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[SŪ 2. 1. 26. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 307 facie view, thus: ‘(If the individual soul be the creator of the world), then there will be the consequence of entire (absorption), or the contradiction of the texts (designating its) being without parts’. That is, if the individual soul be the creator, we must conclude that, in as much as it is without parts, its entire self is present in every act. But this is not really the case, e.g. while lifting a blade of grass, the individual soul does not employ its entire force to the act. Or, else we must conclude that the individual soul must be possessed of parts, which also goes against scriptural authority. Hence, we must conclude that the individual soul cannot be the creator.¹ CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 26–30) SŪTRA 26 “BUT (THE ABOVE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE, SINCE (THE FACT THAT BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD IS) BASED ON SCRIPTURE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The stated objection does not hold good. As the truth mentioned in the texts: ‘He wished “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6.²), ‘He Himself created Himself’ (Tait. 2.7.³), ‘He became existent and that’ (Tait. 2.6.⁴), ‘So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person’ (Chānd. 3.12.6.⁵), ‘Just as a spider creates, so from the Person⁶ the Universe originates’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7.⁷) and so on, is based on Scripture itself—anything else has no basis to stand upon. Vedānta-kaustubha The author states the correct conclusion. The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view. The entire Brahman is not transformed, nor is there any violation of texts. Why? “On account of Scripture.” That is, on account of the mass ¹ G.B. 2.1.26, pp. 58-59, Chap. 2. ² Not quoted by others. ³ Op. cit. ⁴ Op. cit. ⁵ Ś. ⁶ Correct quotation: “Tathā akṣarād bhavati iha viśvam”. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.7, p. 9. ⁷ Not quoted by others.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 26. 308 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.] of texts which declare that Brahman is the non-different material and efficient cause of the world, different from the world, possessed of powers which are transformed and so on. Such scriptural texts are· He wished “May I be many”' (Tait 2.6), ‘He Himself created Himself’ (Tait. 2.7), ‘He became existent and that’ (Tait 2.6), ‘Having created it, he entered into that very thing’ (Tait. 2.6), ‘That divinity thought: “Very well, let me enter into these three divinities··· (Chānd 6.3 2), ‘Having entered by this living soul’ (Chānd. 6.3.2). ‘Who abiding within the earth, . . from the earth does not know’ (Bṛh 3 7 3), ‘Entered within the ruler of men’ (Tait. Ār 3 11.1, 2¹), ‘So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person’ (Chānd 3.12 6) and so on. There is a Smṛti text as well, viz ‘Having voluntarily entered into prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul), Hari shook the mutable and the immutable at the time of dissolution and creation’ (V.P 1.2.29 ²). Like a spider, Brahman is transformed into the form of the world, without waiting for external helpers. Hence there is no violation of the texts desig- nating Him to be without parts. The scriptural text to this effect is as follows ‘Just as a spider creates and takes, just as hairs on the head and body-hairs arise from a person, and medicinal herbs from the earth, so this universe arises from the Imperishable’ (Muṇḍ 1 1.7). There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: ‘Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, again draws them in, so the Soul of beings, having created beings destroys them again’ (Mahā. 12.7072b–7073a³). Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, is declared to be without parts and without limbs, because He has no parts and limbs as His material cause, as threads are of a piece of cloth. If it be objected. If it be admitted that transformation means the projection of power, then there being no transformation of the real nature of the creator, what is the difference of this view from the views of the Sāṁkhyas and the rest? ⁴—(we reply·) Listen. The

¹ P. 191 ² P. 16. ³ P. 615, lines 24-25, vol 3. Reading “sṛṣṭāni harate”. Vaṅgavāsī ed., also p. 1571. ⁴ I.e. according to the Sāṁkhyas, pradhāna is transformed into the world, while according to the Vedāntins also not Brahman Himself, but His power of the non-sentient (acicchakti)—which is pradhāna—is transformed into the world. Hence the two views come to the same thing.

