पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

TO FACE PAGE 96 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' 29° 30' BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 THIRD STAGE 4 30PM SCALE

1. MALHARJ HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA
3. HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER
4. DĀMĀJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV YESHVANT PUĀR & ANTĀJI MĀNKESHWAR.
5. IBRĀHĪM GĀRDI
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU AZ ZULLĀPUR JUMNĀ RIVER PĀNĪPAT CAMPING SITE OF MARĀTHAS CAMP-FOLLOWERS CUT DOWN CAMPING SITE OF ABDĀLI
7. BARKHURDĀR & AMIR BEG
8. RUHELAS
9. SHĀH WALI
10. SUJĀ
11. HĀJI B. SHĀH PASAND
12. RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI'S SLAVES
13. SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' | 29° 15' M. K. BAR. | H. B. SHAH

96 PANIPAT 1761 very old now and had scarcely strength to ride swiftly enough to save his life $^{10}$ It was only because of his early start that he was not overtaken by the pursuing Afghans after the final rout In the meantime at the centre, Bhau tried to rally as many of his troops as he could, and fought to the last Janakoji and Tukoji joined him in this last effort Najib had succeeded in separating half the Shinde contin- gent from the other and closing upon its heels His position at 3 P M was in the gap created by the escape of the Shinde contingent, and Shah Pasand Khan was immediately at his back This position meant that Bhau's escape was now closed The main attack on Bhau came from the personal slaves of Ahmad Shah He had divided his 6,000 slaves into three parties, and placed each of them on the flanks of Bhau Bhau's front was now closed by the Wazir and the rear by Shah Pasand Khan and Barkhurdar Khan On the flanks, the 6,000 fresh troops began to fire incessantly and simultaneously This, combined with the frontal fire of swivel guns, made it impossible for the centre to swerve to any side, and they were turned into a knot which twisted itself this way and that at each attack until completely withered away by death Nana Fadnis reports that Bhau was fighting to the last, till fifty horse- men remained by his side After that Nana Fadnis was separated from Bhau and went back towards Panipat What happened to Bhau afterwards nobody ex- actly knows Tukoji Shinde, Sonaji Bhapkar and many other captains of note lost their lives in the last desperate fight Bhau would not take even a last chance of escape though advised to do so by Tukoji Shinde, and was thus slaughtered by someone somewhere at last We take Kashiraj's account of the finding of Bhau's trunk first and his head afterwards as true, though we do not believe in the story of Bhau's last struggle as reported by a Durrani soldier and put down in writing by Kashiraj, because it would not stand criti- cism Janakoji was wounded and was made a prisoner by Barkhurdar Khan The battle seems to have ended finally by 4 P M, when Nana Fadnis, separated from Bhau, turned his face towards Panipat Already many of the civilians had gathered there after early separating themselves from the centre Thus it was that Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, Bapuji Ballal Phadke and Nana Fadnis met together These three had good horses and therefore they were able to cut their way back to Panipat When Nana Fadnis reached Panipat it was already 5 P M ' Taking the advice of experienced Ramajipant, all of them left their horses and baggage and donned the garbs of ill clad beggars As Ramajipant knew the geography of those parts well, he led the party out, going west After it was dark they started their trek, but before they could cover one kos they were attacked three or four times and searched by the Afghans Each time they could they cut off ten or twenty of the party till they covered a great distance, some twelve or more miles to the south west. Upto this point the three had kept together But again the Afghans came and wounded Ramaji and Bapuji who thus fell behind Weak Nana Fadnis swerved into tall grass and was thus saved, his frail figure probably creating compassion • $^{10}$ Ibid. 3.516, dated 11 3 1760 1

TO FACE PAGE 96 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 30') BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 THIRD STAGE 4 30PM SCALE FURLONGS 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 MILES

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA 3 HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER 4 DAMAJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV YESHVANT PUAR & ANTAJI MANKESHWAR 5 IBRAHIM GARDI 3 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU AZTULLIPUR BAPOLI JUMNA RIVER PANIPAT CAMPING SITE OF MARATHAS CAMP-FOLLOWERS CUT TO LOOT CAMPING SITE OF ABDALI 6 BARKHURDAR & AMIR BEG 7 RUHELAS 8 SHAH WALI 9 SUJA 10 NAJIB 11 SHAH PASAND 3 RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDALI'S SLAVES 14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDALI 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 20')

