पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I Pages THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND, 1758-59 1-17 Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasions of India and the contract between the Emperor of Delhi and the Peshwa, 1; Effect of the transfer of the Subahs to the Peshwa 2; How Deccan Politics affected the Peshwa's policy towards Delhi, 3; Abdali's arrangement for the govern- ment of India and the Panjab, 5; How his plan came to be thwarted 5 The Maratha slogan for the governance of the Indian empire, 6; Raghunathrao's letter to the Peshwa reiterating the Maratha ideal, 6; Note his invasion of the Panjab and the Maratha entry into Lahore 7; The Peshwa recalls Raghoba to the Deccan and Adina Beg dies, 8; Tukoji Holkar pushes on to Peshawar, to support Abdul Rahim Khan, Ahmad Shah's nephew and a claimant to the Afghan throne 9; Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde go upto the Satlaj, but soon return towards Delhi 10; The flaw in the Maratha policy in the Panjab 10; Their line of communication stretched by 500 miles, 11; The Poona Court had no correct idea of the adventure they were entering in 12; Sabaji Shinde not a fit man to counteract the personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali 12; Abdali's return from Khorasan and Jahan Khan's invasion of the Panjab 13; The Peshwa's recall of Dattaji Shinde, a disastrous step, 14 Financial loss to the Marathas in their Panjab glory, 14; Raghunathrao's advice to Dattaji and Janakoji to beware of Najib Khan 15; Malharrao's advice to the contrary 15; Ghaziuddin's treacherous behaviour towards the Marathas, 15; Dattaji enters into negotiations with Najib 15; Najib's plot against the Marathas and his invitation to Ahmad Shah Abdali—The Marathas had no information of this plot—Dattaji duped as a result, 16; Najib pins down Dattaji for four months—Sabaji's return from the Panjab— Bapuji Trimbak meets with disaster in the Satlaj Doab—End of the Panjab episode 17 CHAPTER II 5 SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER, 1749-60 18-30 Dattaji Shinde alienates Ghaziuddin but cannot win over Najib, who has both the means and the freedom to create mischief, 18; The strategic position of Sukartal—Dattaji besieges Najib in it 19; Abdali enters the Panjab—Madhavsingh of Jaipur makes his stand against Malharrao Holkar—Shuja comes to the help of Najib—Dattaji sends Govindpant Bundele to attack the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges—He precipitately runs back at the coming of Shuja's troops and the rumours of Abdali's coming, 20; Sabaji joins Dattaji— The emperor Alamgir murdered at the instigation of the Wazir and a new emperor Shah Jahan brought to the throne—The Wazir joins Dattaji—Dattaji raises the siege of Sukartal and goes to meet Abdali 21; Abdali catches Dattaji unprepared and eludes him after- wards joining Najib—Dattaji retreats towards Delhi and calls in Malharrao to his help 22; Malharrao delays—Ahmad Shah and Najib advance towards Delhi—The guarding of the fords by Dattaji—Abdali eludes and crosses over to Buradi—Its situation 23; Dat- taji's plan—Has no idea of engaging with the Afghans till the arrival of Malharrao—Is obliged to meet in the difficult terrain on the bank of the Jamuna—Is overpowered and slain 24; The wounded Janakoji with the whole Shinde contingent runs back and is pursued by the Afghans 25; The description of the retreat he meets Malharrao at Kot Putali— Malharrao's life philosophy—Its contrast with the temperament of the Shindes 26 Mal- harrao's new strategy to meet the Afghan menace—Ghaziuddin's double dealing 27; The Peshwa's dire need of money—Seems to auction the Wazir's post between Ghaziud- din and Shuja—Surajmal Jat makes a common cause with the Marathas—Ahmad Shah invites the northern states to rise against the Marathas but all sit on the fence 28 Abdali's campaign south of Delhi—The Marathas enter the Doab but surprised at Sikandra- bad—Run back to Agra after heavy massacre 29; Holkar and Shinde retreat into the Jaipur territory and wait for the help from the Deccan—Abdali takes Ramgad and can- tons in the Doab—Diplomatic talks with trans-Ganges Ruhelas 30 CHAPTER III SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA, 1760 31-51 None in the Deccan prepared for Dattaji's death—Peshwa in the thick of fight with the Nizam—His position thought to be of a dictator in India, 31; Bussy recalled from Hyderabad—Terminates the French influence in the Deccan—The Peshwa succeeds in de- taching Ibrahim Khan a pupil of Bussy and begins hostilities against the Nizam—The bat- tle of Udgir where the Nizam brothers are completely overpowered 32; Half the dominions xxi

of the Nizam surrendered to the Peshwa—Sadashivrao Bhau becomes the hero of the day— The futility of the Peshwa's victory—Prestige overrules perspection, 33, The squabbles in the Peshwa's family—Raghunathrao refuses to take command of the north—Bhau or- dered by the Peshwa to the north—Vishwasrao the eldest son of the Peshwa placed at the head—Bhau's hands tied throughout the campaign, 34, Bhau's foibles—The divisions selected by Bhau—The difficulties in the march from Patdur to Delhi 35, Bhau's progress hampered by various causes—The Marathas have left Shivaji and Bajirao behind and follow the Mughal manners 36, Bhau invites all northern Indian states to send contin- gents in the fight against Abdali but none comes to his help—Tribes rise in rebel- lion against the Marathas—An epidemite amongst the horses 37, Abdali's plans to return held over through the machinations of Najib—Shuja-ud-daulah was wooed by both parties— Suspicions of Maratha aims 38, The difficult position of the Marathas in all directions— The Peshwa and his advisers cannot grasp the real situation—They miscalculate the enemy forces and attempt a wrong solution 39 Bhau's progress through Central India—Zeitgeist of the 18th century—No common policy for the whole of India—Fissures in the Maratha camp 40, Wisdom in Holkar's advice—Women and pilgrims clog the Maratha march— Nature also goes against the Marathas 41 The meeting with Shinde and Holkar—Dis- cussion of future plan—Bhau chalks out his line of action and proceeds to Delhi, 42, Delhi taken and its government settled 43 44, Peace parleys through the medium of Shuja— Bhau tries to win over Abdali's allies—He misjudges the motives of the various parties and also the abilities of Govindpant Bundele and others, 45, Bhau's army suffers from want of money—Minting down the silver of the Diwan i-khas 46, The Maratha collectors in the north fool both the Peshwa and Bhau—Bhau's legs pulled from Poona, 47, Loose administrative system of the Marathas—Shinde and Holkar fall in with Bhau's line of thought—Surajmal Jat goes back disgruntled—Surajmal's defection due to his selfishness and not to Bhau's insult 49 Abdali's movement in the Doab—Change of his camps— Going and coming of ambassadors 50, Nothing comes out of the peace talks—The condi- tion of the Maratha camp deplorable and deteriorating day by day, 51

