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[SŪ. 1. 1. 2. ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 25 natural powers, denoted by the terms ‘higher’, ‘lower’ and so on, and reduced to a subtle state, as well as of the effects, existent and inherent in them respectively. He is the efficient cause ¹ in the sense of bringing about a union of the sentient beings,—whose attribute of knowledge is in a state of absolute contraction being under the in- fluence of the past impressions of their own karmas which are begin- ningless, and is, thereby, unfit for bringing about the recollection (in their minds) of the retributive experiences (to be undergone in the present birth),—with their respective karmas, and the respective instruments for experiencing them, through manifesting (in them) knowledge, enabling them to experience the fruits of karmas ² There is a Smṛti passage too, conformable to the text dealing with the topic in hand, (i e. the above Taittirīya text, 3.1) in the Mokṣa-dharma ³ It begins. ‘The Scripture which was mentioned by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked’ (Mahā. 12.6769b ⁴), and con- tinues. ‘“He, verily, is the Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inner Soul of all beings, and difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self, who is the creator of the principle of egoity for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here”’ (Mahā 12.6784b– 6786a ⁵). ¹ Nimittatva. ² The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non- sentient into gross effects That is, during dissolution, the entire universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient (cit- śakti and acit-śakti), developing them into grosser effects and producing, thereby, the universe of names and forms. And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective karmas, the results of these karmas, and the instruments for experiencing them—that is, the Lord is the efficient cause in the sense that He regulates the destinies of individual souls in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless im- pressions of past karmas get dimmed and confused; and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past works Vide V.R M., p. 63. ³ ‘Mokṣa-dharma’ is the name of a section of the twelfth book of the Mahā-bhārata, from adhyāya 174 to the end. ⁴ P. 604, line 7, vol. 3. ⁵ Op. cit., lines 22–24.

26 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 2. ADH. 2.] If it be objected:—'In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a multitude of causes is spoken of in the passage: 'Time, nature, destiny, accident, elements and the Person should be known as the Cause' (Śvet. 1.2), so what authority is there for separating specifically Vāsudeva, the Highest Person alone as the cause of the world?—(then we reply:) Listen. A multitude of scriptural and Smṛti passages is our authority for specifying the cause of the world. Compare the following:— 'He, the One, who governs all these causes, connected with time and soul' (Śvet. 1.3), 'He who is a knower, the Time of time, possessed of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2), 'Of whom there is neither a creator, nor a lord' (Śvet. 6.9), 'Verily, Nārāyaṇa was One' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts', 'From Nārāyaṇa is born Brahmā, from Nārāyaṇa is born Rudra' (Nār. 1), 'From the forehead of this being, wrapt up within himself in meditation, was born the Person, with three-eyes, trident in hand' (Mahā. Up. 1.7), 'Kṛṣṇa, the One, the ruler, moving everywhere, is an object of worship, He who, though one, yet appears as many'. '"Ka' is the name of Brahman, I am the 'Īśa', i.e. the Lord, of all beings. We two have sprung up from your body, hence you have the name 'Keśava'", 'I, Brahmā, the primary Lord of people, am born from Him, and you have sprung up from me', 'Kṛṣṇa alone is the source of the worlds, and of their dissolution too', 'Being created by Kṛṣṇa the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient has originated'. 'In the Veda, and in Rāmāyaṇa, verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end, and in the middle' (Hari V. 16232 ¹). '"I am the origin of the entire world, dissolution similarly"' (Gītā 7.6), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"I am the source of everything, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8) and so on. The terms 'Hiraṇyagarbha' and the rest, which we find sometimes in certain texts concerning the origin and so on of the world, should be known to be referring to Brahman. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the Soul of all, the Lord of all, the one topic of all the Vedas, is the cause of the world. Here ends the section entitled 'The Origin' (2). 1 P. 1002, vol 4.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 27 COMPARISON Śaṃkara Reading and interpretation same. Of course, consistently with his doctrine, Śaṃkara must hold that here the term 'Brahman' denotes 'Īśvara' or the lower Brahman. Adhikaraṇa 3. The section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source'. (Sūtra 3) SŪTRA 3 “BECAUSE (BRAHMAN HAS) SCRIPTURE FOR HIS SOURCE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha With reference to the enquiry: What is the proof of His existence? The author states the correct conclusion:— Of Whom “Scripture” alone is “the source”, i.e. the cause of knowing,¹—that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks, is denoted by the term ‘Brahman’. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning enquiry² that Brahman is the object to be enquired into, and it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning characteristic mark³ that the characteristic mark of Brahman is to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world and possess truth, etc. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What is the proof with regard to Him—the proof is being stated. On the doubt, viz. whether Brahman, having the stated marks, is to be arrived at through inference, or has the Veda alone for His proof,—the prima facie view being that He is to be arrived at through inference, since we know from the scriptural text: ‘From whom speech turns back’ (Tait. 2.4, 2 9) that Brahman cannot be known through speech (i.e. texts),— ¹ This explains the compound ‘śāstra-yoni’. ² Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.1. ³ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2.

