति श्रुत्याद्यनुग्रहे ॥ ११३ ॥ 113. But the Witness must be admitted to be subject to change if there be any benefit rendered by It to the intellect. What harm is there if the reflection of the Self is accepted as it is supported by the Śrutis² and Smritis?³ आभासे परिणामश्चेन्न रज्ज्वादिनिभत्ववत् । सर्पादेश्च तथाऽवोचमादर्शे च मुखत्ववत् ॥ ११४ ॥ 114. If you say that there will be changes in the Self in case the reflection is accepted we say ‘No.’ For we have already said (that the reflection of Consci- ousness in the intellect is an unreality) like a snake appearing to be a rope and (like the reflection of a face) in a mirror appearing to be the face itself. नात्माभासत्वसिद्धिश्चेदात्मनो ग्रहणात्पृथक् । मुखादेश्च पृथक्सिद्धिर्हि त्वन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ ११५ ॥ अध्यक्षस्य पृथक्सिद्धावाभासस्य तदीयता । आभासस्य तदीयत्वे ह्यध्यक्षव्यतिरिक्तता ॥ ११६ ॥ ¹ Which only exists and is actionless. ² Br. U., 2. 5. 19. ³ Bh. Gîtâ, 15. 7.

112-119] ' THOU ART THAT ' 253 115, 116. (Objection). No. There will be the fallacy of reciprocal dependence here as the knowlege of the reflection depends on that of the Self (and the knowledge of the Self depends on that of the reflec- tion) ; (but it is not so in the case of the face etc. and their reflections) as the face etc. are always known independent of their reflections. The reflection may be said to belong to the Self if the latter be known to have an independent existence. Again, the Self may have an independent existence if the reflection belongs to It.¹ नैवं स्वप्ने पृथक्सिद्धेः प्रत्ययस्य दृशेस्तथा । रथादेस्तत्र शून्यत्वात्प्रत्ययस्यात्मना ग्रहः ॥ ११७ ॥ 117. (Reply). It is not² so. For the intellect and the Self are known to exist independent of each other in dream (like the face and its reflection), as the Self then illumines the modifications (of the intellect) in the forms of objects such as, chariots ³ etc. though they are not present in that state. अवगत्या हि संव्याप्तः प्रत्ययो विषयाकृतिः । जायते, स यदाकारः स बाह्यो विषयो मतः ॥ ११८ ॥ कर्मेप्सिततमत्वात्स तद्वान्कार्ये नियुज्यते । आकारो यत्र चार्प्येत करणं तदिहोच्यते ॥ ११९ ॥ ¹ The fallacy spoken of in verse 115 is explained here. ² The intellect is an object of the Self (Pure Consciousness) in dream. The Self must, therefore, be admitted to have an existence independent of that of Its reflection. ³ See Br. U., 4. 3. 9.

254 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII 118, 119. Pervaded by Consciousness mental modi- fications in the forms of objects come into existence. External objects are what impart their forms to these modifications. The most desirable of all things (on the part of the agent), these external objects are called objects of his action. One having such a desire is enjoined to perform actions. The mental modifications in which the forms of external objects are present are called the instruments of his knowledge of objects.¹ यदाभासेन संव्याप्तः संज्ञातेति निगद्यते । त्रयमेतद्विविच्यैवात्र यो जानाति स आत्मवित् ॥ १२० ॥ 120. The ego which is pervaded by the reflection of Consciousness is called the knower or the agent of the action of knowing. One who knows oneself, the witness to be distinct from all these three² is a (real) knower of the Self. सम्यक्संशयमिथ्योक्ताः प्रत्यया व्यभिचारिणः । एकैवावगतिस्तेषु भेदस्तु प्रत्ययार्पितः ॥ १२१ ॥ 121. The modifications of the intellect, called 'right knowledge,' 'doubtful knowledge' and 'false knowl- edge,' deviate from their existence. There is one and the same Consciousness³ in all of them. The diffe- rences are due to the modifications. ¹ In verses 118—122 the Self is shown in the waking state to be distinct from the intellect as It is shown to be so in dream in verse 117. ² The agent, the object and the instrument. ³ Pure Consciousness, the Self.

