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288 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "The begin- ing" (Sūtras 14-19) SŪTRA 14 "(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT (VIZ THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts. '"The effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 ¹), '"All this has that for its soul. That is true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3– 6.16.3 ²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd 3.14.1 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non- difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the part of the former), has been established under the aphorism. "If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent, (we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br Sū. 2.1 7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵ The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows: There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect, or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from ¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ³ R. ⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1 18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc. K S.S. ⁵ This is the doctrine of Asat-kāryya-vāda.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 14. ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 289 Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that, viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms, and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "āram- bhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is, on account of the texts. '"The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd 6.1.4), '"The exis- tent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate" He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul. That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity. Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word 'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows. The Chāndogas, having made an initial statement to the effect that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"' (Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage: '"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since 1 The passage is "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttikēty eva satyam". 19

290 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 1. 14. ADH. 6.] they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes 'has its beginning in speech', i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two kinds: 'effect', i e. meaning, and 'name', i.e word. The function of speech rests on these two, viz meaning and word, e.g. we say: 'Fetch water by the pot'. Hence, 'the truth' is that the evolute, characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, having the name 'pot', and conducive to the function of fetching water and so on, is 'just clay'. That is, the view that the effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind and the rest which are different from clay.¹ If the effect is to originate from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of the agent. So desist from further arguments COMPARISON Śaṃkara Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection. Śaṃkara understands the word "Ananyatva" as absolute identity, interprets the word 'vācārambhaṇa' to mean 'that which begins from speech only, but does not exist in reality', and thereby develops his theory of Vivarta at great length ² Rāmānuja He understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference, like Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body relation between Brahman and the universe.³ He interprets the phrase: "vācārambhaṇa" as follows: 'vācā' means: on account of speech, i.e on account of activity preceded by speech; 'rambhaṇa' means: what is touched. Hence the text means. On account of speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of ¹ If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and every- thing, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so. ² "Vācaiva kevalaṁ asti . . . . na tu vastu-vṛttena vikāraḥ kaścid asti", etc. Ś.B. 2.1 14, p. 464. ³ Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

[Sū. 2. 1. 15. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 291 water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.¹ Bhāskara He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference. He criticizes the Śaṁkarite view at length and insists on the reality of difference,² and interprets the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” like Śrīnivāsa. Śrīkaṇṭha He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.³ He explains the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” in the next sūtra, and gives two alternative explanations, viz. “That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity”.⁴ Hence, the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions ‘Fetch water in a pot’ and so on. The second explanation is: “That which has speech for its beginning”.⁵ Hence the text means that an effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: ‘This is a pot’, i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes, but is not a separate substance from the clay. SŪTRA 15 “AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent. 1 “Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśate,” etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2. 2 Bh. B. 2 1.14, pp. 93 et seq. 3 ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8. 4 “Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārasya niṣpādakaṁ bhavati.” Op. cit. 2.1 16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8. 5 Vāgārambha-viṣaya-mātram. Op. cit.

292 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1 16. ADH. 6.] Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause between the effect and the cause Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect and the cause ? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text '"These beings, my dear, have the existent as their root"' (Chānd. 6.8 4). COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. "And because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)" That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and not the clay.¹ SŪTRA 16 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account of the existence" of the effect,—belonging to a pos- terior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence in the text: "Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning" (Bṛh. 1 4.10 ²), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause. "On account of the existence" of the effect,—which is "posterior" and denoted by the term 'this',—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence, in the texts '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "Brahman, verily, was this ¹ Śrī B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2 1 16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B 2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2. ² Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 1. 17. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 293 in the beginning” (Bṛh 1 4.10), the non-difference between the effect and the cause is definitely ascertained COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 17 in both They read “aparasya” in place of “avarasya” and take it to mean ‘an effect’.¹ SŪTRA 17 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER TEXT” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent” in the passage. “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ²), the effect does not exist prior to creation,— (We reply:) “no”. There is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known? “From the complementary passage,” viz. “That was existent” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ³), “from the reasoning”, viz. if a previously non- existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley- sprout from fire? “and from another text”, viz. ‘The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning’ (Chānd 6.2.1 ⁴). Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected· The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its ¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8. ² Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: “Asad eva”. Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175. ³ Ś, Bh. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