THE BATTLE 97 amongst the assailants He proceeded still farther when again a party at- tacked him, drawing him out of the tall grass where he was hiding Here again some old soldier took pity on the boy and thus he was finally saved Because it was the eighth day of the bright half of the lunar month, the moon was shining overhead in the evening till she set after midnight This circum stance, while it was useful to some in covering their flight, was also responsible for the long pursuit by the Afghan troops over that plain and the heavy slaughter of non combatants running on foot for their lives But many more were killed by the surrounding villagers who had suffered terribly during the last three months by the constant tramp of soldiers The Karnal Gazetteer has recorded that the villages of Phurlak (twelve miles to the north), Bala (fifteen miles to the north west), and Dahar (six miles to the south west of Panipat) had migrated to other areas forsaking their sites This will give an idea of the devastation wrought in the surrounding area It is not recorded as to when the elephant on which Bhau's wife, Parvatibai, Nana Fadnis's mother and wife were seated, got itself separated from the other troops From the Maratha chronicles it appears that this elephant was not far behind Bhau's line of battle Once her elephant touched the elephant on which Vishwasrao's corpse had been placed covered under some cloth Then only she came to know of Vishwasrao's death and began to weep and wail If this fact is truly reported, it means that she was half a mile behind the fighting line The chronicles report that one captain with 500 shepherds¹¹ had been specially ap pointed for the protection of Parvatibai The name of this captain is given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand, a name which is not found mentioned in any original document He had been ordered to follow the army to Delhi if it success fully cut its passage through the Afghan lines, but if the battle turned into a defeat, as soon as Bhau's fall was reported, he should cut off Parvatibai so as to avoid her falling into the hands of the Afghans But neither this Visaji nor his shepherds seem to have done anything according to order They ran away at the first shock and tried to save their lives! Only a personal servant, Janu Bhintade, never left her for a moment and tactfully brought her back to Panipat out of the turmoil¹² when only half an hour of the day remained She got down from her elephant and followed Janu Bhintade for some time on foot Fortunately they met one Virsingrao Baravkar with his good horse He took her on his horse and fastening her at his back, carried her out of a sea of Afghans with rocks of corpse heaps in the middle Being a skilful horse ¹¹ Why the Marathi chronicles have reported the fact of 500 shepherds (Dhanagar in Marathi) as specially appointed for the protection of Parvatibai is a mystery Many of the followers of Malharrao Holkar were by caste like him Dhanagars (shepherds) Was it is to suggest that Malharrao had a hand in the protection of Parvatibai? If so why is the name of the captain specifically given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand? The mystery of this reference is rendered still more mysterious by the tale of Parvatibai as we found current in the region surrounding Panipat. A septuagenarian Gaud Brahmin told us the same fact of shepherds (Gujars) being specially charged with the protection of Parvatibai We think that Bhau who was prepared for all eventualities had done some such thing for extricating his wife out of the turmoil by some safe comparatively unfrequented path only known to these local Gujars many of whom must have been certainly serving in the Maratha camp during all these months. It is not unlikely that because some of them acted as guides through the jungle to the south west of Panipat that Janu Bhintade and other loyal Marathas were able to cut their way out of the danger zone. ¹² SPD 2 149 (p 171) P F—7

98 PANIPAT. 1761 man, he carried her safely across When his horse was exhausted by its dou˙ weight he got her down, when another cavalryman, Piraji Raoot, got her his horse and thus carried her twelve miles farther on When his horse l came exhausted he also left her behind, but all along Janu Bhintade kept ] company, walking or riding along by her side No Maratha would refuse he place on his horse on the road, and thus she was thirty miles to the south Delhi when she met Malharrao Holkar and Nana Purandare We have relat this event in detail because it falsifies Malharrao Holkar's plea as put do in Holkar's Thaili 13 Malharrao Holkar was neither charged by Bhau w the special defence of Parvatibai nor did he himself of his own accord do an thing to bring her out of the field Only casually and accidentally th met to the south of Delhi, a circumstance of wh ch Malharrao took full ˙ vantage in preparing his apology The description of the actual battle is very scanty in Marathi, th given in the chronicles being more or less personal and not useful for milita study The only eye-witness who speaks of the last effort of Bhau is the trut ful Nana Fadnis who was only nineteen years old at the time His au biography is a document by itself throwing considerable light on the who campaign It clearly sets forth his own prejudices but none can say that is anywhere untruthful From his writing it seems that Bhau was not u aware of the possibility of defeat, and had, therefore, made provision for t special protection of the women folk As a last resort, it had been decided kill them before they should fall into the hands of the Afghans From Na Fadnis's words, it looks as if Bhau had prepared himself for death But th was personal As a general he had taken care that none other should ha any scent of his personal decision except Nana Fadnis and one or two oth persons like Nana Purandare He had made every provision that was humar possible for the ensuing battle with minute care for all eventualities, but all i precautions came to nothing because the plan was not understood, and, if u derstood, not followed by anyone with zest, except by Ibrahim Khan Gar who was the author of it It is clear that the last fight was fought between t Maratha cavalry and the Afghan infantry But the majority of the Marath generals had, it seems, no faith in Ibrahim's plan and its possible success Th were expecting defeat rather than victory, and as such were more prepar for immediate flight, than for a fight to the finish by sticking to their pos At the same time they knew that precipitous flight at the very beginning w quite impossible, the other troops being engaged at the front It is curio to note that of all those who survived the battle, there is an overwhelmi majority of old men amongst the notables Malharrao Holkar, Vitth Shivdeo, Satvoji Jadhav, Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar, Sabaji Shin Khanaji Jadhav, Janrao Wable and Gangoba Chandrachud were all age

