पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

INTRODUCTION SHIVAJI founded the Maratha State for doing good to the Maratha people But he was also conscious of his role in Indian history as a defender of the Hindus against the onslaught of Islam At the same time he was no crusader against Islam as an alien faith, he only wished to divest it of its political role in India In the first part of his life, he was not sure of his line of action or final goal He made up his mind finally after his return from Agra in 1666 The establishment of an independent Hindu State as a rallying point for all Hindus became his aim thereafter Compromise with Muslims or service under an Islamic State he found incapable of rousing the Hindus from their age long stupor These would neither defend Hinduism in the long run, nor allow the Hindus to grow to their full stature Only a direct challenge to the Islamic idea of State—that Islam only is to live and grow while others must wither away and die—was the surest way of defending Hinduism and the Hindus Aurangzib wished to unite India under one sceptre, that of Islam under the Mughals Shivaji girded his loins to establish an independent Hindu sovereignty in India free from the shackles of the Mughal octopus He succeeded in his determination and crowned himself as the Chhatrapati in 1674 He forged new weapons to gain his ends at the cost of his enemies While his subjects were well protected, he made the enemy subjects pay for his wars against their state by the imposition of the Chauth, to escape which the only remedy was to come under his rule Aurangzib revived the Jizya in the Mughal dominions after a lapse of a hun dred years, to propagate Islam and weaken the infidels Shivaji hurled back the missile with the aim of meeting the new menace by his demand for Chauth from the enemy lands Aurangzib pulled down the temples and desecrated the Hindu shrines Shivaji replied by reviving the temples turned into mosques by the Muslims in the south While Aurangzib's manner was aggressive and bigoted, Shivaji's was defensive and moderate This distinction should be borne in mind when judging Shivaji and Aurangzib, a distinction which marks the modernity and secularism of the one and the medievalism cum ecclesi asticism of the other Not understanding this difference, Toynbee in his Study of History (3 203) has classed Shivaji with Ivan the Terrible, Saladin and Suleyman the Magnificent as champions of alien (non western) civilizations Shivaji was not only a champion of old-world Hinduism, but its modernising reformer also He not only endowed temples or patronized Hindu learning, he also (and primarily) built new forts on the sea coast for protecting his newly established navy on the European model, and sent his own ships to Arabia for direct trade He would not turn his new state into a closed, hermit kingdom after the manner of Japan in the sixteenth century, but left it open to all foreign influences in all walks of life, after due regulation to guard his independence Had Shivaji's ideas and ideals been properly understood and followed by his successors, there would have been no occasion for a Panipat in 1761 ix

Shivaji was a bold soldier and a clever general, an able engineer who knew the art of fortifications better than the engineers themselves, and, above all, had studied geography with the minutest detail with the help of specially prepared charts, as Abbe Carre, the French padre, reports. Can any one doubt Shivaji's modernism with this testimony? Shivaji not only revered Brahmins, but employed them in building his state with the whip of a task- master, too. He made them crown him as a true twice born warrior and received back into his own caste men like Netaji Palkar, who had been living in Afghanistan as a full Muslim for ten years. His bold stand electrified the whole Hindu society from the Indus to the Brahmaputra. Sikhs, Rajputs, Jats, Bundelas, and even the distant Ahoms of Assam rose against Aurangzib and made his reign one long line of more or less successful rebellions. In the south, Shivaji built up a strong state guarded by long lines of impregnable forts and newly built ships, which withstood Aurangzib for a quarter of a century, and ultimately sent him to his grave in 1707. With all their personal drawbacks and vices, Shivaji's immediate suc- cessors could tide over the Fundy tide of Mughal invasion because the men trained under Shivaji knew the basis of his state. With the passing away of these men, a new twist was given to the basis of the Maratha State which ultimately led to Panipat. It came to pass in the following manner. Shivaji's grandson Shahu had been captured with his mother by Zulfiqar Khan when he took Raigad in 1689. He lived in Aurangzib's moving camp for full seventeen years till 1707, when he was released on the advice of Zulfiqar Khan with the intention of creating dissentions amongst the Marathas. He had been be- friended by Aurangzib and his daughter in his captivity, as a result of which Shahu imbibed a life long sense of personal gratitude towards the Mughal imperial house. He could never entertain the idea of completely destroying the Mughal empire. On the other hand, he now and then gave a helping hand to the Mughals. As the orphan son of Shivaji's eldest son who had suffered death terribly at the hands of Aurangzib, and himself a long sufferer in cap- tivity through all sorts of insults privations and slavery, the Marathas natu- rally felt a sympathy for Shahu when he returned. But the army and the civil officers all divided into two opposing factions, creating a permanent schism in the Maratha polity, which is historically found perpetuated in the establishment of Kolhapur as a separate state. Shahu triumphed over his aunt Tarabai, because he was the legitimate heir for whom common people felt a sympathy born of his miseries as well as on account of the shrewish behaviour of his overbearing aunt, who turned all her officers into enmity, one after the other. Shahu returned as a nominee of the Mughals, and as such received the support of all Muslim officers as well as all those who sided with the Mughals for personal gain. All opportunists and new candidates, who had nothing to hope from the party of Tarabai, naturally supported Shahu. Ambitious and unscrupulous men found a new opening for their talents in this fratricidal war. But his supporters overlooked one important constitutional point in their enthusiasm for the good new king. He had returned with the Mughal badge of slavery round his neck. The lands bestowed on him by the Mughal emperor are styled Zamindari lands. 7

