पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

event by four days 42 If their argument has any sense in it, we must think the state of the Maratha camp not as bad as it is depicted, otherwise how could they have waited for four days more? Their confidence is curiously found sup- ported by a rare letter of Janakoji, written only ten days prior to the battle, and reaching its destination without being intercepted by Abdali's patrols 43 He does not betray any sign of fear or hopelessness He assures his revenue collector not to be troubled at the local pin pricks of the Rajput princes, as after the chief enemy (Abdali) is defeated, others will fall in the line with- out effort As we have said elsewhere, the tone of the men who escaped from the battle field was different from their own earlier writing They charged Bhau with being obstinate, not listening to milder and saner counsels, and casting his last die thoughtlessly and in a haphazard manner We take these to be afterthoughts only Had there been not even a thirty per cent chance of bettering their position—and not the hope of defeating Abdali decisively—how the Maratha chieftains could have consented to march out with a hollow square formation, we are not able to comprehend Let it not be forgotten also that notwithstanding the starvation of the Maratha camp, the Marathas were able to charge so effectively in the forenoon part of the battle that they seemed to carry everything before them On this central point, all the authorities on the battle are unanimous This clearly proves that but for some serious disobedience of orders issued after the final decision before the start, or for the sudden demoralisation due to Vishwasrao being shot down, there would not have been that debacle and that stampede which actually took place even to the dismay of such on lookers as Kashiraj and other reporters of the battle We have thought it necessary to put down all these facts before the description of the actual battle, because up till now it has been treated by his- torians in a faulty, not to say malignant, manner According to the chronicles, the rank and file of the Maratha army, perturbed at the prospect and desperate on account of starvation, proceeded to the tent of Bhau and besought him not to allow them to die of starvation and disease but to lead them to the battle, whatever be the destiny awaiting them We have said already that Bhau should have anticipated such a clamour and forestalled it with some continuous preparation spread over a number of days All the men, high and low, combatants and non combatants, in the Maratha camp, should have been completely made aware and tutored of their re- sponsibility and actual part in the battle which was to ensue Clear instruc- tions about the methods of self-protection in the event of a sudden disaster— we do not think inevitable and certain—ought to have been circulated Nana Fadnis says in his autobiography that Bhau had anticipated all possibilities in the conduct of war and provided for them as best he could, and we do not think that Bhau could have failed to take these obvious precautions, consum- mate master of affairs as he was The divergence in the military counsels of the Maratha chiefs was the basic cause for the opposite manner of acting on the 42 Kaifiyat 0.21 Bakhar 0 141 43 Shinde 1.222

PANIPAT 75 field of battle. But that was no fault of Bhau, but a national misfortune. All the various units and classes in the vast Maratha camp spread over miles were not equally affected by the dearth of grain or money, and that seems to be the reason why some still wanted, and thought it possible, to wait, while others less fortunate had reached the sinking point. Ultimately the clamour of the starved decided the day of the battle and not the convenience or forethought of the commander! This was a calamity, but perhaps there was no help for it. In any case, had the battle been fought a fortnight earlier, it would have been better in all respects, for the Marathas. The actual plan decided and adopted by Bhau in consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi and others was, however, made possible by Abdali's change of camp-site and could not have been devised prior to 30th December, 1760. A battle before that date would have been only a frontal attack or a march with a hollow-square formation liable to be disturbed on the flanks which is the weakest point in such a formation. The direction would have been from north to south and not north-west to south-east. The plan envisaged by Kashiraj and put down in a memory drawing of the field of battle, is cor- rect as far as it goes. Only the direction of the Maratha front he was un- able to make out. Kashiraj mistook the longer side of the rectangle on the right-hand side for a front, because guns had been judiciously placed on that side also, and these were pointed towards the Abdali front. The strategy was to march past the right-hand corner of Abdali's camp to the river side with the whole formation, so as to take the river at the back in the evening and then to meet the Afghan army from the right-hand side, which would then become the battle-front. The advantage in this move would have been that the camp-followers would have remained always safe at the back and would have found it possible to run away to the south towards Delhi or to the east across the Jamuna into the Doab in case of a defeat. Had the plan succeeded, the major battle would have come not on the day of the start but on the days following. This would have given double advantage to the Marathas. They would have found the much needed rest, as also time to refresh and recoup at night, and would have been attacking the Afghans on their flank, thus ex- posing their camp to loot. But the hollow square formation with a long rectangular side made up of mutually antagonistic generals was at best a precarious device, as was proved to their cost the next day. THE TRANS-GANGES RAIDS OF THE MARATHAS DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN At the beginning of July 1760, Shuja-ud-daulah finally made up his mind and went over to Abdali's side. From that date Sadashivrao Bhau began writing his letters to Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar and Gopalrao Bapuji, to foment rebellions in Shuja's dominions beyond the Ganges, and raid them. Many of the big zamindars un- der Shuja were small chieftains themselves with armies made up of their per- sonal retainers. Balawant Singh of Benares was the biggest and the most refractory amongst them, though there were others like Balabhadrasingh of