THE BATTLE 99 certain extent, though they were massacred on the way, like Antaji Manakesh- war and Baji Hari Supekar who were killed¹⁴ by the Baluch Zamindars near Farukh nagar to the south west of Delhi Not all who ran away survived rather the majority died as a result of slaughter or by starvation and cold It is certain that some two lakhs of people died during those two or three weeks, but more died from hunger and cold than by wounds in the battle We do not believe that the Maratha camp had five lakhs of people as reported in BROWNE'S translation of Kashiraj, much less can it be ten lakhs as trans lated by Sir Jadunath ¹⁵ Another important thing to note in this affair is the absence of any de tailed account of the campaign or of the final battle from the pen of any of these renegades Malharrao Holkar's supposed confession is only an example of specious pleading specially written to order by some clever scribe Other wise no one else even tries to give the whole account Nana Purandare who was very intimate with Bhau, and was supposed to belong to his party in politics, is ominously silent about the battle, though he had occasion to write of the event From the whole tenor of the various writings about the battle, it is clear that the survivors had come to an understanding among themselves to report it in a particular manner Their additional excuse of doing so was on account of the personal and political necessities of the case The personal necessity arose out of the respect for the feelings of Parvatibai, Bhau's wife who survived and returned in the company of the renegades, as well as anxiety for the health of the Peshwa Though Nana Fadnis, Nana Purandare, Mal harrao Holkar and others seem to have been convinced very early of Bhau's death by the letters they receivd from Kashiraj, Anupgir Gosawi, Purushot tam Hingne, Ganesh Vedanti and others, they were afraid to disclose the fact for its effects on Parvatibai and Nanasaheb The political necessity was still greater The Marathas tried as far as possible to minimise the disaster by starting rumours about the safe running away of Bhau, Janakoji and others, thus trying to keep an atmosphere of expectancy for the sudden emergence of Bhau and Janakoji at any time and from anywhere, as long as they could By this method they did succeed in rallying the survivors and making a bold stand from the base at Gwalior Its definite political effect is seen in the re turn of Ahmad Shah Abdali after waiting for two months at Delhi, and still more by his political arrangement He bestowed the Wazirship of the Mughal Empire-be it noted-not on his ally Shuja ud daulah but on the regicide Ghazi ud din Khan, a protege of the Marathas He tried to conciliate the Peshwa by sending condolence messages couched in an apologetic tone, and also by opening negotiations for a political settlement ¹⁶ In response the Peshwa also tried to look at the matter in a political manner without revengeful feel ings He also sent Mir Anvarulla Khan Trimbakkar to Delhi with dresses of honour for Abdali and his Wazir Shah Wali Khan ¹⁷ But by the time Anvarulla Khan had reached Kota, he got the news of Abdali's sudden return to his own

¹⁴ KHARE 1.71 ¹⁵ IHQ 10.265 ¹⁶ SPD 21.202. ¹⁷ Ibid. 2.168.