294 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2 1. 17. ADH. 6.] non-existence prior to creation, in the text · "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19 1),— (We reply ·) "no", why ? Because there is "such a designation" "on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having name and form unmanifest is different from the attibute of having name and form manifest, and it is because of this different attribute that the world is designated thus in the text · "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd 3 19.1), but is never denoted to be non-existent by nature If it be asked Whence is this known ? We reply · 'From the complementary passage.' For the complementary passage · "That was existent" (Chānd. 3 19 1), refers to the topic of our discussion, viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with name and form unmanifest. The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the effect, viz "From reasoning" That is, the existence of the effect is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained ? We reply: On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay that is existent Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,— (we reply .) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest, hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before ¹ It should be known that, on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not un- precedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand, does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,— for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight, ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Vide V.K 1.3 28–30.

[sū. 2. 1. 17. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 295 a different weight is never found.¹ Likewise, the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect ² is unreasonable. The activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz. digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz the pot and the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the conse- quence will be the origin of the pot through mere activity, even in the absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the wise. The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable. The author states once more another reason for the existence of the effect, thus "And from another text". The other text is the text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz. " 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' " (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is other than the above quoted text, viz: 'The non-existent, verily, was the beginning" (Chānd 3.19.1) Because of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense COMPARISON Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asad- vyapadeśāt . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".³ Interpretation same. ¹ I e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different. ² Asat-kārya-vāda. ³ Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17 and 18.

296 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 18-19. ADH. 6 ] SŪTRA 18 "AND LIKE A PIECE OF CLOTH." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Just as a piece of cloth is at first rolled up, and afterwards spread out, so is the universe. Vedānta-kaustubha The sense is : Just as a piece of rolled up cloth, although not known to be a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, become non-existent, but is indeed existent, existing in a different form, and when spread out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth,—so, indeed, prior to creation, the universe remains existent indeed, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation, having its name and form manifest. Just as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not perceived, even though existent, but do not become non-existent thereby and are known when stretched out again; and just as the banyan tree, existent in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form, is manifested in a gross form, so it is the pre-existent universe alone which originates, in accordance with the Mahā-bhārata passage: "Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, draws them in again, so the soul of beings, having created beings, destroys them again" (Mahā 12.7072b-7073a 1) and the Viṣṇu-purāṇa passage "Just as a gigantic banyan tree is contained in a small seed, so is the entire universe in you, the seed, during (the state of) contraction (viz dissolution)". (V.P 1 12.666–67a 2.) SŪTRA 19 "AND JUST LIKE THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Just as the vital-breath, having the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, etc. remains in its real form; and 1 P. 615, lines 24-25, vol 3. Reading: "sṛṣṭāni harate". Vaṅgavāsī ed. also, p. 1571. 2 P. 108.

