पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

TO FACE PAGE 6 KANDAHAR 1 KABUL 2 KASHMIR 3 LAHORE 4 DELHI 5 MULTAN 6 THATTHA 7 AJMER 8 AGRA 9 OUDH 10 BIHAR 11 BENGAL 12 ALLAHABAD 13 MALWA 14 GUJRAT 15 (CUTCH, SORATH) KHANDESH 16 BERAR 17 AURANGABAD 18 BEDAR 19 ORISSA 20 HAIDRABAD 21 BIJAPUR 22 GONDWANA ASSAM ARCOT SINHALDWEEP BAY OF BENGAL THE REGION WHICH WAS TRODDEN BY MARATHA HORSES MAP OF INDIA SHOWING MUGHAL SUBAHS SCALE

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 7 Maratha army first approached Sarhind which was governed by Abdus Samad Khan, a valiant general of Abdali He was at this time on a punitive expedi- tion against Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State Hearing that the Marathas were advancing, he settled accounts with Alasingh, quickly returned to Sarhind and made preparations for defending it The Maratha troops were not more than fifty thousand in number, though rumour had swelled it to two lakhs In the first week of March 1758, they began the siege of Sarhind which does not seem to have continued long Abdus Samad Khan tried to escape but was captured along with Jang Baz Khan and other Afghans The Mara- thas and the Sikhs thoroughly looted Sarhind and afterwards destroyed it • Hearing of the fall of Sarhind, Jahan Khan, who had advanced from Lahore to help Abdus Samad, returned precipitately The Maratha forces advanced further, Adina Beg Khan leading them on the way Seeing them rapidly advancing with confidence, Jahan Khan and his ward, the boy Timur, lost heart, as they had not more than twenty five thousand troops with them to de- fend themselves The valiant captain Manaji Paygude led the vanguard of the Marathas with ten thousand horse along with one thousand Mughals un- der Khwajah Mirza On the 20th April, 1758, the Marathas entered Lahore Prince Taimur and Jahan Khan had already evacuated it on the day previous and carried all their property beyond the Ravi The Marathas, after taking charge of the fort, quickly crossed the river and pursued the Afghans upto the river Chinab Only the Durrani troops of Taimur escaped hurriedly with Jahan Khan at their head All his other troops, Turkish, Afghan and Indian, were over powered by the Marathas, who took vast spoils in their camp The Marathas would have pursued Jahan Khan still further, but fortunately for him the river was deep and unfordable and all the boats necessary for crossing the river had been taken to the other side by Taimur Sultan ⁷ Raghoba stayed in Lahore only for a month and then prepared to re- turn to the Deccan at the express orders of the Peshwa leaving the administra- tion of the whole province in the hands of Adina Beg who agreed to pay seventy five lakhs a year to the Marathas An equal revenue was to go to the Wazir at Delhi as his half share in the bargain The Maratha corps engaged in this famous campaign were those of Manaji Paygude Gangadhar Bajirao Retharekar, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Rayaji Sakhdeo, Renuko Anaji and • Bapuji Trimbak, besides the Holkars contingent Hari Raghunath Bhide, a fast friend and supporter of Raghoba, had also accompanied them Why Raghoba was not allowed to continue in the Panjab is difficult to say In his only available letter (Note 6) he writes that he was returning because the Peshwa had recalled him As a matter of fact the five years from 1757 to 1761 were the most critical years in Indian history The Marathas who aspired to take into their hands the political control of the whole continent, had to keep their attention on the problems arising in all corners of India The Peshwa had recalled his brother from Lahore probably because he thought the Deccan politics were more important, and wished to end the French influence at the court of the ⁷ SPD 27.218, 220 Shinde 3 93, 94

8 PANIPAT: 1761 Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con- spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore, just when Abdali's troops there had been reduced to a small force But once having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across Abdali's path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al- ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis- carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri- gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoji Holkar and Khandoji Kadam, Raghoba ordered Vitthal Shivdev to repair there Janakoji Shinde, after his meeting with Raghoba in Rajputana on his way back, sent the old and experienced Sabaji Shinde to take over the whole charge of the Maratha affairs in the Panjab as a deputy governor Of these, Vitthal Shivdev⁸ seems to have continued there only up to October, together with his colleague Satvoji Jadhav Sabaji reached Lahore some time after But in the interval Adina Beg died on the 16th September, 1758⁹ He was the only experienced and influential man in the Panjab not altogether ill dis- posed towards the Marathas After his death began again the vicious scramble for power in that region Khwajah Mirza tried to assume the governorship at Lahore and renew his broken career With the help of Tukoji and Khandoji he beat back an invasion of some Afghans and Gakkhars in concert This was before Sabaji's arrival and his taking over the charge of the Panjab Tukoji and Khandoji pushed on beyond the Jehelum¹⁰ and the Indus in pursuit of the Afghans and thus carried the Maratha standards beyond Attock This was sometime in October 1758, before the severe winter in those regions began Sabaji followed them after a short interval and joined them in Pesh.... ¹¹ 8 SPD 21 146 9 SPD 2 96 10 BISM (Persian Mss) No 696 11 Ibid No. 699

