पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA . 49 the route from Delhi to Jaipur, and occupied it without much trouble. When Dattaji returned in 1758 with a strong force he again assumed humbleness and tried to make a common cause with him in the spoliation of the Mughal em- pire. He had kept on good terms with the Shinde family since the time he was saved by Jayapa Shinde against Malharrao's fury at Kumbher, and thus shielded himself against Malharrao's exactions. But he respected neither friend nor foe when it was a question of aggrandizing himself at the cost of others. For the present he had made common cause with Shinde and Holkar, fully knowing that they would not be troublesome to him after their late defeats at the hands of Abdali. On the other hand they were useful to him in meet- ing the calls of Sadashivrao Bhau on his resources. Now finding himself un- able to fulfil his life's ambition of governing Delhi, he silently walked away from Bhau's camp with a show of anger at Bhau's policy. Bhau certainly felt the loss of his help at this crucial time and tried to recall him. Mahipatrao Chitnis, Gangoba Chandrachud and Ramaji Anant were sent after him to bring him back.⁷⁸ This proves that Bhau had no intention of insulting him as is made to appear in the Bhau Bakhar. Nor was he remiss in trying to win him over with assurances. But it looks as if the Jat Raja was thoroughly selfish and left the Maratha camp, ostensibly on account of a difference in out- look on matters of policy, but really to save himself from Bhau's demands and importunities due to the starving condition of his men and animals Throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau was never once suspicious of the Jat's attitude towards the Marathas, but always hoped for good behaviour from him Though he had openly consented not to help⁷⁹ Bhau in his diplomatic talks with Najib and Shuja as Abdali's emissaries, with a view to excuse himself from paying tribute to the Afghan monarch, Surajmal did not do anything antagonistic to the Maratha interests, but on the other hand considerably helped them by allowing provisions and money to pass through his territory unmolested.⁸⁰ There seems to have been talk of Surajmal's son, Jawahirmal, coming to Bhau's help with the Jat forces at the beginning of October. When Prince Javan Bakht was proclaimed on 10th October and the seals of his father were brought into use, the Jat Raja became finally reconciled to the Maratha side.⁷⁹ All these facts refute the criticism of Bhau's behaviour in his dealings with Surajmal Jat. His humane behaviour and the monetary help he afforded to the Maratha fugitives after Panipat completely belies the story so dramatically related in the chronicle. As related above, the peace parleys were dragging on all along, but without sincerity on either side. Ahmad Shah had changed his camp of thatched huts at Anupshahar on the Ganges at the beginning of August.⁸¹ This was first a countermove to Bhau's occupation of Delhi, and was also due to the unhealthiness of the place. Thousands of his horses and camels succumbed to the heavy monsoon in the low-lying Gangetic valley.⁸² His first thought was ⁷⁸ SPD 27.258. ⁷⁹ Parasnis Persian Akhbars Mss ⁸⁰ Raj. 1.259. ⁸¹ Ibid. 1.226-7, 246. ⁸² SPD 2 131; Raj 6 404 P. F.—4