His so-called kingdom can at most be styled an autonomous feudatory prin- cipality in the language of constitutions. And what was worse, he had ac- cepted this status not as a policy to tide over the times, but in all sincerity which he meant to keep. His gentleman's attitude sealed the fate of the Maratha State. Most of the men who had gone over to Shahu's side had gone with selfish motives of personal aggrandisement. They hoped to remain strong and almost free to do what they liked under a weak master such as Shahu was, on account of his precarious position between two mill-stones. The man who helped Shahu most in building up his party and stabilising his rule automati- cally became his Prime Minister or Peshwa. This was Balaji Vishwanath, comparatively a new man from Konkan and a careerist bent on utilising all opportunities to strengthen himself and his master, without regard to the dis- tant effects of his steps on the Maratha polity. Shahu did not know Shivaji's ideals and ideas, ways and means, because he had spent his boyhood and youth in the Mughal camp. Balaji would not know, because that would not have furthered him in his rise. Shahu wanted a new class of persons to keep his poise in the face of overbearing, old officials. Balaji, coming from an outside caste, looked down upon by the entrenched ministers (Deccan Brah- mins), wanted a needy master who would go out of the groove to do the need- ful. Besides, Balaji was endowed with all the personal qualities necessary for imposing oneself on persons of various denominations and motives. Being an outsider, he could pose as a third (disinterested) party in all tussles and quarrels, and would be accepted as such by others also. His position, in course of time, became unassailable. Balaji's opportunism is seen in his support to the Sayyid brothers, the king-makers. He invited their help for crushing Damaji Thorat in his internal rebellion against Shahu's rule, while he accompanied them to Delhi in order to facilitate their intrigues against the lawful emperor. In return he received fresh orders under the seals of puppet emperors, bestowing the Maratha king- dom on Shahu, and the release of Shahu's mother from captivity at Delhi. Thus Shahu's collapsing rule was propped up with Mughal support. In ad- dition, Shahu accepted the duty of serving the Mughal State with fifteen thou- sand troops, which were to be placed at the disposal of the Mughal viceroy in the Deccan to buttress his administration, one fourth revenue (Chauth) of the south being his wages for the same. Shahu was thus not only to be a creature of the Mughals, but was to guarantee the continuation of their rule in the Deccan. This was really cutting the roots of the Maratha State envisaged by Shivaji and reared carefully by his successors. Shivaji had envisaged the gradual withering away of the tree of Islam in India—though not necessarily through the agency of the Marathas—and planned his Maratha State for aid- ing the attainment of that end. The Marathas were expected to be the spear- head of the charge against Islam no doubt, but other Hindus were also ex- pected to act their part in the grand achievement. The end was not a Maratha empire spreading all over India but the complete freedom of all Hindus. If other provinces in India gained their freedom by their own exertions, so far so xi

good But the Marathas would not sit idle if there was no stır amongst them They would do the work themselves irrespective of the cost Aurangzib wanted to enrol the valiant Marathas as his loyal servants like the Rajputs in the north To avoid that fate they waged a continuous war and went through untold sufferings for two generations And now Shahu became a Mughal servant without a struggle! He never struck his own coins but only those of the Mughal emperors His generals and ministers spread all over India but only as Mughal grandees or governors Even all the Marathas never became his subjects and why should they be when they knew Shahu to have been a Mughal subject like themselves albeit styled Chhatrapati? All who felt dissatisfied with the Maratha kingdom crossed over the border and got them elves employed under the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan on better terms than Shahu could hope to offer This support was utilized by the cunning viceroy to stop the payment of Chauth in the first instance and later for buttressing his own independent rule in defiance of Delhi Shahus ministers and gen erals had to fight for their very existence many a time when the viceroy (Nizam) had grown strong with outside support or the Marathas had become weak by internal dissensions This struggle was carried on intermittently for full three quarters of a century and though the Marathas triumphed on most occasions the Nizams rule came to be stabilized in the Deccan But the fun damental cause of this consummation was the primary mistake committed by the Prime Minister of Shahu in accepting the Mughal service on behalf of his guileless master which was later on continued by his successors in office Even Justice M G Ranade has misconstrued this point in his Rise of the Maratha Power because the material before him was scanty Others have fallen into the same error because they have blindly accepted Ranade as their guide Be cause the Peshwas throughout their career tried to act as agents of the Mughal emperors others more clever played the same game and outwitted the Marathas by securing the orders of the puppet emperors set up by themselves The second short sighted step taken by Balaji Vishwanath has also been similarly misconstructed by Ranade and others In the worst days of the Maratha kingdom during 1690 1700 when king Rajaram had gone to the Madras coast and ruled from Gingee (Jinji) the Maratha ministers as a tem porary policy offered fabulous rewards in land and money to the wavering Marathas so that they might not go over to Aurangzib Many of these grants under duress were afterwards resumed by Tarabai whose ministers would have again reverted to Shivajis far sighted policy of awarding no spoils or jagirs but paying in cash from the central treasury Shahus return as a Mughal protege and the outbidding of his clever but short sighted Peshwa put a premium on disloyalty to Tarabai the de facto ruler and thus weakened the very basis of Shivajis modern state Ramachandrapant Amatya who knew at first hand Shivajis state craft has put down for posterity Shivajis ideas and ideals in his unique Rajaniti Balajis policy of awarding a share in the con quered lands to ministers and generals created semi independent barons who ultimately overshadowed the central government after Panipat Balajis pre- caution—lauded as a unique invention—against these barons growing strong and uncontrollable by the central authority viz not to bestow contiguous lands x i

on one person but to award the same in various parts of the country, led to such internecine rivalries, quarrels, wars, peculation etc., that the administration became weak and inefficient everywhere, as was found to his cost by Sadashiv rao Bhau in his Panipat campaign. Historians know the part played by con- servative tradition in the growth of England. Shivaji had laid down the foun- dation of a modern state and its healthy tradition was still in an embryonic state. It was a new thing understood by but few, and was almost stifled dur- ing the calamitous days of Mughal invasion. Still it was known to men like Ramachandrapant Amatya clinging to the de facto rulership. But the new Peshwa of Shahu knew little of that tradition and cared less. His adoption of the line of least resistance in the interest of his master began a new chapter in Maratha history, but it also submerged Shivaji's independent, modern and progressive state.

Balaji's two sons Bajirao and Chimaji were exceptionally clever and valiant. They continued the line laid down by their father and grew strong, almost overbearing, for their weak, stay at home, master. Ostensibly the first ministers of state, they overshadowed Shahu in Indian politics. They chalked out their own policy (in defiance of Shahu's wishes on some occasions), led their own expeditions, defeated and set aside other ministers, in short, began an almost independent central government at Poona in opposition to Shahu's pup- pet court at Satara. Unfortunately they were short lived and could not com- plete their work in their life time. But when they died in 1740, they had created an independent military force under their unitary command, one lakh of Maratha horsemen ready to be led anywhere in India, a force which made history during the next generation under their sons and successors in office.

The third Peshwa Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb, his brother Raghu- nathrao alias Raghoba Dada, and their cousin, Chimaji's son Sadashivrao Bhau, were the three men who made Indian history what it was during 1740- 1761. Their hands were tied to a certain extent till Shahu's death in 1749. But the next dozen years found a free field for their talents as well as pro- pensities. Nanasaheb was more cunning than valiant and he did everything to concentrate power in his hands. He overshadowed and put down his rivals in the Maratha State with the help of his father's independent retainers, Shinde and Holkar, who in course of time went out of the hands of their master. The old king's retainers were either completely eclipsed or found independent spheres for their valour far away from Poona. Raghoba led expeditions to Gujarat, Rajputana, Delhi and the Panjab. Being more valiant than cunning, he mismanaged the Maratha affairs in northern India. Sadashivrao Bhau had to manœuvre for power with his cousin, the Peshwa, for a full dozen years, before he found his way. Thenceforth he managed the civil side in the state and had his say in military matters also, especially in the finance side of ex- peditions. By 1758, he had come to occupy the foremost place in the counsels of the Maratha empire—such as it was.