76 PANIPAT. 1761 Tiloi and Hindupat of Pratapgarh In fact, the times and the surroundings were such that no potentate could be taken as fully established and free from internal rebellions Shuja had placed Veni Bahadur with full powers in charge of his dominions during his absence in Abdali's camp The major portion of Shuja's troops he kept behind him for guarding his dominions, fully knowing the risks to which his dominions would be exposed once he antag- onised the Marathas In fact, his direct help to Abdali was his fine park of artillery and the moral prestige of his name only Sadashivrao Bhau appears from his letters to be unaware of this important fact Shuja's troops are found estimated at 20,000 at the beginning of July, but how many of these he took with him to Abdali's camp is doubtful, as none seem to give very reliable figures But if we take Kashiraj's figures as correct, Shuja had at Panipat 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 20 guns with him, thus leaving 16,000 to guard his dominions All these troops were well disciplined and well equipped They were engaged on a permanent footing and very well paid with the re- sult that they had no cause to grumble and go against their master This was possible because Shuja possessed the most fertile lands in India and he could collect his revenues without any hitch The only possible loop hole in Shuja's dominions was the danger from his big zamindars who were always ready to rebel and would have liked to become independent When Bhau is found ordering Govindpant to invade the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges and Gopalrao Barve to attack Shuja's dominions, he seems to be talking of something which he could not understand Abdali had sent many of the Ruhelas back to their homes during the rains to lessen the pressure on his scanty supplies of grain and possibly with a view to protect their province, thus making it impossible for Govindpant to move in the matter Govindpant occupied Ahmad Khan Bangash's lands in Farukhabad adjoining his, because these were on his side of the Ganges But beyond the river he could not go Similarly, Gopalrao found it impossible to move in the face of Veni Bahadur guarding the Ganges in full force The combined troops of the Marathas under all their captains in this region, are found estimated at only ten to twelve thousand troops Many of these were possibly infantry corps only, and not very well disciplined They were fit for collecting revenues from refractory zamindars hiding in their fortalices, but not fit to face regular troops under Veni Bahadur The rainy season passed in mere manœuvring without any actual invasion In the mid- dle of November, Govindpant turned towards Delhi on account of Bhau's ex- press orders, with his contingent of some 5,000 troops, and only Gopalrao Barve was left behind in the lower Doab, facing Shuja's dominions Sadashivrao had ordered Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar to join his forces with those of Barve, but he does not seem to have crossed the Jamuna from the south at all Be- sides, Shuja's wise mother and Veni Bahadur had by this time quelled the rebel- lions of the zamindars and brought them over to their side by lavish expen- diture on them Gopalrao had written to Bhau in his letter of 22nd November, 1760 that he was presently crossing over into Oudh, actually he was unable to cross before 30th December, 1760, as a part of his army had been sent to Govindpant's help under Bajirao Barve, Ramchandra Krishna and Ghanashyam Pandurang, which he was expecting back But Bhau could not spare these

PANIPAT 77

troops, and so Barve engaged new troops. Ganesh Sambhaji kept on writing that he would come after settling matters in Bundelkhand. Finally, Barve crossed with his new troops and matchlockmen, about 10,000 strong. After crossing, he kept 5,000 infantry for guarding the ghats on the Ganges at his back, and with 5,000 matchlockmen and 1,500 sowars he began his campaign. A thousand horsemen joined him from the lower Doab. With these he at- tacked Bhojpur (sixteen miles to the north-west of Dalmau higher up the Ganges) which was defended by the Ruhelas by forming a square in the European way. But the impetuous attack of the Maratha cavalry broke their formation and they ran back into their fortalice. In this action, the Marathas killed some fifty matchlockmen, ten horsemen and captured the enemy's flags, themselves losing three horses and one trooper with seven wounded. Next day, the Ruhelas were pursued into the neighbouring thicket where they had taken shelter near the village of Dhuremau, five miles to the north-east of Bhojpur, by the fortalice. When attacked, they again ran away after a little skirmish in which the Marathas captured five horses, losing two of their own. Gopal- rao next proceeded to the important fort of Dalmau, which was built on the bank of the river on a prominent hillock. The Marathas first attacked the town adjoining the fort when Haji Beg, the Commandant of the fort, sallied forth two miles with two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, con- sisting of Ruhelas. The attacking Marathas pressed them back into the fort after losing ten horsemen killed and twenty-five wounded. Two hundred enemy Ruhelas were cut off and their fifty horses were killed. The Marathas cap- tured seventy-five horses with the iron drum. The whole town was looted and the Marathas began their march forward, because, had they laid siege to the fort, they would have had to sit there for a long time. Their next camp was at the village of Gaura, on the road to Rai Bareli on the 8th of January, 1761. In this campaign, Balabhadrasingh accompanied Barve, and later on Krishna- nand Pant, Faujdar of Karra, joined them near Manikpur in the Pratapgarh district. Many local Rajput landlords joined them with their retainers so as to take part in the loot, if possible. They carried fire and sword throughout the region till they reached Nawabganj, ten miles north-west of Allahabad, to which they set fire after looting it. Next they proceeded to Fulpura to the north-east of Allahabad, and there repeated their performance. Thus, after they had carried their depredations for more than a hundred miles along the northern bank of the Ganges, retribution descended upon them from behind. Veni Bahadur had sent a strong army at their heels, coming into contact with which the rabble, collected in the Maratha camp, broke at once and zamindars, like Balbhadrasingh, who had joined for loot, fled back. The Maratha army under Gopalrao was dispersed and they ran back in small parties by different roads. Gopalrao personally crossed back with some seven horsemen into the Mirzapur district near the famous temple of Vindhyavasini, and then, taking a westerly route along the southern bank of the Jamuna, returned to his seat at Korah-Jahanabad in the Doab. All his broken troops also returned with- out much mishap. These events took place between 10th to 20th January, 1761. This campaign did not start at the beginning of December as taken

