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[sū. 1. 1. 8. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 47 Although the individual soul is different from Brahman, in nature, it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference. Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation, one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature (from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him; because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3 1 3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached, while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence, Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest COMPARISON Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of the world is not the Saguna Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman ¹), for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguna Brahman)'.² SŪTRA 8 “AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS 'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO (SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching ³ ought to have been pointed out 1 For the explanation of the terms Saguna and Nirguna, see G.B. 2 G B 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1. 3 That is, if pradhāna be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of pradhāna, since Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 8. 48 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like. Vedānta-kaustubha If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well- wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3, 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating the purpose of such a teaching. COMPARISON Śamkara Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a teaching', Śamkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹ Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.² Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second reason.³ Bhāskara Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara inter- prets this sūtra exactly after Śamkara, taking the term "ca" to mean 'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴ 1 Vide Chānd. 6.1. 2 Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209. 3 Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1. 4 Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

[sū. 1. 1. 9. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 49 Baladeva Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)' That is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguna objects, or objects connected with the gunas of prakrti, viz. all worldly objects. Hence, if the Saguna Brahman were the creator of the world, then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be rejected.¹ SŪTRA 9 "(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposi- tion" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the know- ledge of all ²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right. Vedānta-kaustubha Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural text "'Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?'" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir ?"" (Chānd. 6.1 2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although, through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established, since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna). ¹ G B. 1.1 8, pp 50-51, Chap. 1. ² Vide Chānd 6 1. 4

50 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 10 ADH. 5.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous sūtra. Baladeva This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well. SŪTRA 10 "(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF (DURING DEEP SLEEP)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term 'existent', viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep. When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent' (Chānd. 6.8 1¹), can be understood as a non-sentient cause,² it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha On account of the (soul's) "entrance", i.e. dissolution, into "itself",³ i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text: ‘"The existent alone, my dear!"’ (Chānd. 6 2 1), Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, and not pradhāna. If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz. ¹ Ś.R. Bh. Śk. ² A slightly different reading is given in the C S S ed.—which, when translated, is as follows:—As the 'entering', which relates to a sentient being and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by the term 'existent'—viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, . . .' is possible in the case of Brahman alone, etc. (P. 3.) ³ This explains the word 'svāpyayāt'.

[sū. 1. 1. 11. ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 51 ‘ ‘ “ When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence they say of him “ He sleeps ”, for he has entered into his own ” ’ (Chānd 6 8 1) There is also another scriptural text, viz. ‘ Just as a man, when embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing external or internal ’ (Bṛh. 4.3.21). COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. ‘ Svāpyāt ’. Interpretation too different, viz. ‘ (The creator of the world is not the Saguṇa Brahman), because the Creator merges into himself, (not so the Saguṇa Brahman, who merges into something other than himself) ’ ¹ SŪTRA 11 “ (BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term ‘existent’, viz. on account of the universality of ‘ knowing ’, i.e. apprehending. One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads, the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object be understood by the term ‘existent’, the multitude of texts, speaking of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted. ¹ G.B. 1 1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 12. 52 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 5.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja Reading same. Interpretation too is same, since although according to Rāmānuja, the word 'gati' means 'pravṛtti' or primary meaning and not 'avagati' or apprehension as held by Nimbārka, yet the ultimate meaning is the same, viz. the meaning or import of all the scriptural texts is uniform, i e from all of them Brahman alone is known and nothing else, and hence Brahman alone is the cause ¹ Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different. He connects this sūtra more particularly with the preceding one, thus: 'On account of the universality of knowing (the term "existent" as denoting the Supreme Lord)'. That is, just as in this Upaniṣad, viz the Chāndogya, the term 'existent' implies the Lord, and none else, so in all other Upani- ṣads as well. Hence it can never stand for pradhāna. According to him also, thus, the word 'gati' means 'avagati'. ² Baladeva This is sūtra 10 in this commentary Reading same, interpre- tation different, viz.—'On account of the universality of knowing (the Nirguṇa Brahman from all Scriptures)'. That is, Scripture uniformly teaches the Nirguṇa Brahman, and never the Saguṇa. Hence the Nirguṇa Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Accord- ing to him also, the term 'gati' means 'avagati'. ³ SŪTRA 12 "(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ALSO BECAUSE THIS IS DEFINITELY STATED IN SCRIPTURE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Hence, the causality of the Universal Lord,—a sentient Being, denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the ¹ Śrī. B 1 1.11, p. 165, vol. 1. ² ŚK. B. 1.1.11, p. 202, Part 3. ³ G.B 1 1.10, p. 53, Chap. 1.