CHAPTER IV KUNJPURA (October 1760) 52-61 The terrain to the north of Delhi 52, The sufferings of the Maratha army 53, Bhau takes steps to counteract Najib's propaganda against the Marathas—Shah Jahan Sani deposed and Shah Alam declared emperor—The good results of this step—The Sikhs in Lahore proclaim Bhausaheb and pray for his victory, 54, Alasingh of Patiala promises to join Bhau—Abdali's hold over the Panjab lost—A last effort at peace—Bhau proceeds to Kunj- pura for intercepting Abdus Samad Khan 55, Falling down of the Jamuna waters—Bhau's calculations based on wrong information—Attack on Kunjpura 56, Defeat and massacre of the Afghans—Marathas secured booty and wheat collected for Abdali—The idea of a pilgrimage to Kurukshetra miscarries Bhau's plan 57, Abdali crosses the Jamuna at Bhau's back and blocks Bhau's return to Delhi—Bhau orders a march back 58, Abdali crosses with his whole army at Gauripur before Bhau could intercept him 59, The Marathas receive their first rebuff at the hands of Abdali—A retrospect of Abdali's movement in the Doab and a contrast with the state of his army with that of the Marathas 60 Abdali's parallel move towards the north and coming to Baghpat—Search for a ford on the river— Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna 60 Description of his crossing—He comes to- wards Panipat 61

CHAPTER V PANIPAT (November-December 1760) 62-85 The Marathas confident of victory at the beginning—They had enough corn 62, Bhau puts his faith in Ibrahim Khan and fortifies himself at Panipat—He expects Govindpant Bundele to do the impossible, 63, Why Bhau waits after Govindpant's death not known— Perhaps waiting for help from the Deccan as previously promised 64, Strategic posi- tion at Panipat—Bhau aggressive during November, 65, Abdali obliged to retreat to the river side—Abdali's decision not to attack the Marathas in their fortified position and waste his power 66 Kashiraj's incorrect forebodings, 67, Balwantrao Mehendale's death —His wife goes Sati—The turning point in the struggle 68, the "Bakhar" criticism of Balwantrao wrong—Sir Jadunath's incorrect translation, 69, Abdali intercepts letters from the Maratha camp to Delhi and the Deccan—Thus knowing the Maratha plans, Govind- pant comes at last with money to Delhi and invades the Doab 70, Taken by surprise by Atai Khan and killed—He atones for all his sins with his life 71, Abdali tightens the siege and assumes offensive—Shifts his camp and blocks the Maratha road to Delhi— The party of Parashar Dadaji with money loaded on horses cut to pieces by the Afghans —The difficulties of the Marathas, 72, Their misfortunes by fire and scarcity—Cold, rain, and disease add to their sufferings 73 No knowledge of Bhau's plans and waiting—Con- flicting reports in the chronicles, 74 The decision to fight and Bhau's plan decided in consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi, 75; A retrospect of the trans-Ganges plans of the xxii

Marathas—Gopalrao Barves raid on Oudh—Delay to the end of December—Veni bahadur guards Oudh in Shuja's absence, 76, Barve's lightning campaign of a fortnight—He takes Bhojapur, Dalmau and Nawabganj—Veni bahadur descends upon him with a big force— The Zamindars allied with the Marathas run away—The Maratha army dispersed—Barve returns to Korah, 77, Panipat locality not favourable to the Marathas—Maratha manners give scope to mischievous elements, 78, Bhau created a tremendous impression and is still remembered in this locality—Legends about Bhau in the surrounding area—Bhau fort near the village of Isapur, 79, No correct information about it available—The imperial canal flowing to the west of Panipat, 80, The canal water stopped at the head led to the scarcity of water—The existence of the canal need not be doubted 81, The numbers and the Sardars in the Maratha army—Abdalis forces at the beginning of July 1760—Latter additions and subtractions, 82, The final figures engaged in the last battle—Sir Jadunath's estimate tallys with ours—The number of camp followers capable of building the armis in the Afghan camp 83, The number of camp followers—The composition of the Maratha camp, pilgrims and candidates, priests and tradesmen—Women in the Maratha camp— Exaggerated accounts, 84, The chronicles of the 18th century, both Persian and Marathi have no sense of direction and no visualization of the shape of land due to want of maps— • Sir Jadunath misses this point and so is led astray—He has no sense of correct time also from which his description of the battle suffers—He does not understand the lunar calendar and so miscalculates the period of moon light, 85 CHAPTER VI THE BATTLE (14th January 1761) 86-105 ' The Maratha army marches out early in the morning—Their arrangement—The dis tribution of the various captains—The hollow square formation—The arrangement of the Afghan army, 86, The battle begins—Ibrahim khan Gardi leads the vanguard and at tacks the Ruhelas—The Maratha cavalry appointed to support Ibrahim Khan—Acts rashly and out marches of Gardi infantry—Meets with sharp fire and runs back broken in spirit —The aim of the march was to reach the Jamuna and not to offer battle, 87, The orders not understood or followed by the Maratha captains—The Maratha ammunition wasted, the whole responsibility at the front falls on Ibrahim Khan's musketeers—The superiority of the Ruhela fire—The Maratha cavalry fails to take the advantage of the gap created by