[sū. 2. 1. 20. ADH 7 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 297 when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective forms,—so here too Vedānta-kaustubha The sense is Just as the vital-breath, having modes like the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, is existent indeed, though not known in the special forms of the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, and when freed from the control is known clearly in those respective forms,—so the effect, with its name and form un- manifest prior to creation, is not known through those respective names and forms Hence it is established that the world is true like Brahman, having Him for its material cause, and is non-different from Brahman, though different from Him. Here ends the section entitled "The beginning" (6). Adhikaraṇa 7. The section entitled "The desig- nation of another". (Sūtras 20–22) PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 20) SŪTRA 20 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER, THERE IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAULTS LIKE NOT DOING WHAT IS BENEFICIAL AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An objection is raised. Since on the doctrine of the causality of Brahman the individual soul is established to be Brahman in the pass- age: "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9 ¹), there result "faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest" by reason of Brahman's creating the world, which is an abode of all miseries Vedānta-kaustubha The view that there is an absolute difference between the cause and the effect has been disposed of above. Now, since there can be no ¹ R. ŚK.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 20. 298 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 7.] suspicion of an absolute non-difference between the Sentient Being and the non-sentient, the author is here refuting only the view of those who suppose that there is an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul.¹ It may be objected: If Brahman be the creator of the world which is the site of the three kinds of miseries, there must be the "consequence of the fault of not doing what is beneficial". By the term "and the rest" (in the sūtra) the fault of doing what is not bene- ficial is understood. Why? "On account of the designation of another," i.e. on account of the designation of the individual soul as Brahman in the passage · ‘"Thou art that"’ (Chānd 6.8.7; 6.9.4, etc.), "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9) and so on. The sense is that the transmigratory soul, performing good and bad deeds and undergoing threefold pains, is not other than Brahman. Hence the stated faults must result on the part of Brahman, not subject to transmigratory existence COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but unlike Nimbārka continues it up to sūtra 33 (32 in Nimbārka). He takes this adhikaraṇa as concerned with showing that the Brahman, and not the individual soul, is the cause of the world. Thus, first, he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a prima facie view (as according to Nimbārka), thus: "There will be the consequences of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator of the world)".² That is, if the individual soul were the creator of the world, it would not have created a world so full of miseries. Hence, Brahman, not the individual soul, must be the creator. ¹ I.e. the author is not trying to remove the suspicion of an absolute non- difference between Brahman and the material world,—since none is so foolish as to suppose that a Sentient Being and non-sentient object may be absolutely identical—but he is disposing only of the not unnatural belief of an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul ² G.B. 2.1.21, pp. 52-53, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 21. ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 299 CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22) SŪTRA 21 “BUT (BRAHMAN IS) SOMETHING MORE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATION OF DIFFERENCE ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The refutation of this is as follows. We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is “some- thing more” than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. “On account of the designation of difference” in the passage “Who rules the soul within” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹), there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial Vedānta-kaustubha With regard to this prima facie view, the author states the correct conclusion. The word “but” disposes of the prima facie view. Since we hold that Brahman,—omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, without an equal or a superior, and the one identical material and efficient cause of the world,—is “something more”, i.e. superior to the embodied soul, the question of not doing what is beneficial does not arise. The reason of His being something more is stated in the phrase: “On account of the indication of difference”, i.e. on account of the indication of a difference between Brahman and the individual soul in the passages: ‘“O, the self, verily, should be seen”’ (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1), ‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30). The sense is this: Just as in the passage: ‘All this, verily is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), it being impossible for the group of the non-sentient to be non-different from Brahman, its difference from Brahman is admitted by the phrase ‘emanating from Him’ ² so it being impossible for the ¹ P 1074, line 18. R. ² The passage is: “All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him” (Chānd. 3.14.1).

[sū. 2. 1 22. 300 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7 ] individual soul, too, to be by nature non-different from Brahman on the authority of the stated scriptural text designating difference, it is declared to be non-different from Brahman, by such texts like ‘“Thou art that”’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), only as having no existence and activity independently of Brahman, but not by nature. Thus, on account of the designation of difference, in spite of there being a non-difference between the two, faults like doing what is not bene- ficial do not arise. COMPARISON Śaṃkara Interpretation same, but in conclusion he adds, as usual, the explanation that it is only from the empirical point of view that we can speak of creation of a difference between the individual soul and Brahman, but from the transcendental point of view no question of creation arises at all 1 CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 22 “AND (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS ARE) LIKE STONES AND THE REST, THERE IS IMPOSSIBILITY OF THAT” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non- different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some peculiar qualities of its own. Hence, the allegation by the opponent is an “impossible” one. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the stones like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modifications of the earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth, are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do, their peculiar natures,—so is the case here. By the term “and the rest” the 1 “Tatra kuta eva sṛṣṭiḥ, kuto' vā hita-karaṇādayo doṣāḥ?” Ś.B. 2.1.22, p. 484.

[sū. 2 1 22. ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 301 modifications of the tree, such as the leaf and so on, are to be understood. That is, just as the leaf, though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case here. Or else, by the term "and the rest", the ray of the diamond and the rest is understood, for the ray, though non-different from the diamond, etc., is yet found to be different. Hence, just as the ray, though non-different from its substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul. Hence, the respective difference between what is subject to transmigratory existence (viz the individual soul) and what is not, (viz. Brahman) being thus established, there is no inconsistency here. Hence "there is impossibility of that", i.e. there is no possibility of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, as alleged by the opponent. Thus, it is established that there no contradiction is involved in our view. Hence ends the section entitled "The designation of another" (7). COMPARISON Rāmānuja This is sūtra 23 in Rāmānuja's commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Just (as it is impossible for non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest (to be identical with Brahman, so) there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an identity between the individual soul and Brahman)".¹ Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 23 in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary too. "(Since the individual soul, possessed of little knowledge, is declared to be belonging to an absolutely different category from Brahman, the omniscient), just as (non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an absolute identity between the individual soul and Brahman)."² ¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.23, p. 53, Part 2 ² ŚK. B. 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

