पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

40 PANIPAT. 1761 the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution of the problems? From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³ Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century, the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak, had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think- ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara- thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con- sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never won by despondent soldiers! The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde " "Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the ⁴² Raj 1 186 ⁴³ Ibid 1 188 ⁴⁴ Khare 1.22

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 41

Chambal, at which Bhau's councillors laughed again and said, "Shinde and Holkar, Antaji Manakeshvar, Govindpant Bundele, Vitthal Shivdeo and Naro Shankar who had acted as officers with full powers in these parts, are now ill at ease at our coming and can never feel happy at the event" We reproduce these lines not because we believe in their truth but because they show an un- dercurrent of thought diametrically opposite to that of Bhau's policy There was a good substratum of truth in Holkar's advice To proceed against Abdali with heavy camp equipage and the encumbrances of women and chil- dren with a paraphernalia of private servants on a lavish scale, was certainly a mistake Delhi could never have been a secure base for the Marathas in the circumstances then existing In all previous campaigns of the Marathas in the Delhi region, they had suffered from want of food and fodder, not to say money The circumstances had grown even worse now, as Bhau experienced to his cost later on There was no valid reason to believe that the circumstances would have been different in the present campaign But Bhau felt confident of overcoming any difficulty and crossed the Chambal to Dholpur,⁴⁵ which in those times was not a Jat capital but a place of pilgrimage

The Maratha army crossed the Chambal on 8th June, and encamped near the Muchakunda tirth⁴⁶ near Dholpur The whole army went through the ceremony of a holy bath and sojourned for a few days there An eclipse of the sun on the 13th of June⁴⁷ added to the merit of the pilgrimage in this holy place The delay caused by the performance of the rites of pilgrimage frustrated Bhau's original plan of crossing over the Jamuna before the rains near Agra into Govindpant Bundeles districts and attacking Abdali from that base Agra was only some twenty five miles distant from the Maratha camp between the Chambal and the Gambhira, alias Banaganga, river But Bhau was unable to cross that small river and reach Agra for about a month more The monsoon had set in somewhat early that year, and the small river was in spate On his left hand was the Parvati, in front the Gambhira and at the back the Chambal The region is extremely uneven At every hundred yards there is a ravine, a continuous up and down The land is sandy and the rivers and streams, though shallow, spread over for miles across the banks It is dif- ficult to set foot in the bed of the river and there is not enough water for boats to cross In fact, no boats are available on those streams, for after a few days the water is completely drained away and only level sands, yellow and white in colour, are left to act as witnesses for the temporary floods The whole camp must have suffered terribly because camping in those regions looked almost impossible

Though Sadashivrao Bhau could not cross the insignificant river Gambhira, he was able to meet Shinde and Holkar and discuss with them the future problems and line of action, as both of them were encamping on the same side of the Gambhira in the vicinity of Keraoli The first to see Bhau was Gangoba Chandrachud, Holkar's Diwan, on 15th June ⁴⁸ Gangoba be

45 Raj 1 199 46 Bhau Bakhar p 113 47 13th of June was 30 Jyestha, Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, K. Patre Yadi 192. 48 Raj 1.203

42 PANIPAT 1761 longed to that generation of the Marathas which grew up with Bajirao's con quests in Malwa He was the confidential man of Malharrao and had perfect faith⁴⁹ in the wisdom of his master Malharrao Holkar seems to have purposely sent Gangoba to meet Bhau first and sound him in respect of his future policy and temper Malharrao him- self met Bhau along with Janakoji Shinde, a week later, on the 22nd of June ⁵⁰ No difference of opinion is reported at this meeting which seems to have ended amicably, thus belying the purposive colourful writing of the Marathi chroni- cles At the end of the month, Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din saw Sadashivrao Bhau and discussed the future line of action ⁵¹ The plan at the beginning of July was still to cross over the Jamuna into the Doab by build- ing a bridge of boats But even this plan failed because of the rising waters of the Jumuna In fact Bhau's slow march from the Deccan added four addi- tional months of the monsoon to the Panipat campaign, and lowered the vitality and morale of the Maratha army thereby From the tone of a letter written at this juncture, there does not seem to be any difference of opinion between Bhau and his sardars or Surajmal Jat ⁵² The total strength of the Maratha army is given as seventy to eighty thousand while Abdali-Ruhela strength is reported as sixty thousand The balance was to be decided by the joining in of Shuja ud daulah to either side Shuja's army is reported as twenty thousand, with a very strong park of artillery Besides, his army was one on permanent footing and therefore best trained, best equipped and al together more efficient than that of the others It was regularly well paid and therefore contented Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar,⁵³ Jana- koji's Diwan, had been despatched as special ambassadors to Shuja as a last resort to induce him to come over to the Maratha side by offering him any terms he would choose to ask ⁵⁴ But he finally decided against the Marathas and proceeded to meet Abdali at Ramgad Bhau at once changed his plan of crossing into the Doab and arrived at Gau Ghat to the north east of Sikandara where the great Akbar lies buried This place is some ten miles to the north west of Agra on the bank of the Jamuna There the Maratha army halted and bathed in the holy waters on the new moon day of Ashadha, which fell on 12th July, 1760 ⁵⁵ Thence Bhau proceeded to Mathura where he encamped on the 15th of July ⁵⁶ Thence he sent advanced troops to lay siege to Delhi, then commanded by Yakub Ali Khan, a cousin of the Durrani Wazir Shah Wali Khan ⁵⁷ He had only a small force, not more than two thousand strong The rest of the camp with women in it went on performing the pilgrim's rites at Mathura and Brindavan Nana Fadnis, who was accompanying Bhau with his wife and mother, indulged in the holy pilgrimage to his heart's content, ⁴⁹ SPD 2 116 ⁵⁰ Raj 1 217, SPD 2 127 ⁵¹ Purandare 1.387 ⁵² Ibid ⁵³ Raj 1 208 ⁵⁴ Purandare 1 387 ⁵⁵ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 ⁵⁶ Raj 1.217 ⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.222, 223