[Sū. 2. 1. 26. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 309 Sāṁkhyas hold that the material cause of the world is a substance which is different from the puruṣa (or the soul) just as a lump of clay is different from a potter, which does not possess it (viz · puruṣa) as its soul, and which is possessed of independent existence and activity. But Brahman, as admitted by the Vedāntins, is One alone. He transforms Himself into the form of non-sentient objects like the ether and the rest by projecting His power of the enjoyed (i.e. the acit-śakti); having projected the sentient power of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit-śakti) in the form of gods and the rest, and having entered within as their inner controller, makes them undergo the fruits of their respective works; and contracts them during the time of dissolution, as a tortoise does its limbs, and the sun its rays. To the objection, viz. even if there be the collection of external helpers by Brahman, no contradiction arises in the case in hand, and hence pradhāna, established by the Tantra may be the external implement, suitable for the production of the world, just as clay is for the production of a pot What is the use of a transformation consisting in the projection of powers?—the author replies. On this view, there will be contradiction of scriptural texts. This he says in the words: “Because of being based on Scripture”. Transformation consisting in the projection of powers is accepted, based as it is on Scripture. If implements like pradhāna and the rest be admitted, that view will have no basis to stand upon; and the consequence will be that Brahman will have to depend on another for His creation. Further, the following texts will come to be contradicted, viz. ‘All this has that for its soul’ (Chānd 6.8.7 ch.), ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14 1), ‘Which being known, all comes to be known’ and so on,—this is the sense COMPARISON Śaṁkara This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but he adds his usual explanation in conclusion that from the transcen- dental point of view, no question of creation arises at all and hence no question as to how, Brahman, who is partless is yet not transformed in His entirety.¹ 1 Ś B. 2 1.27, p. 491.

310 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 27. ADH 9.] Rāmānuja Interpretation of the word "śabda-mūlatvāt" different,—viz. (The fact that Brahman is possessed of various powers) is based on Scripture 1 According to Nimbārka, it means, as we have seen, "(The fact that Brahman creates the world, yet remains untransformed) is based on Scripture" 2, while according to Śrīnivāsa '(The fact that transformation means nothing but projection of powers) is based on Scripture. Baladeva This is sūtra 27 in his commentary, viz. "(But the above objection does not apply to the case of the Lord, the real creator) on account of Scripture, because (the knowledge of Brahman) is based on Scrip- ture".3 ————— CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 27 “AND SINCE THESE VARIOUS (MODIFICATIONS) (ARE SEEN) IN THE SOUL ALSO.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha When various modifications are appropriate on the part of indivi- dual souls, like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappro- priate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the universe? Vedānta-kaustubha The author is confirming the stated view on the rule of 'how much more'! No wonder that if the creation of the world be due to one who is possessed of true resolves, of inconceivable and infinite powers, and is unchangeable by nature, then faults like entire creator being trans- formed and so on never result,—"since", i e. because "in the soul too", i.e. in the individual soul which has come to attain lordship, "this", i.e. without there resulting any faults like entire transforma- tion, "various" creations are seen in accordance with its own power. ————— 1 Śrī. B. 2.1 29, p. 60, Part 2. 2 This is the interpretation of Saṁkara as well. 3 G.B. 2.1.27, p. 60, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 27. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 311 The second "and" ("ca") is indicative of 'how much more'? (i e. obviousness).¹ To begin with, the forms of swans and the rest, assumed by indivi- dual souls, are well-known in Scripture.² The following Smṛti passages are indicative of the power of the king of gods: 'Now he changes into those particular forms repeatedly. He becomes a bearer of the crest and the thunder-bolt, armed with a bow, and wearing the ear-rings, then in an instant, he comes to look like a Caṇḍāla ³ Then, again, my son, he comes to be clad in bark, with a tuft of hair on the top of his head and matted hair Then he comes to have a large body, becomes fine, likewise stout or thin. Again he changes himself as fair, dark, likewise black, ugly or hand- some, likewise young or old; learned, dull or ignorant, likewise short or long. Then the performer of a hundred sacrifices becomes a high caste or a low caste. He assumes the forms of a parrot or a crow, man or cuckoo, and again assumes the forms of a lion, a tiger or an elephant', and so on The Smṛti passages concerned with power of the sun are as follows: 'The abode of many wonders is the revered Sun, from whom arise all beings, honoured in the three worlds', and so on. Similarly, the creative power of other gods may be known from Scripture itself. The following Smṛti passage is indicative of the power of gods: 'They may make a non-god god, and a god non-god When incensed, they may create rulers of worlds and other worlds'. The following Smṛti passage designates the power Cyavana: 'O, the power of the Brahma-sage Cyavana, the great-soul! The ascetic can create other worlds, simply by wishing, through the power of austerities'. The following Smṛti texts refer to the power of Vasiṣṭha's cow, viz. 'The cow, with her head and neck raised, look terrific, her eyes reddened with anger, and lowing repeatedly. Her body, blazing with anger, shone like mid-day sun. The cow created the Palhavas from her tail in great frequency in the form of the piling up of the ¹ I.e if individual souls are capable of assuming various forms without themselves undergoing modifications, how much more so this must be the case with the Lord, the omnipotent Being. Kaimutyaka-nyāya. ² Vide, e.g. Chānd. 4 1.2, where certain divine sages are said to have assumed the form of swans. For fuller account of this story see V.K. 1.3.34. ³ An outcaste, born from a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.