78 PANIPAT: 1761 by Sir Jadunath,⁴⁴ but at the end on 30th December,⁴⁵ and ended within three weeks Bhau had expected this raid into Shuja's territory to have the effect of diverting his forces from Panipat, but it could not have had that effect be- cause the campaign began very late, and ended simultaneously with the battle of Panipat In joining Abdali, Shuja had insured against any possible attack by Abdali and his allies, the Ruhelas, but had not neglected the defence of his dominion either Bhau's information on these points seems to be de- fective Miscalculation of enemy forces and over-confidence in his own troops led Bhau astray in the whole Panipat campaign From the dates of the let- ters giving the news of the campaign, it cannot be said that the rout of Barve's army took place after the news of the Panipat disaster had reached him, or was an outcome of it It seems, however, that Barve could not rally his dis- persed troops to another effort because, by that time, the news had definitely reached him

I PANIPAT LOCALITY The Panipat locality did not prove favourable to the Marathas on ac- count of its being nearer to the home-land of the Ruhelas Panipat itself was —and is—practically a Muslim town and the areas to its east had a larger proportion of Muslim population when compared to the southern tracts of the United Provinces The road from Panipat to Kairana, Shamli and Muzaf- farnagar across the Jamuna farther on, leads to Sukartal, the stronghold of Najib Khan on the Ganges, and crossing the Ganges to the actual home-land of the Ruhelas, in a straight line In fact it looks as if any place south of Delhi would have been a better locality for the Marathas and worse for the Ruhelas Their food supply was assured with the least inconvenience to them Suraj- mal Jat's advice was correct on this point, because he knew the local human environment. Bhau's original plan of crossing over into the Doab in the vicinity of Agra was correct, but, on account of procrastination, it was spoiled, and the campaign was unnecessarily lengthened by the four months of the rainy season This had a disastrous effect from the financial, physical and moral point of view Shuja would not have gone over to Abdali had Bhau placed himself between Abdali and Shuja's dominions The miscarriage of that project was the first set-back in the Panipat campaign Shakir Khan Ansari's description¹ of the sad condition of Panipat under Maratha occupation must be true as far as it goes That the Marathas must have felled all the trees in the vicinity irrespective of any consideration for the fruit-trees in the gardens, appears true when we take into account the neces- sities of the Maratha camp, military as well as personal Many houses in the city were inevitably demolished by cannon-balls and their residents had to shift to other places The wonder is not that such things occurred, but that the Marathas had left the inhabitants comparatively free without imposing any conditions on them. Most of the inhabitants were allowed to remain where 44 Fall 2.313 45 Ait Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda 3, No 263 1 Fall 2.309

PANIPAT 79 they were and carry on their lives as best as they could under the circumstances We believe that the presence of such a hostile element at their back must have helped the Afghan side much in various ways Spying and sending news dis closing the Maratha position was easy for this population. Besides these, the two sons of Nejabat Khan Ruhela of Kunjpura were captives in the Maratha camp What happened to them is nowhere recorded, and there is no ground for thinking that they were beheaded. Perhaps, in the turmoil just after the defeat, they might have freed themselves and joined the populace in destroying the Maratha camp followers in revenge That the Marathas had not destroyed any edifice wantonly is clear from the undamaged condition of the splendid tombs of the Saint Bu Ali Qalandar and Ibrahim Lodi with the ancient mosques adjoining. This is a clear proof of the mildness of Maratha rule even under the stress of war Their civil manners and inoffensive attitude have cost the Marathas not a little in history. That Bhau, in his Panipat campaign, created a tremendous impression in the Panipat locality is clear from many legends about Bhau, Parvatibai, Janakoji Shinde and Vishwasrao. The Bhau ballad current in the surround- ing area, and still sung by itinerant Jogis, Muslim and Hindu, is a living proof of the impress so created, and this was natural. The camping of lakhs of men in the locality for about three months was a thing that had never before oc- curred even in those war-like times. The earlier battles in the Panipat-Karnal- Thanesar locality had been bloody and decisive from the political point of view, no doubt, but they were never fought to the last in the proper sense of the word, nor was there such a massacre of camp followers after the event The result is seen in the creation of legends. The Jogi, who copied the Bhau ballad for us (published in the Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Insti- tute, 4.3 of 1943), does not record Bhau's death, following in this respect the Maratha chronicles, and says that he went to the village of Bhaopur, some twelve miles to the south-west of Panipat. There he lived for a long time with a Fakir, evidently incognito, hiding his identity. Thence he went to Kairana across the Jamuna after some years, his further life being not known to the men in the Panipat locality. That Bhau did not die on the battle field and lived long afterwards became the traditional belief throughout India, giving rise to imposters who gave themselves out as the real Bhau, and created politi- cal problems adversely affecting the Maratha history. We think that the bal- lad singer's account of Bhau living in Bhaopur is a transparent attempt to con- nect the already existing village of Bhaopur (founded and named after some Bhaosingh, a name common in the locality) with the name of Bhau, the Mara- tha general Such a legend is recorded about another place in the Muzaffar- nagar Gazetteer on page 9 (1920, Reprint) of the U P Series: "The Jamuna in the extreme north of the district appears to occupy much the same place as formerly, and on the south also, it washes the high mound on which stood a Maratha fort still connected with the name of Sadasheo Bhau It may fur- ther be safely conjectured that the channel of the river has not changed much at this point since Panipat Between these two extreme points, however, the bed of the river is tortuous and uncertain" We have seen the mound ourselves near the village of Isapur on which now stands not a fort but a bairagi's ashrama