50 PANIPAT 1761 to move north to the strong fort of Sukartal and remain there At the begin ning of October, he was reported to have left his camp at Sambharam Serai and moved to Ahmad Ganj 79 But soon after he came to Shahadra, opposite to Delhi on the bank of the Jamuna, and encamped there with Shuja and Najib A distant cannonade was also sometimes indulged in by both the armies from the two banks of the river It could not be very effective from a distance of more than a mile with the artillery of those times Besides, none of the parties was willing to waste its ammunition for merely terrifying without military effect Internal trouble was also brewing amongst Abdalis allies Shuja and Najib were strange bed fellows whom only destiny had brought together Najib had promised that no demands for money would be made on Shuja if he joined Abdalis camp This hope was belied, for the hungry and grabbing Afghans tried to make encroachments on him, knowing full well that he was rich This led to a quarrel between Shuja and the Durranis Shuja felt himself deceived by the false promise of Najib and was almost in a repentant mood 63 The Abdali troops, on the other hand, were reluctant to continue their stay in India amidst misery and destitution, with little hope of earning anything in the future Bhau had sent one Bhavanishankar as a Vakil to Shuja across the Jamuna and Shuja also sent his Vakil to Bhau in return 64 It seems from Kashiraj s account that he also accompanied Raja Devidatta, Shuja's envoy But there is no corroboration of the same in Marathi correspondence, a fact which makes one suspicious about the truth of his narrative As Bhau was not satisfied with Raja Devidatta, he sent him back with Bhavanishankar This Bhavanishankar is scarcely mentioned anywhere in the Marathi nar- rative as a person of importance Kashiraj says he was a native of Auranga bad and belonged to his caste As the Brahmins of Aurangabad had taken to Persian studies, they were in great demand at the courts of various north Indian potentates who had any dealings with the Marathas Knowing both Persian and Marathi, they were able to correspond and interpret between the Maratha and other courts, and settled in various capitals The Hingne family was also engaged by the Peshwa for the same qualifications Bhavanishankar first came in contact with the Peshwa in his dealings with Shah Nawaz Khan at the Nizam s court, and seems to have spread his influence over Bhau also 65 As Nana Fadnis in his Autobiography adversely comments on Bhavani shankars influence over Bhau and expresses himself in disapproving terms about his conduct it may be taken as a general opinion of the Maratha camp about the man Bhau over rode the opinions of intimates like Balvantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare and completely put his faith in Bhavani shankars advice, which was also the main cause of Bhaus decision to follow Ibrahim Khan Gardis French tutored mode of warfare. Perhaps, even in the succes ful Udgir campaign, 66 Bhau had followed Bhavanishankars advice and the thundering success in it had established Bhavanishankar in Bhau's con fidence Whatever the fact, his conduct of peace parleys at this juncture did not prove succes sful as Najib-ud daulah threw every obstacle in the way Mal 63 Raj 1.235, 216 64 Samra 2.297

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 51 harrao and Surajmal were also keeping correspondence with Shuja and seek- ing his advice as to the future line of action. Shuja advised the Marathas to follow only the traditional mode of guerilla warfare, and to Surajmal he ad- vised to return to his own country. To Bhau, Shuja professed friendship, while declining to leave Abdali's camp, and promised to help the Maratha cause by giving his best advice. From Kashiraj's account it seems Bhau had receded back a great deal on his original terms one by one. As a last resort, he was ready to surrender the Panjab upto Sarhind, but wanted Abdali no more to in- terfere in the Delhi affairs. But, as mentioned above, nothing came out of this boring of the mountain, not even a mouse. Both sides seem to have put their final faith in a decision by arms. From the beginning, Bhau was ready to al- low Abdali to return to his own country if he so desired. But if he really had a mind to gain that end, it would have been better had he never crossed the Chambal. In that case Abdali would possibly have left India through sheer weariness. But with Bhau's big army advanced to Delhi, it was impossible for Abdali to retreat without offering a battle. From that point of view it would have been better for Sadashivrao Bhau to have turned his attention to Shuja's dominions and to have proceeded to Benares instead of Delhi. But unfortunately for the Marathas throughout their career, they had chosen the cockpit of Delhi as their fighting arena and ultimately lost their all in it. Meanwhile the condition of the Maratha army deteriorated day by day. The bullocks of the artillery department died by hundreds and there were not enough left with strength to drag the guns.⁸⁷ Bhau had also ordered⁸⁸ both Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve to cross over the Ganges and threaten Shuja's and the Ruhela's territories. But Govindpant was unable to move, firstly, on account of the rains, and secondly, because the zamindars in the Doab and Bundelkhand had become defiant and treacherous, and there was no safety for the Maratha posts in those regions. Bhau had taken possession of all the main ghats between Agra and Kunjpura and blocked the crossings for the enemy. He had kept small patrols to guard the ferry ghats and collected all the boats at Selimgad near Delhi. Though Bhau had now placed his main faith in the artillery of Ibrahim Khan,⁸⁹ still he could not recruit any Marathas for service in that department. He had to call the men from the enemy's ter- ritories to do such work.⁹⁰ Bhau seems to have called some European gun- ners from the eastern parts also. Many Portuguese, French, English and other European adventurers and renegades were at this time spread over India, ready to offer their services for good money. The war between the French and the English had detached a number of Frenchmen from Chandranagar and other places in Bengal. These were probably the persons Bhau was hop- ing to engage. But none of these projects materialized and only a certain number of Pathan followers of Ahmad Shah came over to the Maratha side only to create confusion and disaster in the last fight. 85 RAJ. 1.85 86 SPD 25.279 87 RAJ. 1.231 88 Ibid 1.233, 237 89 Ibid. 1.174 90 Ibid. 1.176, 235