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 43 and rapturously describes it in his "Autobiography" 58 Bhau's wife Parvati- bai, Mehendale's wife Lakshmibai, and some other women of high status had accompanied the army mainly with a view to perform the pilgrimages in the great safety of big camps fully provided with every necessity of life. The time of Maratha encampment at Mathura coincided with the Hindu intercalary month of Shravana, deemed the most holy especially near the scene of Krishna's childhood. As discussed previously, Surajmal Jat and Ghazi-ud-din were of the same opinion as that of Malharrao Holkar in not proceeding to Delhi with the whole camp, but to keep the base of operations behind and to carry on the campaign against Abdali with unencumbered troops. But Bhau had decided, probably with the full concurrence of the Peshwa, to follow the new mode of warfare based on infantry tactics. He prepared to take Delhi and make it a base. Surajmal was not against the idea of occupying Delhi but he wanted it to be handed over to him as a keeper, and wished Ghazi ud din to be made a Wazir. After the assassination of Alamgir II, his son, the fugitive prince Ali Gauhar had crowned himself as Emperor in Bihar. He had naturally dis- missed Ghazi ud din from the chancellorship and offered it to Shuja, for he could not allow his father's murderer to continue in the high office. Ghazi ud- din had tried to strengthen his hands by the expedient of taking a young prince out of the imperial prison and crowning him Emperor with the title of Shah Jahan Sani and getting himself appointed as his Wazir. But his plan was miscarried by Dattaji's defeat and death in the preceding year, and he was now a fugitive at Surajmal's Court. Bhau had to act cautiously and take into account the general voice of the populace in the Mughal dominions. The Peshwa had not directly protested against Ghazi ud din's acts of foul murder and to that extent tried not to antagonise him as he had been a creation of the Marathas. But it was necessary to guard against Najib's propaganda and, therefore, Bhau could not approve of Surajmal's proposal to acknowledge Ghazi ud din as Wazir. Bhau also wanted to keep the office open in order to tempt Shuja to the Maratha side, if he could by any means be won over. Bhau, therefore, asked the Jat Raja and Ghazi ud din to accompany him to Delhi and help him in conquering and settling it. He sent Janakoji Shinde, Balvantrao Mehendale and Malharrao Holkar with eight thousand troops in advance on 21st July, 1760. This party reached Delhi on the 25th and at once took possession of the city without firing a shot. In the first surprise on- slaught some fifty Marathas even succeeded in entering the inner citadel by scaling the walls, but instead of at once proceeding to the gates and trying to open them so as to make the whole army enter in, they foolishly engaged in loot and therefore gave time to Yakub Ali Khan, Abdali's keeper, to bring his forces to the scene and drive them out. Balvantrao's pride and impetuous- ness are illustrated in this event. He seems to have at once despatched a courier to Bhau who was following, with the main Maratha camp, to inform him of his victory, and Bhau rewarded the camel rider for bringing in the good news. At the end of the day, however, Balvantrao had to retreat to his camp. 58 Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, Patre Yadi, 192.

44 PANIPAT: 1761 outside the city and place guns around the citadel. Bhau himself had ad- vanced by this time from Mathura and was encamping at the famous serai at Chhatah Now he advanced in haste via Hodal and Palwal and reached Delhi on 31st July By this time the small party of Afghans under Yakub Ali Khan had been battered in the citadel and now with the coming of Ibrahim Khan's park of artillery, they found it impossible to continue the struggle and sued for peace. They were allowed to march out and go back to Abdali with their arms and baggage Their number was only eight hundred.⁵⁹ The Mara- thas occupied the Red Fort on the 1st of August and celebrated their first vic- tory amidst jubilations Bhau himself seems to have sojourned there for a few days to arrange for the administration of the palace, city and the fort till he moved to Shalimar Gardens to the north-west of Delhi. He appointed Naro Shankar as the guardian of the palace and the city with six thousand troops made up of cavalry and infantry. Baloji Palhande was made the keeper of the fort. Sadashivrao Bhau's camp at Delhi after the first fortnight was near the Shalimar Gardens watered by the famous Ali Mardan Khan canal. The place is still very charming, filled with the fragrance of the blossoms of the lucat trees during September and October. The water pavilions of the lux- urious Mughal Emperors are still to be seen there with their mural paintings of birds and flowers, though in a dilapidated condition. Already three con- querors, namely, Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah and Raghunathrao, had lived in them during two decades Now Bhau had occasion to halt there. Though from the military point of view the possession of Delhi was no great gain, it restored the prestige of the Maratha name. Ahmad Shah was, at this time, camping at Anupshahar on the Ganges but he was unable to send any succour to his nominee, Yakub Ali Khan.⁶⁰ Shuja-ud-daulah was ac- tually encamping just on the opposite side of the Jamuna⁶¹ but he was also helpless to do anything in the matter. Perhaps they knew that it was impos- sible to face Ibrahim Khan's artillery and therefore remained silent. In the popular mind, however, the Maratha prestige, lost and lowered by the previous year's events, was completely restored. Shuja, who had willingly joined Abdali, began to waver in his resolution.⁶² He began to exert himself in the peace- move. The Indian allies of Ahmad Shah Abdali in this campaign had joined their forces with his as a lesser evil only. The trans-Gangetic Ruhelas under the leadership of the sagacious Hafiz Rahmat had no love lost for Najib Khan, whose faithlessness and unscrupulous dealings they would not approve. The lame Ahmad Khan Bangash was always shaky in his resolution, never being sure which side to choose. His situation was always precarious as his district of Farukkhabad was situated amidst the more powerful states of Oudh, the Ruhelas, the Marathas and the Jats. Though weak, Ahmad Khan was not unselfish either. He would side with the Marathas with a view to gain some ⁵⁹ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 Raj. 1.223 ⁶⁰ Illiot. 8 147 ⁶¹ Raj. 1.224. ⁶² Ibid. 1.191