80 PANIPAT 1761 and a temple of his household gods, but there was no trace of the fort at least in 1935—nor was the fact of its previous existence known to the in- habitants there. The Gazetteer writer, we take it, must have copied the infor- mation from some local report, or the description given by some previous traveller in the locality. As the mound in question is a prominent object in that low-lying river basin, it could have been very effectively used militarily by placing long-range guns on it and guarding or attacking the passage of the Jamuna near that point. As Ahmad Shah Abdali had moved his camp along the river front just opposite to this mound on the other side of it during the second stage of the Panipat beleaguerment, the military use of such a promi- nent height is not an impossibility. But the idea of the Marathas making use of it during the Panipat beleaguerment presupposes that the Maratha line of communication into the Doab was intact during the earlier part of the Panipat siege, or alternately, the Maratha contingents detached by Bhau for cutting off Abdali's line of supply through the Doab, had approached up to this point, though there is very little likelihood of such a thing happening. As the data on which the Gazetteer writer based his statement are not before us, it is not pos- sible for us now to decide the point. II WAS THE IMPERIAL CANAL TO THE WEST OF PANIPAT FLOWING DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN? Most of the historians, depending upon the information supplied by such sources as Gazetteers whose information is not historically sifted, have taken the Imperial Canal as having stopped flowing eighty years before 1820, when it was again repaired by the British. Imp. Gaz. Vol. XIV, p. 234 (1908), under the heading "Jumna Canal (Western)," supplies the information that there were ancient bridges over the canal at Karnal and Safidon and that the Delhi branch ceased to flow sometime during 1753 to 1760. This informa- tion the Gazetteer has copied from the Persian chronicles, giving an account of the civil war between the Emperor Ahmad Shah and his Wazir Safdar Jang. The canal formed the property of the Wazir and with a view to stopping his income from that source, the canal was broken up by his enemies. But what has been overlooked by the Gazetteer has been now brought to light by the deep researches of Dr. T. G. P. SPEAR of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Writ- ing in the Journal of Indian History (Vol. XIX, Pt. III, No. 57, p. 326, Dec. 1940), he says that the canal was broken up in 1754 in the civil war no doubt,* but was repaired by Ahmad Shah. But thereafter sometime, somehow, it was neglected. Taking into consideration the position of Bhau's camp, the major portion of which was situated to the north-west of Panipat, and the descrip- tion found in the local Bhau ballad,¹ which supplies the information that Bhau's 700 elephants were stationed at the village of Gharaunda, ten miles to the north of Panipat, we assume that the canal was definitely flowing during this period. For elephants require a copious water supply which would be available only in a place like the bank of a river or a flowing canal. That it was flowing can also be guessed from the fact of the mention of the sojourn of ¹ BDCRI 4.173.

PANIPAT 81

the various conquerors in the Shalimar Garden (which depended upon the canal water) to the north-west of Delhi Raghunathrao Peshwa lived there in 1754,² Ahmad Shah Abdalı in 1756-7,³ and Sadashivrao Bhau in September, 1760⁴ They would not have preferred the place unless a copious supply of water was available in the vicinity for a big army We think this to be sufficient proof for taking the canal as flowing during this campaign When Ahmad Shah succeeded in terrorizing the Maratha troops into huddling themselves in the cramped camp at Panipat during the last fortnight before the great bat- tle, the Marathas seem to have lost their access to the canal water to the west of their camp, for Kashıraj says that Ahmad Shah was able to make a circuit round the Maratha camp from a distance, which we think to be correct for the last fortnight only On account of this, the Maratha army seems to have suffered terribly for want of water, in addition to want of food This fact is found mentioned only in the ballad published by us in the Deccan College Bul- letin Vol IV, p 184 If their access to the canal water was not cut off, we think the canal to have been cut higher up in the vicinity of Karnal or Kunj- pura at the head of the canal The ground for such supposition rests on the fact of the reconquest⁵ of Kunjpura by the Afghans during the Panipat siege For the first month and a half, the Marathas were receiving their food supply from the vicinity of Karnal on account of their friendship with Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, but a new army from Afghanistan under Atai Khan came along that route to the help of Ahmad Shah early in December Dılir Khan Ruhela made common cause with these new Afghan troops and took back Kunjpura from its small Maratha garrison, thus closing the Maratha supply from that side Taking into consideration the Afghan tactics it is not unlikely that he might have cut the canal at the head after this event so as to cut the water supply of the Maratha camp at Ahmad Shah's behest Lest it be forgotten, it should be noted that the old Imperial Canal was flowing in those days along a different channel than the present New Delhi branch of the western Jamuna canal It began lower down on the river Jamuna to the north of Kunjpura It flowed to the east of Karnal and not to the west as at present Then it did not take a loop to the west before com- ing to Panipat as at present, but flowed parallel to the west of the Imperial Road at a distance of three or four miles Dr SPEAR in his article referred to above, page 327, supplies the following information "The canal on its old alignment ran along a depression in the apparently flat Jamuna plain In some places the bed of the canal was above the level of the land at a great seepage, and waterlogging was the result The distance between Panipat and Karnal suffered most from this fact" (P 328) 'Then the alignment was altered to correspond with the lie of the land, and it now sweeps in a great curve from Karnal to Panipat " This discussion should convince the reader that the old canal—Shah Nahar—was flowing along to the west of Panipat at a distance of some three to four miles during the Panipat campaign