CHAPTER IV KUNJPURA TO UNDERSTAND Sadashivrao Bhau's campaign north of Delhi, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with the terrain on both sides of the river Jamuna The whole of this area is one vast, continuous, sandy plain formed by the silt of the river It is a gradually sloping plain from the north to the south, and just near the river banks very slightly sloping towards the river This plain is between seven and eight hundred feet above the sea level on an average, with practically no hills worth the name The rocky arm of the Aravalli Range, starting from Mount Abu north of Gujarat, extends just up to the north of Delhi city, and ends in the famous Ridge of Mutiny fame This is the last rocky spot in the whole area North of it one can see scarcely a stone any- where The very few elevated spots to be found in this even terrain look more like mounds than hills, being made up of sandy rubble, and one sometimes suspects these of being the handiwork rather, of man than of nature Where such elevated spots occur, they are sure to be occupied by towns if sufficiently large, or otherwise by a temple, a mosque, a Sadhubava or a Pir Sonepat and Panı pat, reputed to be dating from the Mahabharata War, along with Indrapat or the oldest Delhi, are situated on and alongside small hillocks, less than a hun dred feet above the surrounding level plain Both were walled towns with small citadels on the hill tops The main features to be noted for the history of the eighteenth century in this region were that the region was bounded by the river Jamuna on the east, and by the imperial Ali Mardan Khan Canal (Shah nahar) on the west. The imperial road with the Kos minars or pillars at an interval of two and a half English miles passed through the Doab formed by these natural and man- made aqueducts The road ran parallel to the east of the canal at a distance of about five miles on an average, but it passed by the towns of Sonepat, Panı- pat and Karnal The canal ended in the Delhi palace, after supplying the famous Shalimar gardens to the north west of the city with ample water It had been built to meet the needs of the imperial family in the main, but was probably utilized by others also to the extent possible after fulfilling the re quirements of the palace. The area along the canal and beyond was thickly wooded while that by the side of the river was boggy and marshy, overgrown with rushes and other water plants for miles together There are fords at a distance of about five miles on the river at present, but these were probably fewer in former days, when irrigation canals had not drained the river dry There were ferries and bridges of boats, however, at convenient and necessary places The river re- mained unfordable during the rainy season and sometime after At some places where the river had divided itself into several channels with sandy banks and islands between, fording was easier and these places became the high roads of movement and commerce like those near Kunjpura and Budhia Where the [ 52 ]

