पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 23 an express call for help to Malharrao who started at once on the first of Janu- ary, 1760. Had there been a man of Bajirao's type, he would have possibly covered the distance from Jaipur to Delhi just in time to join Dattaji. But Ahmad Shah probably knowing the speed of Malharrao's advance, decided to forestall him. Ahmad Shah left Sukartal within a week and advanced by way of Meerut to Luni on the Jamuna. This place is about seven miles to the north- east of Delhi and opposite to it is the ferry of Jagatpur. Abdali was trying to find the least defended part on the opposite bank of the Jamuna so as to cross the river without giving any chance to the enemy to attack his force while crossing. It was impossible for him to cross near Delhi, because the fire from the Delhi fort could have been effectively used against him by the Wazir. The ghats just to the north of Delhi were guarded by Dattaji's scouts. Dat- taji himself was camping in the vicinity of Majnu's hillock, two miles to the north of Delhi. He had so distributed his army as to meet any surprise cross- ing by the Durrani troops at any point. But the river was fordable at many points, and it was difficult to keep watch in a low land with the dense fog of January covering it. As Dattaji could have no intimation of Abdali's intentions, he had to depend on mere guess work. Three days passed in manoeuvring for a crossing, and Abdali ultimately chose to cross opposite the village of Buradi, where the terrain was most uneven and difficult. This place is some seven miles to the north of Delhi. Dattaji had guarded the crossings to the south of this place well. In order to mislead the Marathas, Abdali sent small parties to each of the crossings and with the main army he went to Badarpur and tried to cross thence. He crossed over to Buradi because that was probably the least guarded part. The river there had separated into two streams with a sandy low island between. It was overgrown with thick rushes which attain in these parts a height of ten feet. If soldiers lie in ambush interspersed in these rushes, it would be impossible to see or locate them within a few yards. Till one actually arrives on the edge of the river, one cannot see it from any point in the vicinity. Nor can the crossing at this point be seen from any southern point on the bank, because the land there bulges out a little and shuts the view to the north. Though the Marathi chronicle indulges in vivid description, it is not known whether Dattaji had actually placed a force at this particular point. . Perhaps he had not, and he seems to have been informed of the crossing when half the army of Abdali had already crossed. This was on the morning of 10th January, 1760. Early that morning, Dattaji received news, one after the other, of his guards at various points on the river being simultaneously attacked by the cross- ing parties of Durrani and Ruhela soldiers and being very roughly handled by them. This was Abdali's ruse to send Dattaji on the wrong scent. But Dat- taji would not move unguardedly and would not call in the help from his whole camp which was spread over a vast plain, each part being separated from the other by a considerable distance. In fact he had no mind to engage the enemy till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar for whom he was waiting and perhaps wanted to fall back on the city in case of need. His only intention

24 PANIPAT: 1761 was to keep the enemy at a distance from the city till Holkar's arrival so as not to be besieged within the city walls. But this was the very reason why the Durrani made haste and crossed over simultaneously at various points. It seems that none of the parties placed by Dattaji with a few thousand troops each could stand against the enemy's advance with fire from the light cannon placed on the elephants, who swam across in front. Practically the whole of the Shinde contingent was composed of horsemen used to sword and lance, unlike the Ruhelas who were footmen armed with muskets and rifles. The result was that in fights from a distance the Marathas were always at a dis- advantage. When almost all the Maratha parties had been completely routed with heavy loss of life, Dattaji received news from Janrao Wable, a veteran captain of horse, that half the army of the enemy had crossed the river. Dat- taji sent Bayaji Shinde to help Janrao in holding the ghat at Buradi, which is some three miles away from the village of that name. Receiving the news that Bayaji was worsted with his three thousand horse, and he himself killed by a bullet-shot, Dattaji ordered his whole contingent to follow him to the river- bank. He tried to go to the Buradi Ghat not from the west side but from the south-west along the village of Jagatpur. He crossed first an ordinary nullah and then the lake-like inner stream. When he entered the part overgrown with rushes, his cavalry could not keep any line or move in any close formation. The Ruhela infantry, which was lying in ambush in the rushes, opened fire from here, there and everywhere, and made it impossible for Dattaji to proceed. Janakoji who was accompanying Dattaji though forbidden, received a bullet- wound on the right upper arm. The news of this incident had the effect of still more demoralising the Maratha troops, and each tried to turn back to escape what seemed certain death. Dattaji was advised by those near him to order a retreat. But before anything could be done, he himself fell down with a bullet- wound in his ribs. The Afghans then rushed out and completed the rout of the Maratha army with a heavy massacre. The story of the wounded Dattaji being taunted and kicked by Mian Qutb Shah and his cutting off Dattaji's head after some talk, seems more dramatic than true and an invention of the author of the chronicle. We have no belief in it. There was no regular battle at Buradi Ghat and the two armies were never drawn together in battle array, nor is the number of casualties known. Yashvantrao Jagdale, Bayaji Shinde and Maloji Shinde were the noted persons who lost their lives in this action. Govindpant Bundele does not seem to have taken any part in guarding the ghats as written in the chronicle, though he was not far away from the field of battle. Perhaps he was in the camp of Janakoji a few miles away from Delhi. On the Afghan side, Shuja-ud-daulah does not seem to have been present in Abdali's camp nor any of his troops like the Gosawi corps. Therefore, the story given in the Bhau Bakhar of Shuja begging for the head of Dattaji and Umraogir Gosawi buying it for two lakhs and afterwards attending to his full funeral rites must be treated as pure fiction written to console the Shinde family and recommend Ragho Ram Page and Rajaram Chobdar to their attention. The action was fought mainly be- tween the Ruhelas of Najib and Qutb Shah, and Dattaji, though the Dur- ranis followed soon after to turn it into a rout and pursue the Shinde contin-

KARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 25 gent to a long distance. Purushottam Mahadev Hingne¹⁰ who was present in the battle and received a bullet-wound on his thigh, writes that the action was a short and swift one, turning into a rout on account of the general's ac- cidental death in the very first round and the leader receiving a bullet-wound himself. No battle could be fought because the place was unsuitable on ac- count of the thick rushes, and because there was no intention either of offer- ing one till the arrival of Malharrao Holkar. In fact, the main part of the Maratha army was at a distance from the river-bank and not ready for a fight. The division under Dattaji was not sufficient to meet the combined forces of Abdali and Najib with any hope of success. That is why Dattaji had asked Govindpant Bundele with his small brigade to continue with him all along and invited help from Surajmal Jat, who was the only ally left to the Marathas in Northern India. The Wazir's contingent was not more than five thousand strong this time, and was not very helpful or wholeheartedly with the Marathas. The Durranis pursued Janakoji for twenty-five miles and then re- turned. Malharrao who had started on the 1st of January was still at a dis- tance of some one hundred and fifty miles from Delhi! Janakoji followed in the direction of Rewadi towards which place his camp had been despatched with Ruparam Kothari and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, the Shinde's Diwan. It was impossible for Janakoji to ride a horse with his aching wound which had become worse by the first day's headlong flight. As the whole baggage had been looted by the pursuers or left behind as heavy, there was no palanquin with carriers in the whole army. A char-pai (cot) was taken as a substitute and Janakoji was carried on it by the soldiers themselves acting as carriers, leaving their horses in the charge of others. After covering thirty miles in this manner, with great trouble Janakoji reached his camp with the remnants of his broken army after midnight that day. Bhagirathibai, who seems to be a second wife of Dattaji, was in advanced pregnancy and went with the retreat- ing camp. As soon as Janakoji arrived in the camp, his wife Kashibai and Bhagirathibai came out of their tent to see what had happened. Coming to know of Dattaji's death and the defeat of his army, the whole camp was plunged into grief, and there was a great uproar and wailing. From the dramatic description of the Bakhar, Bhagirathibai who was not more than sixteen in age (having been married to Dattaji in March 1758) seems to have been a woman of exceptional self-composure and precociously wise. Instead of indulging in useless crying, she reprimanded others for not taking courage and acting as was necessary under the circumstances. She ordered a halt till the morning and stopped the march of the army so as to dress Janakoji's wounds and afford him rest after a run of twenty hours; but the camp which was terrified by what they had heard and afraid of being caught by the pursuing Durrani troops, started at once in the small hours of the morning in the direction of Rewadi. Disobeying her orders, the whole civil camp started, and as a consequence it became difficult for the leaders to continue the halt without the help of camp-followers. The officers in the Shinde contingent 10 Ibid. 2.114.

26 PANIPAT: 1761 found it an extremely difficult problem to carry the heavy baggage, including stores of cloth, grain and fodder. They sought counsel with the two women who were now in place of their masters, and after a short consultation, took with them the most necessary and light equipment only, setting fire to the rest for fear of its falling into the hands of the enemy. They placed Janakoji in the lady's palanquin and began to search for horses for the use of the two women. Meanwhile, under the stress of panic, the camp-followers had caught all the available horses and run away with them. With difficulty two ponies were secured and the women started on them. Rupram Kothari, who was accompanying the party, suggested, in order to mislead the Durrani pursuers and to put them on the wrong scent, that the two women and Janakoji should separate themselves from the disorderly camp and go secretly to Kumbher. But Kashibai, for fear of falling into the Jat's hands should they turn traitors in this calamity, disapproved the plan and they continued with the broken camp and the army as best as they could. After four days of continuous trou- ble, the fore-runners of the army came into touch with the advance party of the Holkar's contingent and stopped there. • On the 15th January, 1760, Malharrao came and joined the party to the north of Kot Putali. Then only the panic subsided and men found time to think of what had happened and to plan the future in accordance with it. • It seems from Janakoji's letter¹¹ to the Peshwa that the plight of the Shinde army was exaggerated by the Bakhar writer. The Shinde division though defeated, was not as helpless as the author of the chronicle would paint it to be. The action at the Buradi Ghat was fought on the 10th of January, and not on the 9th, as the day was Thursday.¹² Malharrao and his Diwan Gangadharpant Chandrachud were men of quite a different type from Janakoji Shinde and his Diwan Ramaji Anant Dabholkar. Cautiousness and far-sighted- ness were the chief virtues of Malharrao, and these fully coincided with the traditional habits and temper of the Marathas. Malharrao's whole policy was based on opportunism and not on any fixed principles. He would take no risk which would land him into a disaster. If the Marathas got something with- out much effort and little risk, that was sufficient and good. If they could not get the desired fruit and had to return without it, it was no dishonour to them, so thought Malharrao. And it was the guiding philosophy of his life. The Shinde family, on the other hand, was of a different temper. They were straightforward and would not mince matters in their dealings with friend or foe. They were more loyal servants trying to obey the Peshwa's commands as best as they could, and would shirk no risk in gaining their ends. The result is exemplified in the careers of the members of that illustrious family, which was mainly responsible for the Maratha activities in the north for three quar- ters of a century. Malharrao, on the contrary, would, in the greatest diffi- culties, first think of the safety of his life and property and then of everything else. With such a frame of mind, he was honest to himself but not necessarily to others with different principles, tempers and standards of conduct. This 11 Ibid. 21.182. 12 Ibid. 27.247.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 27 somewhat rough man with blunt manners looked out of place and bizarre in a mixed company of polished men with suave manners. At the same time there was always a substratum of truth in his mode of thinking, and others had to fall in line with it in times of difficulty. The present was such a time and Janakoji had to keep his family-dash in the background and follow Malharrao. Malharrao sent back the families with the baggage and the bazar to their homes through the friendly territory of the Raja of Keravli to Gwalior under the guardianship of Govindpant Bundele. He started from Kot Putali on the 23rd February. Bhagirathibai gave birth to a posthumous son¹³ of Dat- taji that night, but he seems to have died soon after. Malharrao and Janakoji then started back towards Delhi with a view to check Abdali's progress and counteract his plans. The Marathas do not seem to have lost courage after the recent untoward happenings. They were still confident of being able to checkmate Abdali and the Ruhelas. Malharrao knew "that Najib Khan and Madhosingh were the chief wirepullers in inviting Ahmad Shah" and, contrary to the common belief, was ready now to reshuffle his former policy of befriend- ing Najib and the Wazir, whom he himself had put on the pedestal. He had thoroughly understood that "Ghazi-ud-din was not acting in consonance with the dignity of his high office and was fickle to a degree. Even though weak himself, he would still indulge in vile machinations and back-door politics. He would do what he liked and on meeting others, humble himself to such an ex- tent as to take away all wrath against his conduct and thus try to wipe out¹⁴ the evil effects of his behaviour." The Peshwa, Nanasaheb, on the other hand,— and in this case acting on the information and the prejudices of Raghunathrao¹⁵ ----wished to stick up for a person up to the last, after once having taken his side, and would not change his position unless an open and sufficient cause obliged him to do so. He had instructed Dattaji to act accordingly, but Ghazi- ud-din would neither grant what the Marathas wanted nor issue imperial sanads bestowing Allahabad and Benares on the Marathas.¹⁶ though Shuja- ud-daulah, his rival, would have been the loser. "You can conquer and take possession of the places you want as you are strong. Why do you want sanads for the same?" he would argue with the Marathas. Simultaneously he would write to Shuja-ud-daulah asking him never to grant or hand over these holy cities to the Marathas, but to prepare himself to defend them to the last. To which Shuja¹⁷ would reply that he would do the needful. Thus the two rivals for the chancellorship of the Empire were simultaneously acting hand in glove with the Marathas and also trying to defend the Muslim dominions at all costs and by every subterfuge. Najib had already deceived; fooled and ruined Dattaji, and the Wazir was now following in his wake. But after his late as- sassinations, it was impossible for the Marathas to back him any more and they had to re-orient their policy. 13 RAJ 1.162. 14 SPD 2 117. 15 Ait. Patra, Yadi 171 16 SPD 27.240 17 Ibid 27.240

