वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32. ADH. 5.] With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. "And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,— because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture. Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5). COMPARISON Śaṁkara Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.¹ Bhāskara This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.² ¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558. ² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number), p. 125.