100 PANIPAT. 1761 country due to the rebellious attitude of his Durrani troops, and had, there- fore, to come back with the elephant which was being carried as a present to Abdali. 18 Estimate of the Loss of Human Lives in the Battle The last trace of resistance on the battle-field ceased at 4 P. M. on that day, when two hours of day-light still remained. This fact, together with the fact of the day being the eighth of the bright moon on which the moon was over- head in the evening casting no shadow and setting after midnight, gave ample time and scope for the Afghans to pursue the fugitives and kill as many of them as possible. It is difficult to estimate the number of Maratha soldiers and non-combatants slaughtered, but the total was not less than one lakh. Out of the 60,000 soldiers, possibly half the number died on the battle field fighting face to face. Some 10,000 more must have died in the pursuit. Of the re- maining 20,000, 10,000 definitely reached Gwalior in safety after a fortnight. The rest died on the way fighting with the villagers or on account of heavy wounds, exhaustion, starvation and disease. Of the survivors, too, half only had run away with their horses, the rest had slowly trudged back on foot losing their horses to the robbers on the way. Amongst the soldiers who lost their lives, Bhau, Vishwasrao, Samsher Bahadur (who had extricated himself out of the final struggle after receiving heavy wounds and run back upto Deeg in the Jat's dominion to die there), Yashvantrao Pawar, Janakoji Shinde (who was slaughtered in captivity), Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his brother-in law and son, Santaji Wagh, Manaji Paygude, Khanderao Nimbalkar, Sonaji Bhapkar, Tukoji Shinde, Dadji Darekar and Narayan Bapuji Rethrekar were the most notable, though practically all the soldiers who died on the battle-field were ex- perienced men who had fought in more than one battle. In the camp were probably one lakh and a half of non combatants. Of these some 6,000 found their way to the non hostile camp of Shuja-ud-daulah and got a shelter there. They were protected from the fury of the Afghans and safely sent back to Jatwada after the return of Ahmad Shah to Delhi. Some 22,000 persons were captured as slaves by the Afghans the next day. Of these a considerable number were women belonging either to the servant or concu- bine class with perhaps a few hundred of married women, who had accom- panied their husbands for pilgrimage. These were sold by their Afghan cap- tors to Indian soldiers. Of the rest, possibly some 50,000 were slaughtered in cold blood by the Afghans on the day after the battle for religious merit. According to Kashiraj, every Durrani soldier slaughtered a hundred or two in this way, which is obviously a gross exaggeration, because if we take even 10,000 Durranis to have done this, it would bring the total slaughter to 10,00,000! Many persons who had foolishly returned to Panipat in the even- ing of the battle and taken shelter in the walled town, were, the next day, hunted out and put to the sword by the hostile townsmen themselves. The Bhau Bakhar reports a curious permission granted by Ahmad Shah to the sons 18 Raj. 6 472

THE BATTLE 101 of Mian Qutb Shah and Abdus Samad Khan who were beheaded by the Marathas at Kunjpura with ignominy They sought permission to slaughter captured men to avenge their fathers' deaths Ahmad Shah gave them the permit to go upto 20 kos and slaughter for four ghatikas only, but not more Thus permitted, Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat and Samad Khan's son killed 5 000 near Bahadurgad to the west of Delhi None of those who were captured alive at Panipat on the next day were slaughtered Their property was looted but they were allowed to get them selves freed by paying a ransom Shuja ud daulah and his Hindu officers, like Anupgir Gosawi and Kashiraj, paid the ransom for many and sent them back with a safe escort Many of the fugitives possibly lost their lives because they would not part with what they possessed on their body Only those who like Nana Fadnis threw away all property and assumed the dress of beggars were able to return unmolested, unless they were caught in the cold massacres related above The loss on the Afghan side can be estimated at some 20,000, practically all dying on the battle field Three fourths of this number were possibly the Indian Ruhelas, the rest being Afghans and other foreign allies THE SPOILS OF THE BATTLE If it is impossible to estimate the total number of men who died at Panipat, it is still more impossible to estimate the spoils which came into the hands of the Afghans and the Ruhelas The definite loss on the Maratha side as stated by Nana Fadnis¹⁹ was 50,000 horses, the number of all the elephants and camels and bullocks is nowhere definitely stated 300 elephants, 3,000 camels and about a lakh of bullocks would be, we believe, a fair estimate All the artillery as well as the weapons possessed by the various soldiers and non- combatants fell into the hands of the victors and brigands The total number of cannon, great and small, heavy and light, should be some 300, 25,000 match locks and muskets of the French pattern wielded by the Gardi troops of Ibrahim Khan must have fallen into the hands of the Ruhelas and the Durranis One lakh of swords, shields and spears in the possession of both combatants and non combatants must have been looted by the victors A similar number of javelins, axes daggers and knives of many varieties also must have been captured from the camp by the victors A few thousand armours, worn by some of the noted Marathas and the Gardis of Ibrahim Khan also must have fallen into the hands of the various captors This is as far as the war material is concerned Of these, most of the horses and bullocks and elephants were in a half starved con- dition, unable to walk even a short distance These were sold by the Afghans to the Indian soldiers at almost nominal prices Many of these must have perished before reaching the homes of their buyers as no fodder was available anywhere in the vicinity of Panipat and Delhi Many of the bullocks must have been slaughtered for food by the victorious Muslims ¹⁹ Purandare 1 417