KUNJPURA 53

river-bank was steep and the water deep, crossing was very difficult, if not impossible. Sadashivrao Bhau, after the first fortnight of August in Delhi, moved¹ his camp from Kalkādevi to the south of the city on the bank of the Jamuna to the west of the city near Seetaram's serai beyond the canal, and this camp seems to have extended upto the Shalimar gardens to the north-west, thus covering an area of more than three miles in length from north to south. Here he lived for almost seven weeks, till he began his northward march to Kunj- pura in the first week of October. The Maratha army suffered great priva- tions² in this camp. The food supply of Delhi was derived from the eastern Doab side in normal times. But this region was in the possession of Najib Khan and Abdali. Besides, the Jamuna was in flood making commercial in- tercourse difficult, if not impossible. Added to the food and fodder scarcity, there was the scarcity of money. No money was forthcoming from any source; neither from the revenue collectors of the Maratha lands in north India, nor from tribute, nor even from loans. Even men of position had to keep from starvation by selling their jewellery and other personal belongings.³ The result was a great deterioration in the physical stamina of men and ani- mals. It must have also told on the morale of the army, though in this case the cool courage and optimism of the commander-in-chief counteracted, to a great extent, the evil effects of the same.⁴ Placed in this quandary, Bhau had recourse to such things as taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-khas to coin money wherewith to pay a bare subsistence allowance to the troops as stated before.⁵ But this was only a stop-gap. The nine lakhs of rupees derived from this vandalic source were just sufficient to feed the army for one month. During a period of three months, only two weekly payments to the soldiers had been made possible, so precarious was the situation. Nor was it possible, while the rains continued, to get out of this plight. The future plans of Abdali were as yet inscrutable. The early setting in of the rains that year with the continuous high flood level of the Jamuna for four months had miscarried the earlier plans hatched by Sadashivrao Bhau to meet Abdali in a pitched battle. The waiting-time factor had gone against the Maratha anticipations. Shuja-ud-daulah's pusillanimous efforts to be on good terms with both the parties had at last resulted in his completely falling under the influence of the wily Najib. Even after going over to the side of Abdali, Shuja still continued his efforts for peace during the rainy season, but to no purpose. Nana Phadnis accuses him of chicanery, though the historian of Oudh vouchsafes his good intentions.⁶ All the same, Bhau would not rely on such a broken reed and decided to open the campaign against Abdali by

1 RAJ 6 404; SPD 27.258. 2 SPD 130, 131 3 Aitihasika Tippane 1 14 4 RAJ. 6 101. 5 SPD 27.257.

KUNJPURA 55 Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh, the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus, at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj- pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Persian Akhbar MS ) From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15-10 1760, it seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi- tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power- less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till the subsidence of the river When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa- tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad- viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he 9 Ibid 1.237 10 Ibid 1.231, 237 11 Ibid 1.252 12 SPD 2.130-31