118-125] ‘ THOU ART THAT ’ 255 आधिभेदाद्यथा भेदो मणेरवगतेस्तथा । अशुद्धिः परिणामश्च सर्वं प्रत्ययसंश्रयात् ॥ १२२ ॥ 122. Just as a jewel differs in colour owing to the proximity of (coloured) things, so, Consciousness differs (according to different modifications of the mind super- imposed on It). Impurities and changes in the Self are all due to Its connection with these modifications. प्रथनं ग्रहणं सिद्धिः प्रत्ययानामिहान्यतः । आपरोक्ष्यात्तदेवोक्तमनुमानं प्रदीपवत् ॥ १२३ ॥ 123. The modifications of the intellect are mani- fested, known and endowed with existence¹ by another, i.e. the Self which is immediately known and different from them. It is inferred with the help of the example of a lamp.² किमन्यद्ग्राहयेत्कश्चित्प्रमाणेने तु केनचित् । विनैव तु प्रमाणेन निवृत्त्यान्यस्य शेषतः ॥ १२४ ॥ 124. Does one make another accept the Self by means of a positive evidence or without one by merely negating the non-Self and leaving over the Self only ? ³ शब्देनैव प्रमाणेन निवृत्तिश्चेदिहोच्यते । अध्यक्षस्याप्रसिद्धत्वाच्छून्यतैव प्रसज्यते ॥ १२५ ॥ ¹ Kath. U. 5. 15. ² The discussion begun here ends in verse 140. ³ After stating that the Self is proved by positive evidence in verse 123 the author refutes in verses 124-140 the doctrine that It is proved by negative evidence only.

256 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII 125. The possibility of a void comes in owing to the witness being unknown ¹ if the non-Self be meant to be negated by means of the evidence of words.² चेतनस्त्वं कथं देह इति चेन्नाप्रसिद्धितः । चेतनस्यान्यतः सिद्धावेवं स्यादन्यहानतः ॥ १२६ ॥ 126. (Objection). ‘You are a conscious being, how³ can you be the body?’ (Reply). It cannot be so proved as the Self is not known (from any other evidence). It might be proved by negating the non-Self if Pure Conciousness were known to exist through an evidence. अध्यक्षः स्वयमस्त्येव चेतनस्यापरोक्षतः । तुल्य एवं प्रबोधः स्यादन्यस्यासत्त्ववादिना ॥ १२७ ॥ 127. (Objection). The Self is self-existent as Pure Consciousness is immediately known. (Reply). The knowledge of the Self (according to you) then becomes similar⁴ to that of the void assumed by the Nihilist. अहमज्ञासिषं चेदमिति लोकस्मृतेरिह । करणं कर्म कर्ता च सिद्धास्त्वेकक्षणे किल ॥ १२८ ॥ 128. (Objection). That the agent, the object and instrument are known to exist simultaneously is proved by memory, (e.g., when one says) ‘I⁵ knew it.’ ¹ By any other evidence. ² The Srutis. ³ The idea is that the Self and the non-Self being contradictory to each other, the former is left over when the latter is negated. ⁴ As regards the want of an evidence. ⁵ The objector tries to prove the independent existence of the Self by showing that there must be a Self-evident principle through which the three things are known simultaneously. And that is the Self.

