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[Sū. 1. 1. 4. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39 texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha 6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text: ‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non- permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:— ‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go, O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’ (Gītā 8.16). If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1) and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with Brahman?— (We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone. Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman, directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified, by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord; ¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent. ² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4. 40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.] and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness. The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too, refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern- ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,² by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text: 'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh 4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance (with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage: 'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br 2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being concerned with His divine body. Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷ ¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds are obligatory. ² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest. ³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1. ⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26. ⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd. 1 6.6, p. 43. ⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41 Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person, omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers, the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage : ‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15). The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of these. Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4). Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra. Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’. (Sūtras 5–12) SŪTRA 5 “BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”, i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes, powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ- khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1) and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the aphorisms is now refuting this view. Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no “word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason. If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con- tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent. He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’ (Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter- mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There- fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the Veda. It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro- priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of ¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the pradhāna.

[sū. 1. 1. 5. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 43 ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),— it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with another, (and not by itself), because such a view is utterly negligible; and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term 'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural, inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on. COMPARISON Śaṃkara Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is mithyā through and through.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non- sentient constitutes the body of the Lord ³ Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴ 1 That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the sattva-guṇa, then prior to creation, all the guṇas being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge can arise in pradhāna. 2 Ś.B 1.1.5, p. 203. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1. 4 G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 6. 44 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] SŪTRA 6 "IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀN- DOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary". Why? "On account of the term 'self'." Vedānta-kaustubha Anticipating the objection, viz.— As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is about to fall',¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: 'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages. 'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here. If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is "secondary", (we reply.) "No." Why? "On account of the term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self' which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self' (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4, 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6 15.3; 6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6 2.1), 'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non- sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the ¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger' (āśaṅkā), in accordance with K.V S 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

[sū. 1. 1. 7. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 45 Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction, it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord, to refer to pradhāna Hence, to say that the perception is even meta- phorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical ¹—this is the sum and substance. COMPARISON Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'If it be said (that the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman, connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term "self"'. That is, the term 'self' has been used in Scripture in connection with the creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.² SŪTRA 7 "(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM 'SELF',) BECAUSE SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brah- man's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the meaning of the terms 'existent', 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest,— so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz in that case, let the term 'self' stand equally for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term 'light' ³ which ¹ That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: 'That Divinity thought:— "Come, let me enter these three divinities" (i.e, fire, water and food)' and so on. (Chānd. 6.3 2 ) ² G B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.). ³ Jyotis.

46 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 7. ADH. 5.] denotes equally a sacrifice ¹ and fire; hence, no inconsistency is in- volved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here: The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term 'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on Him" i. e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called 'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e with regard to one who is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and who is the creator of fire, water and food ² Thus, after having taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the effect as consisting of the Cause (viz Brahman) in essence, in the text: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7, 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6 11.3; 6 12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3, 6 16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)' (Chānd. 6 14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person, who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded, being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain' should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with Vedic use. If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self' is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'. Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul, His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum. ¹ Viz. Jyotiṣṭoma. ² This explains the compound: 'tan-niṣṭhasya'

[sū. 1. 1. 8. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 47 Although the individual soul is different from Brahman, in nature, it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference. Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation, one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature (from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him; because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3 1 3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached, while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence, Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest COMPARISON Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of the world is not the Saguna Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman ¹), for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguna Brahman)'.² SŪTRA 8 “AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS 'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO (SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching ³ ought to have been pointed out 1 For the explanation of the terms Saguna and Nirguna, see G.B. 2 G B 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1. 3 That is, if pradhāna be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of pradhāna, since Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 8. 48 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like. Vedānta-kaustubha If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well- wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3, 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating the purpose of such a teaching. COMPARISON Śamkara Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a teaching', Śamkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹ Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second reason.³ Bhāskara Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara inter- prets this sūtra exactly after Śamkara, taking the term "ca" to mean 'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴ 1 Vide Chānd. 6.1. 2 Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1. 4 Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

[sū. 1. 1. 9. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 49 Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)' That is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguna objects, or objects connected with the gunas of prakrti, viz. all worldly objects. Hence, if the Saguna Brahman were the creator of the world, then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be rejected.¹ SŪTRA 9 "(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposi- tion" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the know- ledge of all ²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right. Vedānta-kaustubha Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural text "'Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?'" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir ?"" (Chānd. 6.1 2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although, through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established, since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna). ¹ G B. 1.1 8, pp 50-51, Chap. 1. ² Vide Chānd 6 1. 4

50 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 10 ADH. 5.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous sūtra. Baladeva This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well. SŪTRA 10 "(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF (DURING DEEP SLEEP)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term 'existent', viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep. When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent' (Chānd. 6.8 1¹), can be understood as a non-sentient cause,² it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha On account of the (soul's) "entrance", i.e. dissolution, into "itself",³ i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text: ‘"The existent alone, my dear!"’ (Chānd. 6 2 1), Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, and not pradhāna. If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz. ¹ Ś.R. Bh. Śk. ² A slightly different reading is given in the C S S ed.—which, when translated, is as follows:—As the 'entering', which relates to a sentient being and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by the term 'existent'—viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, . . .' is possible in the case of Brahman alone, etc. (P. 3.) ³ This explains the word 'svāpyayāt'.

