भारतकोश
वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

Vedanta Parijata Saurabha of Nimbarkacharya with Commentary

भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य (टीकाकार: श्रीश्रीनिवासचार्य - वेदान्तकौस्तुभ सहित) द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished906 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 369, कुल 906 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 369

[SŪ. 2. 2. 18. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 349 sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non- admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible Vedānta-kaustubha Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects, holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause of the world He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic doctrine Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of the world to be of various kinds ¹, and hence he has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the ‘great’.² Now, the doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on account of its similarity to that.³ The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently, four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra, and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the reality of external objects Among them, again, the first maintains that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him, external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams. All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momen- tary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like the lamp itself, this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the ¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms. ² Vide Br Sū 2.2 17. ³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the Vaiśeṣikas.