The disaster minimised by the Marathas in political interest—Rumours of Bhau and Janakoji being alive—Its good effect—Ahmad Shah completely disillusioned—Returns to Afghanistan 98 99, Loss of human lives in the battle, 100, The massacres of the fugitives after the battle—The spoils of the battle 101, Exaggerated account of captured booty— The after events beli the reports—It was a Pyrrhic victory, 102, Maratha food arrange- ments during the battle—And their mode of warfare, 103, The Maratha appearance and their camp and arms 104 105 CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT 106-127 The death of the Commander in chief was made use of by the survivors and renegades by making him a scape goat—Bhau not a free man in peace talks—The Peshwa's share in diplomacy—Bhau not a first rate general—His mould more civil than military—Ahmad Shah on the other hand a completely military man—The Marathas not warlike in the same sense as the Afghans 106, Bhau's ideal and aim different from those of the other Marathas—The guerilla mode handed down by Shivaji—No pitched battle—Useful for de- fence but not for conquest—Malharrao Holkar differs from Bhau and so cannot be con- demned 107, His behaviour throughout his life similar 108 Not treacherous but lukewarm —Govindpant Bundele's case—Rajwade's charges against him—He was a revenue col- lector and not a military captain—His age and habits of life against military dash— Geographical factor makes him all important 109 Abdalis daring puts Bhau in a quandary —Only a similar counter daring could have saved Bhau—Govindpant not a fit man for military duty—Bhau's suspicions about Govindpant—Not a rich man nor efficient not above board 110 Acting hand in glove with various administrative officers—Boastful man- ner, procrastinating—All Maratha officers took the air of chiefs or partners in the empire 111, The Peshwa's system of recruitment for the services defective—No trained staff— Nepotism—Govindpant made a scape goat because he died—Rajwade begins with preju- dice against him 112 Lights upon a sheaf of papers and carried away by the partial presentation of the affair—Changes dates to suit his interpretation—Caste prejudice— Govindpant intimate with the Peshwa family 113 Rajwade's charge proved only as far as the accounts were concerned—Peshwa ought to have devised a better system 114, Level of the population low the main defect—Bhau not proud but prejudiced—Feared but not loved by the surrounding people 115, The misfortune of the Marathas—Bhau not below the average as a General—His sound pleas in advance of the times—The initial mistake of the cavalry at the back of Ibrahim Khan who led the vanguard of the marching hollow square 116 Ideas and orders not understood nor followed because there was no previous training in the new system—Bhau was going on systematically, but he suc- cessively failed in diplomacy, manoeuvring, daring and was trying the final ordeal of pitched battle to destroy the enemy—No unity of thought, no co ordination of effort—The inherent defects of the Maratha system exhibited at Panipat 117, Marathas imitators and not inventors—No proper assimilation of foreign models—Waywardness no comrade- ship—Individual initiative but no collective effort—Personal prosperity the aim—Not indi- viduals but system responsible for the disaster 118, The death of Nanasaheb Peshwa— Not a consequence of the disaster—his health failing for a number of years—Hereditary defect—Addicted to women—Second marriage 119 Probable causes—Medical, astrological, personal 120, Panipat only gave the last shock—Nanasaheb was not in a position to help Bhau—Marathas unconscious of the things surrounding them 121, The Marathas fought for a cause creed and country—The victory did no good to Abdali but ruined the Marathas —Bajirao took a wrong step and it was blindly followed by his sons—Consolidation neg- lected—Ignorance of political forces—No progressive education 122 Defective geographical knowledge, no maps—No written documents or books for the education of younger peo- ple—In short backward civilisation—Marathas no robbers but aspiring to be rulers— Fight for a higher principle 123, Keeping their word sanctity of contract—Bhau requested by the Mughal emperor to relieve him from the burden—Marathas become enemies of all and friends of none—They would have been more successful if they had not accepted the burden of running the Mughal State 124, They were the most powerful forward tolerant, civil and ethical amongst the Indian people of those days—And still they failed 125 The Marathas took to arms as the last alternative—They were ranked non-martial by the British in the 19th century—Fight for a cause but no useless spilling of blood by them— War a moral necessity under certain circumstances—But the military force of a nation not necessarily the manifestation of its moral force—War not a school for virtues— Marathas fought for a cause a principle and not for material gain or glory at Panipat, 126, Abdali also fought for a cause disinterestedly—Derived no benefit from his victory— The Maratha aim was fulfilled one foreigner went away—But another entered by the back door as a result—The irony of history best illustrated by Panipat, 127 XXIV

CHAPTER I THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND THE historic document printed at the very beginning of Rajwade's first volume of original letters marks a turning point in Maratha history. Un- fortunately the document is only a copy in Perso-Marathi of the original con- tract between the Emperor of Delhi and the Peshwa represented by Malharrao Holkar and Jayapa Shinde. The date of the document can now be fixed with certainty. It is May 1752.¹ Ahmad Shah Abdali, the new king of Afghanistan and the successor to Nadir Shah's eastern dominions, then loomed large on the Indian horizon. He had been beaten off in his first attempt of 1748. But he was not a man to be discouraged by one failure. He again invaded the Panjab in 1749 and secured a promise of tribute from its governor. Not re- ceiving the tribute, he invaded for the third time in 1752 and laid siege to Lahore. But Mir Mannu,² the Mughal Subahdar of the province, was a clever man, not devoid of valour. He did not shrink from having a trial of strength with Abdali. Lahore fell, however, at the end of March and Mir Mannu consented to act in future as Abdali's agent. Ahmad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, allowed his governor to pay 50 lakhs of rupees³ to Abdali, being the surplus revenue of the province after defraying all expenditure. The Emperor's consent had been given through the mediation of his favourite, Khoja Jawed, who acted as a sort of unofficial rival to the Wazir in all his dealings. The Emperor had been obliged to accede to the spoliation of his dominions as he could not help Mir Mannu in time. Khoja Jawed had alienated the Mughal grandees so effectually during the last four years, that none was ready to take upon himself the duty of defending the Empire against the Afghans. Wazir Safdar Jang had just then completely overpowered the Ruhelas with the help of Shinde and Holkar. The Wazir had returned to Oudh and the Marathas were on the point of going to the Deccan, when the Emperor's peremptory call obliged the Wazir to go to Delhi with the Marathas so as to bring pressure on Abdali. Before he could come, however, the timid Khoja and the terrified Emperor had acceded to transfer the revenues of the north-western subahs to Abdali, who took it to be a permanent arrangement. When the Marathas with their victorious army came to Delhi, the Khoja thought of counteracting the wrong step that he had taken under pressure. He, in conjunction with the Wazir, prevailed upon the Emperor to enter into a contract with the Marathas by which they would take upon themselves the duty of defending the Empire against its internal and external foes. It is not correct to say that the Wazir was the sole originator of this arrangement as wrongly read by most historians (e.g. Fall 1, p. 306). The flaw in the in- terpretation has arisen on account of not minutely studying the document. The Peshwa had consented to remain loyal to and was to take orders from 1 Shinde 3.203-4 2 His title was Muin-ul-mulk. 3 SPD 21.53. P. F.—1 [1]