[sū. 1 1. 12. ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 53 controller of all,—being definitely stated in Scripture, pradhāna can by no means be accepted as such a cause Vedānta-kaustubha (Brahman alone is the cause of the world), because in this Upaniṣad (viz. Chāndogya) that which is denoted by the term 'existent' "is definitely stated" to be the cause of all as the self of all, in the passage: 'All this, verily, is from the self' (Chānd. 7.26 1), and also because,— as denoted by the term "and",—the same thing is mentioned in other Upaniṣads too Thus, there is a passage in the mantra-upaniṣad of the Śvetāśvataras: 'Who is a knower, the time of time and omnis- cient' (Śvet. 6 2.16), 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense- organs.¹ Of him there is no progenitor, nor lord' (Śvet. 6.9). The Kauṣītakins declare. 'From this self all the vital-breaths depart to their respective places, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds' (Kauṣ. 3 3, 4 20). Similarly, in other places too. We stop here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book Hence, the non-sentient pradhāna, which is an object of inference,² is not the cause of the world, since it is unfit to be the cause of collocation without an intelligent ruler; and because if pradhāna be admitted to have the power of being such a ruler, you come over to our side.³ On the contrary, it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, denoted by the words 'Brahman' and the rest, the one topic of all the Vedas, omnis- cient, omnipotent, the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, and denoted by the term 'existent', is the cause of the world.⁴ Here ends the section entitled 'He sees' (5). ¹ Correct quotation: 'Kāraṇā-dhipādhipaḥ', which is translated here. Vide Śvet 6.9 ² See footnote 1, p. 42. ³ That is, then pradhāna will become Brahman, and cease to be non-sentient, as held by the Sāṁkhyas ⁴ Note the difference between the interpretations of Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa. According to Nimbārka, the word 'śrutatvāt' means 'because this is mentioned in Scripture', and he attaches no special and separate meaning to the word 'Ca' But according to Śrīnivāsa, the word 'śrutatvāt' means: 'because this is mentioned in this Upaniṣad (viz Chāndogya)', and the word 'Ca' means: 'because this is mentioned in other Upaniṣads (viz. Śvetāśvatara, Kauṣītaki and the rest)'.

54 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 13. ADH. 6.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same. Rāmānuja points out in conclusion that this adhikaraṇa is also a refutation of the theory of the Nirguṇa Brahman, since it asserts 'perceiving' or 'willing' on the part of the creator of the world, and 'willing' means being possessed of the quality of intelligence ¹ Baladeva This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz 'And because (the Nirguṇa Brahman) is mentioned in Scripture'. That is, Scripture proves the Nirguṇa Brahman to be the creator, and not the Saguṇa Brahman.² The difference is that while according to Nimbārka (and others too), this section is concerned with the question as to whether Brahman or pradhāna is the creator of the world, according to Baladeva, the question is as to whether the Nirguṇa Brahman or the Saguṇa Brahman is the creator of the world. Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'That which consists of bliss'. (Sūtras 13–20) SŪTRA 13 "(BRAHMAN IS) THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF BLISS, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "That which consists of bliss" is the Supreme Soul alone, but not the individual soul. Why? On account of the repetition (in Scrip- ture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest Self. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, by way of refuting the doctrine of pradhāna, it has been shown that scriptural texts like "'The existent alone, my dear!'" ¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.12, p. 166, vol. 1. ² G. B. 1.1.11, pp. 54-55, Chap. I