54 PANIPAT 1761 first taking the offensive himself His difficulties at Delhi obliged him to take this decision which was urged on him by all and sundry in the Maratha camp Before he could continue his march, Bhau thought it wise to make a political move to counteract the anti Maratha propaganda of Najib and men of his ilk He had already estranged Wazir Ghazi ud din and his supporter Surajmal Jat by his non committal attitude towards their aspirations and de signs All his approaches to Shuja had proved futile It became necessary for him now to give a demonstrable proof of his ultimate intentions So, setting aside the boy Emperor, Shah Jahan III (elevated to that dignity by Ghazi ud din after the murder of Alamgir II in the previous year), Bhau proclaimed the wandering Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor with the title of Shah Alam II In his unavoidable absence his son Prince Javan Bakht, residing at Delhi, was installed as Vali Ahad or Crown Prince and Vicar of the absentee Emperor on 10th October 1760 ⁷ Mints struck new coins in the new Emperor's name, and his seals were also prepared and brought into use The ceremonies and proces- sions connected with these acts were seen through by Nana Purandare and Satvoji Jadhavrao, who had been specially deputed by Bhau for the purpose while encamped at Lalera, three miles to the south of Gannaur⁸ while on his way to Kunjpura The office of the Wazir is said to have been conferred on Shuja in absent a, but there is no mention of this fact in Marathi corre- spondence and hence seems improbable The details of this occurrence in Delhi throw a flood of light on Maratha manners in politics The puppet Emperor, Shah Jahan, was politely asked to vacate his seat as his days were over This was perhaps the first time in Mughal history when an emperor had been set aside without violence to his person The Prince Javan Bakht was escorted to the Juma Masjid by Bapuji Hingne, the Maratha envoy, who sat with the prince on the elephant, while Satvoji stood behind with peacock feathers, a sign of royal insignia, in his hand The ex Empress Zinat Mahal, the grand mother of the prince, was civilly asked to pay 25 lakhs from her privy purse for the expenses, but she paid only 5 lakhs The Marathas never set their hands on the persons of the royal household to get money, like the Afghans of Abdali or the Persians of Nadir Shah The grateful ex Empress took it upon herself to inform Abdali of these proceedings and tried her best to bring about a settlement between him and the Marathas, by forwarding the Maratha draft treaty to him with her recommendations and consent The good result of this action was seen in the satisfaction of Surajmal who was now convinced of the Maratha intentions and henceforward helped the Marathas, though he could not join them with his army The Afghan rule in the Panjab was challenged by the rebellious Sikhs who wholeheartedly came over to the Maratha side They proclaimed Bhau Sahib as the coming ruler with a beat of drums, and devoutly prayed for his victory in Lahore They beseeched their Guru Sahib to punish Abdali for his misdeeds Khwajah Mirza Khan, the son in law of Adina Beg, with the Maratha troops under Krishnaji Pawar stationed at Jammu, invaded Gujrat ⁷ Raj 1.259, Parasnis' Persian Akhbars (unpublished) ⁸ Ibid 1.259

KUNJPURA 55 Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh, the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus, at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj- pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Pers an Akhbar MS ) From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15 10 1760 it seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till the subsidence of the river When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad- viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he 9 Ibid 1.237 10 Ibid 1.231, 237 11 Ibid 1.252 12 SPD XXI

56 PANIPAT: 1761 says, "Four to eight' days are necessary for the river water to go down."¹³ And Abdali actually crossed the river at Gauripur on 24th October.¹⁴ It is impossible to account for this wide discrepancy in the information and calcula- tion of the two most important personages in the Peshwa's army, the com- mander-in-chief and his first general. It is difficult to imagine that these two persons, living in the same camp or even as neighbours, should not have ex- changed ideas and discussed the probabilities amongst themselves. But un- fortunately for the Marathas, some such untoward thing seems to have hap- pened. Bhau, basing his calculation on the idea that the river water would not go down before the second week of November, planned his campaign ac- cordingly. His plan was to take Kunjpura, then proceed to Kurukshetra to perform the pilgrimage, seek allies amongst the Sikhs and the Jats of those regions¹⁵ and then return in time to meet Abdali after refreshing his starved troops, horses, and other animals with the ample grain and fodder supplies of those fertile regions. This plan succeeded as far as the capture of Kunjpura was concerned, but failed in its second part: to obstruct Abdali while crossing the Jamuna. The immediate cause which made Bhau hurry up to Kunjpura within a week was the news received from the Panjab as mentioned already. Abdus Samad Khan whom Abdali had kept back in the Panjab as the Faujdar of Sarhind, had come to Kunjpura with an army of ten thousand and more for carrying supplies to Abdali in the Doab. He was waiting there for the river to subside. It was necessary to defeat him before he could cross the Jamuna and strengthen Abdali's forces. Starting from his camp at Shalimar Bag, seven miles to the north of Delhi on 7th October, Bhau reached Lalera, three miles south of Gannaur on 8th October in the evening. He was at Panipat on the 14th and reached his destination on the evening of the 16th. Abdali who had full information of Bhau's movements, sent an army to aid his men at Kunjpura along the eastern bank of the Jamuna. But it had to stop opposite Kunjpura for want of transport. Viewing this additional peril, the Maratha army decided to storm the fort forthwith. Bhau sent for Ibrahim Khan Gardi- who was lagging behind by one march. He came hurrying up on the night of the 16th and commenced the bombardment of the fort soon after his arrival, on the morning of the 17th The fort of Kunjpura lies seventy-eight miles to the north of Delhi, and is situated some two miles distant from the west bank of the Jamuna. It guarded one of the most frequented roads through the Doab to the Panjab. The river Jamuna to the south-east of Kunjpura, being divided into several channels, was easily fordable by men and animals. The important town of Karnal on the main imperial road lay only six miles to the west of it. The riverside of the fort was marshy and hence easily defensible. Nejabat Khan Ruhela was in possession of the fort and he had a few thousand footmen of his tribe with him to defend the fort. Abdus Samad Khan, Mian Qutb Shah and Momin Khan, the Ghilzai Sardar who had come from Sarhind, had with ¹³ Ait. Tip. 1.14. ¹⁴ RAJ. 1.260. ¹⁵ SPD 21.197.