Ranoji Shinde who was the right hand man of the Peshwa Bajirao in all his dealings, was followed by equally valiant and loyal, though somewhat headstrong and independent minded sons. Malharrao Holkar the left hand man was though equally brave and in addition cunning, quite a different type xxi

of man The reader will know more of him in the course of the narrative further on The rivalry and difference of opinion on questions of policy between Shindes and Holkar shaped the Maratha history in north India in the way it did Nanasaheb tried to keep his supremacy by balancing these two pillars of the State This had a disastrous effect on Maratha politics The Peshwa should have directed one of them in a different direction Their machinations in the same field benefited the enemies of the Marathas The local officers of the Peshwa, like the Hingne brothers and Antaji Manakeshwar in Delhi, Govindpant Bundele and Naro Shankar in central India, had to take orders from these two noblemen in matters civil or military They also took sides in their rivalries and, in general, in northern Indian politics, as lesser grandees in the same field Antaji Manakeshwar, the chief of the guards kept for the per sonal protection of the Emperor, acted against the selfish interests of the Hingnes, the Maratha ambassadors at the Delhi Court They were suspended by the Peshwa for some time and Antaji Manakeshwar called back to the Deccan All these men had rented mahals from the state as a side-business, a thing which should have been forbidden by the Peshwa The state suffered by their personal interest in the state lands Gangadhar Chandrachud the Diwan of Holkar, and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Diwan of the Shindes, also had their individual share in these bickerings, rivalries, back door machina tions against each other The Peshwa's officers in Poona like Sakharam Bapu, Mahadoba Purandare, Baba Fadnis, and others, were acting hand in glove with one of the parties in their appeals to the central authority Unless this back ground is kept in mind, the trend of Maratha politics will not be understood The genealogy of the Peshwa and Shinde families given elsewhere should also be remembered by the reader for a proper understanding of the narrative Another factor which influenced individual actions in all fields was the under current of caste consciousness The Peshwa and his relatives em ployed in higher posts were Konkan Chitpavan Brahmins, in general rivalry with the local Deshasth Brahmins of the Deccan plateau All civil ministers of Shivaji and his immediate successors belonged to the latter class, now ousted from their position by the new comers from the sea coast They naturally felt the loss of their importance in the state The Karhada and Saraswat Brahmins, both in a minority, tried to find independent scope for their abil ities under different noblemen, besides the Peshwa The Marathas, who com posed the bulk of the army and belonged to the puppet king's caste, bore a silent resentment against the clerical usurpers of their supreme authority in the state, and this had had its effect on politics, too Not all men perhaps not even the majority, were affected by this virus, but its imperceptible effect seems undeniable The rule of the Brahmin Peshwas had carried the clock of social reform in Maharashtra backwards, when compared with the seven teenth century Malharrao Holkar's advice to Jankoji and Dattaji Shinde on this count, as presented in the Panipat Chronicle (Bhau Bakhar in Marathi) may or may not be true, or it may be even taken as invented by the writer to suit his construction, but the existence of such social undercurrent cannot be doubted Its existence does not seem to have affected the Panipat campaign in any vital spot, however xlv

The third battle of Panipat was fought between the Marathas led by Sadashivrao Bhau and the foreign Afghans with their Indian allies led by Ahmad Shah Abdali Bhau had been called by the Mughal Emperor Alam gir II before his murder He was acting as Regent of the Mughal empire at the dead emperor's behest The Marathas were fighting with Abdali, the foreign interferer in Indian politics, and not Abdali the champion of Islam This point has not been emphasised by the historians uptil now, because they have misconstrued it Bhau (and the Peshwa also) had invited Shuja ud daulah of Oudh, the Nizam brothers in the Deccan, Kamal ud din Khan Babi from Gujarat and even the Indian Ruhelas and Afghans, to join their forces with him His main support in the campaign was Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his trained infantry corps The Peshwa's half brother Samsher Bahadur was a Muslim, who died of wounds received at Panipat Many departments of the Maratha army, especially the artillery, were manned almost exclusively by the Muslims On the other hand, no Hindu potentate from northern India fought as an ally of the Marathas They were all in their minds, siding with Abdali, and had taken part in calling him to India to punish the Marathas It is unhistorical, therefore to call the battle of Panipat a Hindu Muslim fight, though Najib had screwed'down Abdali on the religious count, for selfish ends Verily religion is the last resort of scoundrels! Temperamentally, the Marathas are incapable of bigotry, fanaticism, extremes They take to a thing as a duty for the time being and leave it when found unnecessary They had taken up arms for the defence of their gods and homes in the seventeenth century They wielded arms in the eighteenth for keeping India free from foreign rule But in the nineteenth they had so far forsaken their military life that they were classed by Lord Roberts with the Bengalees and Madrasees as one of the non martial races of India In 1930, the Bombay Presidency supplied only seven thousand men out of a lakh and fifty eight thousand of Indian soldiers, and all the seven thousand were not Marathas This transformation shows that the Marathas were not war like or bred to the profession of arms in the same sense as the Afghans or the Turks They were peasant civilians turned into soldiers for a cause

Having depicted the historical background so far, it is but meet that I should pass on to the previous writings in the field I am about to enter It is instructive to study the gradual change of opinion on the Panipat affair During the nineteenth century Kashiraj and Duff practically held the field When Rajwade wrote his thundering detailed introduction in 1898 on the basis of new letters in Marathi, he practically carried the public with him as if caught in a flood Nobody stopped to inquire whether his analysis was correct, nor did any one point out the obvious defects in his editing of the letters Ten years later, a level headed professor of history (H G Limaye), writing a special essay on the European modelled Indian armies and their rela tions with the Indian States in the eighteenth century, changed the trend of opinion by half While still charging Govindpant Bundele and Malharrao xi