2 PANIPAT 1761 the Emperor and the Khoja in preference to the Wazir It is important to note this fact because on the basis of it the Peshwa's ambassador at the Delhi Court and the military guard under Antaji Manakeshwar had to take the side of the Emperor and fight for him against the Wazir in 1753, when Safdar Jang rebelled against his master, though by that time Khoja Jawed had been assassinated The Marathas were to receive the Chauth of the north western provinces already usurped by the Afghans These included the Mughal Subahs of Sind, Multan, and Lahore, as well as the districts of Hissar, Sambal, Morada bad and Budaun then under the control of the Ruhelas and other refractory nobles The claim to one fourth of the revenues of these lands could be made good only by conquest, of which there was only a remote possibility To induce the Marathas to accept this hazardous adventure, something more tangible was necessary Therefore the other two refractory Subahs of Ajmer and Agra in the possession of the Rajput and Jat chiefs were given to the Peshwa Previous to this, the Emperor had tried to make good his claim to these lands by send- ing Mir Bakhshi Salabat Khan in 1749, but he had to return disappointed after spending more than two years in those regions without collecting any sub- stantial amount of tributes After ruining this great nobleman, Khoja Jawed had bestowed the Subahs on Ghazi ud din Khan, the eldest son of the Great Nizam ul mulk and Intizam ud daulah, the eldest son of the late Wazir Qamar ud din Khan These two noblemen, though heads of the Turani party after their fathers' deaths, were militarily of no consequence When it was found in the crisis of Abdali's invasion that none of them was useful to the State, the Khoja had to make a compromise with the rival Wazir and bestow the Subahs on the Peshwa, while entering into a contract with him, as related above The transfer of the Subahs was facilitated because the dispossessed Ghazi ud din had another move in his mind, to make good his claim to the Viceroyalty of the Deccan as the eldest son of the Great Nizam The Wazir Safdar Jang wanted to get his son, the boy Shuja ud daulah nominated to the post, but the Peshwa had to set up a rival to Salabat Jang, a son of the Nizam, for which purpose Shuja was not useful, as the grandees of the Dec- can, especially the Maratha Sardars of the Nizam, would not side with a per- son who bore no relationship with him The Khoja had in fact created a coun- terpoise to the Irani Shia party of the Wazir by buying the Maratha support to the Turani Ghazi ud din and the Emperor The Muslim party had gained a great point in bestowing the Subahs of Ajmer and Agra on the Hindu Mara- thas as against the overbearing and refractory Rajputs Thus they had set the Hindus against each other and made a common, solid, Hindu front against the Muslims impossible The far reaching effects of this fundamental move were seen in the next decade (1752 61) The refractory Rajputs came closer to the Muslim party and fought with the Marathas incessantly Panipat was an outcome of it The Peshwa's desire to get complete control of the Deccan by setting up a weak pro-Maratha son of the Nizam as Viceroy, was foiled by the usual Muslim tactics of assassinating the person and calling in foreign help as that

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 3 of the French. Bussy dominated the Deccan politics during this decade, and all the efforts of the Peshwa were directed towards checkmating his moves and machinations. He had to take the false step of joining with the English as a result of it. Thus Indian politics came to be dominated by the moves and in- terests of the foreigners instead of by the sons of the soil whether Hindu or Muslim. The Afghans, the English and the French decided the fate and shaped the future of India during this crucial epoch. The Wazir Safdar Jang clandestinely got Khoja Jawed murdered in August 1752, with a view to bring the Emperor completely under his thumb. But his aim of governing the whole Empire with the Maratha aid was not to be fulfilled. Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang, the Viceroy-designate of the Deccan, was also murdered by his step-mother in Aurangabad in October 1752, lead- ing to a collapse of the Peshwa's arrangement as noted above. Salabat Jang had to be acknowledged as the de facto Viceroy, and the French influence be- came fully established at the Nizam's Court. Another unexpected outcome of this untoward happening was the emergence of a new character on the political stage of Delhi. This was Ghazi-ud-din the younger, a son to the murdered man. By playing upon the good feelings of Safdar Jang, this boy of fifteen got himself appointed as the Mir Bakhshi of the Empire. Soon after, he be- came the leader of the conspiracy against his benefactor, and in this he se- cured the help of the Marathas in the name of the Emperor on the basis of the agreement mentioned above. By making war on the Wazir and his allies the Jats, under the walls of Delhi, he succeeded in driving away Safdar Jang to his governorship of Oudh and Allahabad by the end of 1753. But in doing this he also created a future rival to himself, the wily Najib Khan Ruhela. With the help of the Ruhela contingent under Najib and Malharrao Holkar with his master, the Peshwa's brother, Raghoba (Ragunathrao), Ghazi-ud-din went through another revolution at Delhi in June 1754. He deposed the Emperor Ahmad Shah, after first getting himself nominated as the Wazir in place of his cousin Intizam-ud-daulah⁴. Alamgir II was crowned the new Emperor. Safdar Jang's downfall had been hastened because the Irani Shia party of which he was the head was proclaimed as pro-Hindu by the Turani Sunni party of Mughal grandees. The popular opinion in Delhi held the Empire as well-nigh handed over to the Marathas. A plausible colour is given to this opinion by certain unverified clauses of the agreement of 1752, noted in the beginning. Besides the provinces actually mentioned in that agreement, it is mentioned in contemporary private letters that the Chauth of all the twenty- two provinces⁴ of the Mughal Empire had also been granted to the Marathas, together with the administration of the holy cities of Benares, Brindavan and Mathura. Antaji Manakeshwar is found confirming this information a year later in his despatch⁵ to the Peshwa. But these important clauses are not found in the document published by Rajwade. Perhaps it was a personal un- derstanding with the Wazir and an administrative concession or favour. What ⁴ Shinde 3.203-4. ⁵ SPD 21.53.