102 PANIPAT: 1761 How much property fell into the hands of the captors is very difficult to estimate The personal kit of an average Maratha soldier was very meagre It would be one big brass lota and a small vessel for drinking water, an iron pan for baking bread and a brass plate on which to dine A few hundred big vessels for storing water or cooking rice and vegetables in volume would naturally be found in this big camp where occasionally even Brahmins must have been fed on religious occasions, or when on visits to places of pilgrimage on the way The clothing and bedding of an average Maratha soldier and camp follower could not have been worth much, except for some big sardars and officials who were probably well clad, wearing costly apparel The tents, big and small, screens and other material of an official nature, worth some lakhs, also came into the possession of the Afghans What the bazar accompanying the Maratha army possessed on the last day, it is difficult to say But taking into consideration the famine conditions subsisting in the Maratha camp, there could not have been much of corn, grain and other articles of food and drink The only item left worth noting was cash and jewellery A certain amount of accumulated coin should have been found in the possession of the bazar merchants and artisans who had received fabulous returns for their goods But most of the army and camp followers, as well as the state treasury accompanying the army on the march, had possibly exhausted their treasure in buying things at fabulous prices, and many had to sell their jewellery and trinkets in order to subsist, thus leaving comparatively very little in their pockets or on their per- sons Possibly the accumulated sales money of the merchants had been bor- rowed by the starving individuals in the camp and also perhaps by the state If this surmise is true, then even the merchants' money must have disappeared from the camp in buying victuals and fodder or other necessities Only the unsold and unsalable articles must have remained in the camp and fallen into the hands of the Afghan soldiers Some 20,000 slaves, male and female, were also appropriated by the victors Taking into consideration what has been said above, we do not think the estimate of various writers about loot as correct "Every trooper brought away ten or even twenty camels laden with money" is the description of Kashiraj We think it a gross exaggeration It is true that the Marathas lost everything they possessed, but no Maratha soldier would have on his person or in his pocket precious metal worth more than a hundred rupees on an average It is doubtful whether even this much had been left with him after ten months of march through a foreign country, when looting had been forbidden, salaries and wages not paid for the most part, and all subsisted by selling what they possessed We know the aftermath of war Ahmad Shah Abdali found it im- possible to pay the accumulated salaries of his soldiers and hence they mutinied They were, so reports Nur ud din, completely dissatisfied with what they had received as spoils, which they considered very meagre after two years of hard campaigning The conquered territories were bestowed on the Ruhelas The booty had also to be sold to them at nominal prices on account of the want of cash with which to buy the necessaries The captured horses were worth only ten or twenty rupees each¹ As a result, the unruly Durrani troops were on the point of plundering the camp of Shuja ud daulah who decamped from Delhi

THE BATTLE 193 without even taking leave of the Afghan monarch! It will be seen from these descriptions that this great victory had not brought much cash into the coffers of the Afghans, and was thus a financial failure. While the Marathas had lost their all in the immediate as well as distant sense, there was no commensurate gain to the victors Verily it was a Pyrrhic victory! FOOD ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE BATTLE Sir Jadunath's charge (Fall 2.337) that the Marathas did not carry "roast meat and dry bread" in their saddle is due to his ignorance of the Maratha manners. Roasted gram and rice were generally carried by the Marathas when on travel, together with raw sugar (gur) to be eaten before drinking water after a long journey. Flour for baking bread was carried on the person to be used at halt. The Marathas were vegetarians to a great ex- tent, but they also knew the sustaining power of meat in preference to bread. At least one reference mentioning its use is available in RAJWADE 10-59, dur- ing the war between Janoji Bhonsle and Madhavrao Peshwa in 1769. Janoji for one month was continually on the march every day with Madhavrao close at his heels During a march of three or four days in succession, he could not make a halt so as to bake bread. The Bhonsle army subsisted on mutton only and thus gave the slip to the Peshwa. This clearly proves that occasionally, when available, the Marathas made use of roast meat to subsist on. Of course, it is more than we can say whether the Marathas on the field of Panipat were actually carrying ready-made food on their persons, but our surmise is that they did. MARATHA MODE OF WARFARE That the historic Marathas had perfected an individual mode of cavalry movement is clear from its adoption by Col. Skinner in his later famous "Skinner's Horse." General G. C. MUNDY²⁰ who accompanied Lord COMBER- MERE, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1830, on his tour through northern India, writes of it in the following manner: "The peculiar evolution of the 'Skinner's Horse' and which is most striking to a Eu- ropean eye is the Maratha charge. In this movement the whole corps advances in line, two deep, at a canter or trot, which, like John Gilpin's, becomes 'a gallop soon'; and as they approach their object, the files open out, and every man, uttering a wild, shrill scream, comes thundering on with his sword waving above his head In spite of the apparent disjointed irregularity of the charge, and the amazing speed of their approach, at the word 'halt' every horse is brought upon his haunches within ten paces of the reviewing General. The Maratha charge is certainly well calculated to strike terror into a foe already wavering, but its real physical effect upon staunch troops must be far inferior to the close combined charge of our cavalry" (Page 165) The Marathas were known as superb spearmen and their mode can be judged from the Skinner's Horse trained in the same tradition ²⁰ MUNDY's Pen and Pencil Sketches in India, 3rd ed. (1858).