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 45 portion of Shuja's dominions or the land of the Ruhelas. When not threatened by Shuja and when the Maratha armies were not in his neighbourhood, he would not shirk from invading and occupying the Maratha districts in the lower Doab.⁶³ He would never offend any party by his words and always tried to keep himself on speaking terms with all. Ahmad Khan had come to Abdali's camp but seeing that there was no work there for three months of the rains he and also the Ruhelas, except Najib, left for their homes with Abdali's permission.⁶⁴ From their homes they kept on writing to Bhau that they had joined Abdali under duress. Bhau seems to have misjudged their motives as they were always keeping up a correspondence with Bhau and promising to join him under certain conditions. It is difficult to say whether they actually feared the consequences of joining Abdali as against the Mara- thas or were merely fooling him this time so as to save their dominions from the armies of Govindpant Bundele and Gopalrao Ganesh Barve. But Bhau was trying his best to take advantage of the enforced delay and hoping to separate some of his allies from Abdali. Many Afghan sardars wrote to Bhau that they would detach themselves from Abdali as soon as they found an opportunity to do so. But Abdali kept a strict watch over them and never once allowed them to move away from his camp. Bhau even tried to detach some of the Afghan tribes who were accompanying Abdali with the hope of loot but were not directly employed by him, and were actually starving. Ahmad Shah's Durrani troops were at this time living on loot. Najib was supplying Abdali with 200 maunds of grain and 15,000 rupees cash every day for his aid. But this was sufficient for his personal slaves only. Bhau had ordered Govindpant to engage them if they came over to his side and to send them to Bhau's camp if necessary.⁶⁵ He had asked Govindpant to remain where he was and try to move in such a way as to make Shuja and the Ruhelas leave Abdali's camp for defending their threatened territories.⁶⁶ But the terror of Abdali's forces was such that it made any move on Govindpant's part well-nigh impossible. The Maratha officials in the Doab seem to have been completely demoralised by the experience of the past four years, and no one was ready to take any risk in the matter. This is clear from Sadashivrao Bhau's order to Govind- pant in the middle of August to forbid any Maratha employed under him to send back his effects to the Deccan, as Bhau had come to know of such a move.⁶⁷ It meant that the Marathas living in those regions were not very sanguine about the outcome of the war and feared the worst. This explains the cause of the non-compliance of Sadashivrao Bhau's orders by Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve. They were unable to do anything vigorously or enthu- siastically because the overwhelming majority of the Maratha employees had completely lost heart. Notwithstanding such sombre atmosphere Sadashivrao Bhau was going on with his plans of meeting Abdali after the rains. Though the hope of solv- ing the political problem of the governance of India without resort to arms was ⁶³ Ibid. 1.236. ⁶⁴ Ibid. 1.237. ⁶⁵ Ibid. 1.257 ⁶⁶ Ibid. 1.242 ⁶⁷ Ibid. 1.223.

46 PANIPAT 1761 very remote, still peace parleys continued throughout. Najib Khan's proposal forwarded through Shuja was to hand over the regions beyond Sarhind to Abdali and hand over the Delhi affairs into his hands Shuja wanted the Chancellorship as well as the command over the army of the Mughal Em pire ⁶⁸ But Najib would never allow the military command to pass out of his hands Bhau's idea was to fix the boundary at Attock, leaving Peshawar and Kabul to Abdali, while the imperial defence would be left as it was, meaning through the agency of the Marathas But Bhau was not obstinate on any point. He knew that no one could have everything his own way In diplo macy "give and take" is necessary and inevitable, and therefore he still hoped to find a via media out of the impasse The condition in the middle of September was as follows There was no money left in the government treasury nor was any forthcoming from the revenue collectors like Govindpant Bundele Bhau knew the economic con dition of the region surrounding Delhi very well and understood the difficulties of recovering government dues in the then conditions of northern India Be sides the military trouble due to war with Abdali, nature also had some say in the affair Hail storms and certain pests had that year destroyed the crops in many parts and there was a consequent deficit in revenue collection ⁶⁹ The dismissal of old collectors like Naro Shankar and his brother and recently of Mahadaji Govind Kakirde⁷⁰ appointed in his place, had adversely affected the Maratha revenues in Bundelkhand Bhau also suspected the sincerity of the collectors who, he thought, were withholding payments with a view to take advantage of the difficulties of the government ⁷¹ They would pay after the event instead of before it, as they were not sure of the result of the war and hoped to profit thereby As the army was starving and not even a week's payment out of the month could be made to them, Bhau had recourse to the politically disastrous action of taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan i khas, and minting it into money He was able to secure only nine lakhs by this process and thereby feed his army for one month only It seems this action was tom tomed as insulting to the Mughal throne by the Muslim partisans of Najib, and it inflamed the Muslim population in the surrounding regions against the Marathas As a matter of fact, the Wazir Ghazi ud din had already taken out a part of that very ceiling previously when he was in need of money, and Bhau was not the first vandal to touch it as made out by partisan his- torians ⁷² But none seemed to have noticed the Wazir's act while all flared up against Bhau's behaviour When the famous peacock throne of Shah Jahan was taken away by Nadir Shah or when the whole palace and its inmates were completely stripped of their effects by Abdali, none seemed to have thought these as an insult to the Mughal throne then, possibly because the spoliators were devout Muslims 68 Purandare 1.389 69 Shinde 1.222 Purandare 1.386. 70 Satara 2.291 Dabholkar Mss. 152. 71 SPD 27.234. 72 Ibid 27.257