4 PANIPAT 1761 ever the case, it worked against the interests of Safdar Jang as well as his al- lies, the Marathas. Having once supported the Emperor against their former ally, the Wazir, the Marathas should have consistently supported him thereafter. In- stead they joined the upstart and unscrupulous new Wazir in deposing the Emperor and placing a new man on the throne. This method of changing their policy and allies to suit the interests of the intriguers at the Delhi Court ultimately cost the Marathas very dearly. They successively alienated the Rajputs, the Jats, the Oudh Wazir, as well as the Ruhelas, leaving not even one constant and staunch supporter of their cause. This looseness further increased on account of the conflicting self-interests of the various Maratha commanders and statesmen. All this has to be borne in mind when we come to judge the Maratha vicissitudes in north India, and its final culmination in the disaster of Panipat. After the fourth invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali, which came like an avalanche on the Delhi monarchy in 1757, the Empire was as good as broken. The Marathas came on the scene when the whole region from Agra northward had been looted to the last pie by Abdali. Even Ghazi-ud-din, their own nominee, had become disgusted with the Maratha behaviour. So he accepted the arrangement of Abdali, who appointed Najib as his military agent in the Delhi affairs. Following the advice of Abdali, he had started with two young Delhi princes to establish the Mughal rule in the lost dominions of Oudh and Allahabad. Just when he was about to attack Shuja-ud-daulah who had suc- ceeded Safdar Jang, the Marathas entered the field, dispersed the Wazir's army, and again established their own supremacy at Delhi by ousting Najib. It seems that after this new revolution, they entered into a new treaty with Ghazi- ud-din. In place of the right to Chauth (one-fourth), they fixed their share at half of all the revenues that they might gather from the erstwhile Mughal dominions. Of course, there was no possibility of their getting anything with- out the application of force, which meant war on all fronts of Delhi. With a view to prevent Abdali from ever entering India, they now thought of establishing the Mughal rule in the lost region of the five rivers and beyond. Ahmad Shah Abdali, while returning to his own country with immense loot in May 1757, left his son, the boy Taimur Shah, at Lahore as his Viceroy, with Jahan Khan, his best general, as his guardian. Besides the Afghan party of Abdali, there were two other claimants to the land of the five rivers. One was the Mughal party headed by Mughlani Begum, the ambitious, self-willed and profligate widow of Mir Mannu, the other was the democratic party of the persecuted Sikhs. Mughlani Begum had at first tried to rule with the help of her favourites, but in 1756 Ghazi-ud-din brought her under his control. He married her daughter, Umda Begum, and made Adina Beg Khan, who had already made himself powerful by raising a vast army to include the Sikhs, his deputy. Later on, when Ghazi-ud-din found out his mother-in-law's real char- acter, he got her kidnapped by one of his assistants and brought her back to Delhi. He thereby also secured for himself her vast fortune. The Wazir's deputy ruled at Lahore for six months but was soon ousted by Abdali's nominee.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 5 At the end of the year 1756, Ahmad Shah himself followed, as mentioned above, and returned after leaving Taimur to rule the Panjab. It seems that Jahan Khan was only a blunt soldier and not a diplomat such as one needed to be in the disturbed conditions of the Panjab of those times. Adina Beg Khan, who had been baulked in his ambition to be the chief administrator by the Afghan intrusion, now came out of his hiding in the hills. With the help of his Sikh allies, he carried on a guerrilla war-fare and made Abdali's rule a precarious one in that area. Another complication arose on account of Mughlani Begum who had joined Abdali against her son-in-law, Ghazi-ud-din, with a view to rule the Panjab herself. She had acted as Abdali's spy and agent in digging out the buried wealth of the Delhi nobles. Ahmad Shah was immensely pleased with her and carried her back to Lahore with him on his return. He had promised the Jalandar Doab containing the best land in the Panjab with Jammu and Kashmir to the north of it as her jagir. This ar- rangement could not succeed for military reasons. Ahmad Shah revoked it and thus Mughlani Begum became a pauper, because she was too proud to receive a small pension instead. Her jagir was in the occupation of Adina Beg, and probably she began to intrigue with him against the Afghan deputy. The matters came to the point of Jahan Khan beating the Begum with his own hand and confining her. The military power of Adina Beg was strong enough to baffle the Afghan ruler, and therefore, Jahan Khan thought it best to leave Adina Beg in his post of the revenue collector for a payment of thirty-two lakhs. While Adina Beg wisely remained within his bounds, the Sikhs, perhaps with his connivance, scourged throughout the province expelling Afghan col- lectors. The Marathas who were at this time driving out Abdali's outposts in the Jamuna valley naturally supported this movement against Abdali and opened correspondence with Adina Beg. When the Marathas had completed their work in the Doab, news came that the Sikhs had defeated two Afghan generals, followed by a complete massacre and loot. Abdali's rule in his own country was also challenged by some local parties and the Shah of Iran. Finally, Adina Beg, who had the ambition to become the sole administrator in the Panjab, called in the help of the Marathas. They had already chalked out a policy of blocking Abdali at the Indus for fulfilling their responsibility of defending the Empire against both internal and external foes. At the be- ginning of 1758 they seriously devoted their attention to the problem and planned the campaign in consulation with the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din. A clear idea of the extent of the Mughal Empire is necessary for us to understand this campaign. What has been called the Panjab in the British regime was not a Mughal province. The area between the water-sheds of the Satlaj and the Jamuna had been bifurcated by the Mughals. The southern and the eastern parts of that area were included in the metropolitan province of Delhi. The northern part of the land of the five rivers proper from At- tock to Sarhind was included in the Subah of Lahore. The south-western Panjab, with districts beyond the Indus adjoining to it, formed the Multan province. The modern Sind was called Thattha province, and Kashmir was also a separate province. Beyond the Indus, Kabul and Kandahar-formed two separate provinces, out of which Kandahar was lost by Aurangzib in 1652,

6 PANIPAT: 1761 and Kabul was annexed by Nadir Shah in 1738. But all along, the idea of these two provinces forming part of the Mughal's Indian Empire continued to exist. All these provinces had separate Governors and Diwans in the best days of the Mughal Empire. As gradual decay set in, sometimes more than one province was placed under the charge of one person, and occasionally the whole area came to be controlled by a single strong hand. During the anar- chical times which followed Nadir Shah's invasion, Sind with portions of Mul- tan as well as Kabul and Kandahar completely passed out of Indian hands. Only the Panjab proper continued to be a debatable land for some time. We have briefly noted the condition after Mir Mannu's death in 1753. The Marathas cast the last die in the tragic drama with the slogan of the complete integrity of the Indian Empire as built up by the Mughals with their ancient boundaries. Unfortunately the Indian political world was not sufficiently intellectually or morally advanced to grasp this fundamental idea and fight for it. The Marathas had risen higher in transcending the bounds of race, language, religion and sect. They took their stand on the basis of India for the Indians to be governed and defended by themselves without foreign aid or interference.⁶ Malharrao Holkar accompanied Raghoba in this famous campaign, while Sakharam Bapu was the Diwan and chief diplomatic adviser. The ⁶ I S—Aitihasik Sphuta Lekh 411. Translation of Raghoba's letter, dated 4th May, 1758, from Lahore, received on 18th June, 1758, by the Peshwa (Lele archives) : “ We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on this side of Attock under our rule for the most part and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Khan Abdali's son Taimur Sultan and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops. Ahmad Khan had invaded Ispahan with his troops. But Jabar Shah (?), the Padshah of Iran, came out to meet him and looted some troops of Abdali. So Ahmad has returned to Kandahar with some 12-14 thousand troops. Irani troops have come at their rear pursuing them. Jabarast Khan, Mukarab Khan and other sardars and zamindars of those regions, who had joined Abdali under compulsion, are now rebelling against his rule. They have written supplicatory letters to me and are ready to enrol under us, so as to chastise Abdali. Thus, all have risen against Ahmad Khan who has lost control over the regions. Even if Abdali goes to Herat, he cannot hold on. In short, Abdali cannot get any more support from that side, and so his power must wane. On that side, the Padshah of Iran has driven him into a corner. On this side, we should do the same so as to establish our rule beyond Attock. Your Honour had sent Abdul Rahim Khan Ahmad Khan's nephew and the (legal) heir to the dominion of the Abdalis who had gone to Poona to seek your support, to us. We have decided to establish him at some small place on this side of Attock to serve as his base, and to appoint him to the subah of Kabul and Peshawar beyond. I am sending him with Abdul Samad Khan whom we have captured at Sarhind with his Abdali troops, to- gether with additional Irani and Mughal troops to support him. I hope that they will begin the work of bringing those regions under control and with the (divine) support of your Highness' auspicious valour, defeat Ahmad Khan once for all, so as to begin our rule there. Myself and Malharba have received letters in his own handwriting from the Padshah of Iran, inviting us to Kandahar soon so as to completely overpower Ahmad and fix the boundary (between Iran and Hindustan) at Attock (the Indus). But we are appointing Abdul Rahim, sent by Your Honour, to the subah of Kabul and are helping him with troops and necessaries. Kabul and Kandahar—these two subahs were in the pos- session of India from the times of Akbar to these of Alamgir. Why should (How can?) we hand these over to the ruler of Vilayat (Iran)? Therefore we are giving those subahs to Abdul Rahim here. He (the Padshah of Iran) also must not be caring very much for these (rocky, unproductive, recalcitrant) provinces, he will rule over (his) Iran. We have decided to establish our rule upto Kandahar (as in times of yore) and to despatch sweetly- worded replies to the letters from Iran. Envoys from the rulers of Lati (Sind), Jammu and Kashmir have arrived here (to settle the government of those regions)..”