28 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3.] (We reply) Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, but has the Veda for His proof. Why? "Because (Brahman has) Scripture for His source". That means "Scripture", i.e. the Veda, is the "source", i.e. the cause, the informant, the proof, with regard to whom,—that object is "Śāstra-yoni"; and "Śāstra-yonitva" is the state of being "Śāstra-yoni"—on account of that, i e. on account of having Scripture for His proof 1 The correct conclusion is that Brahman has the Veda alone for His proof. If it be said. For the sake of simplicity, it is well-said that Brahman has Scripture for His source, and thus to say that Brahman has Scripture for His source, i e. has the Veda for its proof, serves our purpose, (i e. is not in conflict with our view),—(we reply.) No, Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, because the phrase : "Because (He has) Scripture for (His) source" indicates a reason which excludes any other proof except Scripture. If it be said: How is it known that He cannot be arrived at through inference?—(we reply) There has been some room for the suspicion that Brahman can be arrived at through inference, since the middle term (or the reason), viz. 'the state of being an effect' 2, stated above, proves the world to be due to a creator.3 With a view to removing it, that significant word 4 is used here (in this sūtra), in accordance with the following scriptural texts.—Viz. : 'The word which all the Vedas declare' (Kaṭha 2 15), 'That with regard to which all the Vedas become one' (Tait. Ār. 3 11 1 5), '"I ask you about Brahman, set forth in the Upaniṣads"' (Bṛh. 3 9.26 6), 'He who does not know the Veda, does not know Him, the great' (Tait Br. 3.12.9 7 7) and so on, and the following Smṛti passages: '"By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known"' (Gītā 15 15), '"In the Veda, in the Rāmāyaṇa, 1 This explains the compound 'śāstra-yonitvāt'. 2 Kāryyatva. 3 That is, it has been laid down in Sūtra 1.1 2 that the world is an effect. This suggests the inference :—Whatever is an effect has a creator. The world is an effect. ∴ the world has a creator (viz. Brahman). This suggestion is negatived by Sūtra 1.1.3, which explicitly says that the Brahman has Scripture alone for His proof, and never inference. 4 Viz. 'śāstra-yoni' 5 P. 19. Reading 'yatrarkam'. 6 Correct reading : 'pṛcchāmi'. 7 P. 202, vol. 3.

[sū. 1. 1. 3. ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 29 verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end and in the middle' " (Hariv 16232 ¹), 'We bow down to that wherein lies the eternal basis of all speech' and so on. If it be said. On the ground of the inference: 'All objects having parts, like the earth and the rest, have a cause, because they are effects, like pots and the rest', Brahman is established to be the cause of the world, since none else can be such a cause, and this being so, why trouble about the Veda?-(we reply·) no, because, the very fact that the elements like the ether and the rest have an origin being not known by anyone without the Veda, that they are effects is not estab- lished, and hence the reason ² is itself unestablished.³ It cannot be said also that the origin of the elements is to be known through the Veda, and the fact that they are effects being proved through this, the reason ⁴ is not unestablished—, for, in that case too, Brahman, the cause of the world being known through the Veda alone, the inference becomes futile, and you virtually come to our side. Thus, even in the case of well-known effects like a house or a shoot, Brahman cannot be inferred from the reason 'producibleness', it being possible to suppose the earth, the seed, water, men and so on to be their causes, and unreasonable to imagine an unseen cause (viz. Brahman). This should be understood here: wherever something is found to be an effect, there it is possible also to arrive, by means of inference, at an individual soul, corresponding to effect, as the agent. But that the entire universe is an effect is not known without the help of the Veda. Hence, the creator of the world, too, can be known through the Veda alone, and never through a thousand inferences. Further, Brahman cannot be known through the evidence of perception, since the ordinary sense-organs are incapable of grasping Him, as declared ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ P. 1002. ² Viz Kāryyatva or state of being an effect ³ That is, it has been argued .— Whatever is an effect has a cause. The world is an effect. ∴ the world has a cause Now, we cannot know that the world is an effect, unless we have recourse to Scripture, and hence Scripture is needed even here too. ⁴ Viz. Kāryyatva or producibleness.

