वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335 SŪTRA 8 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON- DERANT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi- librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer- rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi- bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans- formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde- pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde- pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans- formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder- ance (of the guṇas). It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,— for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta- neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter- native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse without a cause, and also because of the following inference: Whatever has a cause has lapse, like seeds and the rest. Whatever has no cause has no lapse, like the soul.