Holkar for their major share in the defeat, he also pointed out Bhau's personal defects and shortcomings as a commander in chief. Rao Bahadur Sardesai, writing in 1922, summarises the various opinions without offering any new suggestion of his own. An analysis of his writing will bring forth the self contradictory statements due to his defective method of copying all and synthesising none. Mr D V Apte tackling the problem after him, first pointed out the obvious factual defects in Rajwade's arguments. The confusion of directions in Kashiraj's account of Panipat, Rajwade's misapprehension in taking Baghpat as situated on the right bank of the Jamuna, vitiating his whole strategical argument and similar other flaws were ably discussed by him. But even Apte failed to analyse the whole material and point out Raj- wade's manipulation of the same. Prof S N Sen's chapter on Panipat in his Military System of the Marathas (1928), is the best short account in English, which omits nothing of the essentials. With the publication of the Peshwa Daftar, however, during 1930-33, a new chapter opened in the Panipat criti- cism. As soon as the second volume styled Panipat Prakarana was published in 1930 S V Athalye an old collaborator with Rajwade and a deep student of Maratha history, published a review of the same in the Kesari weekly (4th April 1931). He pointed out the incorrect dating of the documents published, and focussed the light of the letters on the events leading to the Panipat cam- paign. He absolved Holkar and Antaji Manakeshwar from the blame and made Bhau and the Peshwa mainly responsible for the disaster. Another young enthusiastic recruit for Maratha history, the late Mr R V Nadkarni, be- gan a series of articles on the Panipat affair in Vividhajnana Vistara and first pointed out on the strength of the new material certain obvious defects in Sardesai's Panipat Prakarana. His original contribution to the discussion con- sists of the constitutional aspect of the Maratha activities in the north in gen- eral and with the Delhi Court in particular. The charge against Govindpant he thought now as more than proved, with an emphasis. But he was unac- quainted with the whole Maratha system and not an expert in research mat- ters. He has taken Agra as situated on the northern bank of the Jamuna and confused Saranjam with Kamavis. Govindpant was a Kamavisdar or Mam- latdar of various revenue taluks; but he had never received any specific Saranjam or Jagir conferred for maintaining an army as a military captain. Not understanding the difference between the two, Nadkarni's downright con- demnation of Govindpant, is based on a false premise. Besides, he wrote only on the basis of SPD 2 and before the publication of Nos 21 and 27, supplying further information about the Panipat campaign. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, com- pletely re-writing the whole episode in 1934, has still missed certain docu- ments then available to him, and in general has taken a very unsympathetic view of the Maratha affairs. His factual errors, incorrect criticism and non- comprehension of the whole affair in proper perspective have been pointed out and criticised in detail by us. Incidentally, the performance of this renowned historian proves our contention that history must be written by one of the nationals. Mr K V Purandare, editor of the documents collected from the Sardar- Purandare family which was throughout the whole period on very intimate terms with the Peshwa family, has also, in his editorial preface to the first xvi

volume, offered criticism on the Panipat affair. His main contribution, based on the documents published by him, is to point out the promise of the Peshwa to go to Bhau's help by the month of Magha or February 1761. If Bhau was biding his time till the arrival of the Peshwa, the cause of his waiting is made clear thereby. He also points out the fact that Nanasaheb had no suspicion of Holkar's saving of his skin by running away from the battlefield. The Peshwa attached, after Panipat, not only the districts held as Jagir by Mal- harrao, but also those held by Shinde and Pawar who had fallen in battle, proving that the attachment was not on account of disobedience at Panipat but for some other reason, possibly financial. But as Purandare wrote his in- troduction in 1929 before the publication of the Peshwa Daftar, his criticism has to be modified in the light of those papers.

I should say something now about the nature of the work to be done and the difficulty of doing it in the proper manner. For this, I cannot begin better than by quoting from the letters of the Duke of Wellington about the battle of Waterloo for comparison: "The people of England may be entitled to a detailed and accurate ac- count of the battle of Waterloo, and I have no objection to their having it, but I do object to their being misinformed and misled. I am really dis- gusted with and ashamed of all that I have seen written of the battle of Water- loo. And there is not one which contains a true representation or even an idea of the transaction and this is because the writers have referred to stories picked up from peasants, private soldiers, individual officers, etc. instead of to the official sources and reports. It is very difficult for me to judge of the particular position of each body of troops under my command at any particu- lar hour. Surely the details of the battle might be left to the original official reports. Historians and commentators were not necessary. There is one event noted in the world—the battle of Waterloo—and you will not find any two people agree as to the exact hour when it commenced. I am accus- tomed to read so many conflicting descriptions of the battle that I would soon begin to believe I was not there myself." Writing to Sir Walter Scott who wished to write authoritatively on the battle of Waterloo, only two months after the event, the Duke, expressing himself in the same tone, further said, 'The object which you propose to your- self is very difficult of attainment, and, if really attained, is not a little in- vidious. The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some indi- viduals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the bat- tle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the ex- act moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance. Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave oc- casion for the distinction of others and perhaps were the cause of material losses, and you cannot write a true history of a battle without including the faults and misbehaviour of part, at least, of those engaged. Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform is not a hero, and that many in- stances of individual heroism must be passed over unrelated, it is better for the general interests to leave those parts of the story untold than to tell the xvii

THE PESHWA FAMILY 1 Balaji Vishwanath = Radhabai (1713-1720) 2 Bajirao (1720-40) Chimaji Apa Sadashivrao Bhau (killed at Panipat) 3 Balaji alias Nanasaheb Raghunathrao alias = Parvatibai = Gopikabai (1740-61) Raghoba Dada Vishwasrao 4 Madhavrao 5 Narayanrao (killed at Panipat) SHINDE GENEALOGY 1 Ranoji (died 1745) 2 Jayapa (1745-55) Dattaji Tukoji Mahadji (assassinated) (killed 1760 (killed at (wounded and at Buradi) Panipat) made lame 3 Janakoji (1755-61) for life) (slaughtered in captivity) xix

whole truth I regret much that I have not been able to prevail upon you to relinquish your plan You may depend upon it you will never make it a satisfactory work I will get you the list of the French army, generals, etc Just to show you how little reliance can be placed even on what are supposed the best accounts of a battle I mention that there are some circumstances men tioned in General -------'s account which did not occur as he relates them He was not on the field during the whole battle particularly not during the latter part of it The battle began I believe at eleven It is impossible to say when each important occurrence took place, nor in what order These are an swers to all your queries but remember I recommend you to leave the battle of Waterloo as it is With the words of these quotations ringing in his ears how dare an Indian writer take up the well worn theme of the battle of Panipat and hope to succeed in the attempt? Waterloo was fought between two most advanced nations represented by such extraordinary men as Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington Everything about it was going on in the most civilized and up to date manner There was no dearth of official despatches reports, explana tions plans memoirs affirmations and contradictions And still we have the comments of the chief actor in the field on the victorious side as quoted above How much more unsatisfactory the state of affairs must be when dealing with Panipat—a battle fought between two parties one of which was backward and the other barbarous! One party could not write an official report of the battle because it simply ceased to exist the other would not write about it be cause it thought it superfluous As for private writings survivors from the defeated and annihilated party could write only apologetically and sometimes with a guilty conscience the members of the victorious party wrote with ex aggeration and bombast, sometimes without any regard for truth knowing that nothing succeeds like success The result is that the historian has to de pend on later gathered partial reports individual memoirs and chronicles written with a purpose, none having a complete vision of the whole affair Even then the material available is very scanty, leaving many lacunæ in the connected story One has to do without maps plans official orders, chits from the generals in their hand writing before the end of the battle as well as later confirmations or denials Such is the basis for Panipat But an historic event on which hung the fate of a nation the destiny of a continent and the future trend of world affairs for centuries cannot, and ought not to go unrelated And it will be granted that the story can best be related by one of the nationals preferably by one belonging to the losing side For thus only can the whole truth about the event come out or find expression With this idea I have ventured to take up the theme and write the follow- ing pages xvii 1