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 9 This forward march of the Marathas was probably to place Abdul Rahim Khan, a nephew of Ahmad Shah Abdali and a claimant, on the Afghan throne. This Khan, though his name is not mentioned anywhere else, had proceeded to Poona to seek the Peshwa's help in re-instating him in Afghanistan. The Marathas seem to have taken him with them to Peshawar and tried to establish him there. They continued in Peshawar during the whole of that winter and returned to Lahore in March 1759, due probably to the Afghan pressure. The internal politics of the province deteriorated still further in the interval. The Maratha generals, left in the various parts of the province to help the local collectors and maintain peace, began to take sides amongst the rival factions for power in that province. Siding with Khwajah Mirza's enemies they ousted him from Lahore, whence he fled with his Sikh allies to the hills of Jammu. Bapuji Trimbak who had been placed at Multan to help the local governor, seems to have been entangled between the local parties of the Afghans and the Mughals in that region. Khwajah Mirza tried to take shelter in the Jammu state, but Ranjit Dev, who was ruling there, asked him to clear out by threatening him with dire consequences if he persisted in his attempt to continue there. 12 He seems to have become a champion of Hinduism at the instance of the Marathas, and openly declared his intention of brooking no impediment from the Muslims in his province. The Mirza, therefore, re- turned to Sialkot and made a common cause with his erstwhile enemies, the wild Gakkhars. In the meantime Abdus Samad Khan, who had been cap- tured at Sarhind by Raghoba and afterwards sent back to Kabul to help Abdul Rahim Khan in his attempt to establish himself in those regions, again re- turned to India in the wake of the returning Maratha troops. He tried to create trouble for the Marathas by joining the opposite parties. He made com- mon cause with Khwajah Mirza, and tried to make the Maratha hold impos- sible in the regions beyond the Ravi. Next he suddenly swooped down on Multan, held the city at ransom, and established his deputy there in opposition to Muhammad Ali Khan, who was governing there with the help of Bapuji Trimbak. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Khan, the people of Mul- tan rose against the barbarous Afghan rule, drove that deputy out of the city, and looted his army. This happened in March 1759. Abdali had by this time freed himself from his western engagements with the Shah of Iran and the affairs of Khorasan which had occupied him for two years. He sent Jahan Khan to re-establish his rule in the Peshawar region. His pressure and the failure of Abdul Rahim Khan's cause obliged the Marathas to recross the Indus and come back to their base at Lahore. After his return Sabaji joined his forces with others and thus reinforced, was able to beat back an invasion of Jahan Khan at the end of August 1759. The Afghan general lost his son in the attempt and many of his troops were killed or wounded. He himself was also wounded and had to retreat across the Indus. The summer of 1759 was the decisive time for the Marathas to make good their hold on the Panjab if they wished to keep it. But Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde who had gone up to the banks of the Satlaj in April that year re- 12 Ibid.

8 PANIPAT: 1761 Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con- spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore, just when Abdalis troops there had been reduced to a small force But once having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across Abdalis path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al- ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis- carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoj

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11 of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marathas. An average Maratha soldier of those days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa- ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home sickness, would not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self sufficient colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover, proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with progressive ideas, methods, or instruments—in short a higher civilization like that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances make them selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes? To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously distributed at the various key points. This stretch is itself geographically divisible into two almost equal parts, one from Ambala to the Chinab and the other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast, sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro- portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore, Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind or Thattha Kashmir and Kandahar became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow clad regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas, in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express despatches kettle drums as well as baggage, but they had never taken the trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel corps, much less organise a mobile artillery of swivel guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul- locks. In the camel corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on the same animal, there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul- lock drawn artillery, on the other hand needed a pioneer force of sappers and miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

10 PANIPAT 1761 turned to Delhi after appointing Sadik Beg, a deputy of Adina Beg, as the chief revenue collector in the regions around Sarhind There was an idea of appointing Naro Shankar¹³ in place of Sabaji Shinde, but it never materialized After camping at Bahlulpur and Machhiwada on the south bank of the Satlaj for a month or so, the Shindes returned with Naro Shankar Their return this time was also due like the return of Raghoba in the previous year, to the Peshwas advice cum orders The Peshwa was overburdened with debts He was writing letter after letter to Dattaji Shinde to take up some new venture which would fill the Peshwas treasury and add a new province to the Maratha dominions Lahore Allahabad Benares, Patna and lastly Bengal were to be taken over one after the other This meant dealing with Najib Khan, Shuja- ud daulah Ghazi ud din the Prince Ali Gauhar and last but not least, the English Sitting at ease in his cosy citadel in Poona and ruminating over the thoughts of conquest over the whole of India was all right as a chamber pas time but the Peshwa never seems to have realized the actual difficulties in that path That a man of Ahmad Shah's type would take the ousting of his son from the Panjab lying down was obviously impossible, still, the Peshwa in sisted on the Shindes returning to Delhi instead of proceeding to Attock and holding that line against all attacks The Marathas remained in the Panjab only for a brief period, from April 1758 to October 1759 They were, constitutionally, acting as agents of the Mughal Emperor and were normally trying to make use of the local ma chinery of government in carrying on the administration and collecting the revenues They had to dismiss the Afghan nominees, no doubt, but in their place they generally appointed the Mughals Whether the Marathas had acted wisely in taking upon themselves such a hazardous adventure as trying to conquer the Panjab and hold it out against such an exceptional man as Abdali must be judged by the result, which is history A thoughtful historian will always consider that it was a wrong step for the Peshwas to cross the Narmada without first taking possession of the south up to Rameshvaram After having crossed that river, they should have at least stopped at the Chambal and first secured the overwhelmingly Hindu provinces of Allahabad and Oudh which were just adjoining to the north, instead of touching the hornet's nest at Delhi The Peshwa thought of first grasping the reins of the central govern ment at Delhi and thus getting legal control over the whole empire That it was a wrong step, impossible of fulfilment on account of the selfish, unpatriotic and pusillanimous attitude of the ruling Muslims is proved at the bar of his tory and no amount of casuistry can take away the blame from the Marathas for the fundamental mistake of choosing the wrong path From the military point of view, it was no wise step for the Marathas to lengthen their line of communication by five hundred miles at one stretch Al ready the distance of one thousand miles from Poona to Ambala was long enough for them to defend successfully To step beyond Sarhind was almost a mad man's behaviour The climate of the regions, with its extremes of heat and cold, was not very propitious and was well nigh beyond the endurance ¹³ SPD 2.100