[sū. 1. 1. 11. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 51 ‘ ‘ “ When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence they say of him “ He sleeps ”, for he has entered into his own ” ’ (Chānd 6 8 1) There is also another scriptural text, viz. ‘ Just as a man, when embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing external or internal ’ (Bṛh. 4.3.21). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. ‘ Svāpyāt ’. Interpretation too different, viz. ‘ (The creator of the world is not the Saguṇa Brahman), because the Creator merges into himself, (not so the Saguṇa Brahman, who merges into something other than himself) ’ ¹ SŪTRA 11 “ (BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term ‘existent’, viz. on account of the universality of ‘ knowing ’, i.e. apprehending. One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads, the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object be understood by the term ‘existent’, the multitude of texts, speaking of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted. ¹ G.B. 1 1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 12. 52 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 5.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja Reading same. Interpretation too is same, since although according to Rāmānuja, the word 'gati' means 'pravṛtti' or primary meaning and not 'avagati' or apprehension as held by Nimbārka, yet the ultimate meaning is the same, viz. the meaning or import of all the scriptural texts is uniform, i e from all of them Brahman alone is known and nothing else, and hence Brahman alone is the cause ¹ Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different. He connects this sūtra more particularly with the preceding one, thus: 'On account of the universality of knowing (the term "existent" as denoting the Supreme Lord)'. That is, just as in this Upaniṣad, viz the Chāndogya, the term 'existent' implies the Lord, and none else, so in all other Upani- ṣads as well. Hence it can never stand for pradhāna. According to him also, thus, the word 'gati' means 'avagati'. ² Baladeva This is sūtra 10 in this commentary Reading same, interpre- tation different, viz.—'On account of the universality of knowing (the Nirguṇa Brahman from all Scriptures)'. That is, Scripture uniformly teaches the Nirguṇa Brahman, and never the Saguṇa. Hence the Nirguṇa Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Accord- ing to him also, the term 'gati' means 'avagati'. ³ SŪTRA 12 "(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ALSO BECAUSE THIS IS DEFINITELY STATED IN SCRIPTURE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Hence, the causality of the Universal Lord,—a sentient Being, denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the ¹ Śrī. B 1 1.11, p. 165, vol. 1. ² ŚK. B. 1.1.11, p. 202, Part 3. ³ G.B 1 1.10, p. 53, Chap. 1.

[sū. 1 1. 12. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 53 controller of all,—being definitely stated in Scripture, pradhāna can by no means be accepted as such a cause Vedānta-kaustubha (Brahman alone is the cause of the world), because in this Upaniṣad (viz. Chāndogya) that which is denoted by the term 'existent' "is definitely stated" to be the cause of all as the self of all, in the passage: 'All this, verily, is from the self' (Chānd. 7.26 1), and also because,— as denoted by the term "and",—the same thing is mentioned in other Upaniṣads too Thus, there is a passage in the mantra-upaniṣad of the Śvetāśvataras: 'Who is a knower, the time of time and omnis- cient' (Śvet. 6 2.16), 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense- organs.¹ Of him there is no progenitor, nor lord' (Śvet. 6.9). The Kauṣītakins declare. 'From this self all the vital-breaths depart to their respective places, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds' (Kauṣ. 3 3, 4 20). Similarly, in other places too. We stop here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book Hence, the non-sentient pradhāna, which is an object of inference,² is not the cause of the world, since it is unfit to be the cause of collocation without an intelligent ruler; and because if pradhāna be admitted to have the power of being such a ruler, you come over to our side.³ On the contrary, it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, denoted by the words 'Brahman' and the rest, the one topic of all the Vedas, omnis- cient, omnipotent, the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, and denoted by the term 'existent', is the cause of the world.⁴ Here ends the section entitled 'He sees' (5). ¹ Correct quotation: 'Kāraṇā-dhipādhipaḥ', which is translated here. Vide Śvet 6.9 ² See footnote 1, p. 42. ³ That is, then pradhāna will become Brahman, and cease to be non-sentient, as held by the Sāṁkhyas ⁴ Note the difference between the interpretations of Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa. According to Nimbārka, the word 'śrutatvāt' means 'because this is mentioned in Scripture', and he attaches no special and separate meaning to the word 'Ca' But according to Śrīnivāsa, the word 'śrutatvāt' means: 'because this is mentioned in this Upaniṣad (viz Chāndogya)', and the word 'Ca' means: 'because this is mentioned in other Upaniṣads (viz. Śvetāśvatara, Kauṣītaki and the rest)'.