THE PESHWA FAMILY 1 Balaji Vishwanath = Radhabai (1713-1720) 2 Bajirao (1720-40) Chimaji Apa Sadashivrao Bhau (killed at Panipat) 3 Balaji alias Nanasaheb Raghunathrao alias = Parvatibai = Gopikabai (1740-61) Raghoba Dada Vishwasrao 4 Madhavrao 5 Narayanrao (killed at Panipat) SHINDE GENEALOGY 1 Ranoji (died 1745) 2 Jayapa (1745-55) Dattaji Tukoji Mahadji (assassinated) (killed 1760 (killed at (wounded and at Buradi) Panipat) made lame 3 Janakoji (1755-61) for life) (slaughtered in captivity) xix

CONTENTS Preface Introduction CHAPTER Page I The Marathas in the Panjab and Beyond 1 II Sukartal, Buradi and After 18 III Sadashivrao's Appointment for Northern India 31 IV Kunjpura 52 V Panipat 62 VI The Battle 86 VII The Judgment 106 Critical Bibliography 128 List of Maps 1 India—Mughal Subahs 6 2 Panipat Route March 36 3 Panipat Vicinity at Present 62 4 Positions of the Rival Camps I 65 5 Positions of the Rival Camps II 68 6 Positions of the Rival Camps III 72 7 Battle of Panipat—First Stage 87 8 Battle of Panipat—Second Stage 90 9 Battle of Panipat—Third Stage 96 xx

SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I Pages THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND, 1758-59 1-17 Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasions of India and the contract between the Emperor of Delhi and the Peshwa, 1; Effect of the transfer of the Subahs to the Peshwa 2; How Deccan Politics affected the Peshwa's policy towards Delhi, 3; Abdali's arrangement for the govern- ment of India and the Panjab, 5; How his plan came to be thwarted 5 The Maratha slogan for the governance of the Indian empire, 6; Raghunathrao's letter to the Peshwa reiterating the Maratha ideal, 6; Note his invasion of the Panjab and the Maratha entry into Lahore 7; The Peshwa recalls Raghoba to the Deccan and Adina Beg dies, 8; Tukoji Holkar pushes on to Peshawar, to support Abdul Rahim Khan, Ahmad Shah's nephew and a claimant to the Afghan throne 9; Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde go upto the Satlaj, but soon return towards Delhi 10; The flaw in the Maratha policy in the Panjab 10; Their line of communication stretched by 500 miles, 11; The Poona Court had no correct idea of the adventure they were entering in 12; Sabaji Shinde not a fit man to counteract the personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali 12; Abdali's return from Khorasan and Jahan Khan's invasion of the Panjab 13; The Peshwa's recall of Dattaji Shinde, a disastrous step, 14 Financial loss to the Marathas in their Panjab glory, 14; Raghunathrao's advice to Dattaji and Janakoji to beware of Najib Khan 15; Malharrao's advice to the contrary 15; Ghaziuddin's treacherous behaviour towards the Marathas, 15; Dattaji enters into negotiations with Najib 15; Najib's plot against the Marathas and his invitation to Ahmad Shah Abdali—The Marathas had no information of this plot—Dattaji duped as a result, 16; Najib pins down Dattaji for four months—Sabaji's return from the Panjab— Bapuji Trimbak meets with disaster in the Satlaj Doab—End of the Panjab episode 17 CHAPTER II 5 SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER, 1749-60 18-30 Dattaji Shinde alienates Ghaziuddin but cannot win over Najib, who has both the means and the freedom to create mischief, 18; The strategic position of Sukartal—Dattaji besieges Najib in it 19; Abdali enters the Panjab—Madhavsingh of Jaipur makes his stand against Malharrao Holkar—Shuja comes to the help of Najib—Dattaji sends Govindpant Bundele to attack the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges—He precipitately runs back at the coming of Shuja's troops and the rumours of Abdali's coming, 20; Sabaji joins Dattaji— The emperor Alamgir murdered at the instigation of the Wazir and a new emperor Shah Jahan brought to the throne—The Wazir joins Dattaji—Dattaji raises the siege of Sukartal and goes to meet Abdali 21; Abdali catches Dattaji unprepared and eludes him after- wards joining Najib—Dattaji retreats towards Delhi and calls in Malharrao to his help 22; Malharrao delays—Ahmad Shah and Najib advance towards Delhi—The guarding of the fords by Dattaji—Abdali eludes and crosses over to Buradi—Its situation 23; Dat- taji's plan—Has no idea of engaging with the Afghans till the arrival of Malharrao—Is obliged to meet in the difficult terrain on the bank of the Jamuna—Is overpowered and slain 24; The wounded Janakoji with the whole Shinde contingent runs back and is pursued by the Afghans 25; The description of the retreat he meets Malharrao at Kot Putali— Malharrao's life philosophy—Its contrast with the temperament of the Shindes 26 Mal- harrao's new strategy to meet the Afghan menace—Ghaziuddin's double dealing 27; The Peshwa's dire need of money—Seems to auction the Wazir's post between Ghaziud- din and Shuja—Surajmal Jat makes a common cause with the Marathas—Ahmad Shah invites the northern states to rise against the Marathas but all sit on the fence 28 Abdali's campaign south of Delhi—The Marathas enter the Doab but surprised at Sikandra- bad—Run back to Agra after heavy massacre 29; Holkar and Shinde retreat into the Jaipur territory and wait for the help from the Deccan—Abdali takes Ramgad and can- tons in the Doab—Diplomatic talks with trans-Ganges Ruhelas 30 CHAPTER III SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA, 1760 31-51 None in the Deccan prepared for Dattaji's death—Peshwa in the thick of fight with the Nizam—His position thought to be of a dictator in India, 31; Bussy recalled from Hyderabad—Terminates the French influence in the Deccan—The Peshwa succeeds in de- taching Ibrahim Khan a pupil of Bussy and begins hostilities against the Nizam—The bat- tle of Udgir where the Nizam brothers are completely overpowered 32; Half the dominions xxi