KUNJPURA 57 them some seven thousand horse.¹⁶ They were encamped outside the fort and tried to defend it to the utmost. But the musketry fire of the Gardis soon broke their resistance by fast withering away their ranks, and they tried to save themselves by entering the fort. Nejabat Khan was at first apprehensive of opening the fort gates to get them in, but had to yield to their entreaties and open the same. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Marathas also fol- lowed behind them and forced themselves into the fort along with the Durranis The Durrani horse and Ruhela footmen fought for some time but were ulti- mately overpowered by the Maratha arms and defeated with heavy slaughter. Four thousand Ghilzais were put to the sword¹⁷ and the rest, taking grass in their mouths and uttering the words, "We are your cows,"¹⁸ were allowed to go, after laying down their arms. The majority of the Ruhela footmen had been wounded together with Nejabat Khan, who died soon afterwards of his wounds. Momin Khan died in the battle from a bullet-shot. Abdus Samad Khan and Mian Qutb Shah were captured alive, beheaded after heaping in- sults on them and their heads paraded through the Maratha camp. Mian Qutb Shah was derided, cursed and insulted most, especially by Shinde's men, as he was responsible for the decapitation of Dattaji Shinde on the battlefield of Buradi, the previous year. Their bodies were exposed to be eaten up by vultures and jackals, no funeral rites being allowed them. The conversa- tion between Qutb Shah and Bhau given in the Bhau Bakhar seems imaginary, as contemporary letters from Shinde's camp do not say a word hinting at such a thing. It has been fabricated to suit the dramatic tone of the whole of the Bhau Bakhar. Bhau got some seven lakhs of rupees in cash, five thousand horses, camels and elephants, arms and the rest, as spoils. But the most opportune gain was of 10,000 khandis of wheat collected at this depot for the Abdali troops. Starvation in the Maratha army ended for the time being, as the troops were paid in kind instead of cash.¹⁹ Horses and other animals also got fodder and grain. More important than this material gain was the revival of optimism in the Maratha army after a four months' period of doldrums, leading to a deterioration of morale. The prowess of the Gardi fire had been put to the test and proved up to the hilt. Bhau spent a week at Kunjpura destroying the fortifications and ar- ranging matters in the new light. He seems to have felt no apprehension of any impending danger as he ordered a march to Kurukshetra of at least a part of the army. While on his way to Kunjpura, Bhau's idea was to finish the work there in four days and then to cross the Jamuna by some upper ghat like that at Budhia, into Saharanpur. He had already seized practically all the boats on the Jamuna on which he could lay hands, and kept them to- gether near the Selimgad fort on the bank of the Jamuna at Delhi with a view to making use of them in case of necessity. He had also kept pickets with small parties of soldiers to guard the main ghats over the Jamuna from ¹⁶ Shinde 3.234, 392; RAJ 1.260, 265 ¹⁷ Purandare 1.391. ¹⁸ Shinde 3.234. ¹⁹ SPD. 21.197-8

