वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 7. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 333 points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on its part per force ¹, still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause. Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls, merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for en- joyment or emancipation, while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said: What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires ful- filled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed out under the aphorism. "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport" (Br. Sū. 2 1.32). Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt") the sense is On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself', just like the statement 'The ether is running'. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. SŪTRA 7 "IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE, (WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move, or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna, ---(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision, but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan ¹ I.e. somehow or other.