of the Nizam surrendered to the Peshwa—Sadashivrao Bhau becomes the hero of the day— The futility of the Peshwa's victory—Prestige overrules perspection, 33, The squabbles in the Peshwa's family—Raghunathrao refuses to take command of the north—Bhau or- dered by the Peshwa to the north—Vishwasrao the eldest son of the Peshwa placed at the head—Bhau's hands tied throughout the campaign, 34, Bhau's foibles—The divisions selected by Bhau—The difficulties in the march from Patdur to Delhi 35, Bhau's progress hampered by various causes—The Marathas have left Shivaji and Bajirao behind and follow the Mughal manners 36, Bhau invites all northern Indian states to send contin- gents in the fight against Abdali but none comes to his help—Tribes rise in rebel- lion against the Marathas—An epidemite amongst the horses 37, Abdali's plans to return held over through the machinations of Najib—Shuja-ud-daulah was wooed by both parties— Suspicions of Maratha aims 38, The difficult position of the Marathas in all directions— The Peshwa and his advisers cannot grasp the real situation—They miscalculate the enemy forces and attempt a wrong solution 39 Bhau's progress through Central India—Zeitgeist of the 18th century—No common policy for the whole of India—Fissures in the Maratha camp 40, Wisdom in Holkar's advice—Women and pilgrims clog the Maratha march— Nature also goes against the Marathas 41 The meeting with Shinde and Holkar—Dis- cussion of future plan—Bhau chalks out his line of action and proceeds to Delhi, 42, Delhi taken and its government settled 43 44, Peace parleys through the medium of Shuja— Bhau tries to win over Abdali's allies—He misjudges the motives of the various parties and also the abilities of Govindpant Bundele and others, 45, Bhau's army suffers from want of money—Minting down the silver of the Diwan i-khas 46, The Maratha collectors in the north fool both the Peshwa and Bhau—Bhau's legs pulled from Poona, 47, Loose administrative system of the Marathas—Shinde and Holkar fall in with Bhau's line of thought—Surajmal Jat goes back disgruntled—Surajmal's defection due to his selfishness and not to Bhau's insult 49 Abdali's movement in the Doab—Change of his camps— Going and coming of ambassadors 50, Nothing comes out of the peace talks—The condi- tion of the Maratha camp deplorable and deteriorating day by day, 51

CHAPTER IV KUNJPURA (October 1760) 52-61 The terrain to the north of Delhi 52, The sufferings of the Maratha army 53, Bhau takes steps to counteract Najib's propaganda against the Marathas—Shah Jahan Sani deposed and Shah Alam declared emperor—The good results of this step—The Sikhs in Lahore proclaim Bhausaheb and pray for his victory, 54, Alasingh of Patiala promises to join Bhau—Abdali's hold over the Panjab lost—A last effort at peace—Bhau proceeds to Kunj- pura for intercepting Abdus Samad Khan 55, Falling down of the Jamuna waters—Bhau's calculations based on wrong information—Attack on Kunjpura 56, Defeat and massacre of the Afghans—Marathas secured booty and wheat collected for Abdali—The idea of a pilgrimage to Kurukshetra miscarries Bhau's plan 57, Abdali crosses the Jamuna at Bhau's back and blocks Bhau's return to Delhi—Bhau orders a march back 58, Abdali crosses with his whole army at Gauripur before Bhau could intercept him 59, The Marathas receive their first rebuff at the hands of Abdali—A retrospect of Abdali's movement in the Doab and a contrast with the state of his army with that of the Marathas 60 Abdali's parallel move towards the north and coming to Baghpat—Search for a ford on the river— Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna 60 Description of his crossing—He comes to- wards Panipat 61

CHAPTER V PANIPAT (November-December 1760) 62-85 The Marathas confident of victory at the beginning—They had enough corn 62, Bhau puts his faith in Ibrahim Khan and fortifies himself at Panipat—He expects Govindpant Bundele to do the impossible, 63, Why Bhau waits after Govindpant's death not known— Perhaps waiting for help from the Deccan as previously promised 64, Strategic posi- tion at Panipat—Bhau aggressive during November, 65, Abdali obliged to retreat to the river side—Abdali's decision not to attack the Marathas in their fortified position and waste his power 66 Kashiraj's incorrect forebodings, 67, Balwantrao Mehendale's death —His wife goes Sati—The turning point in the struggle 68, the "Bakhar" criticism of Balwantrao wrong—Sir Jadunath's incorrect translation, 69, Abdali intercepts letters from the Maratha camp to Delhi and the Deccan—Thus knowing the Maratha plans, Govind- pant comes at last with money to Delhi and invades the Doab 70, Taken by surprise by Atai Khan and killed—He atones for all his sins with his life 71, Abdali tightens the siege and assumes offensive—Shifts his camp and blocks the Maratha road to Delhi— The party of Parashar Dadaji with money loaded on horses cut to pieces by the Afghans —The difficulties of the Marathas, 72, Their misfortunes by fire and scarcity—Cold, rain, and disease add to their sufferings 73 No knowledge of Bhau's plans and waiting—Con- flicting reports in the chronicles, 74 The decision to fight and Bhau's plan decided in consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi, 75; A retrospect of the trans-Ganges plans of the xxii

Marathas—Gopalrao Barves raid on Oudh—Delay to the end of December—Veni bahadur guards Oudh in Shuja's absence, 76, Barve's lightning campaign of a fortnight—He takes Bhojapur, Dalmau and Nawabganj—Veni bahadur descends upon him with a big force— The Zamindars allied with the Marathas run away—The Maratha army dispersed—Barve returns to Korah, 77, Panipat locality not favourable to the Marathas—Maratha manners give scope to mischievous elements, 78, Bhau created a tremendous impression and is still remembered in this locality—Legends about Bhau in the surrounding area—Bhau fort near the village of Isapur, 79, No correct information about it available—The imperial canal flowing to the west of Panipat, 80, The canal water stopped at the head led to the scarcity of water—The existence of the canal need not be doubted 81, The numbers and the Sardars in the Maratha army—Abdalis forces at the beginning of July 1760—Latter additions and subtractions, 82, The final figures engaged in the last battle—Sir Jadunath's estimate tallys with ours—The number of camp followers capable of building the armis in the Afghan camp 83, The number of camp followers—The composition of the Maratha camp, pilgrims and candidates, priests and tradesmen—Women in the Maratha camp— Exaggerated accounts, 84, The chronicles of the 18th century, both Persian and Marathi have no sense of direction and no visualization of the shape of land due to want of maps— • Sir Jadunath misses this point and so is led astray—He has no sense of correct time also from which his description of the battle suffers—He does not understand the lunar calendar and so miscalculates the period of moon light, 85 CHAPTER VI THE BATTLE (14th January 1761) 86-105 ' The Maratha army marches out early in the morning—Their arrangement—The dis tribution of the various captains—The hollow square formation—The arrangement of the Afghan army, 86, The battle begins—Ibrahim khan Gardi leads the vanguard and at tacks the Ruhelas—The Maratha cavalry appointed to support Ibrahim Khan—Acts rashly and out marches of Gardi infantry—Meets with sharp fire and runs back broken in spirit —The aim of the march was to reach the Jamuna and not to offer battle, 87, The orders not understood or followed by the Maratha captains—The Maratha ammunition wasted, the whole responsibility at the front falls on Ibrahim Khan's musketeers—The superiority of the Ruhela fire—The Maratha cavalry fails to take the advantage of the gap created by