² SPD 27 74 ³ Ibid 21 106. ⁴ RAJ 6 404 ⁵ Fall 2.307

82 PANIPAT 1761 III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif- ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com- mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude, Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane, Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare. This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at 75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini- wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest, it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard, and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at 70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti- mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of 14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³ 1 Purandare 1.337 2 SPD. 21.193 3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97

PANIPAT 83 (1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani- pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse, 15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000 Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only, this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec- can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor- tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ- ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶ of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor- rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government 4 Raj 6 406 5 Ibid. 1 406. 6 Fall 2.287

84 PANIPAT: 1761 paid soldiers and camp-followers or irregulars. The figures given by Shamlu and others are inflated because they include all the camp-followers also. An average of four camp-followers for each professional soldier would make a fair estimate⁷ of persons gathered in the two camps, and on that basis it looks as if each camp had two and a half lakhs of people in it. The Maratha camp had many pilgrims also in its entourage. Some sardars had brought their fam- ilies for this very purpose with them, so as to facilitate their travel in comfort and safety. Many priests had gathered in the camp from Benares and Prayag with the hope of getting good fees and alms by plying their trade. Many can- didate clerks had joined with the hope of getting some temporary work or civil appointment in the newly conquered territories. This was almost a normal and permanent camp-following class in the Maratha armies ever since the days of Shivaji, as is attested by Martin, the French Governor of Pondicherry. In- cidentally it shows the nature of the Maratha camp. The chartered bazar accompanying the army supplied all the needs of the people in it. People felt “so little danger in following their camp that life in camp is spent as happily there as in towns.” (MALET’S Memoranda Relative to the Maratha Army at Kharda, Maratha-Nizam Relations, No. 202, p. 272.) Major DIROM writes that the Maratha army on march “resembles more the emigration of a nation guarded by its troops than the march of an army only to subdue an enemy.”⁸ The women camp-followers in the Maratha army were a necessary element for doing certain duties which men thought it derogatory to perform in those days. Cooking their food and cleaning the vessels could be done by males, but grind- ing the corn was thought to be an exclusive duty of the female sex, for per- forming which a number of them accompanied the army. It is difficult to estimate the number of females in the Maratha army, but we think there were some 20,000 all told. Most of these were slaves of their masters, who served in various capacities and also as concubines. Very few married women had accompanied their husbands in this long-drawn-out campaign. Because Bhau, Balvantrao Mehendale, Nana Fadnis and possibly a few others had taken their wives with them, a wrong impression is formed about the total number of such women accompanying the army. Mirat-i-Ahmadi states that 12,000 women in good position among whom 700 travelled in palkis, were taken prison- ers.⁹ We think this statement a gross exaggeration. There could not be more than 100 women carried in litters, nor could the 12,000 women belong to the married class. A few other sardars had also taken their women-folk with them, no doubt, for pilgrimage along the route, but their number was not more than a few hundred at the most.¹⁰ The rest of the women belonged to the slave- concubine class. Nuruddin Hasan’s mention of “handsome Brahman women” being sold after the defeat can only be treated as a figment of the brain, and as to the “rose-limbed slave girls” mentioned by Sir Jadunath,¹¹ their number could be infinitesimally small, if such were to be found there at all. Had the 7 Dirom p. 242. 8 Dirom p. 243. 9 Sardesai Commemoration Volume (English) p. 260 10 Purandare 3.209. 11 Fall 2.348.

PANIPAT 85 Peshwa's army been going on after Shivaji's pattern, there would have been no impediment like this in the camp at all. But Shivaji led few campaigns lasting more than a few months at a stretch or far away from the homes. The Peshwa's army was modelled after the Mughal pattern with all its draw- backs, which proved fatal here as they had proved fatal to Aurangzib in his campaigns against the Marathas. IV. IMPERFECT SENSE OF TIME AND DIRECTION Indians of pre-Panipat days had no maps before them to judge properly of the directions of places, etc, and so we have to take their descriptions of events cautiously. Bhau writes "Abdali has come to the south by crossing the Jamuna at Baghpat." Nana Purandare takes Kunjpura as situated on the south bank of the Jamuna. "Panipat lies 40 kosa from Delhi towards the west." With these examples from contemporary documents before us, we have to ac- cept Kashiraj's directions with correct visualisation. Sir Jadunath has bungled in his attempt to connect Kashiraj's translation with the Browne's map of the battle. This is also due to his non-visualisation of the path of the sun during the days of its highest southern declination. A man from the Maratha camp talking of Abdali's position or Kashiraj writing from the Abdali's camp about the Marathas was sure to confuse correct direction during December-January. Kashiraj has naturally taken the Maratha army as facing eastwards and so de- scribed the Afghans facing westwards on the day of the battle. Another thing incorrectly calculated by Sir Jadunath is the hours of the day. The sun rose at Panipat (latitude 29° 23' 30'' North, longitude 76° 58' 30'' East) on 14-1-1761 at 7 A.M. and set at about 5.20 P.M. (local time). The day thus consisted of about 10 hours and 20 minutes and the battle has to be described accordingly. The day was, in lunar calendar, 8th of the bright half of the month. The moon would set about mid-night on such a day and not at 9.15 P.M. as taken by Sir Jadunath. (Vide Fall 2, pp. 369, 346, etc.)