125-131] ‘ THOU ART THAT ’ 257 प्रामाण्येऽपि स्मृतेः शैघ्र्याद्यौगपद्यं विभाव्यते । क्रमेण ग्रहणं पूर्वं स्मृतेः पश्चात्तथैव च ॥ १२९ ॥ 129. (Reply).¹ Though memory is a right evidence simultaneity is a misconception due to quick perception. So they were perceived before one after another and afterwards remembered in the same way. अज्ञासिषमिदं मां चेत्यपेक्षा जायते ध्रुवम् । विशेषोऽपेक्ष्यते यत्र तत्र नैवैककालता ॥ १३० ॥ 130. Relative to, and characteristically different from, each other the things denoted by the words ‘it’ and ‘myself’ in the sentence, ‘I knew it and myself’, cannot be the objects of simultaneous perception. आत्मनो ग्रहणे चापि त्रयाणामिह संभवात् । आत्मन्यासक्तकर्तृत्वं न स्यात्करणकर्मणोः ॥ १३१ ॥ 131. Three things (namely, an agent, an instrument and an object) are necessary in the perception of each ² one of the knower, knowledge and the known. (And in order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum it cannot be said that each of these three things will prove its own existence, because) the agency of the agent exhausted in proving its own existence will not be available to prove that of the instrument and the object (at the same time). ¹ Verses 129—132. ² And also in the perception of each one of the agent, the instru- ment and the object. Hence there arises a regressus ad infinitum with respect to each of them. 17

258 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII व्याप्तुमिष्टं च यत्कर्तुः क्रियया कर्म तत्स्मृतम् । अतो हि कर्तृतन्त्रत्वं तस्येष्टं नान्यतन्त्रता ॥ १३२ ॥ 132. What is desired to be governed by the action of an agent is an object of that action. The object, therefore, depends on the agent and not on the Self which is other than it. शब्दाद्वानुमितेर्वापि प्रमाणाद्वा ततोऽन्यतः । सिद्धिः सर्वपदार्थानां स्यादज्ञं प्रति नान्यथा ॥ १३३ ॥ 133. It is only through evidences such as, words,¹ inference, etc.² and in no other way that all things become known to those who do not know them. अध्यक्षस्यापि सिद्धिः स्यात्प्रमाणेन् विनैव वा । विना स्वस्य सिद्धिस्तु ज्ञानं प्रत्युपयुज्यते ॥ १३४ ॥ 134. Is the Self also³ substantiated by means of an evidence or not ? Though the Self Itself is independent of evidence, evidence is necessary in order to know It. तस्यैवाज्ञत्वमिष्टं चेज्ज्ञानत्वेऽन्या मतिर्भवेत् । अन्यस्यैवाज्ञतायां च तद्विज्ञाने ध्रुवा भवेत् ॥ १३५ ॥ 135. If the conscious Self Itself is taken to be ignorant an evidence is necessary,¹ in order that It may know Itself to be so. It is surely necessary⁴ in knowing the Self if one⁴ (i.e. the ego) other than It be regarded as ignorant. ¹ The Sruti. ² E.g., sense-perception. ³ Like the non-Self. ⁴ In both the cases, therefore, a positive evidence is necessary.

[132-139] ' THOU ART THAT ' 259 ज्ञातता स्वात्मलाभो वा सिद्धिः स्यादन्यदेव वा । ज्ञानत्वेऽनन्तरोक्तौ त्वं पक्षौ संस्मर्तुमर्हसि ॥ १३६ ॥ सिद्धिः स्यात्स्वात्मलाभश्चेद्यत्नस्तत्र निरर्थकः । सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्स्वहेतुभ्यस्तु वस्तुनः ॥ १३७ ॥ 136, 137. Does substantiation¹ mean being known, being endowed with existence or anything else² ? You should remember the two alternatives spoken of in the previous verse if it means 'being known'. As it is well-known that all things come to existence from their causes no effort (by way of the application of an evidence³) is necessary for substantiation. ज्ञानज्ञेयादिवादेऽतः सिद्धिर्ज्ञातत्वमुच्यते । अध्यक्ष्याध्यक्षयोः सिद्धिर्ज्ञेयत्वं नात्मलाभता ॥ १३८ ॥ 138. Substantiation, therefore, means 'being known' according to the doctrine in which the knower, knowing and the known are admitted. In the case of both the witness and the witnessed it denotes 'being known' and not 'endowed with existence.' स्पष्टत्वं कर्मकर्त्रादेः सिद्धिता यदि कल्प्यते । स्पष्टताऽस्पष्टते स्यातामन्यस्यैव न चात्मनः ॥ १३९ ॥ 139. If it be assumed⁴ that the distinctness of the agent, the object, etc. is what is substantiation (We ¹ See verse 134 above. ² See verse 139. ³ Even a negative evidence upheld by the objector is not neces- sary. So this alternative is refuted. ⁴ By the Bhâttas.