58 PANIPAT 1761 Agra to Kunjpura, a distance of nearly two hundred miles Thus he had unwittingly lengthened his line of communication and taken a certain risk in proceeding to Kunjpura Had he, after quickly finishing the job, crossed over the Jamuna into Saharanpur as intended, or, failing that, at once re turned to Delhi, he would have been saved But here his miscalculation about the fall in the level of the Jamuna waters proved wrong as we have already noted The second factor which delayed the Maratha army was that after a long period of comparative starvation they had found themselves in a land of plenty, which the army was naturally reluctant to leave and return to bar ren Delhi The third and the human factor which made Bhau delay his march was the encumbrance of a horde of women folk family members and priests, who had accompanied the army for performing distant and dangerous pil grimages under its protection Kurukshetra is less than thirty miles from Kunjpura and it was but natural that all the devout people in the army should wish to visit that holy place of the Mahabharata war where Lord Shri Krishna preached his philosophy of life to the hero Arjuna But this natural desire re sulted in an unforeseen calamity and thus proved a veritable Kurukshetra to the Marathas The Maratha army, after spending or rather wasting a week at Kunj pura, moved toward the holy place for one day, but before they could reach their destination at the first halt for the night Bhau received the disquieting news of Abdalis beginning to cross the river, on 25th October 20 He at once made up his mind and turned back toward Delhi with a view to intercepting Abdali before he crossed the river But such a fully equipped army made up of three lakhs of people can move but slowly All became disappointed and sullen as they missed by a hairbreadth the pilgrimage to Kurukshetra They were still more scared by the news of Abdalis crossing the river and blocking their re turn On the first day of their return march they halted near the ancient bridge at Karnal²¹ for the night, the bridge over the famous canal of Firuz Shah Tughaliq and Ali Mardan Khan which flowed from the eastern to its western side Because the editor of Bhau's Kaifiyat was unaware of the geography of these regions, he could not with confidence read the description in Modi script and the place of halt on the bridge Though Bhau made a long march of fifteen miles for the day, the camp could not move as fast, so on the next day he could cover only eight miles and on the third day came, near Panipat Here he heard the news that Abdalis army had completely crossed the river, bag and baggage, and was halting at Sonepat Bhau cautiously sent a party of five thousand men under Baji Hari Deshpande of Supa to meet and check the advance guard of Abdali and take a view of his camp and movement there They were in the vicinity of Sonepat, resting unguardedly after a long march Half of the party was composed of Shinde's men who had already known and experienced the scourge of the Durrani army Their leader asked Baji Hari to be on his guard lest he should find himself surprised But Baji Hari's inexperienced and unbeaten troops 20 RS 1201 1 Bhau Kaifiyat p. 12.