[sū. 1. 1] 13. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 55 (Chānd. 6 2.1) and the rest, all refer to Brahman. Now, the author is showing that the texts about that which consists of bliss and the rest also refer to Brahman who, as possessed of unsurpassed bliss, is different in nature from the class of sentient beings also. In the Taittirīya, four sheaths, viz. that which consists of food, that which consists of the vital-breath, that which consists of mind, and that which consists of understanding, are spoken of in a successive order; and after that it is said: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss. By that this is filled' (Tait 2.5) Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the words 'consisting of bliss', the individual soul is denoted or the Supreme Soul. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested, As in the passage: 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2 5), an embodied soul is mentioned, as in another scriptural text: 'May my (sheaths) consisting of food, con- sisting of the vital-breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of under- standing and consisting of bliss, be purified' (Mahānār. 20 21) it is said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified, and as it is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be purified, so that which consists of bliss is the individual soul,— We reply: "that which consists of bliss" is the Highest self alone, possessed of unsurpassed bliss Why? 'On account of repetition', i e. because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times (in Scrip- ture) in reference to the Highest Self alone, the Highest Person, in texts like: 'If there were not bliss in the ether, for this alone causes bliss' (Tait. 2 7),¹ 'He knows that Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6) and so on; and because, beginning thus: 'This is an investigation into bliss' (Tait. 2.8), the concluding text: 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, he does not fear from anything' (Tait. 2.8), is found to end by establishing that the bliss of Brahman alone is unsurpassable and illimitable. If it be said that here there is the repetition of the word 'bliss' ² only, and not of the words 'consisting of bliss' ³—(we reply) no, be- cause just as in the passage: 'In spring, he performs the jyoti-sacrifice' ¹ Complete quotation · 'For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in the ether' and so on Vide Tait. 2.7, p 70. ² Ānanda ³ Ānanda-maya.

56 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] the word 'jyoti' stands for the word 'jyotiṣṭoma', so here the word 'bliss' stands for the words 'consisting of bliss'. To your allegation that as an embodied soul is mentioned in Scripture, the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) the designation of the embodiedness of the Supreme Self fits in, since He abides within all, viz. that which consists of food and the rest, as their controller. On the other hand, the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2. 5), shows that it (viz. that which consists of bliss) has no other (inner) soul.¹ The expression 'Let them be purified' (in the above Mahānārāyaṇa passage) means 'Let them be embellished' SŪTRA 14 "IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ('ĀNANDA-MAYA') DENOTING MODIFICATION, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) NOT (DENOTED BY THIS WORD), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ABUNDANCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be said that on account of the mention of (the suffix) 'mayat' in the sense of 'modification', the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) no Why ² On account of the mention in Smṛti of (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'abundance' as well. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: That which consists of bliss cannot be the Highest Self. Why ? "On account of the word denoting modifica- tion", i.e. on account of the mention of the suffix 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'modification',—beginning: 'Mayaṭ is used optionally in the classical language after any base (to indicate "product" and 1 That is, the soul consisting of food has the soul consisting of the vital breath as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of mind as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of understanding as its inner soul, and this latter again has the soul consisting of bliss as its inner soul But the last one, viz. the soul consisting of bliss, has nothing else as its soul, but is the inmost soul of all,

[sū. 1. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 57 "part") when food and dress are meant' (Pāṇ. 4.3.143, SD K 1523 ¹), Smṛti goes on to designate (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of modifica- tion thus:— '(The suffix "mayaṭ" is used) invariably after words in which the vowel has been lengthened and after "śara" and the rest' (Pāṇ. 4.3 144; SD.K 1524 ²),—and also because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'modification' in ordinary life in expres- sions like: 'An earthen ³ pot' and so on, as well as in the Veda, in passages like: 'A large branch of the parṇa ⁴ wood ⁵ is the sacrificial ladle', and so on,— (We reply.) "No" Why? "On account of abundance", i e. because Smṛti depicts (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of 'abundance' as well, in the passage. 'Mayaṭ' is added in the sense of 'made thereof' ⁶ and in the sense of 'having a great portion of' ⁷ (Pāṇ 5 4 21, SD K. 2089 ⁸), and because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'abundance', too, in ordinary expressions like 'A sacrifice abounding in food' ⁹ and so on It cannot be said also that since Brahman is admitted to be consisting of bliss, there may be some want of bliss in Him,¹⁰—because here 'abundance' is but a synonym for 'very muchness' Thus, among (all the effects of prakṛti) beginning with mahat and ending with the body, the body being a transformation of food,¹¹ is said to be the person 'consisting of food' Other than and the supporter of it is 'that which consists of the vital-breath'. Other than and the supporter of these two is 'that which consists of mind'. Other than and the controller of these three is the individual soul, called 'the person consisting of understanding'. That which is of the nature of knowledge and has understanding as its attribute (viz the individual soul) is the controller of the three non-sentient persons. That this