260 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII say that) there can be distinctness¹ and indistinctness with respect to the other (i.e., the witness) only, but not the agent.² अदृष्टुनैव चान्धस्य स्पष्टीभावो घटस्य तु । कर्त्रादेः स्पष्टतेष्टा चेद्दृष्टनाऽध्यक्षकर्तृता ॥ १४० ॥ 140. There is no distinctness of a jar to a blind man having no power of vision. (It is nothing more than the jar being known.³) If, however, they⁴ want to predicate distinctness about the agent etc., they must admit that Knowingness belongs to the Self.⁵ अनुभूतेः किमन्यस्मिन्स्यात्तवापेक्षया वद । अनुभवितरीष्टा स्यात्सोऽप्यनुभूतिरेव नः ॥ १४१ ॥ 141. Please tell us⁶ what benefit you derive by holding that knowledge depends on other things. If it is contended that dependence (of knowledge) on the knower is desirable (we reply that) the knower also, according to us, is nothing but Knowledge. अभिन्नोऽपि हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः । ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥ १४२ ॥ 142. The intellect itself, though indivisible, is looked upon by deluded people as consisting of the divisions of the knower, knowing and the known. ¹ When the Self is reflected in the intellect etc. ² Because the agent, the object, etc. are non-conscious by nature. ³ Therefore substantiation does not mean distinctness. ⁴ The Bhāṭṭas. ⁵ Different from the agent. Here ends the discussion begun in verse 123 of this chapter. ⁶ The Idealists.

140-145] 'THOU ART THAT' 261 भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारकं सैव चोच्यते । सत्त्वं नाशित्वमस्याश्चेत्सकर्तृत्वं तथेष्यताम् ॥ १४३ ॥ 143. Actions, agents etc. consist, according to us, (Idealists), of knowledge only. (Reply). You must accept an agent of this know- ledge if you admit its existence and destruction (every moment).¹ न कश्चिच्चेष्यते धर्म इति चेत्पक्षहानता । नन्वस्तित्वादयो धर्मा नास्तित्वादिनिवृत्तयः । न भूतेस्तर्हि नाशित्वं स्वालक्षण्यं मतं हि ते ॥ १४४ ॥ 144. Your own conclusion is given up if you do not admit any quality² (belonging to knowledge). (Objection). The qualities of existence etc. are nothing but the nega- tion of their non-existence and so on. (Reply). Even then knowledge cannot be liable to destruction (every moment) as it is self-existent (and known by itself ³) according to you. स्वलक्षणावधिर्नाशो नाशोऽनाशनिवृत्तिता । अगोरसत्त्वं गोत्वं ते न तु तद्गोत्वलक्षणम् ॥ १४५ ॥ 145. Destruction has for its ultimate limit something which is self-existent.⁴ (You say that) destruction ⁵ is ¹ See verse 23, Chap. 16. ² Such as, existence and destruction every moment. ³ In being born and known by itself it requires more than one moment. It cannot, therefore, be called momentary. ⁴ The appearance and disappearance of things are impossible on account of the absence of a permanent entity (according to you) which must be their ultimate limit. Existence and destruction are, therefore, not possible in your philosophy. ⁵ Destruction being impossible, non-destruction also is so.