TO FACE PAGE 6 KANDAHAR 1 KABUL 2 KASHMIR 3 LAHORE 4 DELHI 5 MULTAN 6 THATTHA 7 AJMER 8 AGRA 9 OUDH 10 BIHAR 11 BENGAL 12 ALLAHABAD 13 MALWA 14 GUJRAT 15 (CUTCH, SORATH) KHANDESH 16 BERAR 17 AURANGABAD 18 BEDAR 19 ORISSA 20 HAIDRABAD 21 BIJAPUR 22 GONDWANA ASSAM ARCOT SINHALDWEEP BAY OF BENGAL THE REGION WHICH WAS TRODDEN BY MARATHA HORSES MAP OF INDIA SHOWING MUGHAL SUBAHS SCALE

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 7 Maratha army first approached Sarhind which was governed by Abdus Samad Khan, a valiant general of Abdali He was at this time on a punitive expedi- tion against Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State Hearing that the Marathas were advancing, he settled accounts with Alasingh, quickly returned to Sarhind and made preparations for defending it The Maratha troops were not more than fifty thousand in number, though rumour had swelled it to two lakhs In the first week of March 1758, they began the siege of Sarhind which does not seem to have continued long Abdus Samad Khan tried to escape but was captured along with Jang Baz Khan and other Afghans The Mara- thas and the Sikhs thoroughly looted Sarhind and afterwards destroyed it • Hearing of the fall of Sarhind, Jahan Khan, who had advanced from Lahore to help Abdus Samad, returned precipitately The Maratha forces advanced further, Adina Beg Khan leading them on the way Seeing them rapidly advancing with confidence, Jahan Khan and his ward, the boy Timur, lost heart, as they had not more than twenty five thousand troops with them to de- fend themselves The valiant captain Manaji Paygude led the vanguard of the Marathas with ten thousand horse along with one thousand Mughals un- der Khwajah Mirza On the 20th April, 1758, the Marathas entered Lahore Prince Taimur and Jahan Khan had already evacuated it on the day previous and carried all their property beyond the Ravi The Marathas, after taking charge of the fort, quickly crossed the river and pursued the Afghans upto the river Chinab Only the Durrani troops of Taimur escaped hurriedly with Jahan Khan at their head All his other troops, Turkish, Afghan and Indian, were over powered by the Marathas, who took vast spoils in their camp The Marathas would have pursued Jahan Khan still further, but fortunately for him the river was deep and unfordable and all the boats necessary for crossing the river had been taken to the other side by Taimur Sultan ⁷ Raghoba stayed in Lahore only for a month and then prepared to re- turn to the Deccan at the express orders of the Peshwa leaving the administra- tion of the whole province in the hands of Adina Beg who agreed to pay seventy five lakhs a year to the Marathas An equal revenue was to go to the Wazir at Delhi as his half share in the bargain The Maratha corps engaged in this famous campaign were those of Manaji Paygude Gangadhar Bajirao Retharekar, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Rayaji Sakhdeo, Renuko Anaji and • Bapuji Trimbak, besides the Holkars contingent Hari Raghunath Bhide, a fast friend and supporter of Raghoba, had also accompanied them Why Raghoba was not allowed to continue in the Panjab is difficult to say In his only available letter (Note 6) he writes that he was returning because the Peshwa had recalled him As a matter of fact the five years from 1757 to 1761 were the most critical years in Indian history The Marathas who aspired to take into their hands the political control of the whole continent, had to keep their attention on the problems arising in all corners of India The Peshwa had recalled his brother from Lahore probably because he thought the Deccan politics were more important, and wished to end the French influence at the court of the ⁷ SPD 27.218, 220 Shinde 3 93, 94

8 PANIPAT: 1761 Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con- spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore, just when Abdali's troops there had been reduced to a small force But once having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across Abdali's path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al- ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis- carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri- gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoji Holkar and Khandoji Kadam, Raghoba ordered Vitthal Shivdev to repair there Janakoji Shinde, after his meeting with Raghoba in Rajputana on his way back, sent the old and experienced Sabaji Shinde to take over the whole charge of the Maratha affairs in the Panjab as a deputy governor Of these, Vitthal Shivdev⁸ seems to have continued there only up to October, together with his colleague Satvoji Jadhav Sabaji reached Lahore some time after But in the interval Adina Beg died on the 16th September, 1758⁹ He was the only experienced and influential man in the Panjab not altogether ill dis- posed towards the Marathas After his death began again the vicious scramble for power in that region Khwajah Mirza tried to assume the governorship at Lahore and renew his broken career With the help of Tukoji and Khandoji he beat back an invasion of some Afghans and Gakkhars in concert This was before Sabaji's arrival and his taking over the charge of the Panjab Tukoji and Khandoji pushed on beyond the Jehelum¹⁰ and the Indus in pursuit of the Afghans and thus carried the Maratha standards beyond Attock This was sometime in October 1758, before the severe winter in those regions began Sabaji followed them after a short interval and joined them in Pesh.... ¹¹ 8 SPD 21 146 9 SPD 2 96 10 BISM (Persian Mss) No 696 11 Ibid No. 699