28 PANIPAT: 1761 The Peshwa had, in his dire need of money, permitted¹⁸ Dattaji to ap- point Shuja to the office of the Wazir if he would grant the Maratha claims and pay down cash. Surajmal Jat was on good terms with Shuja as he was his friend's son and their interests also would not clash. On the one hand the Peshwa wanted these two allies to check-mate the Wazir in case he was not amenable to Maratha interests. On the other hand, he feared their combina- tion as likely to prove too strong for the Maratha power and, therefore, he was willing to support Ghazi-ud-din at all costs, as there was no fear of his becoming powerful enough to defy the Marathas. Dattaji had, therefore, chosen the path of placating Najib while keeping the question of the Chancel- lorship pending. Now that that alternative had disappeared, Malharrao had definitely decided to do away with the double-dealing and ambitious Wazir and invest¹⁹ Shuja with that office. Both Shuja and the Jat feared the Afghan union, as they were likely to be the next victims of that combination. Besides, Surajmal had the ambition of profiting and aggrandizing himself at the cost of the Ruhelas by spreading his power beyond the Jamuna and even the Ganges. Already the Jats had spread in the Doab and colonised certain parts of it. It was but natural, therefore, that they should rally round Surajmal as the "Lord of Braj." Just as Surajmal had made his power unassailable by building, strengthening and storing his forts of Deeg, Kumbher and Bharatpur, similarly he took the fortalice of Sabitgad, near Kol, re-named it Ramgad, and began to turn it into a second Kumbher. From this base he was trying to dominate the upper Doab and Rohilkhand beyond the Ganges. Malharrao had now established friendship²⁰ with the Jat Raja, forgetting the siege of Kumbher and his son's death. As it was in the interest of Surajmal to combat the Afghan power, he made common cause with the Marathas and helped them in this guerilla warfare. From Kot Putali, Malharrao and Janakoji began their new plan of making sudden raids on the enemy's undefended depots and roving round the flanks so as to sieze every opportunity of spoliation. Ahmad Shah was now camping south of Delhi and thence despatching letters to the various chiefs asking them to pay him tribute and join their forces with his in his efforts to drive the Marathas²¹ from northern India. But they knew his ways as well as his power and, therefore, chose to sit on the fence playing the game of procrastination, by neither acceding to nor refusing his demands, but merely . pleading their inability to do anything. Ahmad Shah had to visit their ter- ritories personally in order to squeeze any money out of them. First he moved south and besieged Deeg near Mathura. He drove away the small parties of the Marathas hovering round him. He was not able to make any im- pression on Deeg and had to move in pursuit of the threatening Marathas. Malharrao, accompanied by Janakoji and Naro Shankar, was reported to be at Narnol,²² whither Abdali moved next. 18 Ait. Patren Yadi 167. 19 SPD 21 183. 20 Ibid. 2 121. 21 Ibid. 21 186. 22 Ibid. 21.186.

SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER 29 Leaving Deeg, Ahmad Shah proceeded south-west into the Jaipur ter- ritory plundering wherever he went. He ransomed the small local Rajas of Kadhake and Khobari (Kurke and Khohari?). He was thinking of proceed- ing against the non-committing Madhosingh to Jaipur. On the road he slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting town of Mahwah²³ (twenty miles east of Bandikui), but spared the residents of Baswa²⁴ (ten miles north of Bandikui), as they offered ransom for their town. This was in the third week of February. There he received the news that the Marathas were looting the districts to the west of Delhi and had taken Rs. 10,000 as tribute from Kanaud.²⁵ Ahmad Shah, therefore, swerved north through Alwar territories,²⁶ leaving the direction of Jaipur. But before he could arrive near Delhi, Malharrao had formed another plan, depending upon Abdali's intended move against Jaipur which, had it been put into execution, would have engaged the Afghans there for at least a month or two. As Najib Khan and most of the other Ruhelas were accompanying Abdali on his march, Malharrao and his shrewd Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud thought of attacking the Ruhela lands in the Doab and beyond, in the absence of their proprietors. The Maratha army crossed the Jamuna to the south of Delhi on 20th February, 1760, and de- scended upon the rich town of Sikandrabad. There they halted and com- pletely looted the town on the Holi Day i.e. 1st March, 1760. They should have moved from the place the next day and proceeded farther, but there they heard that Najib Khan's treasure of ten lakhs was coming into the Doab on its way to the Abdali camp. It had come up to the bank of the Ganges opposite to the town of Anup Shahar. Getting this clue, they sent pickets to see where the Ganges could be crossed. In the meanwhile, Ahmad Shah hear- ing this move of Holkar, suddenly changed his direction and ran to the south of Delhi. Thence he detached Jahan Khan and Najib Khan with 35,000 troops unencumbered with any artillery or camp equipage. Surajmal Jat who in this guerilla war was helping the Marathas, came to know of this sudden move of Abdali and sent information of the same to Gangoba Chandrachud to warn him in time. The Maratha army had, therefore, already divided itself. The Shinde contingent under Janakoji as well as old Malharrao Holkar had fallen back towards Mathura and Agra. Rupram, the Jat envoy, accom- panied them. But the rest of Holkar's troops who never had any acquaintance with the Durrani ways and no experience of battling against them, laughed at the idea of running away on mere news of the enemy, and taunted the Shinde's troops as being faint-hearted. Janakoji, therefore, separated from Holkar and started towards Mathura. Malharrao himself personally followed him and ordered Gangoba Tatya to check the Durrani advance. But his corps was surprised, caught unprepared and massacred with heavy slaughter

²³ KHARE 1.21 ²⁴ Ibid. ²⁵ SPD 2.118. ²⁶ Ibid. 21.186. ²⁷ Ibid. 2.121.

30 PANIPAT: 1761 by Jahan Khan. Gangoba, who was personally alert, was able to run away and save himself; but Anandrao Ram Yadav, Shetyaji Kharade and his son were killed in the running fight,²³ and the broken remnant of the frightened army crossed the Jamuna back into the Jat territory, wherever it could. The experiment of checkmating the Durrani forces by guerilla tactics thus ended in failure. The Maratha forces, therefore, retreated to the borders of the Jaipur territory and encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. The Maratha tactics, how- ever, had saved not only the Jats but also the Rajput princes. Abdali had to turn back from Jaipur because the Marathas had swept towards Delhi, and now his army had to be stationed in the Doab to ward off the Maratha raids against the Ruhelas. The Marathas now reached a complete understanding with Surajmal Jat and renewed their former agreements with him. Surajmal promised to follow the Maratha policy in all respects. His own territories in the Doab were now directly threatened and he concentrated his strength on the defence of Ramgad (the modern Aligarh), which, however, surrendered to Abdali's overwhelming forces within a month. As all the Ruhelas were not on good terms and in full accord with Najib, the Marathas now tried to divide them by entering into a separate arrangement with Hafiz Rahmat, the grand old man amongst the trans-Gangetic Ruhelas. He agreed to join his forces with the Marathas, send back Abdali after detaching him from Najib and not to help Najib in his fight against the Marathas. The Marathas agreed, on the other hand, not to invade the other Ruhelas but to content themselves with the cis-Gangetic territories. Abdali would have now left for Afghanistan, had not Najib induced him to remain in India for protecting him against the chafing wrath of the Marathas. His stay in India gave a new turn to the Maratha politics in the north. ²³ Ibid. 2.121.

CHAPTER III SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA WHEN the tidings of Dattaji's death reached the Peshwa's camp at Ahmadnagar in the south, none in the Deccan was prepared for such a bolt from the blue. All had full confidence in the military talents of Dattaji Shinde. They expected him at least to stem the tide of the Durrani invasion if not to defeat Abdali and drive him back. Besides, the Peshwa had ordered Malharrao Holkar to proceed to Dattaji's help and he was expected to be on the route towards the Panjab. This was in the middle of November 1759, after Sabaji's return to Sukartal. At that time, it was expected that the Nizam in the Dec- can would be cowed down by ordinary manoeuvring of troops and be prepared to part with the north-western portion of his dominions. It seems that the Nizam had consented to grant Ahmadnagar and Parenda forts together with the revenue of the surrounding territories amounting to ten lakhs, to the Peshwa.¹ But afterwards, due to the advice of his brothers, he tried to equivocate about the grant of Ahmadnagar which was not only a strong fort in the military sense, but was a place of prestige for the Muslims, being the old seat of the Nizamshahi Kingdom. The Peshwa was not in a mood at that time to tolerate any delaying tactics. His position at the hour was thought to be almost that of a dictator in India. Since the Maratha standards were carried beyond the Attock² in the previous year, the Peshwa's fame had spread not only throughout the length and breadth of India, but had travelled beyond the boundaries to Iran and Turan.³ In the south his generals Balvantrao Mehendale, Gopalrao Patwardhan, Malhar Naik Raste and Visaji Krishna Biniwale had established the Maratha suzerainty south of the river Krishna.⁴ In the north his brother Raghunnathrao and his generals Dattaji and Mal- harrao had created such awe that none in those parts was willing to cross swords with the Marathas. Even the chiefs not conquered by the Marathas were ready to send ambassadors and try to negotiate terms for their existence and continuance.⁵ Shuja-ud-daulah had paid tribute⁶ and the English in Bengal, though they had slyly usurped the power by a silent revolution without pro- claiming themselves the masters, were still in need of the Peshwa's goodwill and forbearance towards them, and actually sent emissaries to the Poona Court to ward off Raghunathrao's proposed advance into Bengal.⁷ The Peshwa had, it seems, actually assured Clive of his support, and Clive made political use of that assurance in imposing himself upon the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah.⁸ Simi- larly, the English advance through Orissa to Masulipatam and the occupation ¹ RAJ. 1 154. ² BISM (Persian Mss) No. 696, dated 20-12 1758 ³ Aitihasika Sphuta Lekh 411 ⁴ SPD 28.200-02, 204, 210, 216, 217, 266 ⁵ BISM (Persian Mss.) No 699 ⁶ K. Patre Yadi No. 166 ⁷ JIHQ 15.3.388. ⁸ Hill 2.387, 388, 400 [ 31 ]