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE

FINALLY, as decided at night, the Maratha army rose in the early hours of Wednesday, the 14th January, 1761, and prepared itself to march out of the beleaguered camp at Panipat. After going through the morning round of physical duties, Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao bathed, worshipped the gods, had a hurried breakfast and then dressed themselves in full armour for the ensuing battle. The whole camp was agog throughout the previous night. They had collected all their little belongings and tied them in bundles to be carried away by securing them to their backs or on the bullocks and other pack animals which had survived. Some carts and other heavy goods, found either difficult to arrange properly or as absolutely unnecessary on the march, were left behind in the camp in order to facilitate the march. With the first call of the trumpets, the whole camp started and arranged itself in marching order as best it could.¹ To the front were placed the heavy cannon, behind it the infantry of Ibrahim Khan followed in triangular formation so as to make the artillery in front, the spear head of the march. To their rear were placed Damaji Gaikawad, Yashwantrao Pawar, Vitthal Shivdeo, Antaji Manakeshwar, Samsher Bahadar and other small units. Then followed Bhau and Vishwas- rao with their personal troops. After them came non combatants and bag- gage. On the right flank of the rear were appointed the Shinde and Holkar contingents. The lighter artillery was placed mainly on the right of the march- ing square, though a few were placed on the left and at the back also, to scare away any surprise attack on those sides. The hollow square thus formed marched out step by step and stood three miles in front of Abdali. Their posi- tion at nine o'clock (local time) was: Ibrahim Khan's infantry in the village of Nimbdi to the south-west of Panipat, Bhausaheb with the centre one mile be- hind him to the north of Ugrakhedi, Malharrao Holkar at the rear directly one mile to the south of Panipat. The non combatants and camp followers were standing between Panipat and Ugrakhedi, their left-hand side reaching the out- skirts of Rajakhedi to the north. The distance between Malharrao Holkar's rearmost contingent and Abdali's left under Shah Pasand Khan was more than three miles, his contingent probably standing in the field to the east of Siwa. The Afghan army when arranged stood roughly in a crescent shaped curved line from Siwa to Chhajpur Khurd. Barkhurdar Khan's Risala was standing there with the nullah at their back. Dunde Khan and Hafiz Rahamat Khan were standing between Chhajpur Kalan and Ujah. Ahmad Shah was somewhere between Risalu and Dhadaula, while Wazir Shah Wali Khan's cavalry stood ready between Risalu and Ujah. Ahmad Shah's baggage and camp were between Dhadaula and Nurpur. Najib ud daulah and Shuja ud

¹ The front originally was spread from Kabuli Bagh to the north-east of Panipat, to Chandani Bagh to the west of it, where Ibrahim Khan's corps were camping. This was the head of the Maratha march in order. The direction it took was to the south-east of Panipat.

[ 86 ]

TO FACE PAGE 87 BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 FIRST STAGE 10 A.M. SCALE

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDIA
3. HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER
4. DAMANJ VITHAL SHIV VYT SHYAT PUJE & ANTAJI MANKESHWAR
5. IBRAHIM GARDJ
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU Foot note — Shah Pasand khan was standing with five thousand troops at the left flank of Abdali's line of battle across the Mughal Road to the northeast of Siwa