THE BATTLE 105 housings, the fringe of which reached nearly to the ground, were of velvet embroidered in gold and silver . The Mahratta elephants have a style of gait and carriage peculiar to themselves, and are as superior in appearance to ours, as the English thorough bred racer is to the earth-stopper's hack. The Company's elephants, probably from having been rode too young, and oppressed with burthens, shuffle along with short step , their necks bent, and their heads hanging with the melancholy air of an Oxford street hackney coach horse. The Mahratta elephant strides majestically along, his head elevated far above his shoulder, and his tusks standing out horizontally. The chiefs pride themselves greatly on these ani- mals, and take pleasure in teaching them a variety of tricks." (Pages 213, 4 ) Though these descriptions are dated seventy years after Panipat, they can as well serve for the visualisation of the Maratha army on that fatal field.

CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib- ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation Our narrative should have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are flimsy after thoughts As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa Sadashivrao Bhau's strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per- sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out Bhau cer- tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history Three fourths of his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated as military in form Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion in his mental make up The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests Sadashivrao was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but that does not seem to be his favourite occupation His mind was diplomatic in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance and administration Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every minute of his life amidst war His expertness was born of this long, all ab- sorbing experience Such an experience and such period of candidateship seldom fall to the lot of an average man Certainly none of the Marathas could boast of such training The historic Marathas were war like no doubt, but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success Unfortunately such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole Bhau and others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar

THE JUDGMENT. 107. lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Pánipât cam- paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao, had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out

CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com- bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in-chief and ascrib- ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con- ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau's strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per- sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer- tainly cannot be pronounced a first-rate general in history. Three-fourths of his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one-fourth can be treated as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab- sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war-like no doubt, but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military. Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals. If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time, held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a supreme cause like the defence of one's motherland. It was the life long con- viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha- rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under- stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le- [ 106 ]

THE JUDGMENT. 107 lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam- paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao, had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal- harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar- rao had proceeded to Lahore. Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's idea was similar. He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali. Afterwards he would have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired. Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode coming down from the days of Shivaji. Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de- cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas, their old mode was all right; but now that the Marathas had spread over the length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and time. Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not. Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded when not confronted by the new type of infantry. He received his coup-de- grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled back to Kalpi to save his life! Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat. The late Vishwanath K. Rajwade in his oft-repeated and uncritically accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun- dele. We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes was at the root of the whole difference. Just as Bhau's mind was already prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam- paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any- thing but favourable. Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely.² He had kept a simi- lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons. Such an attitude was possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other. In 1750- 51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the

¹ Raj. 1 Introduction. ² Purandare, 1.287, 293

CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com- bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib- ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con- ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau s strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per- sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer- tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history. Three fourths of his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao was no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab- sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war like no doubt, but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military. Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals. If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time, held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a supreme cause like the defence of ones motherland. It was the life long con- viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha- rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under- stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le- [ 106 ]

lieved in his professions at all This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam- paign Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao, had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto Attock and even beyond It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan Taking advantage of the absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar- rao had proceeded to Lahore Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's idea was similar He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali Afterwards he would have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode coming down from the days of Shivaji Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de- cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas, their old mode was all right, but now that the Marathas had spread over the length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and time Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not. Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded when not confronted by the new type of infantry He received his coup de- grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled back to Kalpi to save his life¹ Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat. The late Vishvanath K RAJWADE in his oft repeated and uncriticaly accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun- dele We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes was at the root of the whole difference Just as Bhau's mind was already prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam- paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any- thing but favourable Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely ² He had kept a simi- lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons Such an attitude was possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other In 1750- 51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the ¹ RAJ 1 Introduction ² Purandare, 1.287, 293