32 PANIPAT: 1761 of the French jagirs by Colonel Forde was made possible by Maratha for- bearance and the Peshwa's pressure on the Nizam Salabat Jang, the grantor of these jagirs. Naturally the Peshwa was thinking himself as suzerain in all these parts of India occupied by the English, for both the Deccan and Bengal as well as Arcot were paying chauth to the Marathas and the English had still not remonstrated against or interfered with this right. Bussy who had been recalled from the court of Hyderabad by Lally, had left for Pondicherry in July 1758. The result was that the fruit of his occupation of Daulatabad and of the assassination of Shah Nawaz Khan who was a protege of the Peshwa had been snatched away by others after his de- parture. Thus ended the French influence at the Nizam's Court. The Peshwa had succeeded in detaching Ibrahim Khan Gardi, pupil of Bussy, from the Nizam's service and engaging him himself.⁹ Thus strengthened, the Peshwa sent his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, with forty thousand troops to occupy Ahmad- nagar as promised by the Nizam. He was saved the trouble of besieging that strong fort as Kavi Jang, its keeper, agreed to deliver it to the Marathas in con- sideration for a jagir with an annual revenue of Rs. fifty thousand.¹⁰ Visaji Krishna took possession of it on 9th November, 1759. Thence Sadashivrao Bhau proceeded towards Beed and Dharur and commenced hostilities with the Nizam by fomenting and strengthening internal quarrels amongst the Nizam brothers. Basalat Jang separated himself from the Nizam and marched towards the south. The Maratha sardars of the Nizam, Nimbalkars and Khan- dagle, were sitting sulkily at home and not joining their forces with those of Nizam Ali, who had taken the lead after the departure of the French. Sadashivrao hoped for a quick decision in the campaign and after its suc- cessful termination intended to send Raghunathrao into the north to help Dattaji. But Nizam Ali would not part with the territories demanded by the Peshwa without a trial of strength. Skirmishes began from the 20th January, 1760, and gradually the Maratha armies surrounded the Nizam and his brother. The Nizam wanted to reach the fort of Dharur and make a stand there, but the Marathas would not allow him to escape from Udgir and con- tinuously followed close at his heels. By forming a hollow square, the Nizam marched out in the French fashion from Udgir and slowly moved towards Ausa, skirmishing all along the way. When the fort of Dharur remained some fifteen miles ahead, the Marathas held up his march by completely surround- ing him on all sides and attacking him in the rear. In the battle of 3rd Febru- ary, 1760, the Nizam was completely defeated and hemmed in, and there- fore sued for peace. By the terms of the peace, the Nizam ceded to the Marathas practically the half of his remaining dominions. Nizam Ali, the chief instigator, was to go back to his jagir in Berar and the Nizam Salabat Jang was to remain in Hyderabad. His Maratha sardars¹¹ were to leave the Nizam's service. The foreign relations of the Nizam were to be guided by the ⁹ Purandare 1.382. ¹⁰ Ibid. 1.382. ¹¹ Raj. 1.165.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 33 Maratha policy, especially his dealings with the French.¹² Bijapur, Ahmad- nagar, Burhanpur and Daulatabad, all four former capitals of the Muslim dominions, were surrendered together with the important forts of Asher and Mulher.¹³ Sadashivrao Bhau had become the hero of the day. He writes that but for the new danger in the north, the whole of the south would have come under the rule of the Peshwa. Unfortunately he reckoned without his host. Already the English had stolen a march politically, and now militarily also they loomed large on the horizon. Bussy had already been made a prisoner by them, and Haider Ali had so firmly set foot in Mysore as never to be ousted. While the Peshwa had just then taken possession of Underi and Kansa from the Sidi,¹⁴ Janjira and Surat never became Maratha possessions. Even the Nizam brothers, though de- feated with heavy loss and deprived of half their dominions, were only biding their time. They had given their consent to the treaty because they had to, but there was no intention in their mind of fulfilling the terms in the real spirit.¹⁵ By the treaty they had merely played for time to reshuffle their mat- ters, gain over their disaffected Maratha sardars to their side, seek help from the Pathans of Karnool, the Bedars of Surapur and also Murarrao Ghorpade. Their whole army had not been completely crushed and, in fact, they had sought peace at once to keep it intact. All these points had been placed before Bhau and he should have thought of them seriously. But the Peshwa thought more of recovering the prestige lost in north India as a result of the fall of Shinde Consequently he ordered preparations to be made for despatching a strong force to the north to drive out Abdali. Throughout the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa who had stopped at Ahmadnagar, and directed the movements from that place, now proceeded to- wards Paithan on his way to Patdur, southeast of Jalna, where he had sum- moned the Bhosle brothers from Nagpur to settle their quarrels. Sadashivrao Bhau himself proceeded north to that place, after crossing the Godavari, to meet him and thrash out the future policy through corsultations with all. They met there in the first week of March 1760, and first celebrated their vic- tory by playing the Rangapanchami festival with zest. Then began the dis- cussions. All the three cousins were there, and it was the declared intention of the Peshwa and also of Bhau to send Raghunathrao to the north as originally arranged. It should be remembered that up to that time the final route of Mal- harrao Holkar by Abdali at Sikandrabad, which took place in the first week of March, had not been reported to the Peshwa, as news travelled very slowly in those days. If the news had reached the Peshwa's camp at Padtur in time, that would have perhaps given a different turn to the whole affair. It seems that the discussions assumed the form of family bickerings in the Peshwa's family. Personal opinions, long cherished prejudices, partiality and selfish- ¹² SPD 40.123. ¹³ Raj. 1.166. ¹⁴ Ibid. 1.157 ¹⁵ SPD 1.86. P. F.—3