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11 of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marāthas. An average Maratha soldier of those days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa- ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home-sickness, would not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self-sufficient colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover, proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand, had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with progressive ideas, methods, or instruments,—in short a higher civilization like that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances, make them- selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes? To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously distributed at the various key-points. This stretch is itself geographically divisible into two almost equal parts; one from Ambala to the Chinab and the other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast, sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro- portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore, Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind, or Thattha, Kashmir and Kandahar became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow-clad regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas, in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express despatches, kettle-drums as well as baggage; but they had never taken the trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel-corps, much less organise a mobile artillery of swivel-guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul- locks. In the camel-corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on the same animal; there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul- lock-drawn artillery, on the other hand, needed a pioneer force of sappers and miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

12 PANIPAT 1761 of Raghunathrao in this far famed Panjab campaign was Sakharam Bapu He seems to have developed a faculty for easily disposing of the twenty two subahs of the Mughal Empire by his parlour calculations ¹⁴ Raghunathrao also had developed a similar faculty from his early boyhood ¹⁵ Thus there seems to have been some brain wave set in motion at the court of Poona whereby all such problems of high imperial policy were quickly settled at one sitting on the basis of theoretical or oral information supplied by Munshis! When Raghunathrao went on his first expedition to Gujarat in 1753 ¹⁶ (when he was only nineteen), he had already discussed from his base in Kathiawad the possibility of proceeding to Sind and Multan via Bhujnagar, i e Cutch ¹⁷ Had he followed that idea and put it into an actual plan, he would have then and there realized the necessity of organizing an efficient camel corps, for his route would have taken him through the great Indian desert, between Marwad and Sind As it was, the project never materialized, and Raghunathrao re turned to pursue his way to Kumbher of Surajmal Jat to break his head there There seems to be something fundamentally wrong in the plans of conquest hatched in the hen coop of Shanwarwada (the Peshwa's palace in Poona), for the Peshwa is found constantly ordering his generals to proceed on new conquests and then as suddenly recalling them or transferring them to dif ferent fields! Otherwise we cannot account for the miserable failure of that decade of incessant activity preceding Panipat Raghunathrao had left behind not more than ten thousand troops in the Panjab when returning Afterwards, when Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Shinde arrived, the total number was perhaps twenty thousand This force, with its shortcomings, was quite inadequate to keep back Abdali and govern the Panjab against a number of rebellious adventurers with local support Raghunathraos idea of setting up a rival claimant in the Kabul area and get ting the necessary work of stopping Abdali done through him, was good on paper, but a rival who would be able to make even a semblance of a stand against the overpowering personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali was difficult to find The only feasible plan in the circumstances then existing was to stop at the river Jehelum and try to defend the line of Multan, Lahore and Jammu by making a common cause with the Rajputs and Sikhs in those regions This meant a departure from the policy of governing the Mughal provinces through the old decrepit machinery of derelict officers, civil and military Men like Ranjit Dev of Jammu and Alasingh Jat of Patiala would have been ready to join such a front with an ideological basis different from the ideology of the Mughal Empire But there was no personality of Shivaji's type amongst the then existing Marathas That was the real difficulty of the Maratha Empire if it was going to be built Ahmad Shah Abdali, it should not be forgotten, was a Shivaji amongst his compatriots He had put the name of Afghanistan on the map Before his advent the Afghans were divided into various inde- pendent, warring and backward tribes, ready to accept service under any con- ¹⁴ Ibid 284 ¹⁵ Purandare 1 158-9 ¹⁶ SPD 21.38 ¹⁷ Ibid. 21.58.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 13 queror and work as his slaves Ahmad Shah not only freed his own tribe from the clutches of a Persian ruler, but he freed the other Afghan clans also Then he welded them into a nation Instead of seeking fortune as individual ad- venturers in India and Persia, as they had done from the times of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Afghans now thought of uniting amongst themselves and set- ting out on conquering expeditions as a well knit nation To meet such a personality and such a new nation was no easy task The Marathas should have produced such a personality, or failing that, a combination of individuals who could match it Unfortunately this could not happen, and the result is recorded in the pages of history In October 1759, Jahan Khan returned with a bigger army He formed, in fact, the advance guard of Abdali's army in its new campaign The Maratha army in the Panjab, at this time, was not more than fifteen thou- sand strong Of this, five thousand under Bapuji Trimbak were in Multan, five thousand under Tukoji garrisoned Lahore, while Sabaji had another five thousand moving from place to place The only region of the Panjab which was comparatively well settled and yielding any direct revenue, as distinguished from tributes and ransoms, was the Sarhind—Jalandar area This had been placed under Sadik Beg—wrongly copied as Sandip Beg in Marathi chronicles He had consented of his own accord to pay five lakhs more than originally set- tled with Adina Beg His Diwan Lakshmi Narayan had been won over to the Maratha side The mutual relations between Tukoji Holkar and Sabaji Shinde in the Panjab were none too good Sabaji treated Tukoji as a lower official and kept the whole purse and power in his own hands ¹⁸ Tukoji at this time was a junior officer and only a servant of Malharrao Holkar and not, as is wrongly thought, one of his near relations, though he ultimately succeeded to the Holkar's jagir Malharrao wrote to Tukoji to send Holkar's share in the revenues of the Panjab to Indore Tukoji replied that Sabaji Patel had taken all the money and had allowed him only the daily wages for his troops When Tukoji remonstrated, Sabaji showed him a letter from Janakoji Shinde order- ing Tukoji to draw only wages while the rest of the account would be settled by Janakoji and Malharrao, the masters, amongst themselves As Tukoji had no intention of impeding the government machinery and fighting a civil war, he followed Janakoji's instructions According to Tukoji, without the help of Malharrao the Shindes would never succeed in the Panjab Moreover, Sabaji would never take Tukoji into confidence and settle the Maratha policy in consultation with him Otherwise, complains Tukoji, it was possible to estab- lish peace in the Panjab, had Sabaji followed his advice In his incomplete letters¹⁹ (and only two such letters have unfortunately come into the hands of historians) he clearly says that the Marathas had collected revenues from Sar- hind, the (Jalandar) Doab, Lahore, Multan and Attock From this description it is clear that the Marathas had spread up to the Indus and beyond, and not stopped at the Chinab as emphatically stated 18 Chandrachuda Daftar I.49, II.4 (To be read together) 19 Ibid. I.49, II.4.

