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[sū. 2. 1. 28. ADH. 9] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 313 and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground. that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers ? 1 CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 28 “ AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Let our view stand Since the faults mentioned by you rebound to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent. Vedānta-kaustubha The particle “and” (“ca”) is meant for disposing of the doctrines which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṁkhyas and the rest, who maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with our determination of the cause of the world. Why? “Because there is fault in their own views.” Thus, the Sāṁkhyas admit that pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is trans- formed into mahat and the rest This being so, the consequence is that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well. If it be argued There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply ) In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect, like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must be its cause, like threads If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna, already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to 7 G.B 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

314 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 29. ADH 9.] your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise to the world Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are devoid of parts. Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be refuted. COMPARISON All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" 1 Inter- pretation same Baladeva This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṁkhya view, but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him, "And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator, the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent cannot. 2 ―――――― CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 29 "AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN." 3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge 1 G.B. 2.1.29. 2 G.B 2 1.28. 3 C.S S. ed. leaves out the "ca", p 29.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 29. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 315 and power' (Śvet 6.8 ¹), "that" divinity is "endowed with all powers", i. e. is able to do everything. Vedānta-kaustubha The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest Person. The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and others, viz . pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand to reason But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e. endowed with all powers, "and", i e. hence, He alone is capable of being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest Why ? "Because it is seen,—", i.e (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it ("tad"),² viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i e. because of the scriptural texts like 'The own power of the divinity, hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet 1.3), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and action' (Śvet 6 8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd 8.1.5, 8.7 1, 3) and so on; and because of the Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3 2 ³) COMPARISON All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā". Śaṁkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the next sūtra). ¹ R, Śk, B. ² This explains the compound "tad-darśanāt". ³ P 22.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 30. 316 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9 ] CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 30 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY,) THAT HAS BEEN SAID" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs in the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6 8¹), it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.² Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers; still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest; like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on, and like gods and others without implements befitting particular places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects, though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs' on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs from the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)— (We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism: "Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 2.1.26). The meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action, 'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scrip- tural texts to this effect, viz: 'The soul, which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is He' (Tait. 2 7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all tasks' (Chānd 3 14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3 19) and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows: ¹ R, ŚK, B. ² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26. ³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

[sū. 2. 1. 31. ADH. 10] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 317 ‘“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action”’ (Gītā 3 22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion estab- lished by the Vedānta. Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the entire” (9). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.· “that has been answered (by Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upanisad (viz. Śvetāśva- tara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6 8), cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 ¹) Adhikarana 10: The section entitled “Having a need”. (Sūtras 31–35) PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31) SŪTRA 31 “(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the activity of an agent having a need.” ¹ G B 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

318 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 32. ADH. 10.] Vedānta-kaustubha Now, a doubt is raised. Let this be so, yet there being no need on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him. The prima facie view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of the activity of the agent having a need", and on account of there being no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires eternally fulfilled. CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35) SŪTRA 32 "BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO BRAHMAN)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha With regard to it, we reply. Such creation and the rest of the Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known in ordinary life. Vedānta-kaustubha The author is stating the correct conclusion. The particle "but" is for disposing of the prima facie view. Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i e. a mere play with the creation of the universe and so on. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but the phrase: "lokavat" explained a little differently, thus: As in ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the fulness of spirit, so is the case here.¹ Here Baladeva criticizes the

¹ G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1 33. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 319 Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen) by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since the prince gets some pleasure from it.¹ CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 33 "(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves, and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest of the world, as in the case of the cloud. "So" exactly the scriptural text. "One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action" (Bṛh. 3.2.13 ²) "shows". Vedānta-kaustubha It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. He must be open to the charge of "inequality", i.e. of creating an unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like gods, men, animals and so on And, He must be open to the charge of "cruelty", i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings, making the individual souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death, and the rest. (We reply.) No There cannot be any inequality and cruelty on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of (His) having regard", i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has regard for, i.e takes into account, their respective works or karmas, ¹ Op. cit., p. 72. ² Ś, R.