34 PANIPAT 1761 ness had played their role in what should have been purely political discus- sions. The Peshwa had always shown his predilection towards his brother Raghunathrao, and had somehow formed a good opinion about his ability Sadashivrao Bhau, for all his ability and wisdom, was still a cousin and there- fore not on a par with Raghunathrao He could have no legal share in the Peshwa's dominions and estates, and was only the first servant of the state. Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, was supposed to be the chief instigator against the superior claims of Sadashivrao to high office due to his ability When Raghunathrao was ordered¹⁶ to take the command of the north, he put in a plea that he would not accept the responsibility¹⁷ unless provided with ample funds Sadashivrao Bhau who was a strict accountant and auditor gen- eral held Raghunathrao responsible for the debts of the Panjab campaign and he strongly resented the charge Raghunathrao had taken the past lesson to heart and, therefore, wished to absolve himself from the results of the forth coming campaign After much recriminative discussion, the Peshwa ordered Bhau him self to shoulder the responsibility and lead the campaign ¹⁸ The Peshwa was rather unwilling to spare such a consummate, able and all round administrator as Bhau for a long time, but there was no help for it, as Bhau had been stung to the quick by a challenge from his cousin to prove his own valour and ability to add ample funds to the central treasury by going on the campaign himself But Gopikabai feared the consequence of Bhau's going to the north, accom- panied by his wife and with a big army His prestige had already risen very high by the Udgir campaign If he became equally successful in the north and were to establish a separate kingdom for himself, who was there to check him? It was necessary, therefore, to keep some constitutional check on his conduct and with this view Vishwasrao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, was placed at the head of the forces, with Bhau acting as his deputy From the correspondence in the whole Panipat campaign, it is clear that Bhau was not free to settle anything on his own responsibility Every time he referred the matter to and sought the previous sanction of the Peshwa. This was a false position in the then circumstances for a supreme authority like Bhau It appears to have had a dilatory and derogatory effect on Bhau's conduct of affairs, making it im- possible for him to free himself from the entanglement at Panipat later on, when need for a quick, decisive step arose This point should constantly be borne in mind when reading the forthcoming account of Panipat. While the suspicions and the prejudices of the Peshwa and his personal circle affected the Maratha policy throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau's personal predilections also shaped it to a great extent If Raghunathrao was always dependent on his assistants for shaping his policy, Bhau had a tendency towards the other extreme of acting on his own responsibility after abruptly cutting short the discussion on any subject and dictating the final thing him 16 Ibid 40 129 17 KHARE 1 14 For the previous debts contracted by him the Peshwa had been obliged to impose a new debt-contribution on all his jagirdars. Vide Satara 2.292. 18 RAJ 1 168.

self. The result was that he seemed, which he was actually not, proud or even haughty. This was a virtue as far as administrative efficiency—which depends upon quick and final decision—was concerned, but it cannot be said to be helpful when policy is to be shaped amongst equals. Over-riding opinion is always possible for a higher authority, but it is not always conducive to the best results, as ultimately the working out of the decisions devolves upon the subordinates. A commander-in-chief can scarcely act against the combined opinion and will of his generals. Bhau selected his own assistants and corps from amongst the as- semblage gathered in the Nizam's dominions. To begin with, his army was not more than twenty-five thousand strong, besides the infantry under Ibrahim Khan, which was nine thousand. Though Raghunathrao did not join, some of the corps subordinate to him were included in the army which accompanied Bhau to the north. The Maratha army was made up of the feudal divisions under the main sardars. These sardars employed subordinate corps under indi- vidual captains. The sardar was responsible for the conduct, training, equip- ment and payment of the corps employed by him. Certain revenue districts were assigned to him as jagirs for the expenditure thereof. Not all the noted captains in the Maratha army were sardars. Certain corps were directly em- ployed by the Peshwa who paid them from the central treasury. There was no one fixed scale of payment, certain sardars being paid more favourably than 'others. The bigger sardars, like Shinde and Holkar, were treated more as partners in the state than as mere subordinates. They had specified per- centages of the total revenues in certain regions permanently assigned to them as their inalienable share. It should be particularly noted that throughout the Panipat campaign, the payment of the whole army did not devolve on Sa- dashivrao Bhau. The divisions of Shinde and Holkar and also of a few other sardars were expected to be paid by the sardars themselves. Bhau was re- sponsible for the payment of the Peshwa's own troops, called "Huzarat," and directly paid corps like those under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The inconvenience felt by the non-receipt of revenues called in by Sadashivrao Bhau from men like Govindpant Bundele mainly affected the Peshwa's own divisions and not the divisions under Shinde and Holkar. The normal Maratha practice was for the moving army to subsist on its own earnings in the regions through which it passed. When the army was warring in a foreign territory, it would automati- cally subsist on tributes, ransoms and spoils, but when passing through its own dominions or the dominions of its allies, it had to buy everything it needed. In the Panipat campaign this was the condition in the main. Khandesh, Malwa, the Jat country, the Delhi region, were all non-belligerent territories. Besides, due to the continuance of almost constant war in the territories sur- rounding Delhi for almost a decade, the regions had become depopulated, non- agricultural and insecure. Unless there was good cash in one's pocket and one could keep the line of communication safe for caravans bringing supplies, it was impossible to go on for any length of time. There was no government commissariat department giving free rations or selling things at fixed prices in those days. The bazar which accompanied a moving army was chartered, guaranteed and given the necessary protection by the army commander no