262 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII the negation of non-destruction. A cow is defined according to you as the non-existence of a non-cow. It cannot be the definition of a cow. क्षणवाच्योऽपि योऽर्थः स्यात्सोऽप्यन्याभाव एव ते ॥ १४६॥ 146. Things denoted by the word ‘momentary’ are also, according to you, only the negation of things that are non-momentary.¹ भेदाभावेऽप्यभावस्य भेदो नामभिरिष्यते । नामभेदैरनेकत्वमेकस्य स्यात्कथं तव ॥ १४७ ॥ 147. (The Idealists). As there cannot be any dif- ference in non-existence² differences are due to names only. (Reply). Please, tell me how there can be manyness in one (indivisible non-existence) due only to different names. अपोहो यदि भिन्नानां वृत्तिस्तस्य कथं गवि । नाभावा भेदकाः सर्वे विशेषा वा कथंचन ॥ १४८ ॥ 148. How³ can the negation (of a non-cow) denote a cow if by the word negation the negation of different things is meant ? (Again) no negation⁴ distinguishes one thing from another, nor can special properties⁵ do it. ¹ You have, therefore, to accept a permanent real entity. ² The Idealist means to say that his negation is not that of a reality. ³ For there is no limit to the number of things denoted by the word non-cow. All of them cannot, therefore, be known. So a cow cannot be defined. ⁴ E.g., the negation of a horse or that of a goat does not distinguish a cow from either of them. ⁵ E.g., hornlessness etc. See the next verse.

146-152] 'THOU ART THAT' 263 नामजात्यादयो यद्वत्संविदस्तद्विशेषतः ॥ १४९ ॥ 149. Just as names, species, etc. do not qualify Knowledge) according to you as it has no special properties, (so, the negation of a non-cow, hornless- ness etc. do not qualify a cow). प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा व्यवहारे यदिच्छसि । क्रियाकारकभेदैस्तदभ्युपेयं ध्रुवं भवेत् ॥ १५० ॥ 150. You have to admit difference as you have to accept sense-perception and inference consisting of actions, agents and so on in everyday life. तस्मान्नीलं तथा पीतं घटादिर्वा विशेषणम् । संविदस्तदुपैयं स्याद्येन चाप्यनुभूयते ॥ १५१ ॥ 151. Entities qualifying knowledge such as, jars, blue, yellow, etc. and also the knower by which these are known must be accepted.¹ रूपादीनां यथान्यः स्याद्ग्राह्यत्वादग्राहकस्तथा । प्रत्ययस्तत्तथान्यः स्याद्व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ॥ १५२ ॥ 152. Just as the perceiver is different from colours etc. which are perceivable, so, the Knower, the Self, is different from the modifications of the intellect which are knowable. (Again) just as a lamp revealing things ¹ Here ends the refutation of the Idealists begun in verse 141 above. Hence in addition to knowledge the knower and the known also must be accepted. See verses 141 and 142.

264 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII is different from them, so, the Knower is different from things known. अध्यक्षस्य दृशेः कीदृक्संबन्धः संभविष्यति । अध्यक्षेग¹ तु दृश्येन मुक्त्वान्यो द्रष्टृदृश्यताम् ॥ १५३ ॥ अध्यक्षेण कृता दृष्टिर्दृश्यं व्याप्नोत्यथापि वा । नित्याध्यक्षकृतः कश्चिदुपकारो भवेद्धियाम् ॥ १५४ ॥ 153, 154. What other relation except that of the seer and the seen can there be between the Self, the Witness and the modifications of the intellect witnessed by It ? (Question :) Does the consciousness of the Self pervade the modifications (really² or apparently) ? (Answer). If apparently, the eternal Self must be of some utility³ to the intellect. स चोक्तस्तन्निभत्वं प्राक्संव्याप्तिश्च घटादिषु । यथालोकादिसंव्याप्तिर्व्यञ्जकत्वाद्धियस्तथा ॥ १५५ ॥ 155. It has been said before⁴ that the benefit derived from (the proximity of) the Self by the intellect is that it appears conscious like the former. Being a revealer the intellect⁵ pervading objects like light and so on pervading jars etc. आलोकस्थो घटो यद्वद्बुद्ध्यारूढो भवेत्तथा । धीव्याप्तिः स्याद्घटारोहो धियो व्याप्तौ क्रमो भवेत् ॥ १५६ ॥ ¹ The reading should perhaps be अध्यक्षेण. ² Real pervasion is impossible as the Self is changeless. ³ See the following verse. ⁴ Verse 87 above. ⁵ The Self is thus related to external objects through Its reflection.