The disaster minimised by the Marathas in political interest—Rumours of Bhau and Janakoji being alive—Its good effect—Ahmad Shah completely disillusioned—Returns to Afghanistan 98 99, Loss of human lives in the battle, 100, The massacres of the fugitives after the battle—The spoils of the battle 101, Exaggerated account of captured booty— The after events beli the reports—It was a Pyrrhic victory, 102, Maratha food arrange- ments during the battle—And their mode of warfare, 103, The Maratha appearance and their camp and arms 104 105 CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT 106-127 The death of the Commander in chief was made use of by the survivors and renegades by making him a scape goat—Bhau not a free man in peace talks—The Peshwa's share in diplomacy—Bhau not a first rate general—His mould more civil than military—Ahmad Shah on the other hand a completely military man—The Marathas not warlike in the same sense as the Afghans 106, Bhau's ideal and aim different from those of the other Marathas—The guerilla mode handed down by Shivaji—No pitched battle—Useful for de- fence but not for conquest—Malharrao Holkar differs from Bhau and so cannot be con- demned 107, His behaviour throughout his life similar 108 Not treacherous but lukewarm —Govindpant Bundele's case—Rajwade's charges against him—He was a revenue col- lector and not a military captain—His age and habits of life against military dash— Geographical factor makes him all important 109 Abdalis daring puts Bhau in a quandary —Only a similar counter daring could have saved Bhau—Govindpant not a fit man for military duty—Bhau's suspicions about Govindpant—Not a rich man nor efficient not above board 110 Acting hand in glove with various administrative officers—Boastful man- ner, procrastinating—All Maratha officers took the air of chiefs or partners in the empire 111, The Peshwa's system of recruitment for the services defective—No trained staff— Nepotism—Govindpant made a scape goat because he died—Rajwade begins with preju- dice against him 112 Lights upon a sheaf of papers and carried away by the partial presentation of the affair—Changes dates to suit his interpretation—Caste prejudice— Govindpant intimate with the Peshwa family 113 Rajwade's charge proved only as far as the accounts were concerned—Peshwa ought to have devised a better system 114, Level of the population low the main defect—Bhau not proud but prejudiced—Feared but not loved by the surrounding people 115, The misfortune of the Marathas—Bhau not below the average as a General—His sound pleas in advance of the times—The initial mistake of the cavalry at the back of Ibrahim Khan who led the vanguard of the marching hollow square 116 Ideas and orders not understood nor followed because there was no previous training in the new system—Bhau was going on systematically, but he suc- cessively failed in diplomacy, manoeuvring, daring and was trying the final ordeal of pitched battle to destroy the enemy—No unity of thought, no co ordination of effort—The inherent defects of the Maratha system exhibited at Panipat 117, Marathas imitators and not inventors—No proper assimilation of foreign models—Waywardness no comrade- ship—Individual initiative but no collective effort—Personal prosperity the aim—Not indi- viduals but system responsible for the disaster 118, The death of Nanasaheb Peshwa— Not a consequence of the disaster—his health failing for a number of years—Hereditary defect—Addicted to women—Second marriage 119 Probable causes—Medical, astrological, personal 120, Panipat only gave the last shock—Nanasaheb was not in a position to help Bhau—Marathas unconscious of the things surrounding them 121, The Marathas fought for a cause creed and country—The victory did no good to Abdali but ruined the Marathas —Bajirao took a wrong step and it was blindly followed by his sons—Consolidation neg- lected—Ignorance of political forces—No progressive education 122 Defective geographical knowledge, no maps—No written documents or books for the education of younger peo- ple—In short backward civilisation—Marathas no robbers but aspiring to be rulers— Fight for a higher principle 123, Keeping their word sanctity of contract—Bhau requested by the Mughal emperor to relieve him from the burden—Marathas become enemies of all and friends of none—They would have been more successful if they had not accepted the burden of running the Mughal State 124, They were the most powerful forward tolerant, civil and ethical amongst the Indian people of those days—And still they failed 125 The Marathas took to arms as the last alternative—They were ranked non-martial by the British in the 19th century—Fight for a cause but no useless spilling of blood by them— War a moral necessity under certain circumstances—But the military force of a nation not necessarily the manifestation of its moral force—War not a school for virtues— Marathas fought for a cause a principle and not for material gain or glory at Panipat, 126, Abdali also fought for a cause disinterestedly—Derived no benefit from his victory— The Maratha aim was fulfilled one foreigner went away—But another entered by the back door as a result—The irony of history best illustrated by Panipat, 127 XXIV

CHAPTER I THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND THE historic document printed at the very beginning of Rajwade's first volume of original letters marks a turning point in Maratha history. Un- fortunately the document is only a copy in Perso-Marathi of the original con- tract between the Emperor of Delhi and the Peshwa represented by Malharrao Holkar and Jayapa Shinde. The date of the document can now be fixed with certainty. It is May 1752.¹ Ahmad Shah Abdali, the new king of Afghanistan and the successor to Nadir Shah's eastern dominions, then loomed large on the Indian horizon. He had been beaten off in his first attempt of 1748. But he was not a man to be discouraged by one failure. He again invaded the Panjab in 1749 and secured a promise of tribute from its governor. Not re- ceiving the tribute, he invaded for the third time in 1752 and laid siege to Lahore. But Mir Mannu,² the Mughal Subahdar of the province, was a clever man, not devoid of valour. He did not shrink from having a trial of strength with Abdali. Lahore fell, however, at the end of March and Mir Mannu consented to act in future as Abdali's agent. Ahmad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, allowed his governor to pay 50 lakhs of rupees³ to Abdali, being the surplus revenue of the province after defraying all expenditure. The Emperor's consent had been given through the mediation of his favourite, Khoja Jawed, who acted as a sort of unofficial rival to the Wazir in all his dealings. The Emperor had been obliged to accede to the spoliation of his dominions as he could not help Mir Mannu in time. Khoja Jawed had alienated the Mughal grandees so effectually during the last four years, that none was ready to take upon himself the duty of defending the Empire against the Afghans. Wazir Safdar Jang had just then completely overpowered the Ruhelas with the help of Shinde and Holkar. The Wazir had returned to Oudh and the Marathas were on the point of going to the Deccan, when the Emperor's peremptory call obliged the Wazir to go to Delhi with the Marathas so as to bring pressure on Abdali. Before he could come, however, the timid Khoja and the terrified Emperor had acceded to transfer the revenues of the north-western subahs to Abdali, who took it to be a permanent arrangement. When the Marathas with their victorious army came to Delhi, the Khoja thought of counteracting the wrong step that he had taken under pressure. He, in conjunction with the Wazir, prevailed upon the Emperor to enter into a contract with the Marathas by which they would take upon themselves the duty of defending the Empire against its internal and external foes. It is not correct to say that the Wazir was the sole originator of this arrangement as wrongly read by most historians (e.g. Fall 1, p. 306). The flaw in the in- terpretation has arisen on account of not minutely studying the document. The Peshwa had consented to remain loyal to and was to take orders from 1 Shinde 3.203-4 2 His title was Muin-ul-mulk. 3 SPD 21.53. P. F.—1 [1]