36 PANIPAT 1761 doubt, but the merchants were not responsible for the continuous supply as such, nor were the prices fixed This was a constant source of difficulty for a moving army There was no assurance of supply nor certainty about the cost, which led not only to slackness and even obstruction in the war effort, but to the bankruptcy of the soldiers and the authorities as well Sadashivrao Bhau's progress was very slow if he had the intention of joining Shinde and Holkar before the rains These generals had been prac- tically driven out of the Delhi area, and were then camping at a safe distance from the Durrani forces behind the Jat principality, using Surajmal as a mid dleman in their diplomatic negotiations 19 Ahmad Shah Abdali had sent emissaries to both Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, ordering them to unite their forces with his and send monies to aid him in his work of driving out the Marathas,21 but both pleaded their inability to do anything in the mat- ter and tried the game of procrastination and equivocation Surajmal was the more cunning of the two He would always call himself a mere zamindar, or even a tenant, and not a prince He replied that he would pay the ac- knowledged Emperor the revenues due to him If Ahmad Shah would him- self assume that position and remain permanently in India, he would pay him as the legal sovereign Till then he could not possibly do what he had been asked, especially as his territories had been ravaged by the movements of both the Maratha and the Durrani armies 22 As the Indian summer advanced, Abdali encamped in the vicinity of Ramgad in the mid Doab, exhausted by the three months' incessant running after the elusive Marathas of the Shinde- Holkar contingents Each party now expected the other to renew the fight first, and would not start it themselves This stalemate could have been broken only by the junction of the forces under Sadashivrao Bhau and the exhausted generals in the north Bhau started from Patdur on the 14th of March, 1760, but had only crossed the Narmada after a month, covering a distance of not more than two hundred miles The delay was due to the preparation and joining in of the various corps with equipment for a long and distant campaign Sadashivrao Bhau's Panipat campaign was, in fact, on the model of the Mughal Emperors and not like that of Shivaji or Bajirao I The Maratha army had large tents, screens for women's apartments, and the various departments to look after the convenience of the leaders and the army The chiefs rode on superb Arab or Central Asian chargers and wore gorgeous dresses of gold brocades Their weapons and other equipment were also of the best type, and the brigades under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, trained after the French model, were the envy of Indian potentates of those times The presence of these infantry corps with their cannon, regulated the whole movement of the army, and the daily marches would cover but a few miles The heavy siege-guns which accom- panied the army, together with the light field artillery, slowed the rate of progress, as the long rows of bulls necessary to draw them would move but slowly over the rugged country and narrow passes in the Satpura and Vindhya 19 SPD 2 121 21 Ibid 21 186. 22 Ibid.

TO FACE PAGE 36 MAP SHOWING PÂNIPAT ROUTE MARCH ABDALI'S ROUTE ···· MAHRATHAS' ROUTE –––– SCALE Foot-note:—Baghpat to the west of Meerut on the bank of the Jamuna and the village of Gauripur five miles to the north of Baghpat have been inadvertently omitted from this map. Ahmad Shah crossed the Jamuna at Gauripur and went to Sonepat.

38 PANIPAT: 1761 lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan- istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro- claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud- din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress, Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in- terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom. She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support- ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun- ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions, which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al- lahabad and Ayodhya. In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out- wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use- ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im- pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March, 1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put- ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength- ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during 33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246 34 Ibid. I 154. 35 Ibid. I,167.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 39 Balaji Bajirao's rule is always inexplicable, and it was much more so during the Panipat campaign Looking to the political condition then existing in India, and the strength of the Marathas, it was a first rate mistake to have left the south Indian tangle to take its own shape, and proceed to north India after Udgir, especially after knowing the complete defeat of the Shinde Holkar forces There were at least four fronts on which the Maratha attention was necessary then The Abdali front in the north, the Haider Ali front in the south, the Nizam front in the Deccan and the English front—for such it was though the ,Peshwa was completely unaware of it—along the whole Indian coast The Maratha power seemed to be at its zenith at the end of 1758,³⁶ but the funda- mental weakness of their unplanned spreading became apparant soon By the end of 1759 they were completely driven out of the Panjab and suffered a major defeat owing to the death of Dattaji soon after In the south, Haider Ali who was strengthening himself silently, had slyly set aside the all conquer- ing Marathas, establishing himself, finally in September 1759 by defeating Nanjraj³⁷ and imprisoning him with the puppet Mysore ruler The English had established their power in Bengal equally firmly, and had, taking advan- tage of the Maratha support, occupied the best districts in the Nizam's dominion on the eastern sea board by driving out the French What Sadashivrao Bhau could conquer from the Nizam after his far famed victory of Udgir, the Brit- ish had taken away from the Nizam by merely marching a few thousand troops, under Colonel Forde,³⁸ from Bengal to the Northern Sarkars' The result of Bhau's going to the north at this juncture after the French defeat at Wandiwash in January 1760, was exemplified not only in the far reverberat ing defeat of Panipat on 14th January, 1761, but, simultaneously or quickly fol- lowing on its heels, in the occupation of Pondicherry by the English on 16th January, 1761, and the defeat of the Emperor Shah Alam by Colonel Car- nack in Bihar on 15th January, 1761, that is, a day after the Panipat disaster ³⁹ By these events, little noticed or thought of then, the future of India was decided, more than by the defeat at Panipat Sadashivrao Bhau was fighting for the preservation of the Mughal Empire for the descendant of Taimur who actually became a prisoner and a tool in the hands of the English' Bhau thought that but for Abdali the whole south would have come into the pos- . session of the Marathas'⁴⁰ But by the defeat of the French in the south and the occupation of the Northern Sarkars, the English became powerful enough in the south to defy all others The Peshwa had planned the capture of Janjira from the Sidi this year (1760), but by the covert action⁴¹ of the English it never came to pass' Even the lands conquered from the Nizam at the be ginning of 1760 had to be returned when he threatened Poona after Panipat. How can a historian account for these results but on the one supposition that 36 BISM (Persian Mss ) No 696, dated 20-12 1758, No 699, dated 15-4-1^759 37 RAJ 1 138. 38 Cambridge History of India 5 162 39 Fall 2.542 40 RAJ 1 166. 41 SPD 40.136