302 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 23. ADH. 8.] Baladeva This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. "(Since the individual soul, though sentient, is dependent) like (non-sentient objects like) stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of the individual souls being the creator of the world)." 1 Adhikarana 8: The section entitled "The Obser- vation of Collection". (Sūtras 23-24) SŪTRA 23 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF COLLECTION, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD), (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR (HE TRANSFORMS HIMSELF) LIKE MILK." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that "on account of the observation of the col- lection" of many implements by potters and others, Brahman, who is without any external implement, is not the cause of the world— (we reply:) "no", since Brahman transforms Himself "like milk", possessing, as He does, powers peculiar to Him alone. Vedānta-kaustubha The objection, viz. if the universal Lord, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, the soul of all, and without an equal or a superior, be the creator of the world, there arises the faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, has been refuted above on the ground that the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman as having Him as its soul, is yet subject to transmigratory existence as subject to beginningless karmas, and thus different from Him by nature. Now, the author is disposing of the following objec- tion, viz. that Brahman is not the creator of the world on account of the absence of the collection of external implements. The words "and the rest" are to be supplied from the last aphorism. The word "for" denotes the reason. 1 G.B. 2.1.23, p. 56, Chap. 2.

[SŪ 2. 1. 23. ADH. 8] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 303 If it be objected. In ordinary life, it is always found that external implements like stick and so on are employed for the production of effects like pots, etc. Hence, Brahman who has no helpers, is not the creator of the world To the question: Whence is this known ? We reply. That Brahman is without any helpers is definitely ascer- tained from the following texts, designating the impossibility of the existence of any kind of agent in the beginning: " 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second' " (Chānd. 6.2 1), 'There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one' (Mahā Up. 1.2), "Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, the absolute",— (We reply.) "no". Why? "Because" Brahman is "like milk" Just as in ordinary life milk, water and the rest are transformed into the form of effects like sour milk, ice and so on,—there is no external implement here,—so Brahman, possessed of the sentient and the non- sentient as His powers, is capable of being the one identical material and efficient cause of the world through His very nature He has not to depend on the collection of accessories for creating the world, as declared by the text: "Supreme is His power, declared to be mani- fold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and power" (Śvet 6 8). Whey, on the other hand, is sometimes mixed with milk, simply for giving a certain flavour to it, and not for making it turn sour,¹ because we find that milk turns sour even when whey is absent from it, and that water and the rest do not turn into sour milk even when whey is present in them. It is because the potters and others are mere efficient causes that they have to depend on clay, etc. for making pots, etc.; and it is because they lack the requisite power that they have to depend on the stick, the wheel and so on. Although the facts mentioned in the Veda are ever-established, yet objections are being raised against them again and again for removing the doubts of those who are entitled to the study of it, for silencing the opponent and for making one understand the meaning of the Veda without a vestige of doubt. ¹ This replies to the objection, viz. that the above example of milk is not to the point, since milk is not transformed into sour milk by itself, but has to depend on whey

[SŪ. 2. 1. 24. 304 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 8] COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "If it be objected that on account of the observation of the completion (of a piece of work by the individual soul,) (it cannot be likened to inert stones and the rest, but is a free agent), (we reply) no, for (the soul's power of action is) like (the cow's power of producing) milk".¹ That is, although the soul is an agent and can as such bring works to completion, yet it is not an independent agent, but has to depend on the Lord for its activities, just as the cow cannot by herself produce milk, but has to depend on the life-energy. SŪTRA 24 “AS IN THE CASE OF THE GODS AND THE REST TOO IN (THEIR WORLD.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Just as the gods and the rest create what they want through a mere wish, so does the Lord too. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. Milk and the rest are non-sentient, while Brahman is sentient; as such, the examples cited are not to the point,— the author replies here. The word "too" suggests the possibility of an analogy with the sentient. The case in hand is analogous not merely to that of non- sentient objects, like milk, etc. as shown above, but is also analogous to that of the sentient, known from Scripture to be the power of the Lord. Just as "in the world", i.e. in the world of the gods and the rest, or in Scripture,—the cause of the beholding of all objects,—the gods, the fathers, the sages, the Nāgas and the rest, celebrated to be possessed of great powers, are found to create the objects which they want, as befitting time and need, through a mere wish; just as a spider acts by itself alone independently of any external implement, so the Highest Person, celebrated in all the worlds and Vedas as possessed of great ¹ G B. 2.1.4, pp 56-57, Chap. 1.