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 47 Bhau’s difficulties were increased by the Peshwa’s ignorance of northern Indian affairs. It was customary for the Maratha army to subsist on the land they marched through; but, after experience, the people of the regions through which they marched had become wiser than before, and left nothing on the spot to be carried away by the Marathas. Bhau had himself taken Raghunath- rao to task for not being able to defray the expenditure of his campaign, and now he could not possibly ask for funds from the Deccan. The stress of cir- cumstances, however, obliged even the proud Bhau to beg for funds. The Peshwa first ordered the revenue collectors in the north to pay half the revenues to Bhau. This order only facilitated equivocation by the delaying collectors They would write to the Peshwa that Bhau had taken the whole revenue from them and write to Bhau that they had sent the whole money to the Deccan. Bhau, therefore, over-riding the Peshwa’s orders, asked the collectors to send the whole amount to him only. Still no money was forthcoming from anybody Bhau had received two lakhs’from Govindpant and eighty thousand from Babu- rao Koner of Jhansi. This was all he was able to receive at Delhi. While Bhau was besieged at Panipat, Govindpant brought four lakhs and twenty thousand to Delhi at the beginning of December, only a quarter of which reached Bhau’s camp in safety. Besides Govindpant, some other collectors like Gopal Keshav of Bhander (SPD, 29-12) also seem to have forwarded their collections to Delhi after Bhau’s move to Kunjpura. The capture of Delhi had placed an additional burden on Bhau’s depleted treasury because he had now to provide for the palace-expenditure which came to more than a lakh per month. There is some ground for suspicion that Bhau’s plans were being ob- structed by certain forces in Poona, antagonistic to him. Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, always feared, it seems, the complete usurpation of power by Bhau as he was already the sole administrator. The Peshwa was every day growing weaker and weaker both physically and morally. This fact also en- hanced the lady’s fears. She, as well as the Peshwa’s advisers in Poona, espe- cially the wily Sakharam Bapu, who it should be noted, was with the Peshwa in the Deccan and had not accompanied Vishwasrao to the north, as wrongly stated by Sir Jadunath,⁷³ seem to have been responsible for advising the Peshwa to withhold any more help to Bhau for fear of his increasing power. Sakharam Bapu was perhaps the cleverest brain in the Poona Court of those times. He was from very early days a sort of rival to Bhau in diplomatic matters. The Peshwa seems to have used Bapu as a tool to keep a balance of power at the Poona Court. Bhau’s ways were open and straightforward. Bapu’s conduct was exactly the reverse. The two could not go together with these contrary dispositions. Sakharam Bapu had, therefore, always sided with the party opposite to Bhau. He accompanied Raghunathrao in his north Indian campaigns as his chief adviser and administrator. Though Raghunath- rao as the master cannot be absolved from the blame, the chief responsibility for the financial mismanagement of his campaigns should be properly placed on Sakharam Bapu’s shoulders. Being conscious of his share in the guilt, ⁷³ Fall 2.240 (foot note)

48 PANIPAT 1761 Bapu naturally must have come to loggerheads with Bhau when the final ac- counts of the campaigns came to be settled Peculation was quite rampant in those days in official circles and the Maratha state was no exception to the rule Profiteering at the cost of govern- ment was thought to be no sin and was a normal part of a wise man's living While some of the generals and diplomats and administrators waxed fat, the state languished for want of money The Peshwa's government perhaps suf- fered more than the other governments through this mischief, because the ruder Maratha generals were more grabbing and the selfish and brainy Brahmin ac- countants and collectors were clever at figures To spite Bhau now, Bapu must have taken full advantage of his difficulties in tutoring the Peshwa against him Bhau's advisers and assistants in this campaign were also rivals of Bapu at the Poona Court Trimbak Sadashiv alias Nana Purandare and Balvantrao Mehendale were not well disposed towards him, Nana Purandare was on al- most inimical terms with Bapu 74 In short Sakharam Bapu belonged to the party of critics of Sadashivrao's policy One is, therefore, led to believe in the truth of that one line commentary copied and reproduced in Khare I,75 which also explains to some extent the attitude of the Peshwa towards the Delhi campaign of Sadashivrao Bhau as reported by Naro Gangadhar from the Peshwa's camp in the Deccan 76 Sadashivrao Bhau, writing from Delhi in the middle of September 1760 to his intimate friend, Dhondo Malhar Purandare, states that there is no dif- ference of opinion between him and the two sardars Shinde and Holkar It means that the dramatic episode of Surajmal described in detail in the Bakhar is all imaginary and an after thought Honest difference of opinion about the policy to be followed against Abdali might be there, but the cause of his ab- ruptly leaving Delhi without taking leave of Bhau must be his disappointment Bhau would not place the city in the charge of the Jat, but appointed Naro Shankar as the guardian of the city and the palace, instead Surajmal was, no doubt, very shrewd and cautious His advice to keep the main camp with its heavy encumbrances back in the Gwalior region was sound But he was personally very selfish and always tried to secure his ends under the cloak of humbleness. This time he wished to follow the same path and set himself up as a regent in Delhi with the help of the Marathas His past behaviour towards the Marathas was neither very honest nor consistent After Raghu- nathrao's campaign against him in 1754, he occupied the lands in the Doab surrounding Kol Ramgad during their absence from the north in 1755 77 In 1756 he would not risk his troops against Abdali by joining Antaji Manakesh- war, though he took full advantage of Antaji's cover to guard his dominions and save his forts When Raghunathrao again returned to the north, he still kept himself studiously aloof and saved his skin Meanwhile he had reaped the harvest out of Maratha weakness due to Jayapa's assassination He sud- denly descended upon the strong imperial hill fort of Alwar which guarded 74 Purandare 3.82. 75 Khare, 1.25 6 SI D 2.133 77 Hingne 1.159.