153-159] ' THOU ART THAT ' 265 156. Just as a jar ¹ placed in the sun may be said to be mounted on light, so, an object in the intellect may be said to be mounted on it. Being mounted is nothing but being pervaded by the intellect. Objects become pervaded by the intellect one after another. पूर्वं स्यात्प्रत्ययव्याप्तिस्तततोऽनुग्रह आत्मनः । कृत्स्नाध्यक्षस्य नो युक्तः कालाकाशादिवत्क्रमः ॥ १५७ ॥ 157. The intellect pervades an object (and assumes its form) when the object is revealed through the help (i.e., the reflection) of the Self. Like time and space the all-pervading Self ² can have no order or succession (in pervading objects). विषयग्रहणं यस्य कारणापेक्षया भवेत् । सत्येवं ग्राह्यशेषे च परिणामी स चित्तवत् ॥ १५८ ॥ 158. A thing like the intellect that depends on the agent etc. in pervading its objects (and does not pervade all objects at the same time,) some being always Ieft unpervaded, is liable to transformation. अध्यक्षोऽहमिति ज्ञानं बुद्धेरेव विनिश्चयः । नाध्यक्षस्याविशेषत्वान्न तस्यास्ति परो यतः ॥ १५९ ॥ 159. It is to the intellect and not to the Self which is immutable that the knowledge, 'I am Brahman' ¹ See verse 6, chap. 14. ² See verse 7, chap. 14.

266 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII belongs. Moreover the Self is changeless because ¹ It has no other witness. कर्त्रा चेदहमित्येवमनुभूयेत मुक्तता । सुखदुःखविनिर्मोक्षो नाहंकर्तरि युज्यते ॥ १६० ॥ 160. If the agent, the ego, were to feel ' I am liberated ' ² freedom from pain and pleasure would not be reasonable ³ with respect to it. बाध्यते प्रत्ययेनेह विवेकेनाविवेकवान् । देहादावभिमानोत्थो दुःखीति प्रत्ययो ध्रुवम् । कुण्डलीप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रत्यगात्माभिमानिना ॥ १६१ ॥ विपर्ययेऽसदन्तं स्यात्प्रमाणस्याप्रमाणतः ॥ १६२ ॥ 161, 162. The wrong knowledge that one is happy or unhappy due to one's identification with the body etc., like the pleasure or sorrow due to the possession or loss of an ear-ring, is surely negated by the right knowledge that one is Pure Consciousness. An evidence becoming non-evidence, everything will end in non-existence in the reverse case.⁴ दाहच्छेदविनाशेषु दुःखित्वं नान्यथात्मनः । नैव ह्यन्यस्य दाह्यादावन्यो दुःखी भवेत्क्वचित् ॥ १६३ ॥ 163. One feels pain when one's body gets burnt, cut or destroyed, (because one identifies oneself with ¹ It is only changeful things that can have a witness. If a witness of the Self is assumed there will be a regressus ad infinitum. ² Liberation, the result, apparently belongs to the Self. (See verses 107, 108 and 109 above.) ³ For an agent is always connected with pain and pleasure. ⁴ Where wrong knowledge to negate right knowledge.

