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वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

Vedanta Parijata Saurabha of Nimbarkacharya with Commentary

भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य (टीकाकार: श्रीश्रीनिवासचार्य - वेदान्तकौस्तुभ सहित) द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished906 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 374, कुल 906 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 374

[SŪ 2. 2. 21. 354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More- over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned. SŪTRA 21 "(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS- NESS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non- existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi- tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be "simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness! Vedānta-kaustubha The author condemns the causeless origin of effects. If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the "contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the "contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;