14 PANIPAT 1761 by Sir Jadunath²⁰ and copied on his authority by Dr Hari Ram Gupta and others That they had gone to Peshawar is also clear from the contemporary Persian Akhbars which clearly say that Tukoji had reached Peshawar in October 1758, and that Sahibji (Sabaji) Patel had started from Peshawar and reached Lahore in March 1759 It is no "ignorant boast" of the Marathas, therefore, "that the Maratha standards were carried up to the Indus at Attock," as in fact they had not only reached that crossing but had, ignoring the so- called bar for the Hindus not to cross it, actually reached Peshawar and lived there for about six months ²¹ This was the zenith of Maratha expansion, and it is not a sin, we think, if the Marathas feel some natural pride in that event Raghunathrao had kept Adina Beg as the chief administrator in Lahore and the Jalandar area because it was through his invitation and support that the Marathas had entered the Panjab He is reported to have promised to pay the Marathas in cash for their help at the rate of one lakh of rupees for every day of marching and half a lakh for every day of halt,²² but it is doubtful whether the Marathas did receive even a portion of such payment It is known, on the whole, that Raghunathrao's campaign of Lahore had been anything but profitable to the Peshwa's government Raghunathrao had presented a deficit account of eighty lakhs to the Poona court and Sadashivrao Bhau had an oc casion to reprimand him in that connection Nor does it seem that Adina Beg ever paid the seventy-five lakhs a year as promised to the Marathas No doubt, he died within four months of the event and during the interval he had to wage incessant war against the Sikhs for whom he had no particular love, though he had made use of them in his rebellion against the Afghan rule In fact, though an able administrator, he had no scruples against changing sides and he may be called a time server or an opportunist in politics After his death, his widow and a boy-child succeeded to his office with Sadik Beg, who was already a foujdar of Sarhind, as her deputy This seems to have weakened the admin istration and become detrimental to the Maratha cause In short, the Peshwa's idea of making use of the machinery of the Mughal government with all its en- cumbrances proved fatal to the Maratha cause in the Panjab as it had proved in other parts of India as well After his return from the Panjab in May 1759, Dattaji Shinde thought of going to Bengal through the territory of Shuja-ud daulah in order to exact Chauth from the new Nawab Mir Jafar set up by the English and pay off the Peshwa's debts. The Peshwa's letters to the Shindes in this connection do not show him in the best light He had no scruples in choosing any side provided money could be had out of it The Marathas seemed to be auctioning the Wazir- ship of Delhi to the highest bidder ²³ Malharrao was directly responsible for the 1754 revolution in Delhi with a new Emperor and a new Wazir But later he was convinced that the Wazir was anything but a straightforward man So he turned away from Ghazi ud din and naturally inclined towards Najib Khan ²⁰ Fall 2 76. ²¹ BISM (Persian Mss.) Nos. 696, 699, BISMQ No 93 (Marathas Beyond Attock) ²² GUPTA, Adina Beg Khan, p 33 ²³ Ait., Patren Yadi Nos 166, 167, 171