40 PANIPAT. 1761 the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution of the problems? From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³ Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century, the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak, had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think- ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara- thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con- sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never won by despondent soldiers! The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde " "Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the ⁴² Raj 1 186 ⁴³ Ibid 1 188 ⁴⁴ Khare 1.22

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 41

Chambal, at which Bhau's councillors laughed again and said, "Shinde and Holkar, Antaji Manakeshvar, Govindpant Bundele, Vitthal Shivdeo and Naro Shankar who had acted as officers with full powers in these parts, are now ill at ease at our coming and can never feel happy at the event" We reproduce these lines not because we believe in their truth but because they show an un- dercurrent of thought diametrically opposite to that of Bhau's policy There was a good substratum of truth in Holkar's advice To proceed against Abdali with heavy camp equipage and the encumbrances of women and chil- dren with a paraphernalia of private servants on a lavish scale, was certainly a mistake Delhi could never have been a secure base for the Marathas in the circumstances then existing In all previous campaigns of the Marathas in the Delhi region, they had suffered from want of food and fodder, not to say money The circumstances had grown even worse now, as Bhau experienced to his cost later on There was no valid reason to believe that the circumstances would have been different in the present campaign But Bhau felt confident of overcoming any difficulty and crossed the Chambal to Dholpur,⁴⁵ which in those times was not a Jat capital but a place of pilgrimage

The Maratha army crossed the Chambal on 8th June, and encamped near the Muchakunda tirth⁴⁶ near Dholpur The whole army went through the ceremony of a holy bath and sojourned for a few days there An eclipse of the sun on the 13th of June⁴⁷ added to the merit of the pilgrimage in this holy place The delay caused by the performance of the rites of pilgrimage frustrated Bhau's original plan of crossing over the Jamuna before the rains near Agra into Govindpant Bundeles districts and attacking Abdali from that base Agra was only some twenty five miles distant from the Maratha camp between the Chambal and the Gambhira, alias Banaganga, river But Bhau was unable to cross that small river and reach Agra for about a month more The monsoon had set in somewhat early that year, and the small river was in spate On his left hand was the Parvati, in front the Gambhira and at the back the Chambal The region is extremely uneven At every hundred yards there is a ravine, a continuous up and down The land is sandy and the rivers and streams, though shallow, spread over for miles across the banks It is dif- ficult to set foot in the bed of the river and there is not enough water for boats to cross In fact, no boats are available on those streams, for after a few days the water is completely drained away and only level sands, yellow and white in colour, are left to act as witnesses for the temporary floods The whole camp must have suffered terribly because camping in those regions looked almost impossible

Though Sadashivrao Bhau could not cross the insignificant river Gambhira, he was able to meet Shinde and Holkar and discuss with them the future problems and line of action, as both of them were encamping on the same side of the Gambhira in the vicinity of Keraoli The first to see Bhau was Gangoba Chandrachud, Holkar's Diwan, on 15th June ⁴⁸ Gangoba be

45 Raj 1 199 46 Bhau Bakhar p 113 47 13th of June was 30 Jyestha, Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, K. Patre Yadi 192. 48 Raj 1.203

42 PANIPAT 1761 longed to that generation of the Marathas which grew up with Bajirao's con quests in Malwa He was the confidential man of Malharrao and had perfect faith⁴⁹ in the wisdom of his master Malharrao Holkar seems to have purposely sent Gangoba to meet Bhau first and sound him in respect of his future policy and temper Malharrao him- self met Bhau along with Janakoji Shinde, a week later, on the 22nd of June ⁵⁰ No difference of opinion is reported at this meeting which seems to have ended amicably, thus belying the purposive colourful writing of the Marathi chroni- cles At the end of the month, Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din saw Sadashivrao Bhau and discussed the future line of action ⁵¹ The plan at the beginning of July was still to cross over the Jamuna into the Doab by build- ing a bridge of boats But even this plan failed because of the rising waters of the Jumuna In fact Bhau's slow march from the Deccan added four addi- tional months of the monsoon to the Panipat campaign, and lowered the vitality and morale of the Maratha army thereby From the tone of a letter written at this juncture, there does not seem to be any difference of opinion between Bhau and his sardars or Surajmal Jat ⁵² The total strength of the Maratha army is given as seventy to eighty thousand while Abdali-Ruhela strength is reported as sixty thousand The balance was to be decided by the joining in of Shuja ud daulah to either side Shuja's army is reported as twenty thousand, with a very strong park of artillery Besides, his army was one on permanent footing and therefore best trained, best equipped and al together more efficient than that of the others It was regularly well paid and therefore contented Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar,⁵³ Jana- koji's Diwan, had been despatched as special ambassadors to Shuja as a last resort to induce him to come over to the Maratha side by offering him any terms he would choose to ask ⁵⁴ But he finally decided against the Marathas and proceeded to meet Abdali at Ramgad Bhau at once changed his plan of crossing into the Doab and arrived at Gau Ghat to the north east of Sikandara where the great Akbar lies buried This place is some ten miles to the north west of Agra on the bank of the Jamuna There the Maratha army halted and bathed in the holy waters on the new moon day of Ashadha, which fell on 12th July, 1760 ⁵⁵ Thence Bhau proceeded to Mathura where he encamped on the 15th of July ⁵⁶ Thence he sent advanced troops to lay siege to Delhi, then commanded by Yakub Ali Khan, a cousin of the Durrani Wazir Shah Wali Khan ⁵⁷ He had only a small force, not more than two thousand strong The rest of the camp with women in it went on performing the pilgrim's rites at Mathura and Brindavan Nana Fadnis, who was accompanying Bhau with his wife and mother, indulged in the holy pilgrimage to his heart's content, ⁴⁹ SPD 2 116 ⁵⁰ Raj 1 217, SPD 2 127 ⁵¹ Purandare 1.387 ⁵² Ibid ⁵³ Raj 1 208 ⁵⁴ Purandare 1 387 ⁵⁵ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 ⁵⁶ Raj 1.217 ⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.222, 223