2 PANIPAT 1761 the Emperor and the Khoja in preference to the Wazir It is important to note this fact because on the basis of it the Peshwa's ambassador at the Delhi Court and the military guard under Antaji Manakeshwar had to take the side of the Emperor and fight for him against the Wazir in 1753, when Safdar Jang rebelled against his master, though by that time Khoja Jawed had been assassinated The Marathas were to receive the Chauth of the north western provinces already usurped by the Afghans These included the Mughal Subahs of Sind, Multan, and Lahore, as well as the districts of Hissar, Sambal, Morada bad and Budaun then under the control of the Ruhelas and other refractory nobles The claim to one fourth of the revenues of these lands could be made good only by conquest, of which there was only a remote possibility To induce the Marathas to accept this hazardous adventure, something more tangible was necessary Therefore the other two refractory Subahs of Ajmer and Agra in the possession of the Rajput and Jat chiefs were given to the Peshwa Previous to this, the Emperor had tried to make good his claim to these lands by send- ing Mir Bakhshi Salabat Khan in 1749, but he had to return disappointed after spending more than two years in those regions without collecting any sub- stantial amount of tributes After ruining this great nobleman, Khoja Jawed had bestowed the Subahs on Ghazi ud din Khan, the eldest son of the Great Nizam ul mulk and Intizam ud daulah, the eldest son of the late Wazir Qamar ud din Khan These two noblemen, though heads of the Turani party after their fathers' deaths, were militarily of no consequence When it was found in the crisis of Abdali's invasion that none of them was useful to the State, the Khoja had to make a compromise with the rival Wazir and bestow the Subahs on the Peshwa, while entering into a contract with him, as related above The transfer of the Subahs was facilitated because the dispossessed Ghazi ud din had another move in his mind, to make good his claim to the Viceroyalty of the Deccan as the eldest son of the Great Nizam The Wazir Safdar Jang wanted to get his son, the boy Shuja ud daulah nominated to the post, but the Peshwa had to set up a rival to Salabat Jang, a son of the Nizam, for which purpose Shuja was not useful, as the grandees of the Dec- can, especially the Maratha Sardars of the Nizam, would not side with a per- son who bore no relationship with him The Khoja had in fact created a coun- terpoise to the Irani Shia party of the Wazir by buying the Maratha support to the Turani Ghazi ud din and the Emperor The Muslim party had gained a great point in bestowing the Subahs of Ajmer and Agra on the Hindu Mara- thas as against the overbearing and refractory Rajputs Thus they had set the Hindus against each other and made a common, solid, Hindu front against the Muslims impossible The far reaching effects of this fundamental move were seen in the next decade (1752 61) The refractory Rajputs came closer to the Muslim party and fought with the Marathas incessantly Panipat was an outcome of it The Peshwa's desire to get complete control of the Deccan by setting up a weak pro-Maratha son of the Nizam as Viceroy, was foiled by the usual Muslim tactics of assassinating the person and calling in foreign help as that

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 3 of the French. Bussy dominated the Deccan politics during this decade, and all the efforts of the Peshwa were directed towards checkmating his moves and machinations. He had to take the false step of joining with the English as a result of it. Thus Indian politics came to be dominated by the moves and in- terests of the foreigners instead of by the sons of the soil whether Hindu or Muslim. The Afghans, the English and the French decided the fate and shaped the future of India during this crucial epoch. The Wazir Safdar Jang clandestinely got Khoja Jawed murdered in August 1752, with a view to bring the Emperor completely under his thumb. But his aim of governing the whole Empire with the Maratha aid was not to be fulfilled. Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang, the Viceroy-designate of the Deccan, was also murdered by his step-mother in Aurangabad in October 1752, lead- ing to a collapse of the Peshwa's arrangement as noted above. Salabat Jang had to be acknowledged as the de facto Viceroy, and the French influence be- came fully established at the Nizam's Court. Another unexpected outcome of this untoward happening was the emergence of a new character on the political stage of Delhi. This was Ghazi-ud-din the younger, a son to the murdered man. By playing upon the good feelings of Safdar Jang, this boy of fifteen got himself appointed as the Mir Bakhshi of the Empire. Soon after, he be- came the leader of the conspiracy against his benefactor, and in this he se- cured the help of the Marathas in the name of the Emperor on the basis of the agreement mentioned above. By making war on the Wazir and his allies the Jats, under the walls of Delhi, he succeeded in driving away Safdar Jang to his governorship of Oudh and Allahabad by the end of 1753. But in doing this he also created a future rival to himself, the wily Najib Khan Ruhela. With the help of the Ruhela contingent under Najib and Malharrao Holkar with his master, the Peshwa's brother, Raghoba (Ragunathrao), Ghazi-ud-din went through another revolution at Delhi in June 1754. He deposed the Emperor Ahmad Shah, after first getting himself nominated as the Wazir in place of his cousin Intizam-ud-daulah⁴. Alamgir II was crowned the new Emperor. Safdar Jang's downfall had been hastened because the Irani Shia party of which he was the head was proclaimed as pro-Hindu by the Turani Sunni party of Mughal grandees. The popular opinion in Delhi held the Empire as well-nigh handed over to the Marathas. A plausible colour is given to this opinion by certain unverified clauses of the agreement of 1752, noted in the beginning. Besides the provinces actually mentioned in that agreement, it is mentioned in contemporary private letters that the Chauth of all the twenty- two provinces⁴ of the Mughal Empire had also been granted to the Marathas, together with the administration of the holy cities of Benares, Brindavan and Mathura. Antaji Manakeshwar is found confirming this information a year later in his despatch⁵ to the Peshwa. But these important clauses are not found in the document published by Rajwade. Perhaps it was a personal un- derstanding with the Wazir and an administrative concession or favour. What ⁴ Shinde 3.203-4. ⁵ SPD 21.53.