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 17 When, after waiting for two months, Dattaji realized the impasse in which he had been placed by Najib, he thought of punishing him. By this time, however, Najib had formed his impregnable lines behind natural impedi- ments on the bank of the Ganges at Sukartal and from that secure position defied the might of the Shindes. From this place of refuge he built a causeway for himself across the Ganges and thus kept open his line of communication with the Ruhela regions beyond. From these he secured supplies and also military help. He engaged Dattaji in this manner for four months, till the latter was obliged to raise the siege in order to meet Abdali coming down from the Panjab in December, 1759. Sabaji was governing the Panjab with some ten thousand troops, a force quite inadequate to hold the line against the Afghan tornado. Abdali had sent his general Jahan Khan in advance with fifteen thousand troops from Peshawar and himself followed by way of Shikarpur in Sind along the right bank of the Indus. They had first to deal with the Sikh rebels. The Sikhs defeated Jahan Khan's vanguard and killed two thousand of his troops. Seeing that he could not possibly hold his own, Sabaji precipitately fell back from Batala and returned by way of Ambala and Kunjpura to Dattaji's camp at Sukartal on the Ganges. This was in the beginning of November 1759. Only the corps of Bapuji Trimbak which had been stationed at Multan had no time to run away and hence was caught in the Doab. It had come up to Firozpur on the Satlaj, where it was overtaken by a party of the Afghans who cut it to pieces. Only five hundred out of a total of six thousand returned on foot, unclad and underfed, all their property including horses having been plun- dered by the Afghans. They came a month and a half later and met Dat- taji near Thaneshwar where he had proceeded to meet Abdali, by breaking up his camp at Sukartal, in the last week of December 1759. The Bhau Bakhar vividly describes the horror felt by Dattaji Shinde and his troops when they saw their comrades returning in such a wretched condition. The en- thusiasm for fighting with Abdali faded away and all thought it as an evil omen of forthcoming disaster. This was the beginning of the end of the Panjab episode in Maratha history. That episode had occupied only a brief period of one and a half years and carried the Maratha standards up to Pesha- war, but the cost of this glory was out of all proportion to the gains, and ended with the great setback of Panipat a year later.

16 PANIPAT 1761 given a prejudicial colour by the author of the Bhau Bakhar, so as to make it appear as a clandestine agreement between Govindpant and Najib to support the latter When the Shindes entered the Doab, Najib Khan was brought to the Maratha camp to discuss terms with Dattaji The author of the Bakhar says of this interview that Janakoji, Naro Shankar, Antaji Mankeshwar and other Sardars wanted to arrest Najib Khan this time, but Dattaji, through the advice of Govindpant, at once forbade them from entertaining such a treacherous thought This was in conformity with the whole Maratha tradi- tion as exemplified in history and in accord with their general feeling Had the Marathas ever taken to what they themselves called "Moglai lava" or "Moglai maslat," meaning thereby the politics of treacherous arrests and mur- ders, their whole history would have perhaps been written otherwise, though it is a moot point in history whether they would not have been more successful —barring the moral stigma—in their undertakings thereby Najib, however, got a new lease of life by his double dealings in this affair Had he flatly refused to help the Marathas in building a bridge over the Ganges, they would have possibly found out some other means of gaining their ends Dattaji had the intention of proceeding to Bengal post haste be- fore the monsoon had set in and the rivers flooded He had planned to canton in Patna²⁵ and thence to bring pressure on Bengal during the monsoon His plan was completely foiled by the delaying and promising tactics of Najib When a month passed and the monsoon actually set in, he pleaded his in ability to do the needful, and promised to build the bridge after the rains Side by side he was hatching a conspiracy of driving away the Marathas from the north It seems that Emperor Alamgir II was himself a party to this con- spiracy, being fed up with the tyrannical Wazir Malika Zamani, the Dowager Empress, was whole heartedly behind the idea or, perhaps, she herself was the originator of it, as depicted in all the Marathi chronicles Najib Khan is depicted as following her orders and wishes Madhosingh of Jaipur and Bijesingh of Marwad were also whole heartedly supporting Najib in his invi- tation to Abdali to come back to India and drive the Marathas south of the Narmada once for all Najib was so clever in keeping the whole project secret that even Govindpant Bundele,²⁶ who was a near neighbour of his and always on the alert for news of any kind, was unaware of this internal correspondence carried on for two years between these parties, and even sending of special en- voys to the court of Abdali at Kandahar The Marathas came to know of this secret only when Abdali actually entered the Panjab and began to drive away the Maratha outposts in that province, in October 1759 This bespeaks of great looseness in the management of Maratha affairs That they should have no information of projects for ousting them and should not have properly ap- praised the characters of the various persons engaged in activities against their rule, shows that their intelligence department had none of that efficiency that it had in the times of Shivaji and Rajaram in the previous century This weak- ness was fatal to the Maratha Empire. ²⁵ Ibid. 2.101. ²⁶ Ibid. 60.126.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 17 When, after waiting for two months, Dattaji realized the impasse in which he had been placed by Najib, he thought of punishing him. By this time, however, Najib had formed his impregnable lines behind natural impedi- ments on the bank of the Ganges at Sukartal and from that secure position defied the might of the Shindes. From this place of refuge he built a causeway for himself across the Ganges and thus kept open his line of communication with the Ruhela regions beyond. From these he secured supplies and also military help. He engaged Dattaji in this manner for four months, till the latter was obliged to raise the siege in order to meet Abdali coming down from the Panjab in December, 1759. Sabaji was governing the Panjab with some ten thousand troops, a force quite inadequate to hold the line against the Afghan tornado. Abdali had sent his general Jahan Khan in advance with fifteen thousand troops from Peshawar and himself followed by way of Shikarpur in Sind along the right bank of the Indus. They had first to deal with the Sikh rebels. The Sikhs defeated Jahan Khan's vanguard and killed two thousand of his troops. Seeing that he could not possibly hold his own, Sabaji precipitately fell back from Batala and returned by way of Ambala and Kunjpura to Dattaji's camp at Sukartal on the Ganges. This was in the beginning of November 1759. Only the corps of Bapuji Trimbak which had been stationed at Multan had no time to run away and hence was caught in the Doab. It had come up to Firozpur on the Satlaj, where it was overtaken by a party of the Afghans who cut it to pieces. Only five hundred out of a total of six thousand returned on foot, unclad and underfed, all their property including horses having been plun- dered by the Afghans. They came a month and a half later and met Dat- taji near Thaneshwar where he had proceeded to meet Abdali, by breaking up his camp at Sukartal, in the last week of December 1759. The Bhau Bakhar vividly describes the horror felt by Dattaji Shinde and his troops when they saw their comrades returning in such a wretched condition. The en- thusiasm for fighting with Abdali faded away and all thought it as an evil omen of forthcoming disaster. This was the beginning of the end of the Panjab episode in Maratha history. That episode had occupied only a brief period of one and a half years and carried the Maratha standards up to Pesha- war, but the cost of this glory was out of all proportion to the gains, and ended with the great setback of Panipat a year later.