daulah were on the plain between Risalu and Siwa. We do not think that the Afghan army was standing in a continuous line along the whole front between Chhajpur and Siwa.² There were gaps between the various contingents which were ordered to the front, though none so wide as to allow a Maratha corps safely to thrust itself between. Najib-ud-daulah had to cover full three miles before he could come into contact with the Shinde division to the west of Ugrakhedi. The army was spread on a front some seven miles in length from Chhajpur Khurd to the west of Siwa The right-hand side of the Maratha square was not more than three miles in length, and spread from Nimbdi to Chandni Bagh (to the east of Panipat) in almost a straight line. The battle began with a cannonade as usual. Within an hour Ibrahim Khan's corps touched the Abdali front at the point where the trans-Ganges Ruhelas were massed in front of the village of Chhajpur Kalan. On the right-hand side of these Ruhelas Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg were stand- ing ready to cover the Maratha flank on that side. Ibrahim Khan ordered two corps to stand in front of them so as to stop their advance with a view to cut off the gunners in front of the corps of Ibrahim Khan. The rest of his in- fantry engaged with the Ruhelas. His quick firing muskets soon began to have their effect on the opposite side. The infantry advanced step by step fighting for each inch of ground, but the heavy siege-guns seem not to have kept up the march and soon lagged behind. This was probably due to the difficulty of dragging them on an uneven ground, and also to the advance of the Ruhela cavalry to cut off the gunners as is usual in this kind of battle. For three hours the combat went on, and the Ruhelas were pressed back with heavy slaughter. Only a few hundred match-lockmen remained with their chiefs Hafiz Rahmat and Dunde Khan. This was the result of the battle at twelve o'clock. But before this the Maratha cavalry, detailed for supporting Ibrahim Khan and standing half a mile at his back, had acted injudiciously, not understanding the kind of battle they were engaged in. In their impetuosity they seem to have acted on their own initiative and broken the marching order absolutely neces- sary when the army is to advance in a square formation. They advanced rapidly at a trotting pace and soon overmarched the infantry corps of Ibrahim Khan. But they met with the sharp fire of the Ruhela infantry and had to run back with broken spirits. Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar then galloped back and stood behind the heavy guns fixed in the ground and pos- sibly chained together so as to obstruct the advance of the enemy cavalry to cut off the gunners. Damaji Gaikawad also met with a similar check from the Durrani cavalry to his left, and he, too, returned back and stood behind as at the beginning. This disobedience of orders was the chief cause of the Pani- pat disaster. Before starting, Bhau had clearly placed his plan before his of- ficers and asked them to march straight without breaking the order by swerving to the right or left. The aim of the march was to gain ground and reach the river Jamuna before evening and not to offer battle. If the enemy would step aside and allow the Marathas to press forward with their whole mass, then the Marathas were not to engage with them at all. Only if and when the ² IHQ 10.259, 60.

THE BATTLE 89 self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the camel-swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it, Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops

88 PANIPAT 1761 enemy would not allow them passage in their march, the cavalry was to charge and press forward, beating the enemy back so as to break their order As at the very beginning this breach of order occurred, it had a disastrous moral ef- fect on the frontal troops The first cause of the break in the ordered march was due to the heaviness of the Maratha guns which, on account of their long range, fired their shots in a faulty manner so as to fall at the back of the enemy Thus their ammunition was wasted without gaining the desired ef- fect of breaking the enemy line of battle and creating a gap in it for the troops to advance Ibrahim Khan had then to cease fire and order his infantry to march with bayonets in their hands to break the enemy line and make a breach The Telinga infantry under Ibrahim Khan was formed of well trained corps with experience of such battles Their resolute advance made the Ruhelas fall back, leaving few soldiers with the chiefs as stated above But in this ef- fort Ibrahim Khan lost half his troops in killed or wounded, and then the preponderating number of Ruhelas began to tell The Ruhelas were in the proportion of three to one of Ibrahim Khan's musketeers Their match locks fired heavier bullets and were even more effective on account of their steady aim due to their long barrels Their range also exceeded that of the com- paratively light muskets of French make used in Ibrahim Khan's infantry If, at this psychological moment of apparent stale mate, the Maratha cavalry had advanced again, galloping to support him, there would have been no further slaughter amongst them, and the battle would have been carried on in the intended order But, as said above, the cavalry ordered for his support had foolishly advanced first, and then coming back stationed themselves behind the chained heavy guns, with their strength exhausted and spirits broken Damaji Gaikawad who was to the left of the Maratha thrust—thus adjoining Barkhurdar Khan's out flanking cavalry—behaved better than Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar He supported the two corps left by Ibrahim Khan to meet the enemy on that side As there was no infantry facing them, they repulsed the Ghilzais on that side as often as they advanced with their scathing fire But Damaji was himself wounded in the action and he also returned to stand in the company of Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar Until now we have said nothing about the Maratha centre under Bhau He was standing to the right of the (middle) centre of the Maratha march Behind him to the left were standing the non combatants and camp followers The attack on Bhau's side seems to have been begun not by Bhau himself but by the Durrani Wazir who advanced farther than the main line, firing his camel swivels manned by Persian bombardiers ³ The Maratha light artillery placed on the right of their march and facing the Durrani line obliquely was gradually receding back from the Durrani line Its fire would not reach the Durrani line at all, except at the front under Ibrahim Khan At nine o'clock the dis- ance between Bhau's right hand side and the Durrani Wazir's front was a mile or so According to the Maratha plan, Bhau would not swerve to his right unless it was attacked by the enemy The Wazir on whom naturally the main responsibility fell and who was stationed at the centre, advanced him ³ MUNDY p. 215 (note)