160-166] ' THOU ART THAT ' 267 it). Otherwise the Self (which is different from the body) is never pained. Owing to there being burns etc. in one man another is not pained. अस्पर्शात्वाददेहत्वान्नाहं दाह्यो यतः सदा । तस्मान्मिथ्याभिमानोत्थं मृते पुत्रे मृतिर्यथा ॥ १६४ ॥ 164. As I am not touched ¹ by anything and do not possess a body I am never susceptible of being burnt. Pain arises from the wrong notion (due to a false identification with the body) like the wrong notion of one being dead at the death of one's son. कुण्डल्यहमिति ह्येतद्बाध्येतैव विवेकिना । दुःखीति प्रत्ययस्तद्वत्केवलाहंधिया सह ॥ १६५ ॥ 165. Just as the wrong notion, 'I possess an ear- ring' is removed when the right ² knowledge regarding it arises, so, the false consciousness, 'I am unhappy' is negated by the right knowledge, 'I am Pure Brahman'. सिद्धे दुःखित्व इष्टं स्यात्तच्छक्तिश्छन्दसात्मनः । मिथ्याभिमानतो दुःखी तेनार्थापादनक्षमः ॥ १६६ ॥ 166. The Self might be freely imagined to have the potentiality of pain in It if It were proved to possess pain at all. One's identification with the body etc. is the cause of the pain felt and is responsible for the idea of such a potentiality existing in It. ¹ Kath. U., 1. 3. 15. ² I.e., an ear-ring is a piece of gold having no connection with a man.

268 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII अस्पर्शोऽपि यथा स्पर्शमचलश्चलनादि च । अविवेकात्तथा दुःखं मानसं चात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ १६७ ॥ 167. Just as, due to indiscrimination, touch and movement are felt to be in the Self (which is devoid of them), so, mental pain is also felt to be in It owing to the same reason). विवेकात्मधिया दुःखं नुद्यते चलनादिवत् । अविवेकस्वभावेन मनो गच्छत्यनिच्छतः ॥ १६८ ॥ तदानुदृश्यते दुःखं नैश्चल्येनैव तस्य तत् । प्रत्यगात्मनि तस्मात्तद्दुःखं नैवोपपद्यते ॥ १६९ ॥ 168, 169. The pain (due to one's identification with the subtle body) comes to an end like movements etc. on one's having the discriminating knowledge (that one is the Innermost Self), coming to an end (when one knows that one is different from the gross body. Un- happiness is seen in one when one's mind roams against one's will on account of Ignorance. But it is not seen in one when the mind is at rest. It is, there- fore, not reasonable that unhappiness is in the inner- most Self. त्वंसतोस्तुल्यनीडत्वान्नीलाश्ववदिदं भवेत् ॥ १७० ॥ 170. The saying, 'Thou art That,' (therefore) implies an indivisible reality,¹ the words 'Thou' and 'That' expressing the same reality (indirectly) like (the words 'blue' and 'horse' in) the sentence,² it is a blue horse.' ¹ Self-Brahman. ² This example is meant to imply an indivisible thing and not a qualified one.

167-173] 'THOU ART THAT' 269 निर्दुःखवाचिना योगात्त्वंशब्दस्य तदर्थता । प्रत्यगात्माभिधानेन तच्छब्दस्य युतेस्तथा ॥ १७१ ॥ 171. The word 'Thou' comes to mean one free from pain on account of its being used (in the same predicament) with the word 'That' which means One eternally devoid of pain. Similarly, used in the same connection with the word 'Thou' meaning the Inner- most Self (which is directly known) the word 'That' also (comes to mean a thing directly known). दशमस्त्वमसीत्येवं वाक्यं स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ १७२ ॥ 172. The sentence, ('Thou art That' produces the immediate knowledge) of Self-Brahman like the say- ing,¹ 'You are the tenth.' स्वार्थस्य ह्यप्रहाणेन विशिष्टार्थसमर्पकौ । प्रत्यगात्मावगम्यन्तौ नान्योऽर्थोऽर्थाद्विरोध्यतः ॥ १७३ ॥ 173. Without giving up their own meanings² the words, ('thou' and 'That') deliver (by implication) a special one³ resulting in the knowledge of Self- Brahman. They do not express any other⁴ meaning contrary to it. ¹ See foot-note 2, verse 3, chap. 12. ² Direct meanings. The direct meaning of the word 'thou' is Pure Consciousness with the intellect and the reflection of Consciousness in it. The direct meaning of the word 'That' is Pure Consciousness with Mâyâ (Primeval Ignorance) and the reflection of Consciousness in it. ³ A Being indivisible and of the nature of Bliss only, Self- Brahman. ⁴ I.e., One connected with or qualified by anything else. See Sankarâchârya's 'Vâkya Vritti' verse 38.