CHAPTER II SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER BEFORE proceeding to Bahlulpur¹ on the Satlaj to arrange for the govern- ment of the Punjab in February 1759, Dattaji had already forfeited the confi- dence of the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din by his policy of initiating things on his own au- thority without paying any attention to the Wazir's interests and susceptibilities. The Wazir complained that even after giving his all, the Empire was not able to keep its prestige. All who had taken part in the business had lost their all with nothing left to fall back upon.² This was a true indictment. As the Wazir had found the Maratha power to be a broken reed in times of need, he had perforce to open negotiations with others and try to have something in his own power. Abdali, when he returned in 1757, had tried to establish a sort of balance of power at the Delhi court. He had restored the deposed Emperor to his place and therefore the Wazir was no more free to do away with him or to over ride him when he liked.³ Najib Khan had been ap- pointed Mir Bakshi thus placing the military power in his hands as a check on the Wazir. Ahmad Shah had also shown the wisdom of deposing Intizam- ud-daulah (on whom he had at first bestowed the Wazirship) and restoring Ghazi-ud-din to his office. When the Marathas returned, they had to do away with Najib as the one real representative of Abdali's cause in India. But he was not arrested and put into prison as he ought to have been, if the Marathas wished to rule over Delhi. On the contrary, he was allowed to keep the districts under him, and to act as a collector for the Marathas! This meant that Najib had still left to him both the means and the freedom to create mischief. When Dattaji returned, he found a stalemate in the Delhi politics due to this position. While the Wazir had all the legal power of the Empire, of appointing and dismissing, of granting and resuming, centred in him there was no sanction behind his decrees as the military power rested with Najib. Dattaji by his high handedness alienated the Wazir, but did not, by any means, win over his rival for power, Najib. Dattaji discovered this fact when it was too late. As stated in the previous chapter, he confidently tried to make Najib join him in his cause through the mediation of Govindpant Bun- dele. But Najib completely foiled his project by procrastination. Dattaji, angered by this deceit and insult, at once besieged Najib with an overwhelming force. But even this overwhelming force was ineffective before the cunning and the ability of Najib. There are certain natural impediments which it is impossible to over- come even with greater force. Najib's camp at Sukartal had the Ganges on three sides and on the fourth side the ground was so uneven that to approach Najib's camp with artillery or even with cavalry was well-nigh impossible, espe- cially during the rains. The plains in the Gangetic Doab become so muddy 1 BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699 2 SPD 27.140 3 Purandhare 3.205 [ 18 ]

