वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 41 ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 381 relation with a body, and no objection can be raised here,—(we reply:) no. "On account of enjoyment and the rest." The sense is this: If like the individual soul, the Lord, too, has such a relation with a body, then all the faults like experiencing pleasure and pain, and thereby being the agent of good or bad actions and the rest must pertain to Him also. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and others Interpretation different, viz. "If it be argued: As in the case of sense-organs, (we reply:) no, on account of enjoyment and the rest". That is, if it be argued that the Lord rules over pradhāna in the same way as the individual soul rules over its sense-organs,—we point out: In that case the Lord Himself must undergo pleasure and pain ¹ At the end of this sūtra, Śaṁkara gives an alternative explanation of this and the immediately preceding sūtras and this explanation tallies with that of Nimbārka. SŪTRA 41 "(THERE WILL RESULT ON THIS VIEW) FINITUDE OR NON- OMNISCIENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If there be a connection between Him and the unseen principle,² consisting in merit and the rest, then there must be "finitude" and "non-omniscience" (on His part). Vedānta-kaustubha It cannot be said also: What objection can there be if enjoyment and the rest result on the part of the Lord? What can a snow-flake do when fallen on the sun?—for it is unreasonable. On account of performing good and bad deeds, due to nescience and the cause of transmigratory existence, and of undergoing their consequences, there must of course result "finitude", i.e. liability to being created, ¹ Ś.B. 2.2.40, p. 570, Śrī. B. 2.2.37, p. 113, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.2.36 (written as 2.2.39), p. 128; Śk. B. 2.2.37, p. 108, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.40. ² Adṛṣṭa.