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 9 This forward march of the Marathas was probably to place Abdul Rahim Khan, a nephew of Ahmad Shah Abdali and a claimant, on the Afghan throne. This Khan, though his name is not mentioned anywhere else, had proceeded to Poona to seek the Peshwa's help in re-instating him in Afghanistan. The Marathas seem to have taken him with them to Peshawar and tried to establish him there. They continued in Peshawar during the whole of that winter and returned to Lahore in March 1759, due probably to the Afghan pressure. The internal politics of the province deteriorated still further in the interval. The Maratha generals, left in the various parts of the province to help the local collectors and maintain peace, began to take sides amongst the rival factions for power in that province. Siding with Khwajah Mirza's enemies they ousted him from Lahore, whence he fled with his Sikh allies to the hills of Jammu. Bapuji Trimbak who had been placed at Multan to help the local governor, seems to have been entangled between the local parties of the Afghans and the Mughals in that region. Khwajah Mirza tried to take shelter in the Jammu state, but Ranjit Dev, who was ruling there, asked him to clear out by threatening him with dire consequences if he persisted in his attempt to continue there. 12 He seems to have become a champion of Hinduism at the instance of the Marathas, and openly declared his intention of brooking no impediment from the Muslims in his province. The Mirza, therefore, re- turned to Sialkot and made a common cause with his erstwhile enemies, the wild Gakkhars. In the meantime Abdus Samad Khan, who had been cap- tured at Sarhind by Raghoba and afterwards sent back to Kabul to help Abdul Rahim Khan in his attempt to establish himself in those regions, again re- turned to India in the wake of the returning Maratha troops. He tried to create trouble for the Marathas by joining the opposite parties. He made com- mon cause with Khwajah Mirza, and tried to make the Maratha hold impos- sible in the regions beyond the Ravi. Next he suddenly swooped down on Multan, held the city at ransom, and established his deputy there in opposition to Muhammad Ali Khan, who was governing there with the help of Bapuji Trimbak. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Khan, the people of Mul- tan rose against the barbarous Afghan rule, drove that deputy out of the city, and looted his army. This happened in March 1759. Abdali had by this time freed himself from his western engagements with the Shah of Iran and the affairs of Khorasan which had occupied him for two years. He sent Jahan Khan to re-establish his rule in the Peshawar region. His pressure and the failure of Abdul Rahim Khan's cause obliged the Marathas to recross the Indus and come back to their base at Lahore. After his return Sabaji joined his forces with others and thus reinforced, was able to beat back an invasion of Jahan Khan at the end of August 1759. The Afghan general lost his son in the attempt and many of his troops were killed or wounded. He himself was also wounded and had to retreat across the Indus. The summer of 1759 was the decisive time for the Marathas to make good their hold on the Panjab if they wished to keep it. But Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde who had gone up to the banks of the Satlaj in April that year re- 12 Ibid.

8 PANIPAT: 1761 Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con- spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore, just when Abdalis troops there had been reduced to a small force But once having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across Abdalis path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al- ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis- carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoj

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11 of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marathas. An average Maratha soldier of those days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa- ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home sickness, would not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self sufficient colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover, proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with progressive ideas, methods, or instruments—in short a higher civilization like that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances make them selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes? To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously distributed at the various key points. This stretch is itself geographically divisible into two almost equal parts, one from Ambala to the Chinab and the other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast, sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro- portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore, Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind or Thattha Kashmir and Kandahar became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow clad regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas, in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express despatches kettle drums as well as baggage, but they had never taken the trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel corps, much less organise a mobile artillery of swivel guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul- locks. In the camel corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on the same animal, there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul- lock drawn artillery, on the other hand needed a pioneer force of sappers and miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

10 PANIPAT 1761 turned to Delhi after appointing Sadik Beg, a deputy of Adina Beg, as the chief revenue collector in the regions around Sarhind There was an idea of appointing Naro Shankar¹³ in place of Sabaji Shinde, but it never materialized After camping at Bahlulpur and Machhiwada on the south bank of the Satlaj for a month or so, the Shindes returned with Naro Shankar Their return this time was also due like the return of Raghoba in the previous year, to the Peshwas advice cum orders The Peshwa was overburdened with debts He was writing letter after letter to Dattaji Shinde to take up some new venture which would fill the Peshwas treasury and add a new province to the Maratha dominions Lahore Allahabad Benares, Patna and lastly Bengal were to be taken over one after the other This meant dealing with Najib Khan, Shuja- ud daulah Ghazi ud din the Prince Ali Gauhar and last but not least, the English Sitting at ease in his cosy citadel in Poona and ruminating over the thoughts of conquest over the whole of India was all right as a chamber pas time but the Peshwa never seems to have realized the actual difficulties in that path That a man of Ahmad Shah's type would take the ousting of his son from the Panjab lying down was obviously impossible, still, the Peshwa in sisted on the Shindes returning to Delhi instead of proceeding to Attock and holding that line against all attacks The Marathas remained in the Panjab only for a brief period, from April 1758 to October 1759 They were, constitutionally, acting as agents of the Mughal Emperor and were normally trying to make use of the local ma chinery of government in carrying on the administration and collecting the revenues They had to dismiss the Afghan nominees, no doubt, but in their place they generally appointed the Mughals Whether the Marathas had acted wisely in taking upon themselves such a hazardous adventure as trying to conquer the Panjab and hold it out against such an exceptional man as Abdali must be judged by the result, which is history A thoughtful historian will always consider that it was a wrong step for the Peshwas to cross the Narmada without first taking possession of the south up to Rameshvaram After having crossed that river, they should have at least stopped at the Chambal and first secured the overwhelmingly Hindu provinces of Allahabad and Oudh which were just adjoining to the north, instead of touching the hornet's nest at Delhi The Peshwa thought of first grasping the reins of the central govern ment at Delhi and thus getting legal control over the whole empire That it was a wrong step, impossible of fulfilment on account of the selfish, unpatriotic and pusillanimous attitude of the ruling Muslims is proved at the bar of his tory and no amount of casuistry can take away the blame from the Marathas for the fundamental mistake of choosing the wrong path From the military point of view, it was no wise step for the Marathas to lengthen their line of communication by five hundred miles at one stretch Al ready the distance of one thousand miles from Poona to Ambala was long enough for them to defend successfully To step beyond Sarhind was almost a mad man's behaviour The climate of the regions, with its extremes of heat and cold, was not very propitious and was well nigh beyond the endurance ¹³ SPD 2.100