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 19 during the rains that a horse running at full speed would bury itself chest- deep in a few steps. The riverside land becomes boggy and too treacherous to be entered. Thick undergrowth of rushes and thorny bushes makes pene- tration by infantry also very difficult. While these were the difficulties which the Maratha army had to face, Najib's line of communications in the rear always remained open even during the rains, as due to a bend in the river, the force of the current there becomes the least troublesome. The trans- Gangetic region was peopled and controlled by his own kith and kin, the Ruhelas. There was never any difficulty in fetching grain and fodder, am- munition and other war necessaries. Added to these were, of course, the in- domitable spirit, the singleness of purpose and personal bravery of his troops who were the best infantry trained on the European model in those days Dattaji was camping some two miles from Sukartal near the. village Miranpur, which was the centre of the famous Sayyads. These Sayyads be- longed to the Shia sect and hence hated the Sunni Ruhelas. Dattaji had built a temporary mud fort for his camp. Thence the Maratha troops would sally out and try to come into direct contact with the Ruhelas. But this had been made difficult for the Maratha cavalry, and it seems the Maratha foot- men in the 18th century had none of the virtues of pluck and resourcefulness which were the most enviable and noticeable features of Shivaji's Mavlas. During a siege which lasted for more than four months, there were scarcely any actions as such. The Bhau Bakhar gives a vivid description of the condi- tions during these months. The exchange of artillery fire between the two armies was indecisive, because the shots from the Maratha side could not hit Najib's camp under any circumstances. At a lower angle the shot would fall into the surrounding ravines and at a higher angle the shot would go whistling across Najib's camp and fall into the Ganges. On the other hand, fire from Najib's camp was very effective and would daily kill a few who tried to approach. Dattaji had this time some forty thousand troops with him in- cluding the contingents of Govindpant, Antaji Manakeshwar's son Bahiropant and the local levies of the Sayyads. Najib had possibly not more than ten thousand troops, though it is quite impossible to be sure of the figures of those days. But though the troops actually staying in Najib's camp were com- paratively few, beyond the Ganges the whole clan of the Ruhelas, some fifty thousand strong, was helping him in all possible ways. While the Maratha troops suffered from scarcity, Najib always had access to all the things he wanted. Besides, the climate of those muddy and boggy low lands was found unsuitable to the health of the Maratha troops and the animals of the south- ern breed. Whenever Dattaji tried to assault, he was repulsed at heavy cost. Two such offensive actions seem to have taken place during these months with more than a thousand casualties. Jivaji Shinde and his son Hanmantrao were killed in one of these actions. As the siege was dragging on, Najib Khan's diplomacy was winning greater successes for him. Ahmad Shah had already started from Kandahar and was thinking of entering-the Panjab from the southern side via Bhakkar and Multan. But he could not cross the Indus at any point and had to come

20 PANIPAT: 1761 north to Attock along the right bank of the river via Mithankot, Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan. His general, Jahan Khan, entered the Panjab in October 1759 by way of Peshawar. Madhosingh of Jaipur, who was a party to the anti-Maratha conspiracy, made a firm stand against the troops of Malhar- rao Holkar who had been ordered by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji's help. Shuja-ud-daulah had been sounded by Najib, though their earlier relations were none of the best. Najib impressed on Shuja the gravity of the situa- tion in which Shuja would find himself if the Marathas were ever able to cross the Ganges and enter Oudh. Feeling the impending danger, Shuja consented to help Najib in every way to hold the line of the Ganges. When October came in, Dattaji devised a new strategy of squeezing out Najib. Getting the help of one Jeta Gujar who pointed out a ford higher up the Ganges, Govindpant Bundele with ten thousand troops crossed the river⁴ at the back of Najib and attacked Jalalabad, the Ruhela fort, around which a town had also grown. There were no troops worth the name there, but at the call of Zabeta Khan, Najib's son, the Afghan clansmen all over Rohil- khand came to help him. They held the fort while the Maratha troops plun- dered and burnt their property and houses in the southern plain. Govindpant next turned due south to the bridge-head on the eastern bank of the Ganges, opposite Sukartal. The Marathas succeeded in cutting off the bridge-head and thus threatened Najib's line of communication by the bridge of boats. Hafiz Rahmat, the grand old man amongst the Ruhelas, advised Najib to come to terms with the Marathas, but Najib would not leave Sukartal under any cir- cumstances and bided his time. His Ruhela troops were alarmed and began to waver, but Najib clenched his teeth and pulled on as best as he could, till he was relieved by the vanguard of the Oudh army sent by Shuja under Umraogir Gosawi. The rumours of Abdali's quick and near approach through the Panjab were also circulated by Najib to frighten the Marathas. As a mat- ter of fact, Abdali was still far away. But the Maratha troops under Govind- pant lost heart and precipitately returned without crossing swords with the Gosawi troops. The rumour of Abdali's coming to the Panjab and Janakoji's chit to return hastened Govindpant's sudden flight.⁵ Thus the advantage which might have been gained by the Maratha side was lost by this sudden development. Though the troops returned in a hurry and as a result some were actually killed or drowned, Sir Jadunath's estimate that half of their number were drowned is very wide of the mark. This can be seen from Govind- pant's letter to Sadashivrao Bhau.⁶ Najib Khan was almost on the point of running away from Sukartal as most of his troops had left to defend their homes, but in all these affairs destiny ultimately is found going against the Marathas. Because Umraogir entered the scene just in time and rumours were circulated by Najib that Shuja was himself following with thirty-thou- sand troops, Janakoji thought it necessary to send a note to Govindpant to re- turn at once. Similarly the early rumours of Abdali's march had their effect on ⁴ Raj. I 140, 141, 142. ⁵ Ibid. 1.143. ⁶ SPD 40.126