[sū. 2. 1. 27. 312 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.] charcoal, as it were ¹; the Drāviḍas from her tail; the Śakas from her urine; the Yavanas from her womb, numerous Śabaras from her dung; the Cicukas, the Pulindas, the Cīnas, the Hūṇas, the Sakelaras from her foam as well as the Mlecchas of various kinds' (Mahā. 1.6679b– 6680a, 6682-6683, 6685) and so on. Similarly, other individual souls, too, possess the power of various kinds of creations, which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity, and also because they are not suitable here. Even in eminent indivi- dual souls, the power of creating object is insignificant, befitting their own powers and only given by the Lord. It is not possible for even the freed soul to be the creator of the entire universe. This will be made clear in the aphorism. "Devoid of the activity regarding the universe' (Br Sū. 4.4.17) COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. Interpretation different: viz. And thus in the soul (the attributes of the non-sentient are not found), for there are manifold (powers) (in different objects) That is, we find that the sentient individual soul, which is different from non-sentient objects, does not possess their attributes. Similarly, these non-sentient objects themselves, fire, water and the rest, which are different from one another, do not share one another's attributes, but have manifold attributes. In the very same manner Brahman who is different from both the sentient and the non-sentient does not possess their attributes, but numerous others not found in them.² Baladeva This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. And thus (there are mysterious powers) in the soul (viz. Brahman), because various (powers) (belong to the tree of all desires, or to the philosopher's stone). That is, we believe, on the ground of Scrip- ture alone, that the tree of all desires and the philosopher's stone possess mysterious powers, capable of giving rise to elephants, horses ¹ Aṅgār-iva+ṇamul. Here the suffix 'ṇamul' implies comparison in accord- ance with the rule Pāṇ. 3.4.45. S. K. 3366, p. 714, vol. 2. ² Śrī. B. 2.1.28, pp. 60-61, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2.1.28, p 39, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 28. ADH. 9] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 313 and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground. that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers ? 1 CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 28 “ AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Let our view stand Since the faults mentioned by you rebound to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent. Vedānta-kaustubha The particle “and” (“ca”) is meant for disposing of the doctrines which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṁkhyas and the rest, who maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with our determination of the cause of the world. Why? “Because there is fault in their own views.” Thus, the Sāṁkhyas admit that pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is trans- formed into mahat and the rest This being so, the consequence is that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well. If it be argued There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply ) In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect, like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must be its cause, like threads If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna, already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to 7 G.B 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

314 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 29. ADH 9.] your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise to the world Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are devoid of parts. Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be refuted. COMPARISON All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" 1 Inter- pretation same Baladeva This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṁkhya view, but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him, "And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator, the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent cannot. 2 ―――――― CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 29 "AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN." 3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge 1 G.B. 2.1.29. 2 G.B 2 1.28. 3 C.S S. ed. leaves out the "ca", p 29.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 29. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 315 and power' (Śvet 6.8 ¹), "that" divinity is "endowed with all powers", i. e. is able to do everything. Vedānta-kaustubha The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest Person. The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and others, viz . pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand to reason But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e. endowed with all powers, "and", i e. hence, He alone is capable of being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest Why ? "Because it is seen,—", i.e (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it ("tad"),² viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i e. because of the scriptural texts like 'The own power of the divinity, hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet 1.3), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and action' (Śvet 6 8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd 8.1.5, 8.7 1, 3) and so on; and because of the Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3 2 ³) COMPARISON All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā". Śaṁkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the next sūtra). ¹ R, Śk, B. ² This explains the compound "tad-darśanāt". ³ P 22.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 30. 316 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9 ] CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 30 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY,) THAT HAS BEEN SAID" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs in the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6 8¹), it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.² Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers; still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest; like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on, and like gods and others without implements befitting particular places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects, though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs' on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs from the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)— (We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism: "Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 2.1.26). The meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action, 'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scrip- tural texts to this effect, viz: 'The soul, which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is He' (Tait. 2 7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all tasks' (Chānd 3 14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3 19) and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows: ¹ R, ŚK, B. ² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26. ³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