108 PANIPAT 1761 Wazir Safdar Jang * Malharrao was head strong but he had also the knack of neatly and vigorously carrying out a piece of work on which he had set his heart or on which a challenge was offered to him In the dispute for suc- cession at Jaipur he had taken a different attitude from the Peshwa and Ram- chandra Bawa, but ultimately he forced his will on the others and executed the thing in his own manner Similarly, after Ghazi ud din s poisoning in 1752 when the Peshwa went back on his promise to his sardars, Malharrao and Jayapa were suspected of being in collusion with Tarabai and Mahadoba Purandare so as to checkmate the Peshwa s plans for the governance of the Maratha Empire ³ Even that suspicion was ultimately found to be wrong These examples will show the tenor of Malharrao s previous life, and can ac- count for the suspicion which fell upon him during the Panipat campaign, of acting hand in glove with Najib, Shuja and Surajmal In popular mind, this suspicion proved correct as Malharrao could escape from the disaster un- scathed with most of his troops but we have no faith in this judgment Sa- dashivrao Bhau very well knew Malharrao's ways in politics, but had decided to take a different line in this campaign on his own responsibility Not only Malharrao but other sardars also were dissatisfied with Bhau on account of his financial exactions To balance his budget after Raghunathrao's deficit cam- paign of the Panjab, Bhau had put the burden of the Peshwa's debts on the shoulders of the various Saranjamdars and Jagirdars Malharrao had to pay 30 lakhs for this debt tax ⁴ but due to the debacle after Dattaji Shinde s death, Malharrao had not found it possible to pay it in time before the Panipat cam- paign Holkar's Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud is found putting excuses⁵ for the non payment of this accepted debt tax Bhau was naturally dissatisfied with Malharrao and other sardars for their non payment of this tax which had put a strain on his treasure purse Malharrao was always a man of tight purse, but there does not seem to be any ground for suspicion that there was any bickering between Bhau and his sardars on this point during the Panipat cam- paign Those who think him acting in collusion with Surajmal Jat should note the fact of his behaviour after the disaster Holkar's Kaifiyat,⁶ ostensibly written to represent Malharrao's side, positively tells us that he would not put his faith in Surajmal and remain in his territory to recoup himself When one Jat zamindar tried to stop him in his flight by catching hold of the reins of his horse, Malharrao asked his companion, Govindrao Bule, to cut off the Jat's hand, and drove away precipitately for fear of treachery This anecdote represents Malharrao s mind He would not put faith even in his friend, for who could guarantee that the Jat Raja had not changed his mind as a result of the disaster? Malharrao's whole manner was that of a very suspicious and overcautious man taking no risks The anecdote is supported by the fact of his flight through the Jat s territory south of Mathura without sojourning in it He took a road skirting on the Jat dominion, but not through it, and went direct to Bhind via Agra, crossing the Chambal and the Kuwari along the river

• Shinde 3.25 3 Purandare 1.311 4 Satara, 2.292. • 5 S P D 21 184 6 Kavyetihasa Sangraha No 18, 2nd Ed. 1930 p 23