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA . 49 the route from Delhi to Jaipur, and occupied it without much trouble. When Dattaji returned in 1758 with a strong force he again assumed humbleness and tried to make a common cause with him in the spoliation of the Mughal em- pire. He had kept on good terms with the Shinde family since the time he was saved by Jayapa Shinde against Malharrao's fury at Kumbher, and thus shielded himself against Malharrao's exactions. But he respected neither friend nor foe when it was a question of aggrandizing himself at the cost of others. For the present he had made common cause with Shinde and Holkar, fully knowing that they would not be troublesome to him after their late defeats at the hands of Abdali. On the other hand they were useful to him in meet- ing the calls of Sadashivrao Bhau on his resources. Now finding himself un- able to fulfil his life's ambition of governing Delhi, he silently walked away from Bhau's camp with a show of anger at Bhau's policy. Bhau certainly felt the loss of his help at this crucial time and tried to recall him. Mahipatrao Chitnis, Gangoba Chandrachud and Ramaji Anant were sent after him to bring him back.⁷⁸ This proves that Bhau had no intention of insulting him as is made to appear in the Bhau Bakhar. Nor was he remiss in trying to win him over with assurances. But it looks as if the Jat Raja was thoroughly selfish and left the Maratha camp, ostensibly on account of a difference in out- look on matters of policy, but really to save himself from Bhau's demands and importunities due to the starving condition of his men and animals Throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau was never once suspicious of the Jat's attitude towards the Marathas, but always hoped for good behaviour from him Though he had openly consented not to help⁷⁹ Bhau in his diplomatic talks with Najib and Shuja as Abdali's emissaries, with a view to excuse himself from paying tribute to the Afghan monarch, Surajmal did not do anything antagonistic to the Maratha interests, but on the other hand considerably helped them by allowing provisions and money to pass through his territory unmolested.⁸⁰ There seems to have been talk of Surajmal's son, Jawahirmal, coming to Bhau's help with the Jat forces at the beginning of October. When Prince Javan Bakht was proclaimed on 10th October and the seals of his father were brought into use, the Jat Raja became finally reconciled to the Maratha side.⁷⁹ All these facts refute the criticism of Bhau's behaviour in his dealings with Surajmal Jat. His humane behaviour and the monetary help he afforded to the Maratha fugitives after Panipat completely belies the story so dramatically related in the chronicle. As related above, the peace parleys were dragging on all along, but without sincerity on either side. Ahmad Shah had changed his camp of thatched huts at Anupshahar on the Ganges at the beginning of August.⁸¹ This was first a countermove to Bhau's occupation of Delhi, and was also due to the unhealthiness of the place. Thousands of his horses and camels succumbed to the heavy monsoon in the low-lying Gangetic valley.⁸² His first thought was ⁷⁸ SPD 27.258. ⁷⁹ Parasnis Persian Akhbars Mss ⁸⁰ Raj. 1.259. ⁸¹ Ibid. 1.226-7, 246. ⁸² SPD 2 131; Raj 6 404 P. F.—4

50 PANIPAT 1761 to move north to the strong fort of Sukartal and remain there At the begin ning of October, he was reported to have left his camp at Sambharam Serai and moved to Ahmad Ganj 79 But soon after he came to Shahadra, opposite to Delhi on the bank of the Jamuna, and encamped there with Shuja and Najib A distant cannonade was also sometimes indulged in by both the armies from the two banks of the river It could not be very effective from a distance of more than a mile with the artillery of those times Besides, none of the parties was willing to waste its ammunition for merely terrifying without military effect Internal trouble was also brewing amongst Abdalis allies Shuja and Najib were strange bed fellows whom only destiny had brought together Najib had promised that no demands for money would be made on Shuja if he joined Abdalis camp This hope was belied, for the hungry and grabbing Afghans tried to make encroachments on him, knowing full well that he was rich This led to a quarrel between Shuja and the Durranis Shuja felt himself deceived by the false promise of Najib and was almost in a repentant mood 63 The Abdali troops, on the other hand, were reluctant to continue their stay in India amidst misery and destitution, with little hope of earning anything in the future Bhau had sent one Bhavanishankar as a Vakil to Shuja across the Jamuna and Shuja also sent his Vakil to Bhau in return 64 It seems from Kashiraj s account that he also accompanied Raja Devidatta, Shuja's envoy But there is no corroboration of the same in Marathi correspondence, a fact which makes one suspicious about the truth of his narrative As Bhau was not satisfied with Raja Devidatta, he sent him back with Bhavanishankar This Bhavanishankar is scarcely mentioned anywhere in the Marathi nar- rative as a person of importance Kashiraj says he was a native of Auranga bad and belonged to his caste As the Brahmins of Aurangabad had taken to Persian studies, they were in great demand at the courts of various north Indian potentates who had any dealings with the Marathas Knowing both Persian and Marathi, they were able to correspond and interpret between the Maratha and other courts, and settled in various capitals The Hingne family was also engaged by the Peshwa for the same qualifications Bhavanishankar first came in contact with the Peshwa in his dealings with Shah Nawaz Khan at the Nizam s court, and seems to have spread his influence over Bhau also 65 As Nana Fadnis in his Autobiography adversely comments on Bhavani shankars influence over Bhau and expresses himself in disapproving terms about his conduct it may be taken as a general opinion of the Maratha camp about the man Bhau over rode the opinions of intimates like Balvantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare and completely put his faith in Bhavani shankars advice, which was also the main cause of Bhaus decision to follow Ibrahim Khan Gardis French tutored mode of warfare. Perhaps, even in the succes ful Udgir campaign, 66 Bhau had followed Bhavanishankars advice and the thundering success in it had established Bhavanishankar in Bhau's con fidence Whatever the fact, his conduct of peace parleys at this juncture did not prove succes sful as Najib-ud daulah threw every obstacle in the way Mal 63 Raj 1.235, 216 64 Samra 2.297

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 51 harrao and Surajmal were also keeping correspondence with Shuja and seek- ing his advice as to the future line of action. Shuja advised the Marathas to follow only the traditional mode of guerilla warfare, and to Surajmal he ad- vised to return to his own country. To Bhau, Shuja professed friendship, while declining to leave Abdali's camp, and promised to help the Maratha cause by giving his best advice. From Kashiraj's account it seems Bhau had receded back a great deal on his original terms one by one. As a last resort, he was ready to surrender the Panjab upto Sarhind, but wanted Abdali no more to in- terfere in the Delhi affairs. But, as mentioned above, nothing came out of this boring of the mountain, not even a mouse. Both sides seem to have put their final faith in a decision by arms. From the beginning, Bhau was ready to al- low Abdali to return to his own country if he so desired. But if he really had a mind to gain that end, it would have been better had he never crossed the Chambal. In that case Abdali would possibly have left India through sheer weariness. But with Bhau's big army advanced to Delhi, it was impossible for Abdali to retreat without offering a battle. From that point of view it would have been better for Sadashivrao Bhau to have turned his attention to Shuja's dominions and to have proceeded to Benares instead of Delhi. But unfortunately for the Marathas throughout their career, they had chosen the cockpit of Delhi as their fighting arena and ultimately lost their all in it. Meanwhile the condition of the Maratha army deteriorated day by day. The bullocks of the artillery department died by hundreds and there were not enough left with strength to drag the guns.⁸⁷ Bhau had also ordered⁸⁸ both Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve to cross over the Ganges and threaten Shuja's and the Ruhela's territories. But Govindpant was unable to move, firstly, on account of the rains, and secondly, because the zamindars in the Doab and Bundelkhand had become defiant and treacherous, and there was no safety for the Maratha posts in those regions. Bhau had taken possession of all the main ghats between Agra and Kunjpura and blocked the crossings for the enemy. He had kept small patrols to guard the ferry ghats and collected all the boats at Selimgad near Delhi. Though Bhau had now placed his main faith in the artillery of Ibrahim Khan,⁸⁹ still he could not recruit any Marathas for service in that department. He had to call the men from the enemy's ter- ritories to do such work.⁹⁰ Bhau seems to have called some European gun- ners from the eastern parts also. Many Portuguese, French, English and other European adventurers and renegades were at this time spread over India, ready to offer their services for good money. The war between the French and the English had detached a number of Frenchmen from Chandranagar and other places in Bengal. These were probably the persons Bhau was hop- ing to engage. But none of these projects materialized and only a certain number of Pathan followers of Ahmad Shah came over to the Maratha side only to create confusion and disaster in the last fight. 85 RAJ. 1.85 86 SPD 25.279 87 RAJ. 1.231 88 Ibid 1.233, 237 89 Ibid. 1.174 90 Ibid. 1.176, 235