[sū. 2. 1. 31. ADH. 10] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 317 ‘“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action”’ (Gītā 3 22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion estab- lished by the Vedānta. Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the entire” (9). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.· “that has been answered (by Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upanisad (viz. Śvetāśva- tara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6 8), cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 ¹) Adhikarana 10: The section entitled “Having a need”. (Sūtras 31–35) PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31) SŪTRA 31 “(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the activity of an agent having a need.” ¹ G B 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

318 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 32. ADH. 10.] Vedānta-kaustubha Now, a doubt is raised. Let this be so, yet there being no need on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him. The prima facie view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of the activity of the agent having a need", and on account of there being no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires eternally fulfilled. CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35) SŪTRA 32 "BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO BRAHMAN)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha With regard to it, we reply. Such creation and the rest of the Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known in ordinary life. Vedānta-kaustubha The author is stating the correct conclusion. The particle "but" is for disposing of the prima facie view. Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i e. a mere play with the creation of the universe and so on. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but the phrase: "lokavat" explained a little differently, thus: As in ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the fulness of spirit, so is the case here.¹ Here Baladeva criticizes the

¹ G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1 33. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 319 Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen) by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since the prince gets some pleasure from it.¹ CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 33 "(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves, and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest of the world, as in the case of the cloud. "So" exactly the scriptural text. "One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action" (Bṛh. 3.2.13 ²) "shows". Vedānta-kaustubha It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. He must be open to the charge of "inequality", i.e. of creating an unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like gods, men, animals and so on And, He must be open to the charge of "cruelty", i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings, making the individual souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death, and the rest. (We reply.) No There cannot be any inequality and cruelty on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of (His) having regard", i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has regard for, i.e takes into account, their respective works or karmas, ¹ Op. cit., p. 72. ² Ś, R.

320 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 34. ADH 10.] just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on their respective seeds. If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies: "shows", i.e the holy Scripture shows this thus. 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed; he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed' (Kaus. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds' (Brh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of bad deeds becomes bad' (Brh. 4 4.5). COMPARISON Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikarana here. CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 34 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED ALSO." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that since the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1 ¹) declares the 'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's dependence on the works does not fit in,-(we reply:) "no", as works exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden subsequent creation is unreasonable.² And this is "observed also" in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Rg. V. 10.190.3 ³) and so on. 1 Ś, R, ŚK, B. 2 I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to admit that it arises from a prior creation. 3 Pp. 413-14.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 34. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 321 Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: The reason, viz 'on account of dependence', does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works." That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained. Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diver- sities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,— (We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless" of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in" in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',1 and in accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest and unmanifest effect,2 as well as because a sudden subsequent creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6 1), 'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible, they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been deter- mined to be real 3 In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end' (Cūl. 5 4), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18 5), 'Know prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā 13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient sub- stances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

1 I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot, so it is impossible to say whether karmas are the earlier or the saṁsāra. Hence they are taken to be beginningless. 2 Vide V.K. 2 1 17-18. 3 Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff. 4 Correct quotation: "Anādavatī" Vide p. 230. 5 Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20. 21

322 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 35, ADH. 10.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . . . . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".¹ Bhāskara He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt", (sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).² Baladeva He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. But he takes the first portion only, viz "Na . . anāditvāt" as indicated within the previous adhikarana beginning a new adhikarana with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca", concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in Scripture).³ CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 35 "AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from all contradictions. Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta- pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka. ¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499. ² Bh. B., p. 107. ³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 323 Vedānta-kaustubha "And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes, mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means whatsoever. Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10). Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself. Baladeva This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and myste- rious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹ Résumé The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva. ¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap 2.

324 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] Śamkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17 and 35 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras; while Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya) SECOND QUARTER (Pāda) Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im- possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10) SŪTRA 1 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied "arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is) not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān- tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section, the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents. It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to 1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1. ADH. 1.] dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci- pation to our own view. Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹: "The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven, beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause, nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴; (3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations. Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4. ³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot. The effects are limited. ∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna. I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna. ⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power. Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest. ⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause. Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them ⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution, and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19; also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14. ⁷ P. 18.