¹ P 786, vol 1. ² P 786, vol. 1. ³ Mṛn-maya ⁴ Parṇa is a large-leaved sacred tree, whose wood is used for making sacred vessels, later generally called 'palāśa' M.W . p 606. ⁵ Parṇa-mayī. ⁶ Tad-vacana ⁷ Prakṛtu-vacana, meaning 'Prācuryyeṇa prastutam prakṛtam, tasya vacanam'. SD. K. 2089, p. 931, vol 1. ⁸ Op cit. ⁹ Anna-maya ¹⁰ That is, when it is said. 'Annu-maya yajña', it is meant that the sacrifice consists mostly of food, but not entirely Similarly, it might be thought that the expression 'Ānanda-maya Brahman' means that Brahman is mostly bliss but not entirely bliss, 1.e. there is some non-bliss in Brahman ¹¹ That is, it is food which being assimilated produces and keeps the body.

58 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 15. ADH. 6.] possessor of the attribute of understanding is of the nature of know- ledge, will be made clear in the second chapter ¹ But why, then, has the attribute alone been indicated in the text 'Understanding performs a sacrifice?' (Tait 2 5). Listen The very nature, too, of the knower is self-manifesting, and the use of the term 'understand- ing' or the nominative case-ending should be understood to be referring to it The use of the neuter gender ² is meant for denoting a thing.³ For this very reason, in the Kānva recension, viz. 'Who abiding in understanding' (Brh 3 7 22), and in the Mādhyandina recension, viz. 'Who abiding in the self' (Śat Br 14 6 7.30 ⁴), in spite of the difference of words, the meaning, viz. the individual soul, is the very same. And for this very reason, the statement: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice, and deeds too' (Tait. 2.5) is perfectly justifiable, it being impossible for the mere attribute of understanding to be an agent. And, it, the individual soul, the knower, should be known to be possessed of bliss, in accordance with the text: 'That is one human bliss' (Tait 2.8), as well as another scriptural text: 'For verily, on getting this essence, one becomes blissful' (Tait. 2 7). The Supreme Person, an ocean of immense bliss in contrast to its (viz. the individual soul's) little bliss, is the controller of all, referred to in the text: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding, is the self which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2 5) Move- over, the Supreme Person, the One, is indeed established in all the Vedāntas as free from all faults by nature, so there is not even an odour of slightest non-bliss in Him,—so much in brief. SŪTRA 15 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAUSE OF THAT" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On account of being the cause of the bliss of the individual soul too, the Highest Self alone is that which consists of bliss. ¹ Vide V.K. 2.3 18. ² Viz. 'vijñānam' in the text ³ That is, the word 'understanding' does not stand for a mere abstract attribute here, but for a concrete thing, viz. the individual soul, possessed of the attribute. ⁴ P 861, line 19.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 16 ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 59 Vedānta-kaustubha Scripture designates that He (viz Brahman) alone is the “cause” of the bliss “of that”, viz. the individual soul,—which, according to the prima facie view, was suspected to be that which consists of bliss,—thus:—'For, verily, this alone causes bliss' (Tait 2 7). Here the term “ānandayāti” means ‘ānandayatī’. The sense is that as he who gives riches and knowledge to others is himself possessed of immense riches and immense knowledge, so the statement that the Highest Self, too, causes bliss to individual souls means that He is possessed of immense bliss. Just as the term ‘consisting of light’ is applied to Lord Sun, whose very nature is to remove all dark- ness, so exactly the application of the term ‘consisting of bliss’ to the Lord, the topic of the present discussion, the cause of all, without an equal or a superior, and devoid of even a tinge of non-bliss of any sort, is perfectly reasonable SŪTRA 16 “AND THE MANTRA-DESCRIBED (VIZ. BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED (TO BE CONSISTING OF BLISS).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha That which is stated in the mantra-text: viz ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1),¹ is “mantra-described”.² That alone is celebrated by the term “consisting of bliss”. Vedānta-kaustubha That which is stated in the mantra-text which beginning thus: ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), continues: ‘He who knows Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinite, situated in the cave’ (Tait. 2 1) is the “mantra-described”, i.e. Brahman alone, the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. He is cele- brated in the following Brāhmaṇa-text as well—viz. ‘Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss’ (Tait. 2.5), since the mantra and the Brāhmaṇa, ¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B ² Mantra-varṇikam.