54 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 13. ADH. 6.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same. Rāmānuja points out in conclusion that this adhikaraṇa is also a refutation of the theory of the Nirguṇa Brahman, since it asserts 'perceiving' or 'willing' on the part of the creator of the world, and 'willing' means being possessed of the quality of intelligence ¹ Baladeva This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz 'And because (the Nirguṇa Brahman) is mentioned in Scripture'. That is, Scripture proves the Nirguṇa Brahman to be the creator, and not the Saguṇa Brahman.² The difference is that while according to Nimbārka (and others too), this section is concerned with the question as to whether Brahman or pradhāna is the creator of the world, according to Baladeva, the question is as to whether the Nirguṇa Brahman or the Saguṇa Brahman is the creator of the world. Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'That which consists of bliss'. (Sūtras 13–20) SŪTRA 13 "(BRAHMAN IS) THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF BLISS, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "That which consists of bliss" is the Supreme Soul alone, but not the individual soul. Why? On account of the repetition (in Scrip- ture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest Self. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, by way of refuting the doctrine of pradhāna, it has been shown that scriptural texts like "'The existent alone, my dear!'" ¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.12, p. 166, vol. 1. ² G. B. 1.1.11, pp. 54-55, Chap. I

[sū. 1. 1] 13. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 55 (Chānd. 6 2.1) and the rest, all refer to Brahman. Now, the author is showing that the texts about that which consists of bliss and the rest also refer to Brahman who, as possessed of unsurpassed bliss, is different in nature from the class of sentient beings also. In the Taittirīya, four sheaths, viz. that which consists of food, that which consists of the vital-breath, that which consists of mind, and that which consists of understanding, are spoken of in a successive order; and after that it is said: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss. By that this is filled' (Tait 2.5) Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the words 'consisting of bliss', the individual soul is denoted or the Supreme Soul. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested, As in the passage: 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2 5), an embodied soul is mentioned, as in another scriptural text: 'May my (sheaths) consisting of food, con- sisting of the vital-breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of under- standing and consisting of bliss, be purified' (Mahānār. 20 21) it is said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified, and as it is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be purified, so that which consists of bliss is the individual soul,— We reply: "that which consists of bliss" is the Highest self alone, possessed of unsurpassed bliss Why? 'On account of repetition', i e. because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times (in Scrip- ture) in reference to the Highest Self alone, the Highest Person, in texts like: 'If there were not bliss in the ether, for this alone causes bliss' (Tait. 2 7),¹ 'He knows that Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6) and so on; and because, beginning thus: 'This is an investigation into bliss' (Tait. 2.8), the concluding text: 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, he does not fear from anything' (Tait. 2.8), is found to end by establishing that the bliss of Brahman alone is unsurpassable and illimitable. If it be said that here there is the repetition of the word 'bliss' ² only, and not of the words 'consisting of bliss' ³—(we reply) no, be- cause just as in the passage: 'In spring, he performs the jyoti-sacrifice' ¹ Complete quotation · 'For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in the ether' and so on Vide Tait. 2.7, p 70. ² Ānanda ³ Ānanda-maya.

56 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] the word 'jyoti' stands for the word 'jyotiṣṭoma', so here the word 'bliss' stands for the words 'consisting of bliss'. To your allegation that as an embodied soul is mentioned in Scripture, the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) the designation of the embodiedness of the Supreme Self fits in, since He abides within all, viz. that which consists of food and the rest, as their controller. On the other hand, the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2. 5), shows that it (viz. that which consists of bliss) has no other (inner) soul.¹ The expression 'Let them be purified' (in the above Mahānārāyaṇa passage) means 'Let them be embellished' SŪTRA 14 "IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ('ĀNANDA-MAYA') DENOTING MODIFICATION, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) NOT (DENOTED BY THIS WORD), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ABUNDANCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be said that on account of the mention of (the suffix) 'mayat' in the sense of 'modification', the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) no Why ² On account of the mention in Smṛti of (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'abundance' as well. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: That which consists of bliss cannot be the Highest Self. Why ? "On account of the word denoting modifica- tion", i.e. on account of the mention of the suffix 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'modification',—beginning: 'Mayaṭ is used optionally in the classical language after any base (to indicate "product" and 1 That is, the soul consisting of food has the soul consisting of the vital breath as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of mind as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of understanding as its inner soul, and this latter again has the soul consisting of bliss as its inner soul But the last one, viz. the soul consisting of bliss, has nothing else as its soul, but is the inmost soul of all,