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11 of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marāthas. An average Maratha soldier of those days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa- ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home-sickness, would not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self-sufficient colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover, proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand, had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with progressive ideas, methods, or instruments,—in short a higher civilization like that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances, make them- selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes? To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously distributed at the various key-points. This stretch is itself geographically divisible into two almost equal parts; one from Ambala to the Chinab and the other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast, sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro- portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore, Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind, or Thattha, Kashmir and Kandahar became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow-clad regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas, in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express despatches, kettle-drums as well as baggage; but they had never taken the trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel-corps, much less organise a mobile artillery of swivel-guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul- locks. In the camel-corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on the same animal; there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul- lock-drawn artillery, on the other hand, needed a pioneer force of sappers and miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

12 PANIPAT 1761 of Raghunathrao in this far famed Panjab campaign was Sakharam Bapu He seems to have developed a faculty for easily disposing of the twenty two subahs of the Mughal Empire by his parlour calculations ¹⁴ Raghunathrao also had developed a similar faculty from his early boyhood ¹⁵ Thus there seems to have been some brain wave set in motion at the court of Poona whereby all such problems of high imperial policy were quickly settled at one sitting on the basis of theoretical or oral information supplied by Munshis! When Raghunathrao went on his first expedition to Gujarat in 1753 ¹⁶ (when he was only nineteen), he had already discussed from his base in Kathiawad the possibility of proceeding to Sind and Multan via Bhujnagar, i e Cutch ¹⁷ Had he followed that idea and put it into an actual plan, he would have then and there realized the necessity of organizing an efficient camel corps, for his route would have taken him through the great Indian desert, between Marwad and Sind As it was, the project never materialized, and Raghunathrao re turned to pursue his way to Kumbher of Surajmal Jat to break his head there There seems to be something fundamentally wrong in the plans of conquest hatched in the hen coop of Shanwarwada (the Peshwa's palace in Poona), for the Peshwa is found constantly ordering his generals to proceed on new conquests and then as suddenly recalling them or transferring them to dif ferent fields! Otherwise we cannot account for the miserable failure of that decade of incessant activity preceding Panipat Raghunathrao had left behind not more than ten thousand troops in the Panjab when returning Afterwards, when Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Shinde arrived, the total number was perhaps twenty thousand This force, with its shortcomings, was quite inadequate to keep back Abdali and govern the Panjab against a number of rebellious adventurers with local support Raghunathraos idea of setting up a rival claimant in the Kabul area and get ting the necessary work of stopping Abdali done through him, was good on paper, but a rival who would be able to make even a semblance of a stand against the overpowering personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali was difficult to find The only feasible plan in the circumstances then existing was to stop at the river Jehelum and try to defend the line of Multan, Lahore and Jammu by making a common cause with the Rajputs and Sikhs in those regions This meant a departure from the policy of governing the Mughal provinces through the old decrepit machinery of derelict officers, civil and military Men like Ranjit Dev of Jammu and Alasingh Jat of Patiala would have been ready to join such a front with an ideological basis different from the ideology of the Mughal Empire But there was no personality of Shivaji's type amongst the then existing Marathas That was the real difficulty of the Maratha Empire if it was going to be built Ahmad Shah Abdali, it should not be forgotten, was a Shivaji amongst his compatriots He had put the name of Afghanistan on the map Before his advent the Afghans were divided into various inde- pendent, warring and backward tribes, ready to accept service under any con- ¹⁴ Ibid 284 ¹⁵ Purandare 1 158-9 ¹⁶ SPD 21.38 ¹⁷ Ibid. 21.58.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 13 queror and work as his slaves Ahmad Shah not only freed his own tribe from the clutches of a Persian ruler, but he freed the other Afghan clans also Then he welded them into a nation Instead of seeking fortune as individual ad- venturers in India and Persia, as they had done from the times of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Afghans now thought of uniting amongst themselves and set- ting out on conquering expeditions as a well knit nation To meet such a personality and such a new nation was no easy task The Marathas should have produced such a personality, or failing that, a combination of individuals who could match it Unfortunately this could not happen, and the result is recorded in the pages of history In October 1759, Jahan Khan returned with a bigger army He formed, in fact, the advance guard of Abdali's army in its new campaign The Maratha army in the Panjab, at this time, was not more than fifteen thou- sand strong Of this, five thousand under Bapuji Trimbak were in Multan, five thousand under Tukoji garrisoned Lahore, while Sabaji had another five thousand moving from place to place The only region of the Panjab which was comparatively well settled and yielding any direct revenue, as distinguished from tributes and ransoms, was the Sarhind—Jalandar area This had been placed under Sadik Beg—wrongly copied as Sandip Beg in Marathi chronicles He had consented of his own accord to pay five lakhs more than originally set- tled with Adina Beg His Diwan Lakshmi Narayan had been won over to the Maratha side The mutual relations between Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Shinde in the Panjab were none too good Sabaji treated Tukoji as a lower official and kept the whole purse and power in his own hands ¹⁸ Tukoji at this time was a junior officer and only a servant of Malharrao Holkar and not, as is wrongly thought, one of his near relations, though he ultimately succeeded to the Holkar's jagir Malharrao wrote to Tukoji to send Holkar's share in the revenues of the Panjab to Indore Tukoji replied that Sabaji Patel had taken all the money and had allowed him only the daily wages for his troops When Tukoji remonstrated, Sabaji showed him a letter from Janakoji Shinde order- ing Tukoji to draw only wages while the rest of the account would be settled by Janakoji and Malharrao, the masters, amongst themselves As Tukoji had no intention of impeding the government machinery and fighting a civil war, he followed Janakoji's instructions According to Tukoji, without the help of Malharrao the Shindes would never succeed in the Panjab Moreover, Sabaji would never take Tukoji into confidence and settle the Maratha policy in consultation with him Otherwise, complains Tukoji, it was possible to estab- lish peace in the Panjab, had Sabaji followed his advice In his incomplete letters¹⁹ (and only two such letters have unfortunately come into the hands of historians) he clearly says that the Marathas had collected revenues from Sar- hind, the (Jalandar) Doab, Lahore, Multan and Attock From this description it is clear that the Marathas had spread up to the Indus and beyond, and not stopped at the Chinab as emphatically stated 18 Chandrachuda Daftar I.49, II.4 (To be read together) 19 Ibid. I.49, II.4.