60 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 17. ADH. 6.] the object to be explained and the explanation, refer to the same topic. Hence that which consists of bliss is the Highest Self alone. SŪTRA 17 "NOT THE OTHER, ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The qualities peculiar to the Lord, which are mentioned in Scripture as relating to that which is signified by the term 'consisting of bliss', being "inappropriate" on the part of anything else, "the other", i.e. the individual soul, is not signified by the term 'consisting of bliss' Vedānta-kaustubha "The other", i.e the individual, soul is not to be understood here by the term 'consisting of bliss'. Why? "On account of inappropriateness", i.e. the creatorship of the entire world and the like, mentioned as relating to that which consists of bliss in the scriptural text: "He wished: 'May I be many, may I procreate' He created all this" (Tait. 2.6), are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul. Hence that which consists of bliss is Brahman alone. Or else, the following construction (of the sūtra) may be under- stood:—The individual soul, "other than" Brahman, is not "mantra- described", because the qualities which are peculiar to the "mantra- described", viz. being the object to be attained by the wise and so on, are "inappropriate" on the part of anything else. COMPARISON Rāmānuja Reading same, interpretation different—'The other (viz. the individual) (is) not (the object of the text: "Truth, knowledge and infinite", Tait. 2.1), on account of inappropriateness'. That is, Rāmānuja takes this sūtra as continuing more particularly the theme of the preceding sūtra where it has been shown that Brahman is designated by the text 'Truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1) Here it is shown, he points out, that none else than the Lord, not

[sū. 1. 1. 18 ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 61 even the freed soul, can be the object of the above text, for even the freed soul is not absolute ¹ knowledge in the sense the Lord is, as even the freed soul cannot wish to be many and so on. So it is not appro- priate that the individual soul can ever be the object of the above text and be identical with Brahman ² Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'The other' (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha) (is) not (the cause of the world), on account of in- appropriateness'. According to Śrīkaṇṭha a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 17–20), concerned with the question whether the Lord is the cause of the world, or someone else, viz. Hiraṇya- garbha.³

SŪTRA 18 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account of the designation of a difference" between the obtainer and the object obtained in the text: 'For, verily, on obtaining this essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2 7) ⁴ the individual soul is not that which consists of bliss. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, that which consists of bliss or the 'mantra- described' one is not the individual soul. Why? Because the individual soul and the Supreme Being are designated as different. Thus, the text 'He is, verily, the essence. For, verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait 2 7), designates a difference between the Highest Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described, as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul, as the obtainer, since the obtainer cannot be the object obtained. There is a difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, otherwise an

¹ Nirupādhika. ² Śrī. B. 1.1 17, pp. 193-194, Part 1. ³ ŚK. B. 1.1.17, pp. 230–237, Part 3. ⁴ Ś, Bh.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 19. 62 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 6 ] intermixture of qualities will result,—this is the meaning of the two aphorisms. COMPARISON Śaṁkara This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. Reading and literal inter- pretation same, quotes the same passage, but in conclusion adds his own view, viz. that really and transcendentally, there is no difference between the soul, the obtainer, and Brahman, the obtained.¹ Rāmānuja Reading and interpretation same, but refers to a different passage, viz. Taittirīya-upaniṣad, 2.5.² Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different, viz : ‘(If it be said that Hiraṇyagarbha is identical with the Supreme Lord, then we reply, no), on account of the designation of difference’.³ —— SŪTRA 19 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF DESIRE (THROUGH WHICH SIMPLY THE LORD IS ABLE TO REALIZE HIS PURPOSES), THERE IS NO DEPEN- DENCE (OF THE LORD) ON (WHAT IS AN OBJECT OF) INFERENCE (VIZ. PRADHĀNA).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the individual soul be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on pradhāna which is an (object of) “in- ference”, just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the Highest Person, non-material, consisting of bliss and omnipotent, has to depend on nothing. Why? “On account of desire”, i.e. on account of intention, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘He desired: “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6).⁴ 1 Ś.B 1.1.17, pp. 221-22. 2 Cf. also Chānd. 6.2.3. ‘Sa aīkṣata bahu syām’, etc. 3 ŚK. B. 1.1 19, pp. 237 ff, Part 1. 4 Ś, R, Bh, B.