[sū. 2. 1. 25. ADH 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 305 powers, omniscient, omnipotent and having true resolves, creates the whole group of effects through a mere wish. Hence, it is established that no contradiction is involved in our view simply because certain well-known implements are found employed in ordinary creations. Here ends the section entitled "The observation of collection" (8). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. (The Lord though invisible, is the creator of the world,) just as the gods too (though invisible, are seen to work) in the world, (i.e. to produce rain and so on).¹ Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The con- sequence of the entire". (Sūtras 25-30) PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 25) SŪTRA 25 "(IF BRAHMAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD, THERE WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENTIRE (BRAHMAN BEING TRANSFORMED INTO THE WORLD), OR THE VIOLATION OF THE TEXT ABOUT (BRAHMAN'S) HAVING NO PARTS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An objection is raised:— If Brahman be the material cause of the world, then if He be admitted to be without parts, there will be the "consequence of the entire" (Brahman being transformed into the world); if possessed of parts, then the scriptural texts about His having no parts will be contradicted. 1 G.B. 2.1.25. 20

[SŪ. 2. 1. 25. 306 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.] Vedānta-kaustubha Anticipating the objection,—viz. If Brahman be transformed into the form of the world absolutely independently of any external im- plement, then let Him not depend on His own powers as well. But since the view that Brahman is the material cause through His mere nature leads to the horns of a dilemma, He cannot reasonably be the material cause; and hence pradhāna alone must be the material cause,—the author is replying to it by pointing out that in the case of Brahman, external implements cannot be admitted, as they are not mentioned in Scriptures, and as they will make Brahman a dependent creator, and that His own powers, which are non-different from Him, may very well be admitted, as they have Scripture for their authority. The prima facie view is as follows: Is Brahman,—knowable from the scriptural texts like: ‘ “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second” ’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘The soul, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on, and transformed into the form of the effect,—without parts, or possessed of parts? If it be said: without parts, (we reply.) then the consequence will be that the entire Brahman will become the effect, as in the case of milk; there will not remain a transcendent Brahman, beyond transmigratory existence and to be approached by the freed, the scriptural texts designating Brahman as unintelligible will be con- tradicted; universal release will result, and Brahman will come to possess the attributes of grossness and the rest. If on the other hand, He be admitted to have parts, then there will not arise faults like the entire Brahman being transformed into the world, but the scriptural texts designating that Brahman, the cause of the world, has no parts will come to be contradicted, viz. the texts: “Without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless, stainless” (Śvet 6.19), “For He is the celestial, incorporal Person, the outside and the inside, unborn” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) and so on. So none but pradhāna can be the the cause of the world. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He reads “vyakopa” instead of “Kopa”. Interpretation, too, is different, viz.. he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a prima

[SŪ 2. 1. 26. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 307 facie view, thus: ‘(If the individual soul be the creator of the world), then there will be the consequence of entire (absorption), or the contradiction of the texts (designating its) being without parts’. That is, if the individual soul be the creator, we must conclude that, in as much as it is without parts, its entire self is present in every act. But this is not really the case, e.g. while lifting a blade of grass, the individual soul does not employ its entire force to the act. Or, else we must conclude that the individual soul must be possessed of parts, which also goes against scriptural authority. Hence, we must conclude that the individual soul cannot be the creator.¹ CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 26–30) SŪTRA 26 “BUT (THE ABOVE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE, SINCE (THE FACT THAT BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD IS) BASED ON SCRIPTURE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The stated objection does not hold good. As the truth mentioned in the texts: ‘He wished “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6.²), ‘He Himself created Himself’ (Tait. 2.7.³), ‘He became existent and that’ (Tait. 2.6.⁴), ‘So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person’ (Chānd. 3.12.6.⁵), ‘Just as a spider creates, so from the Person⁶ the Universe originates’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7.⁷) and so on, is based on Scripture itself—anything else has no basis to stand upon. Vedānta-kaustubha The author states the correct conclusion. The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view. The entire Brahman is not transformed, nor is there any violation of texts. Why? “On account of Scripture.” That is, on account of the mass ¹ G.B. 2.1.26, pp. 58-59, Chap. 2. ² Not quoted by others. ³ Op. cit. ⁴ Op. cit. ⁵ Ś. ⁶ Correct quotation: “Tathā akṣarād bhavati iha viśvam”. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.7, p. 9. ⁷ Not quoted by others.