self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the camel swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it, Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops surrounding Bhau belonged to the select group and were possibly in the best of condition. Working under the eye of the commander in chief himself, and themselves possessing a high sense of duty with patriotic fervour for the name of the Marathas, they came sweeping down and would not stop even in the face of the sharp fire from the swivel guns. Now a cavalry battle fought with lance and sword on the Maratha side and musketry and archery on the other side began in good earnest. It is certain that the Afghan cavalry under Ahmad Shah had more musketeers, match lockmen and archers amongst them than were to be found in the Maratha army.⁴ Each Maratha of note had possibly a hand gun by his side but he had neither love for it nor expertness at its use. He pre- ferred lance and spear at a short distance to the clumsy bow and arrow or heavy, long matchlock of those days. 'The fighting was so violent that earth and sky could not be seen and the eye of heaven became dazzled at beholding this spetacle. (Kashiraj.) The Afghan army was composed of 12,000 horse- men and 8,000 foot soldiers, besides 1,000 camel guns. 'The Marathas drank them up like the water of a river.' Atai Khan, the son of the Wazir's paternal uncle, (who had carried the raid against Govindpant Bundele and slaughtered him) was slain. 3,000 Durranis were put to the sword and the rest fled back at the fury of the Maratha charge. Only 200 troops stood surrounding the Grand Wazir with fifty camel guns in his front. He was clad in full armour from head to foot, still dismounting from his horse he sat down on the ground, saying to his followers, "Comrades! Vilayat is far off, whither are you going?" He asked Kashiraj (who himself reports this) to take a message to Shuja ud- daulah that he was dying and that Shuja should come to his aid. Shuja did nothing of the kind, however, excusing himself with the plea that it was not proper to break the line of battle at that stage and thus allow the Marathas a possible chance to pierce past the Afghan line through the gap. As a mat- ter of fact, though Shuja stood ready with all his troops and guns throughout the day, none moved from the Maratha side against him. This clearly shows that the oblique Maratha line never came by itself into direct contact with the Afghan line at the left throughout the main fight, a distance of more than a mile still intervening between the two armies. But though Shuja would not come to the Durrani Wazir's aid, Ahmad Shah was not unaware of his plight. By this time it was twelve noon, and it seemed for a moment at the centre that the Marathas were triumphing. Ahmad Shah who was some three miles to the back, received intelligence of ⁴ Even in 1795 match-lock seemed to be daily gaining ground of the long spear ac- cord ng to MALET. In 1760 it must have been comparatively rare. (Poona Residency Cor- respondence 4.2 0)

90 PANIPAT 1761 the dispersion of his troops from the right flank to the centre As a precau- tionary measure he asked his zenana to mount on horses and camels so as to be ready to run away in case of emergency At the same time he took the stern measure of beating back his run away troops who had now crowded themselves in the Afghan camp He called in his nasaqchs (military provosts) and ordered 500 of them to go to his camp and striking with their axes all the camp followers great and small, drive them back to the battle field caring for nothing else By this method he brought within an hour 8,000 armed men, mostly foot soldiers to fill in the gap created at the back of the trans Ganges Ruhelas The remaining 1,500 military provosts were sent to the battle field with orders to kill every man who ran away from the battle and refuse to return to the charge This order they executed so effectually that after killing a few they compelled the rest to stand in battle array again behind the Grand Wazir's line Ahmad Shah sent some 4,000 fresh troops to reinforce the Wazir from his retinue Thus, within an hour, by one o'clock, 10,000 horsemen stood ready behind the Wazir to charge again, while on the right hand side of the Afghan line 8,000 soldiers supported the Par Ruhelas in their efforts to stop the march of Ibrahim Khan's successful Gardi troops Let us now take stock of the military position at noon At the very beginning the Maratha cavalry under Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had acted impetuously and gone beyond their orders, attacking the Ruhelas before Ibrahim Khan had created a gap in their ranks by the fire of his artillery and the attack of his musketry The result was they had to run back exhausted and stand behind the chained heavy artillery to escape an attack from the enemy Thus their fighting power was neutralized when it was most necessary to take advantage of the gap created by Ibrahim Khan Gardi two hours later Damaji Gaikawad, on the other hand, had succeeded, for the time being, in warding off the flank attack on Ibrahim Khan's troops by Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg, by supporting the two Gardi corps left by Ibrahim Khan on his left side In the centre, Shah Wali Khan's quick advance had obliged Bhau to break the line of the marching square and advance to meet the Wazir, with what result we have already seen Twelve noon to one o'clock was the most crucial period of the battle Had the beaten horsemen under Vitthal Shivdeo, Yashwantrao Pawar and Damaji Gaikawad courageously rushed out and marched past the chained guns in front of them to support Ibrahim Khan, it is very likely they would have succeeded in marching past the Ruhela line with the help of the Gardi troops, and outflanked them But they do not seem to have done anything of the kind Perhaps there was a distance of one mile or so intervening by now between the advanced corps of Ibrahim Khan and the heavy artillery behind which their troops stood, with the result that no correct news of the condition at the front was available to them For the time being they stood safe behind the chained guns, Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg finding it impossible to assail them Perhaps these Persian Mughals did not advance from their flanking position, with a view to cut off the ad- vancing Marathas if they tried to create a breach on that side Thus it so happened that the Maratha troops reaped no tactical advantage from the an-

TO FACE PAGE 90

BATTLE OF PĀNIPAT 1761 SECOND STAGE 1 PM

SCALE

1 MALHĀR JĪ HOLKAR 2 SINDHIĀ 3 HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER 4 DĀMĀJĪ, VITTHAL SHIVDEV & YESHVANT PUĀR, ANTĀJĪ MĀNKESHWAR 5 IBRĀHĪM GĀRDĪ 13 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU

6 BARKHURDĀR & AMĪR BEG 7 RUHELĀS 8 SHĀH WALĪ 9 SUJĀ 10 NAJĪB 11 SHĀH PASAND 12 ABDALĪ'S RESERVED TROOPS OF SLAVES 14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLĪ

Foot note —Ahmad Shah was viewing the Maratha line, it seems, with a telescope (dur bīn, vide Irvine p 246, note 1)