[sū. 1. 1. 19. ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 63 Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (viz. the individual soul). Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. Pradhāna may very well be denoted by the term ‘consisting of bliss’, as it contains the quality of sattva which is the cause of bliss, and as it corresponds to the effect ¹,—we reply — The term ‘consisting of bliss’ contains no “reference” to “in- ference”, i. e. to that which is inferred, viz. pradhāna. Why? “On account of desire”, i.e. because the text, which refers to that which consists of bliss, viz. ‘He desired: “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6), mentions one who desires. The sense is that desire means volition, and that is not possible on the part of the non-sentient pradhāna, but is possible on the part of the omniscient Lord of all. Although pradhāna has already been set aside by the aphorism ‘Because (the creator) sees, not, non-scriptural’ (Br. Sū. 1.1.5), it is once more set aside here with a view to confirming the ‘universality of knowing’ ² and hence there is no fault of repetition. Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:)—if the indivi- dual soul be denoted by the term ‘consisting of bliss’, the topic of the present discussion, it must be the cause of the world as well; and in that case, just as potters have to depend on clay and the rest for creating pots, etc. so the individual soul too must depend on pradhāna, which is a synonym for ‘inference’. ³ But if the omnipotent Brahman be the cause of the world, no such fault arises,—this is the sense. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 18 in their commentaries. Reading same, interpre- tation different, viz. ‘And on account of desiring, there is no reference

¹ That is, pradhāna, the non-sentient cause, is similar to the effect, the non- sentient world. Vide V.K. 1.1.5. ² Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.11, where it has been said that Brahman is universally known from all texts to be the cause of the world. ³ That is, pradhāna has been called ‘inference’ (anumāna) in the sūtra, because it is an object of inference.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 20. 64 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 6.] to (what is an object of) inference (viz pradhāna) (in the term "ānanda- maya"). That is, Scripture predicates willing on the part of the ānanda-maya, and willing is possible on the part of a conscious being alone.¹ Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different—viz. 'And, (even) on account of desire, (i e. in spite of the fact that Hiraṇyagarbha is said to have desired to create the world,) (his being the creator) is not dependent on reasoning (i.e. does not stand to reason,) (because it is the Lord Himself who created the world in the character of Hiraṇyagarbha)'.² SŪTRA 20 "AND (SCRIPTURE) TEACHES THE UNION WITH THAT (VIZ. BLISS) OF THIS (VIZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IN THIS (VIZ. THE LORD)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Scripture "teaches" the "union with that", i.e. the union with bliss, in the passage:—'Verily, he is an essence, for verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2. 7). Hence it is established that He, on attaining whom the individual soul comes to be united with bliss, is different from it Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also that which consists of bliss is neither the individual soul, nor pradhāna, but Brahman alone, since Scripture "teaches" the "union with that", i.e. the "union" or 'connection', with "that", or the Highest Self,—i.e. salvation, characterized by the attaining of His nature,³—'of this', i.e. of the individual soul, relying on Him, "in this", i.e. in the Highest Person, the Highest ¹ Ś. B. 1. 1. 18, p. 222; Bh. B. 1. 1. 18, p. 26. Note that this is adopted as an alternative explanation of the sūtra by Śrīnivāsa, but not by Nimbārka. See above. ² ŚK. B. 1. 1. 19 (pp. 240-241, Part 3) ³ Note that while according to Nimbārka, the word 'tad-yogam' means 'union with bliss', according to Śrīnivāsa, it means 'union with the Highest Self', or salvation, though ultimately these two interpretations come to the same thing.