320 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 34. ADH 10.] just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on their respective seeds. If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies: "shows", i.e the holy Scripture shows this thus. 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed; he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed' (Kaus. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds' (Brh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of bad deeds becomes bad' (Brh. 4 4.5). COMPARISON Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikarana here. CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued) SŪTRA 34 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED ALSO." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that since the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1 ¹) declares the 'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's dependence on the works does not fit in,-(we reply:) "no", as works exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden subsequent creation is unreasonable.² And this is "observed also" in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Rg. V. 10.190.3 ³) and so on. 1 Ś, R, ŚK, B. 2 I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to admit that it arises from a prior creation. 3 Pp. 413-14.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 34. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 321 Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: The reason, viz 'on account of dependence', does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works." That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained. Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diver- sities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,— (We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless" of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in" in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',1 and in accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest and unmanifest effect,2 as well as because a sudden subsequent creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6 1), 'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible, they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been deter- mined to be real 3 In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end' (Cūl. 5 4), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18 5), 'Know prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā 13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient sub- stances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

1 I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot, so it is impossible to say whether karmas are the earlier or the saṁsāra. Hence they are taken to be beginningless. 2 Vide V.K. 2 1 17-18. 3 Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff. 4 Correct quotation: "Anādavatī" Vide p. 230. 5 Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20. 21

322 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 35, ADH. 10.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . . . . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".¹ Bhāskara He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt", (sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).² Baladeva He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. But he takes the first portion only, viz "Na . . anāditvāt" as indicated within the previous adhikarana beginning a new adhikarana with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca", concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in Scripture).³ CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 35 "AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from all contradictions. Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta- pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka. ¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499. ² Bh. B., p. 107. ³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 323 Vedānta-kaustubha "And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes, mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means whatsoever. Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10). Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself. Baladeva This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and myste- rious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹ Résumé The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva. ¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap 2.

324 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] Śamkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17 and 35 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras; while Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya) SECOND QUARTER (Pāda) Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im- possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10) SŪTRA 1 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied "arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is) not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān- tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section, the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents. It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to 1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1. ADH. 1.] dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci- pation to our own view. Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹: "The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven, beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause, nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴; (3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations. Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4. ³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot. The effects are limited. ∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna. I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna. ⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power. Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest. ⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause. Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them ⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution, and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19; also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14. ⁷ P. 18.

[sū. 2. 2. 1. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327 Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi- sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly, the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause, so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non- distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause, viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴ On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e. what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,— can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob- jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be created. The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons, intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference ¹ This explains the first reason. ² This explains the second reason. ³ This explains the third reason. ⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

[sū. 2. 2. 2. 328 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.] establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṁkhya, viz. pradhāna):— Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and not having Brah- man for its soul, is non-existent; because it is not perceived. Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent); like the sky-flower Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e. not non-existent); like the sun. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra. SŪTRA 2 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity (on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference, is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action only when superintended by conscious beings.

[sū. 2. 2. 3. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 329 SŪTRA 3 "AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY) LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY.) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE INCITER)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that like milk, etc pradhāna acts for the origin and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply ) that "there too" the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text: "Who abiding within water" (Bṛh 3.7.4 ¹) Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the im- possibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pra- dhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non- sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf, and just as water discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest, and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest, as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sen- tient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the guṇas, is transformed into many forms,— We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being. On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection, and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does not stand to reason,—(we reply.) there is the flow of the milk then by reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the ground of her love for her master.² ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Ś, R, Bh. ² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remem- bers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 4. 330 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.] Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on as dependent on a low ground ¹ and on account of being liquid. Every- thing being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts. 'Who abiding within water' (Bṛh 3.7.4), '"At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, some rivers flow to the east"' (Brh. 3.8 9) and so on. Hence the in- ference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world SŪTRA 4 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (AC- CESSORY), (PRADHĀNA IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON- DEPENDENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence" of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not de- pend on anything else. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Why? "On account of the non- existence of what is different" That is, if pradhāna,—which is not superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non- sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on its part.² Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than pradhāna. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-depen- dence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world, 1 I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground 2 I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 5. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 331 pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because works will then become the cause of the world, because the inde- pendence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally, because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent, too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works, performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna? The fact is that the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: '"Pleasure, pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence, equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone"' (Gītā 10. 4a-5b). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too, must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the aphorism: "As in the case of a man and stone" (Br. Sū. 2.2.7) COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: "Because of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dis- solution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else), (pradhāna is not the cause of the world)".¹ SŪTRA 5 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE GRASS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass ¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8

332 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 6 ADH. 1.] and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause, —the author replies: “No”. This cannot be said Why? “On ac- count of the non-existence elsewhere,” i.e. because “elsewhere”, or in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them, into the form of milk The particle “and” implies that since the transformation of the grass, etc , eaten by cows, into the form of milk is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same SŪTRA 6 “EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “Even if there be the admission” of activity on the part of pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause, since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it being non-sentient. Vedānta-kaustubha It has been said under the aphorism: “And on account of acti- vity” (Br. Sū. 2 2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author