CHAPTER IV KUNJPURA TO UNDERSTAND Sadashivrao Bhau's campaign north of Delhi, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with the terrain on both sides of the river Jamuna The whole of this area is one vast, continuous, sandy plain formed by the silt of the river It is a gradually sloping plain from the north to the south, and just near the river banks very slightly sloping towards the river This plain is between seven and eight hundred feet above the sea level on an average, with practically no hills worth the name The rocky arm of the Aravalli Range, starting from Mount Abu north of Gujarat, extends just up to the north of Delhi city, and ends in the famous Ridge of Mutiny fame This is the last rocky spot in the whole area North of it one can see scarcely a stone any- where The very few elevated spots to be found in this even terrain look more like mounds than hills, being made up of sandy rubble, and one sometimes suspects these of being the handiwork rather, of man than of nature Where such elevated spots occur, they are sure to be occupied by towns if sufficiently large, or otherwise by a temple, a mosque, a Sadhubava or a Pir Sonepat and Panı pat, reputed to be dating from the Mahabharata War, along with Indrapat or the oldest Delhi, are situated on and alongside small hillocks, less than a hun dred feet above the surrounding level plain Both were walled towns with small citadels on the hill tops The main features to be noted for the history of the eighteenth century in this region were that the region was bounded by the river Jamuna on the east, and by the imperial Ali Mardan Khan Canal (Shah nahar) on the west. The imperial road with the Kos minars or pillars at an interval of two and a half English miles passed through the Doab formed by these natural and man- made aqueducts The road ran parallel to the east of the canal at a distance of about five miles on an average, but it passed by the towns of Sonepat, Panı- pat and Karnal The canal ended in the Delhi palace, after supplying the famous Shalimar gardens to the north west of the city with ample water It had been built to meet the needs of the imperial family in the main, but was probably utilized by others also to the extent possible after fulfilling the re quirements of the palace. The area along the canal and beyond was thickly wooded while that by the side of the river was boggy and marshy, overgrown with rushes and other water plants for miles together There are fords at a distance of about five miles on the river at present, but these were probably fewer in former days, when irrigation canals had not drained the river dry There were ferries and bridges of boats, however, at convenient and necessary places The river re- mained unfordable during the rainy season and sometime after At some places where the river had divided itself into several channels with sandy banks and islands between, fording was easier and these places became the high roads of movement and commerce like those near Kunjpura and Budhia Where the [ 52 ]

KUNJPURA 53

river-bank was steep and the water deep, crossing was very difficult, if not impossible. Sadashivrao Bhau, after the first fortnight of August in Delhi, moved¹ his camp from Kalkādevi to the south of the city on the bank of the Jamuna to the west of the city near Seetaram's serai beyond the canal, and this camp seems to have extended upto the Shalimar gardens to the north-west, thus covering an area of more than three miles in length from north to south. Here he lived for almost seven weeks, till he began his northward march to Kunj- pura in the first week of October. The Maratha army suffered great priva- tions² in this camp. The food supply of Delhi was derived from the eastern Doab side in normal times. But this region was in the possession of Najib Khan and Abdali. Besides, the Jamuna was in flood making commercial in- tercourse difficult, if not impossible. Added to the food and fodder scarcity, there was the scarcity of money. No money was forthcoming from any source; neither from the revenue collectors of the Maratha lands in north India, nor from tribute, nor even from loans. Even men of position had to keep from starvation by selling their jewellery and other personal belongings.³ The result was a great deterioration in the physical stamina of men and ani- mals. It must have also told on the morale of the army, though in this case the cool courage and optimism of the commander-in-chief counteracted, to a great extent, the evil effects of the same.⁴ Placed in this quandary, Bhau had recourse to such things as taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-khas to coin money wherewith to pay a bare subsistence allowance to the troops as stated before.⁵ But this was only a stop-gap. The nine lakhs of rupees derived from this vandalic source were just sufficient to feed the army for one month. During a period of three months, only two weekly payments to the soldiers had been made possible, so precarious was the situation. Nor was it possible, while the rains continued, to get out of this plight. The future plans of Abdali were as yet inscrutable. The early setting in of the rains that year with the continuous high flood level of the Jamuna for four months had miscarried the earlier plans hatched by Sadashivrao Bhau to meet Abdali in a pitched battle. The waiting-time factor had gone against the Maratha anticipations. Shuja-ud-daulah's pusillanimous efforts to be on good terms with both the parties had at last resulted in his completely falling under the influence of the wily Najib. Even after going over to the side of Abdali, Shuja still continued his efforts for peace during the rainy season, but to no purpose. Nana Phadnis accuses him of chicanery, though the historian of Oudh vouchsafes his good intentions.⁶ All the same, Bhau would not rely on such a broken reed and decided to open the campaign against Abdali by