[sū. 1. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 57 "part") when food and dress are meant' (Pāṇ. 4.3.143, SD K 1523 ¹), Smṛti goes on to designate (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of modifica- tion thus:— '(The suffix "mayaṭ" is used) invariably after words in which the vowel has been lengthened and after "śara" and the rest' (Pāṇ. 4.3 144; SD.K 1524 ²),—and also because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'modification' in ordinary life in expres- sions like: 'An earthen ³ pot' and so on, as well as in the Veda, in passages like: 'A large branch of the parṇa ⁴ wood ⁵ is the sacrificial ladle', and so on,— (We reply.) "No" Why? "On account of abundance", i e. because Smṛti depicts (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of 'abundance' as well, in the passage. 'Mayaṭ' is added in the sense of 'made thereof' ⁶ and in the sense of 'having a great portion of' ⁷ (Pāṇ 5 4 21, SD K. 2089 ⁸), and because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'abundance', too, in ordinary expressions like 'A sacrifice abounding in food' ⁹ and so on It cannot be said also that since Brahman is admitted to be consisting of bliss, there may be some want of bliss in Him,¹⁰—because here 'abundance' is but a synonym for 'very muchness' Thus, among (all the effects of prakṛti) beginning with mahat and ending with the body, the body being a transformation of food,¹¹ is said to be the person 'consisting of food' Other than and the supporter of it is 'that which consists of the vital-breath'. Other than and the supporter of these two is 'that which consists of mind'. Other than and the controller of these three is the individual soul, called 'the person consisting of understanding'. That which is of the nature of knowledge and has understanding as its attribute (viz the individual soul) is the controller of the three non-sentient persons. That this

¹ P 786, vol 1. ² P 786, vol. 1. ³ Mṛn-maya ⁴ Parṇa is a large-leaved sacred tree, whose wood is used for making sacred vessels, later generally called 'palāśa' M.W . p 606. ⁵ Parṇa-mayī. ⁶ Tad-vacana ⁷ Prakṛtu-vacana, meaning 'Prācuryyeṇa prastutam prakṛtam, tasya vacanam'. SD. K. 2089, p. 931, vol 1. ⁸ Op cit. ⁹ Anna-maya ¹⁰ That is, when it is said. 'Annu-maya yajña', it is meant that the sacrifice consists mostly of food, but not entirely Similarly, it might be thought that the expression 'Ānanda-maya Brahman' means that Brahman is mostly bliss but not entirely bliss, 1.e. there is some non-bliss in Brahman ¹¹ That is, it is food which being assimilated produces and keeps the body.

58 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 15. ADH. 6.] possessor of the attribute of understanding is of the nature of know- ledge, will be made clear in the second chapter ¹ But why, then, has the attribute alone been indicated in the text 'Understanding performs a sacrifice?' (Tait 2 5). Listen The very nature, too, of the knower is self-manifesting, and the use of the term 'understand- ing' or the nominative case-ending should be understood to be referring to it The use of the neuter gender ² is meant for denoting a thing.³ For this very reason, in the Kānva recension, viz. 'Who abiding in understanding' (Brh 3 7 22), and in the Mādhyandina recension, viz. 'Who abiding in the self' (Śat Br 14 6 7.30 ⁴), in spite of the difference of words, the meaning, viz. the individual soul, is the very same. And for this very reason, the statement: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice, and deeds too' (Tait. 2.5) is perfectly justifiable, it being impossible for the mere attribute of understanding to be an agent. And, it, the individual soul, the knower, should be known to be possessed of bliss, in accordance with the text: 'That is one human bliss' (Tait 2.8), as well as another scriptural text: 'For verily, on getting this essence, one becomes blissful' (Tait. 2 7). The Supreme Person, an ocean of immense bliss in contrast to its (viz. the individual soul's) little bliss, is the controller of all, referred to in the text: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding, is the self which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2 5) Move- over, the Supreme Person, the One, is indeed established in all the Vedāntas as free from all faults by nature, so there is not even an odour of slightest non-bliss in Him,—so much in brief. SŪTRA 15 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAUSE OF THAT" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On account of being the cause of the bliss of the individual soul too, the Highest Self alone is that which consists of bliss. ¹ Vide V.K. 2.3 18. ² Viz. 'vijñānam' in the text ³ That is, the word 'understanding' does not stand for a mere abstract attribute here, but for a concrete thing, viz. the individual soul, possessed of the attribute. ⁴ P 861, line 19.