THE JUDGMENT 109 Jamuna to avoid the oft-trodden and direct road to Gwalior After Panipat he fought against the rebels in Malwa and Bundelkhand In November 1761, he decisively defeated Madhosingh of Jaipur, getting a wound himself He fought in the Rakshasabhuwan campaign and helped in defeating the Nizam in 1763 Returning to the north, he again joined Jawahirmal Jat against—be it noted—Najib All these incidents make it difficult to believe that Malhar- rao was treacherous towards Bhau or the Peshwa A man's character ought to be judged as a whole and not by his suspicious behaviour in one incident only Govindpant Bundele has been made the chief scape goat for the Panipat disaster One third of RAJWADE'S renowned introduction to his first volume of letters is devoted to an analysis of Govindpant's behaviour and his down- right condemnation, making him solely responsible for the miscarriage of Bhau's plans RAJWADE'S charges against Govindpant are as follows Firstly, he was not successful in bringing Shuja ud daulah to the Maratha side Next, he had not made proper arrangements for Bhau's transport into the Doab Thirdly, he had not sent the monies called for Fourthly, he would not invade Shuja's dominions and create a diversion in that direction And last, but not least, he did not cut off Abdali's supplies coming through the Doab, thus making Bhau's plan futile We have seen in the course of the campaign how none of these charges can be substantiated RAJWADE, and following him other critics also, have wrongly assumed that Govindpant was a military captain On page 19, RAJWADE puts Govindpant in the list of renowned generals of the time⁷ The suffix Pant as opposed to Rao appended to the name of Govind is itself a proof that the man was taken as a civilian and not a soldier He was not a Saran- jamdar or Jagirdar maintaining troops out of the income of his Jagir He was an ambitious mamlatdar who on account of a boastful temperament, aspired to be a captain He had to call in various military captains like Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Gangadhar Bajirao, Manaji Payagude and others for helping him in meeting the rebels in his districts Occasionally he had himself acted as a captain, but that was against insignificant opponents and in the company of regular troops Even Bhau looked towards him as a mamlatdar first and a military sardar afterwards In RAJ 1, Letter No 244, Bhau specifically says, "You are not now only a Mahalkari You have with you as many troops as with a sardar" This means that Bhau was bolstering up Govindpant and asking him to take upon himself work which was nor- mally not his His age (sixty five) and habits of life were against Bhau's ex- pectation This was not a question of ordinary times but of a fight to the finish Only exceptionally good captains could have done what Bhau asked Govindpant to do The argument that as Bhau asked Govindpant repeatedly to do certain things, it must have been in his power to do it, is faulty The fact is, geographically, Govindpant was living in a region to the rear of Abdali, and as such he was the only man who could have done anything in the mat- ter Bhau could not detach a part of his army and send it to Abdali's rear, as Abdali was sitting across the path Upto October, Sadashivrao had ordered Govindpant not to come to the north⁷ but to invade the enemy dominions be- ⁷ RAJ 1.258, 260

112 PANIPAT: 1761 miss an unwanted officer or to replace him by a better one. If Govind- pant did not prove serviceable enough during the Panipat campaign, the result must be attributed to the defective system and not to the individual. But supposing that Govindpant did not send the funds to Bhau even though he did possess them, his non-compliance had little to do with the military side in the Panipat affair. Ample funds in the hands of Bhau at Panipat would not have brought him the necessary supplies which depended solely on the military strength to fetch them. Even Bhau, writing to his son after Govind- pant's death, is not found speaking anything against him. The Peshwa heard the news of Govindpant's death after his crossing the Narmada in January 1761. Writing a letter⁸b of condolence to his son, the Peshwa eulogised his faithful services unto death, a befitting end to a long life of faithful serv- ice. The Peshwa wanted to treat the sons of Govindpant as children in his own family. This shows that the Peshwa had no information or suspicion of Govindpant's dereliction in the Panipat camgaign. Balkrishna Dikshit, writing from Benares about Govindpant's end, remarked,⁸c "A great man has passed away." Thus it would seem that contemporary opinion did not condemn Govindpant. It was only when survivors from Panipat, who wished to absolve themselves from all blame, began to put the whole responsi- bility on those who had died, that Govindpant came in for his share in the condemnation along with Bhau and Balvantrao. The Bhau Bakhar puts the whole affair in such a dramatic form as to lead to the inevitable disaster. It has made Govindpant a friend of Najib Khan⁹ from the beginning of the campaign, where he is shown as an accessory of Malharrao in shielding Najib against Dattaji Shinde's wrath! Govindpant is the agent who made Dattaji accept Najib's treacherous proposal of building a bridge over the Ganges, so as to de- lay the affair till the arrival of Abdali! Later on, Govindpant is represented as having refrained from attacking Najib's family and treasure in his trans- Ganges raid by accepting five lakhs as a bribe. Ultimately Govindpant is killed, according to the Bakhar, not by Atai Khan, but by Najib's Ruhelas! Now from what we know of Govindpant's relations with the Shinde family from the very beginning, it cannot be imagined that he would do anything of the kind, especially against the Shindes. There is positive proof in his letters to Ramaji Anant, the Diwan of the Shindes, that Govindpant favoured Jayapa Shinde in preference and perhaps as against Malharrao Holkar.¹⁰ In Dattaji's cam- paign against Najib, Govindpant is throughout acting under his orders. He