भारतकोश
पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary

टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished197 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 69, कुल 197 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 69

40 PANIPAT. 1761 the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution of the problems? From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³ Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century, the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak, had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think- ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara- thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con- sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never won by despondent soldiers! The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde " "Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the ⁴² Raj 1 186 ⁴³ Ibid 1 188 ⁴⁴ Khare 1.22