[sū. 1. 1. 20 ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 65 Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described. And the scriptural text to this effect is as follows:—‘For, truly, when he finds fear- lessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, un- defined, and unsupported, then he is gone to fearlessness. When, however, he makes the smallest distinction therein, then he comes to have fear’ (Tait. 2 7) The meaning of this is as follows. ‘When’, i e when at the time of birth which took place at a time when there was a causeless kindly glance by the Lord, as mentioned in sacred texts, thus ‘But should Madhusūdana glance at a person, when he is born, he should be known to be pure and given to the thought of salvation’. ‘“Through my grace, he attains an eternal and un- changeable place”’ (Gītā 18.56) and so on, ‘he’, i.e. a knower, devoid of any desire for enjoyments here or hereafter, restoring to the feet of the Lord alone and possessed of the characteristics as stated in Scripture thus · ‘ “I am easily attainable by one, O Pārtha, by the ever- free ascetic, who constantly remembers me, not thinking ever of another”’ (Gītā 18 14), ‘He who departs, discarding the body, uttering the one syllable “om” and remembering me, goes to a supreme goal’, ‘“Knowing me, he goes to peace”’ (Gītā 5.29), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), and so on, becomes fearless, he ‘finds’, i.e. attains, ‘a foundation’, i.e unfailing, devotion (or reliance) through His grace alone. ‘Then’, i.e im- mediately after, ‘he is gone to fearlessness’, on account of the absence of any devotion (on his part) to anyone else, which (alone) is the cause of fear In whom ? ‘In the invisible’, i.e. in that which is different from the group of the non-sentient which is visible. Again, in whom? ‘In the incorporeal’, ie in the supremely conscious Being, who is different from the group of souls or conscious beings,—that He is the supremely conscious Being is stated in the Kaṭhavallī, thus. ‘Conscious among the conscious’ (Kaṭha. 5.13; also Śvet. 6.13);—‘in the undefined’, i.e. in that which is not estab- lished as having so-muchness and the nature and qualities of which are to be known from the Vedānta alone; ‘in the unsupported’, i.e. in that which has no basis, which is possessed of infinite, incon- ceivable powers,—this is the sense. And ‘when’, i.e. when during the period of nescience, ‘he’, i.e. a non-knower, ‘makes’ even the smallest ‘distinction’, i.e. relies on something else, viz. one or other of the ends, connected with means (other than a complete resort to the Lord alone), ‘then he comes to have fear’. Hence, it is 5

[sū. 1. 1. 20. 66 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 6.] established that that which consists of bliss is Brahman, different from all the sentient and the non-sentient ¹ Here ends the section entitled 'That which consists of bliss' (6). COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. Reading and interpretation same, quotes the passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa. But here Śaṃkara changes his point of view all of a sudden, and after having given at length the very same interpretation as given by Nimbārka, viz. that the 'ānanda-maya' referred to in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad (Tait. 2.5) is the Highest Self,² and not the individual soul or pradhāna, he finally rejects it, at the end of this sūtra, in favour of another, viz. that the word 'Brahman' in the immediately following phrase. 'Brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā' (Tait 2.5), refers to Brahman prin- cipally, and not as a member of the 'ānanda-maya', for the 'ānanda- maya' would refer to the qualified Brahman, and never to the non- qualified Brahman, which is called 'ānanda', and not 'ānandamaya'.³ Bhāskara This is sūtra 19 in his commentary too. Reading same, inter- pretation of the word 'tad-yogam' slightly different—viz 'union with Him (the Lord)', i.e. salvation.⁴ (Cf. Śrīnivāsa.) Quotes a different portion of the same passage (viz the portion quoted by Śrīnivāsa). Śrīkaṇṭha Reading same, interpretation different—viz. 'Herein (viz. in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad) (Scripture) teaches his (i.e. Hiraṇya- ¹ Note that here Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa understand the word 'śāsti' as referring to two different portions of the same passage, viz. Tait. 2 7, Nimbārka to the first part, Śrīnivāsa to the last. ² Vide Ś.B. 1.1.12, p. 217, 'Para evātmā ānanda-mayo bhavitum arhati' In this very sūtra also, it is said:—'Tasmād ānanda-mayaḥ paramātmā iti sthitam'. Ś.B. 1.1.19, p. 223. ³ Vide Ś.B. 1.1.19, pp. 225-26. ⁴ Bh. B. 1.1.19, p. 26.