30 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 3. ADH. 3.] by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' ' "This knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest!¹ It leads to proper knowledge only being told by another" ' (Kaṭha 2 9). That is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby. 'Told' by 'another', i.e by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On account of reasoning having no ground' (Br Sū. 2 1.11); by the Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover, who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world, who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known through inference. It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) and so on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism: 'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū. 3.2.22). (An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound "Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too, the very same meaning is arrived at.¹ The resulting meaning is that Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text, viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur- veda and the Sāma-veda' (Bṛh. 2.4.10; Maitrī. 6 32). And, on this interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negatived, for what we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural ¹ Cf. Ś B. 1.1.3.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH 4 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 31 and Smṛti passages, viz : 'By means of speech, which is devoid of form and eternal' (Ṛg. V 8.75.6 ¹, Tait Sam. 2 6 11 2 ²), 'Speech, without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial, was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities' (Mahā. 12 8534 ³). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him ⁴ This we shall explain later on.⁵ Hence, it is established that Brahman has the Veda as His sole proof. Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source' (3) Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concord- ance'. (Sūtra 4) SŪTRA 4 "BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta- texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts ⁶ are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of estab- lishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture as His sole proof ? ⁷—the correct conclusion is as follows: ¹ P 162. ² P. 241, vol 1. ³ P. 666, line 22, vol. 3 ⁴ That is, if Brahman were to breathe forth the Vedas, He must have a body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is non-material, since when He breathes forth the Vedas, there is no matter. ⁵ See V.K 1.3 28–30. ⁶ An artha-vāda is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism. ⁷ The sense of the objection is: All Vedas set forth injunctions or prohibitions with regard to action But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set forth the above, there are in the Vedas some texts which are merely indicative,

[sū. 1. 1. 4 32 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.] ‘That’, ie Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) “samanvayāt ” is to be explained thus. “Sama- nvaya” means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on account of that—“samanvayāt” Or else, because there is concord- ance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in brief It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge ¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments, and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,— by way of generating a desire for knowledge ² This is ascertained from the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³ If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not injunctive. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the Vedas cannot be maintained. Hence, the Vedānta-texts too must be taken as not establishing Brahman, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts. ¹ That is, the proper function of karmas is simply to purify the mind, and thereby create a desire for knowledge. Karma, thus, is a means and not an end, the way to truth and not truth itself Hence the Vedānta-texts, dealing as they do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere karmas. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.26. ² I e. knowledge is not an aṅga of karma, on the contrary, karma is an aṅga of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8. ³ Viz Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 33 rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹ the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā ³ and so on, as well as among those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case, the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz. Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the rest, refer to the very same topic (viz Brahman).⁸ Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins). 1 Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1, Chānd 3.14.1–4. 2 Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1 1. 3 Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section), Chānd. 3.1–11. 4 Vide e g Brh. 5 7–9, etc.; Chānd 3 18–21, 7.1–12, etc. 5 The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on Brahman directly as the self, others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on. 6 That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols, are to be understood as directly referring to Brahman, i.e. to be interpreted literally, and not as referring to Brahman indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately before that some texts are direct and primary, some indirect and secondary, and takes all to be equally direct and primary. 7 Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on. 8 That is, the view that all texts are concerned with Brahman directly in no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned with Brahman equally.

34 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been said that Lord Krsna, the substratum of great qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection, viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purport- lessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ¹). Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purport- less, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda as His sole proof? The term "but" disposes of the (above) prima facie view. "That", i e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world, has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concord- ance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained as follows:) "Samanvaya" means 'Concordance in point of entirety of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or Lord Krsna, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation, the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualties like omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning, One only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

