पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

PANIPAT 63 Bhau was depending upon the activities of Govindpant Bundele and Naro Shankar. Had they succeeded in cutting off Abdali’s supplies and making him move from his camp, Abdali would have had only two alternatives before him, either to run away to his home without offering a battle, or attacking the Mara- thas in their strong positions. We do not think that it would have been dif- ficult for him and his allies to disperse to their homes, as suggested by Krishna Joshi in his letter,⁴ though ostensibly his road to Afghanistan was blocked by the Maratha camp at the very onset. But Govindpant was scarcely a fit man to carry out the orders of Bhau, because primarily he was not a soldier but a civilian. The military circumstances in the regions surrounding his area have also to be taken into account. Not only were the Rajput zamindars, with their strong fortalices, disaffected towards the rule of the Marathas internally, but externally also the Ruhela chiefs and Shuja’s nominee, Veni Bahadur, were vigilant and bent on taking advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas Shuja had taken only a small part of his army to the battlefield, leaving the main portion under Veni Bahadur⁵ to defend his dominions in his absence. Shuja himself had only willynilly gone to Abdali under strong pressure for avoiding the invasion of his own territories by Abdali and his Ruhela allies, and never took any important part in the whole campaign or in the final bat- tle. By his behaviour he was insuring his safety between two powerful rivals. When Bhau blames Govindpant for not devastating Shuja’s dominions so as to exert a pressure on him to return to his dominions for defence, he seems to be unaware of the fact that there was sufficient army on the spot to defend it. Govindpant’s leaving his dominions meant exposing them to an invasion by Veni Bahadur, as was found to his cost by Gopalrao Govind Barve⁶ in his attempt.⁷ But sometimes it is necessary to take the risk of completely exposing one’s dominions in order to gain a necessary military advantage. Only a man like Frederick the Great of Prussia or a Madhavrao Peshwa could dare it and reap the harvest. It was too much to expect such an action from Govindpant, and when he tried to perform it for escaping the charge of disobedience, he had to pay for the attempt with his life and complete defeat. This exposition should convince the reader that Bhau’s strategy was based on precarious means, and he was misguided in depending on a man of Govindpant’s calibre. There were other means of gaining his end, but Bhau never seems to have tried these. In the last resort, why Bhau should have waited up to the breaking point of the 14th of January, completely passes our understanding. Bhau knew of Govindpant’s death on 23rd December, and we can find no excuse for Bhau to defer the attack for three weeks, thus weak- ening still further the Maratha side during this long interval by starvation, exposure and disease. The only suggestion that might explain Bhau’s delay is the idea of his waiting for the coming of Nanasaheb from the Deccan so as to catch Abdali between two grind-stones. This suggestion finds no conclusive evidence in documents. The Peshwa seems to have been informed by his son, ⁴ Raj. 1.265. ⁵ A. L. Shrivastava, op cit., pp. 94, 111. ⁶ Ibid. 111. ⁷ See the section on The Trans-Ganges raids further on.