1 RAJ 6 404; SPD 27.258. 2 SPD 130, 131 3 Aitihasika Tippane 1 14 4 RAJ. 6 101. 5 SPD 27.257.

KUNJPURA 55 Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh, the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus, at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj- pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Persian Akhbar MS ) From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15-10 1760, it seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi- tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power- less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till the subsidence of the river When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa- tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad- viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he 9 Ibid 1.237 10 Ibid 1.231, 237 11 Ibid 1.252 12 SPD 2.130-31

54 PANIPAT 1761 first taking the offensive himself His difficulties at Delhi obliged him to take this decision which was urged on him by all and sundry in the Maratha camp Before he could continue his march, Bhau thought it wise to make a political move to counteract the anti Maratha propaganda of Najib and men of his ilk He had already estranged Wazir Ghazi ud din and his supporter Surajmal Jat by his non committal attitude towards their aspirations and de signs All his approaches to Shuja had proved futile It became necessary for him now to give a demonstrable proof of his ultimate intentions So, setting aside the boy Emperor, Shah Jahan III (elevated to that dignity by Ghazi ud din after the murder of Alamgir II in the previous year), Bhau proclaimed the wandering Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor with the title of Shah Alam II In his unavoidable absence his son Prince Javan Bakht, residing at Delhi, was installed as Vali Ahad or Crown Prince and Vicar of the absentee Emperor on 10th October 1760 ⁷ Mints struck new coins in the new Emperor's name, and his seals were also prepared and brought into use The ceremonies and proces- sions connected with these acts were seen through by Nana Purandare and Satvoji Jadhavrao, who had been specially deputed by Bhau for the purpose while encamped at Lalera, three miles to the south of Gannaur⁸ while on his way to Kunjpura The office of the Wazir is said to have been conferred on Shuja in absent a, but there is no mention of this fact in Marathi corre- spondence and hence seems improbable The details of this occurrence in Delhi throw a flood of light on Maratha manners in politics The puppet Emperor, Shah Jahan, was politely asked to vacate his seat as his days were over This was perhaps the first time in Mughal history when an emperor had been set aside without violence to his person The Prince Javan Bakht was escorted to the Juma Masjid by Bapuji Hingne, the Maratha envoy, who sat with the prince on the elephant, while Satvoji stood behind with peacock feathers, a sign of royal insignia, in his hand The ex Empress Zinat Mahal, the grand mother of the prince, was civilly asked to pay 25 lakhs from her privy purse for the expenses, but she paid only 5 lakhs The Marathas never set their hands on the persons of the royal household to get money, like the Afghans of Abdali or the Persians of Nadir Shah The grateful ex Empress took it upon herself to inform Abdali of these proceedings and tried her best to bring about a settlement between him and the Marathas, by forwarding the Maratha draft treaty to him with her recommendations and consent The good result of this action was seen in the satisfaction of Surajmal who was now convinced of the Maratha intentions and henceforward helped the Marathas, though he could not join them with his army The Afghan rule in the Panjab was challenged by the rebellious Sikhs who wholeheartedly came over to the Maratha side They proclaimed Bhau Sahib as the coming ruler with a beat of drums, and devoutly prayed for his victory in Lahore They beseeched their Guru Sahib to punish Abdali for his misdeeds Khwajah Mirza Khan, the son in law of Adina Beg, with the Maratha troops under Krishnaji Pawar stationed at Jammu, invaded Gujrat ⁷ Raj 1.259, Parasnis' Persian Akhbars (unpublished) ⁸ Ibid 1.259

KUNJPURA 55 Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh, the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus, at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj- pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Pers an Akhbar MS ) From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15 10 1760 it seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till the subsidence of the river When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad- viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he 9 Ibid 1.237 10 Ibid 1.231, 237 11 Ibid 1.252 12 SPD XXI

56 PANIPAT: 1761 says, "Four to eight' days are necessary for the river water to go down."¹³ And Abdali actually crossed the river at Gauripur on 24th October.¹⁴ It is impossible to account for this wide discrepancy in the information and calcula- tion of the two most important personages in the Peshwa's army, the com- mander-in-chief and his first general. It is difficult to imagine that these two persons, living in the same camp or even as neighbours, should not have ex- changed ideas and discussed the probabilities amongst themselves. But un- fortunately for the Marathas, some such untoward thing seems to have hap- pened. Bhau, basing his calculation on the idea that the river water would not go down before the second week of November, planned his campaign ac- cordingly. His plan was to take Kunjpura, then proceed to Kurukshetra to perform the pilgrimage, seek allies amongst the Sikhs and the Jats of those regions¹⁵ and then return in time to meet Abdali after refreshing his starved troops, horses, and other animals with the ample grain and fodder supplies of those fertile regions. This plan succeeded as far as the capture of Kunjpura was concerned, but failed in its second part: to obstruct Abdali while crossing the Jamuna. The immediate cause which made Bhau hurry up to Kunjpura within a week was the news received from the Panjab as mentioned already. Abdus Samad Khan whom Abdali had kept back in the Panjab as the Faujdar of Sarhind, had come to Kunjpura with an army of ten thousand and more for carrying supplies to Abdali in the Doab. He was waiting there for the river to subside. It was necessary to defeat him before he could cross the Jamuna and strengthen Abdali's forces. Starting from his camp at Shalimar Bag, seven miles to the north of Delhi on 7th October, Bhau reached Lalera, three miles south of Gannaur on 8th October in the evening. He was at Panipat on the 14th and reached his destination on the evening of the 16th. Abdali who had full information of Bhau's movements, sent an army to aid his men at Kunjpura along the eastern bank of the Jamuna. But it had to stop opposite Kunjpura for want of transport. Viewing this additional peril, the Maratha army decided to storm the fort forthwith. Bhau sent for Ibrahim Khan Gardi- who was lagging behind by one march. He came hurrying up on the night of the 16th and commenced the bombardment of the fort soon after his arrival, on the morning of the 17th The fort of Kunjpura lies seventy-eight miles to the north of Delhi, and is situated some two miles distant from the west bank of the Jamuna. It guarded one of the most frequented roads through the Doab to the Panjab. The river Jamuna to the south-east of Kunjpura, being divided into several channels, was easily fordable by men and animals. The important town of Karnal on the main imperial road lay only six miles to the west of it. The riverside of the fort was marshy and hence easily defensible. Nejabat Khan Ruhela was in possession of the fort and he had a few thousand footmen of his tribe with him to defend the fort. Abdus Samad Khan, Mian Qutb Shah and Momin Khan, the Ghilzai Sardar who had come from Sarhind, had with ¹³ Ait. Tip. 1.14. ¹⁴ RAJ. 1.260. ¹⁵ SPD 21.197.