¹ P. 36, vol 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 35 Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘There was verily, Nārāyaṇa alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). ‘Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: “I am Brahman”’, ‘From Him arose all this’, ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Ait. 1.1.1), ‘From this self, verily, the ether originated’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘The word which all the Vedas record’ (Kaṭha 2.15), ‘That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of man’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1.2 ²), ‘To whom all the gods bow down’, ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’ (Tait. 2 9), ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Bṛh. 3 9 28), ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘The self that is free from sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst’ (Chānd. 8.7 1.3), ‘Who is omniscient, all-knowing’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), ‘Brahman, verily, is all this’ (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times) and so on. (Prima facie view.) An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collec- tion of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, ‘One, who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma ⁴ sacrifice’ and so on, are injunctive texts. ‘A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ and so on, are prohibitive texts. ‘The wind, verily, is the quickest deity’ (Tait. Saṁ. 2.1.1 ⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. ‘Oblation to you’ (Tait. Saṁ. 1.1.1 ⁶), ‘O, heavens, having the fire as your head’ (Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; ⁷ Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a ⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ. ‘Jyotiṣṭoma’,⁹ ‘Aśva-medha’ ¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: ‘Then, ¹ P. 19. Reading: ‘Yatrārkaḥ’. ² P. 181. ³ Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya. ⁴ Name of a Soma-sacrifice, consisting divisions, Agniṣṭoma and the rest. M.W., p. 427. ⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol 1. ⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1. ⁷ P. 132, line 7. ⁸ P. 163, line 16. ⁹ See footnote 4, above. ¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What- ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows: We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e. has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that 'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not 'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve- dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho- ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion: 'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1. ² P. 3, vol. 1. ³ That is, the inference is as follows:— Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action. A religious duty has the Veda for its proof. ∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and prohibitions. ⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1. ⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 37 purport’ (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2 7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative ‘through having glorification as their purport’, i.e. by way of glorifying the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,— which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts) admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the ‘that’ (viz. Brahman) and ‘thou’ (viz. the individual soul)² glorify the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act, and the knowledge concerning it (viz. the ‘that’) called the ‘higher knowledge’,³ glorify the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are con- cerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordi- nate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original prima facie view.⁴) (Author’s conclusion.) To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, in- vented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘The Brāhmaṇas desire to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through penance, through fasting’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the statement ‘They desire to know through sacrifice’, there be a direct connection of the instrument, viz. ‘sacrifice’, with the meaning of the root,⁶ as in the sentence ‘He desires to go by the horse’, then the sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge (i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1. ² Cf the famous text ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc) ³ Vide e.g. Mund 1.1 4-5. ⁴ It began on p. 35. ⁵ The correct conclusion begins here ⁶ Viz. ‘vid’=to know.

[sū. 1. 1. 4. 38 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹ there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism 'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26). It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit, teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation. If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya ² sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1 ³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge), so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be referring to works,— (We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just, as here, the world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6 ⁴) is of a greater force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one, and because it is improper to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'. ² See footnote 2, p. 5 ³ P. 1, vol. 1. ⁴ Correct quotation: 'Karma-cita' and not 'karma-jita', which is translated here. Vide Chānd. 8 1.6, p. 415.

[Sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39 texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha 6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text: ‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non- permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:— ‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go, O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’ (Gītā 8.16). If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1) and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with Brahman?— (We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone. Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman, directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified, by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord; ¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent. ² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness. The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too, refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern- ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,² by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text: 'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh 4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance (with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage: 'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br 2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being concerned with His divine body. Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷ ¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds are obligatory. ² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest. ³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1. ⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26. ⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd. 1 6.6, p. 43. ⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41 Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person, omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers, the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage : ‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15). The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of these. Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4). Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra. Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’. (Sūtras 5–12) SŪTRA 5 “BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”, i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes, powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ- khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1) and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the aphorisms is now refuting this view. Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no “word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason. If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con- tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent. He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’ (Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter- mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There- fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the Veda. It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro- priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of ¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the pradhāna.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 43 ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),— it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with another, (and not by itself), because such a view is utterly negligible; and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term 'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural, inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on. COMPARISON Śaṃkara Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is mithyā through and through.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non- sentient constitutes the body of the Lord ³ Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴ 1 That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the sattva-guṇa, then prior to creation, all the guṇas being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge can arise in pradhāna. 2 Ś.B 1.1.5, p. 203. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1. 4 G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 6. 44 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] SŪTRA 6 "IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀN- DOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary". Why? "On account of the term 'self'." Vedānta-kaustubha Anticipating the objection, viz.— As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is about to fall',¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: 'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages. 'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here. If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is "secondary", (we reply.) "No." Why? "On account of the term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self' which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self' (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4, 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6 15.3; 6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6 2.1), 'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non- sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the ¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger' (āśaṅkā), in accordance with K.V S 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.