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 21 Dattaji's removing his camp from Sukartal Sabaji actually reached Dat- taji's camp on 10th November, 1759, but the news of his coming back was circulated a month earlier so as to loosen Dattaji's grip over Sukartal Abdali was still near Lahore and his troops had not penetrated up to Thaneshwar till the last week of December, but Ghazi ud din, who was chicken hearted, was frightened when he caught certain news carriers carrying letters to and from the Emperor Alamgir at Delhi Therein the Emperor was found writing in vitations to Shuja ud daulah on the one hand and Ahmad Shah Abdali on the other, and they were assuring him of their imminent arrival Seeing the danger, the Wazir, who was quick in decision and had no qualms of conscience, got the Emperor and Intizam ud daulah (his rival for Wazirship) murdered on November 29, 1759, through Balabash Khan, his captain, and unceremoniously flung their corpses on the river bank Next, the Wazir's assistants produced a prince from the house of Taimur and crowned him as Emperor under the title of Shah Jahan III This prince was a grandson of Kam Bakhsh,⁷ the youngest son of Aurangzib, and was dragging his life out in the imperial prison Thus the Wazir thought that he had taken precautions against Abdali's making use of the old Emperor and his possible Wazir As a matter of fact, this event sent a thrill of horror through the Muslims of Hindusthan and the Wazir, who was already hated as a tool of the Marathas, lost what little respect was still felt for him As the Marathas did not seem to have protested against this act, they were naturally held morally responsible for this butchery It took away the sympathy for the Marathas and had a worse effect on Sadashivrao Bhau's campaign the following year Dattaji being thoroughly disappointed at the siege and at the negotia- tions for tribute and help from Shuja ud daulah, ultimately raised the siege on 15th December and divided his army into two parts He placed the camp, the bazar and their inmates, together with his family, under the charge of Rupram Kothari and asked him to go back to Delhi with his Jat troops He himself with his select troops proceeded to meet Abdali beyond the Jamuna so as to stop him from entering the Doab and joining Najib He had perhaps twenty five thousand chosen horsemen under him He proceeded to Karnal by crossing the Jamuna south of Kunjpura at the Andhera Ghat on 18th Decem ber, 1759, and sent scouts to find out Abdali's movements He learnt that Abdali s son, Taimur Shah, with forty thousand troops and all his Sardars had arrived north of Ambala and were camping at Laldu, Banora and Chhat⁸ on Saturday, the 15th of December, and that Ahmad Shah was himself following The first skirmish between the vanguards of the two armies took place on 20th December Dattaji himself proceeded north with his chosen twenty five thou sand troops without any camp equipment, carrying only as much luggage as a soldier could carry on his horse He had ordered Janakoji Shinde and the Wazir Ghazi ud din to remain at Karnal some fifteen miles behind his ad- vance line, with their parks of artillery, in order to check any surprise party of the Durrani troops proceeding south to attack the main camp and the bazar, ⁷ Ibid. 2 107 ⁸ Ibid 2.109

22 PANIPAT: 1761 from proceeding further south towards Delhi with Govindpant Bundele. Hear- ing that Dattaji was advancing with his unencumbered troops to cut him off before reaching the Jamuna, Abdali changed his intention of crossing the river by the easier crossing, south of Kunjpura, so as to proceed straight through Shamli and Muzaffarnagar to Sukartal. Instead, he kept close to the moun- tain side and arrived at Jagadhri on the 23rd. He himself with his select troops and a park of mobile artillery stopped to engage the advancing Dattaji, and ordered his camp with its heavy baggage to begin crossing at once. Dattaji advanced vigorously, but to his dismay found that he had been anticipated by the Durrani and thus was unable to cut off and loot his camp equipage. On the other hand, he had to face the sharp fire of Shutarnals which killed his troops en masse. Thus no effect could be produced on Abdali's army, while the loss on the Maratha side was considerable, amounting to some four thou- sand killed and wounded. There was no corresponding gain in obstructing Abdali's advance. On the night of that battle of 24th December, Abdali de- camped with his whole camp crossing the river by the Budhia Ghat on his way to Saharanpur. Next morning, when Dattaji saw the number of killed and wounded, he must have felt deeply for his error of judgment in keeping his artillery behind. This was the first occasion on which the Marathas discovered the weakness of their traditional mode of warfare, which was found inade- quate in dealing with the new mode based on artillery and musketry. Dattaji now retreated to Delhi, arriving there about the 5th January, 1760. Thence he detached his camp and sent it back under the protection of Ruparam Kothari to the Jat territory. He himself was preparing to go to Meerut and attack Abdali and the Ruhelas combined. The Peshwa had long ago ordered Malharrao Holkar to leave Rajputana and proceed to Sukartal to help the Shindes. But his life-long habits of procrastination and perhaps his unwillingness to join his forces with those of the Shindes, especially in the work of completely crushing Najib against his will, delayed his march from Balwada which he was besieging then. As a matter of fact, Balwada was an insignificant fort under a captain of Jaipur. But it held out this time for some two months. This seems to be due to Madhosingh's policy of engaging the Maratha generals separately till the arrival of Ahmad Shah Abdali. As Najib Khan and Madhosingh of Jaipur were the two most important conspirators in the conspiracy of driving the Marathas south of the Narbada with the help of Abdali, it was but natural that Madhosingh should, in furtherance of their cause, try to pin down Malharrao to Rajputana so as to frustrate his plans of proceeding to help Dattaji. Anyway, Malharrao's conduct on this occasion had the effect of putting the whole brunt of meeting Abdali on the Shindes. Dattaji was trying now to postpone a trial of strength with the combined Dur- rani and Ruhela troops till the arrival of Malharrao. Malharrao in extenua- tion of his delaying conduct is found putting the plea that the Shindes⁹ had cancelled their first call for help from Sukartal, when they found they had enough troops with them after the arrival of the Panjab troops under Sabaji and Tukoji. But after the first battle near the Budhia Ghat, Janakoji sent ⁹ Ibid. 2.117

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23 an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu- ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided to forestall him. Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north- east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir. The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat- taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross- ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions, he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi, where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes, it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point. . Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th January, 1760. Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross- ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat- taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention