भारतकोश
पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary

टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished197 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 98, कुल 197 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 98

94 PANIPAT: 1761 Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all couriers. On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau. From this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761.* If Bhau was hoping to carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the whole narration of the campaign. Apart from the truth of such a promise, it looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could have reached Bhau in time. If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum, there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the south. If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time. Only such an il- lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in time to be of any help. But there was no such man available at Poona, at least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition. All these con- siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet- ter understood by Bhau. He should have made up his mind, at least after Govindpant's death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there, without waiting till the last day, as he actually did. This waiting seems to