KUNJPURA 57 them some seven thousand horse.¹⁶ They were encamped outside the fort and tried to defend it to the utmost. But the musketry fire of the Gardis soon broke their resistance by fast withering away their ranks, and they tried to save themselves by entering the fort. Nejabat Khan was at first apprehensive of opening the fort gates to get them in, but had to yield to their entreaties and open the same. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Marathas also fol- lowed behind them and forced themselves into the fort along with the Durranis The Durrani horse and Ruhela footmen fought for some time but were ulti- mately overpowered by the Maratha arms and defeated with heavy slaughter. Four thousand Ghilzais were put to the sword¹⁷ and the rest, taking grass in their mouths and uttering the words, "We are your cows,"¹⁸ were allowed to go, after laying down their arms. The majority of the Ruhela footmen had been wounded together with Nejabat Khan, who died soon afterwards of his wounds. Momin Khan died in the battle from a bullet-shot. Abdus Samad Khan and Mian Qutb Shah were captured alive, beheaded after heaping in- sults on them and their heads paraded through the Maratha camp. Mian Qutb Shah was derided, cursed and insulted most, especially by Shinde's men, as he was responsible for the decapitation of Dattaji Shinde on the battlefield of Buradi, the previous year. Their bodies were exposed to be eaten up by vultures and jackals, no funeral rites being allowed them. The conversa- tion between Qutb Shah and Bhau given in the Bhau Bakhar seems imaginary, as contemporary letters from Shinde's camp do not say a word hinting at such a thing. It has been fabricated to suit the dramatic tone of the whole of the Bhau Bakhar. Bhau got some seven lakhs of rupees in cash, five thousand horses, camels and elephants, arms and the rest, as spoils. But the most opportune gain was of 10,000 khandis of wheat collected at this depot for the Abdali troops. Starvation in the Maratha army ended for the time being, as the troops were paid in kind instead of cash.¹⁹ Horses and other animals also got fodder and grain. More important than this material gain was the revival of optimism in the Maratha army after a four months' period of doldrums, leading to a deterioration of morale. The prowess of the Gardi fire had been put to the test and proved up to the hilt. Bhau spent a week at Kunjpura destroying the fortifications and ar- ranging matters in the new light. He seems to have felt no apprehension of any impending danger as he ordered a march to Kurukshetra of at least a part of the army. While on his way to Kunjpura, Bhau's idea was to finish the work there in four days and then to cross the Jamuna by some upper ghat like that at Budhia, into Saharanpur. He had already seized practically all the boats on the Jamuna on which he could lay hands, and kept them to- gether near the Selimgad fort on the bank of the Jamuna at Delhi with a view to making use of them in case of necessity. He had also kept pickets with small parties of soldiers to guard the main ghats over the Jamuna from ¹⁶ Shinde 3.234, 392; RAJ 1.260, 265 ¹⁷ Purandare 1.391. ¹⁸ Shinde 3.234. ¹⁹ SPD. 21.197-8

58 PANIPAT 1761 Agra to Kunjpura, a distance of nearly two hundred miles Thus he had unwittingly lengthened his line of communication and taken a certain risk in proceeding to Kunjpura Had he, after quickly finishing the job, crossed over the Jamuna into Saharanpur as intended, or, failing that, at once re turned to Delhi, he would have been saved But here his miscalculation about the fall in the level of the Jamuna waters proved wrong as we have already noted The second factor which delayed the Maratha army was that after a long period of comparative starvation they had found themselves in a land of plenty, which the army was naturally reluctant to leave and return to bar ren Delhi The third and the human factor which made Bhau delay his march was the encumbrance of a horde of women folk family members and priests, who had accompanied the army for performing distant and dangerous pil grimages under its protection Kurukshetra is less than thirty miles from Kunjpura and it was but natural that all the devout people in the army should wish to visit that holy place of the Mahabharata war where Lord Shri Krishna preached his philosophy of life to the hero Arjuna But this natural desire re sulted in an unforeseen calamity and thus proved a veritable Kurukshetra to the Marathas The Maratha army, after spending or rather wasting a week at Kunj pura, moved toward the holy place for one day, but before they could reach their destination at the first halt for the night Bhau received the disquieting news of Abdalis beginning to cross the river, on 25th October 20 He at once made up his mind and turned back toward Delhi with a view to intercepting Abdali before he crossed the river But such a fully equipped army made up of three lakhs of people can move but slowly All became disappointed and sullen as they missed by a hairbreadth the pilgrimage to Kurukshetra They were still more scared by the news of Abdalis crossing the river and blocking their re turn On the first day of their return march they halted near the ancient bridge at Karnal²¹ for the night, the bridge over the famous canal of Firuz Shah Tughaliq and Ali Mardan Khan which flowed from the eastern to its western side Because the editor of Bhau's Kaifiyat was unaware of the geography of these regions, he could not with confidence read the description in Modi script and the place of halt on the bridge Though Bhau made a long march of fifteen miles for the day, the camp could not move as fast, so on the next day he could cover only eight miles and on the third day came, near Panipat Here he heard the news that Abdalis army had completely crossed the river, bag and baggage, and was halting at Sonepat Bhau cautiously sent a party of five thousand men under Baji Hari Deshpande of Supa to meet and check the advance guard of Abdali and take a view of his camp and movement there They were in the vicinity of Sonepat, resting unguardedly after a long march Half of the party was composed of Shinde's men who had already known and experienced the scourge of the Durrani army Their leader asked Baji Hari to be on his guard lest he should find himself surprised But Baji Hari's inexperienced and unbeaten troops 20 RS 1201 1 Bhau Kaifiyat p. 12.