270 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII नवसङ्ख्यापहाराद्धि स्वात्मानं दशपूरणम् । अपश्यञ्ज्ञातुमेवेच्छेत्स्वमात्मानं जनस्तथा ॥ १७४ ॥ अविद्याबद्धचक्षुष्ट्वात्कामापहृतधीः सदा । विविक्तं दृशिमात्मानं नेक्षते दशमं यथा ॥ १७५ ॥ 174, 175. Just as misled by the number nine the boy¹ did not know the truth i.e., himself and wanted to know himself, so, one does not see one's own Self, the Witness, though detached from the non- Self and self-evident, on account of one's eyes be- ing covered by Ignorance and intellect captivated by desires. दशमस्त्वमसीत्येवं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यतः । स्वमात्मानं विजानाति कृत्स्नान्तःकरणेक्षणम् ॥ १७६ ॥ 176. One knows one's own Self, the witness of the intellect² and all its modifications, from sentences such as, ‘Thou art That’ like the boy who knew himself from the sentence, ‘You are the tenth.’ इदं पूर्वमिदं पश्चात्पदं वाक्यं भवेदिति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ततो वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ॥ १७७ ॥ वाक्ये हि श्रूयमाणानां पदानामर्थसंस्मृतिः । नियमो नैव वेदेऽस्ति पदसांगत्यमर्थतः ॥ १७८ ॥ 177, 178. The understanding of sentences ¹ is possible (on the knowledge of the implied meanings of the words) after it has been ascertained by the method of ¹ See foot-note 2, verse 3, chapter 12. ² Including the ego. ³ I.e., the understanding of the meaning of the word 'Thou' to be the meaning of the word 'That'.

174-180] ‘ THOU ART THAT 271 agreement and contrariety which words should be placed first ¹ and which next. For the order of words in Vedic sentences follows ² the meaning of the sentences. No rule about (the order of) remembering the meanings of words in sentences holds good in the Vedas. यदा नित्येषु वाक्येषु पदार्थस्तु विविच्यते । वाक्यार्थज्ञानसंक्रान्त्यै तदा प्रश्नो न युज्यते ॥ १७९ ॥ 179. The question ³ is out of place when the mean- ings of words in sentences ⁴ having fixed meanings are made clear ⁵ in order that the meanings of sentences may be comprehended. अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिः पदार्थस्मरणाय तु । स्मृत्यभावे न वाक्यार्थो ज्ञातुं शक्यो हि केनचित् ॥ १८० ॥ 180. The method of agreement ⁶ and contrariety is spoken of in order that one may be acquainted with the (implied) meanings of words. For no one can know the meaning of a sentence without knowing (the mean- ings of the words in it). ¹ In construing sentences we place the words having known meanings, 'I', 'thou', etc. first and 'That,' 'Brahman', etc. next, which have unknown meanings. ² In the Vedic statement, 'oblations should be offered to fire', 'barley gruel should be cooked', though offering of oblations precedes it is done next; for the offerings must be made with the cooked gruel. Such is the case with the words 'That' and 'thou' in the sentence 'That thou art' (तत्त्वमसि). ³ How one is Brahman. ⁴ 'Thou art That' etc. ⁵ By the method of agreement and contrariety. See verse 96 above. ⁶ See verse 96 above.