KUNJPURA 59 took the warning lightly and slept soundly on the plains, allowing their horses to roam in the green fields for grazing, and the unexpected attack came as forewarned. Shah Pasand Khan, one of Abdali's best captains of cavalry, suddenly pounced upon the sleeping party. Shinde's men had kept a picket on a tall tree watching for the danger. As soon as clouds of dust were seen at a distance the picket came down and cried aloud of the danger. Shinde's men who were on guard at once took to their horses and ran away.²²· Baji Hari's party found it impossible to get hold of their horses in the grazing field and it was some time before they could get them. In the meanwhile, men of Shah Pasand Khan came, seized as many horses of the Marathas as they could and • cut down the horsemen. Very few were fortunate enough to escape and carrry back the news to Bhau. This event checked the further march southwards, and Bhau had to fall back on Panipat and begin encampment there. We shall now turn to study Abdali's movements He and his Indian allies were encamping on the opposite bank of the Jamuna near Delhi. Shuja- ud-daulah was the first to move to that place in the beginning of August and encamp to the south of the area near the grain mart of Patpatganj. The Ruhelas and Abdalis followed sometime later, probably at the end of the month. They encamped to Shuja's north, near Shahdhada. When Bhau came to Delhi at the beginning of August, he had encamped to the south of Delhi near the Kalkadevi Temple, just opposite to Shuja on the other bank. In Septem- ber, Bhau moved his camp to the Shalimar gardens, seven miles to the north- west of Delhi amidst pleasant surroundings, and his army encamped to his south, to the west and north of the city. From these encampments the rival armies were eying each other inquisitively. They occasionally discharged their heavy long-range guns and threw some heavy cannon-balls into each other's camps just to create confusion and fear. But the river flowed roaringly be- tween. None dare cross the river in the face of the other, though diplomats were individually going and coming and carrying on peace-talks. As Abdali had the fertile Doab at his back, and as the home lands of the Ruhelas were on the other side of the Ganges, his army was comparatively well supplied with the necessaries of life. To lighten the burden, he had allowed many of the Ruhela soldiers to return to their homes, asking them to keep themselves ready to return at the first call. The Maratha army, on the other hand, was living from hand to mouth. The whole of the surrounding area had been eaten up by the constant movements of the rival armies in the fields during the last seven years. The districts to the west of Delhi had been assigned as jagirs to the Baluch sardars of the Emperor. They were recalcitrant generally, and just then at loggerheads with the Marathas. Tukoji Holkar and Khandoji Kadam²²ᵃ had been sent against them at the beginning of October. For getting the food stuffs from a distance the Marathas had to pay fancy prices to the Banjaras. Nana Phadnis, Bapuji Ballal Phadke,²²ᵇ Balvantrao Mehendale and others, writing from Delhi during September and October, describe the woeful state of the Maratha army: "The horses have forgotten to chew the grain; the

²² Bhau Bakhar 0.126. ²²ᵃ Persian MS ²²ᵇ SPD 2.130-1.

60 PANIPAT 1761 grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart ment, and they are dying in hundreds" To escape from this dilemma, the Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with the consequence noted above When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north of Delhi, in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con- sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh- pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad we have copied down from the bard of Siva ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru ²³ BDCRI 4 3 stanza 33

KUNJPURA 61 kshetra. Abdali took three days to cross the river with all his army, cannon, elephants and other camp equipage. The place where he crossed was a little out of the way where there was no proper ghat for landing. The army had to cross the various streams and shallows over a distance of half a mile. Some- times the horses would swim, at others they would wade through sands in knee- deep water. On the other side was the silt deposited by monsoon floods. Horses and men found themselves bogged in the soft mud. It was difficult, al- most impossible, to take a step without sinking still deeper. This difficulty they overcame by cutting down the various water plants and rushes growing on the river-bank, and spreading them deep over the passage all along the route. When these had sunk into the mud, a thatchy road was naturally built over it by the trampling of thousands of horses and men. Had there been a daring and resourceful guard of a few thousand troops with a few guns of precision, a crossing would never have been possible. After safely reaching the other bank, Ahmad Shah at once sent a small party to drive away all the Maratha pickets on the western bank, and seize any boats they could find bound fast at the ghats. They seem to have succeeded in collecting some, which were used in ferrying the baggage on the second day. Ahmad Shah himself crossed after half the army was on the other side. There were a few casualties, no doubt, in the tumult and hurry of crossing. But at last the whole army was safe on the other bank and began their march to Sonepat, which they reached on the 27th October. Next day they moved to Gannaur where Ahmad Shah halted for three²⁴ days. Baji Hari's attempt to scout must have happened during this interval. The number of casualties in this attempt is not correctly reported anywhere, though Kashiraj gives the figure at two thousand, and the place where they crossed swords as near the serai of Samalkha. Bhau fell back as a result of it and encamped at Panipat. Ahmad Shah advanced to Samalkha on 31st October, and to Pasina the next day. A distance of some three miles was left between the advanced posts of the two armies. The two armies came face to face at last after four months of eying each other on the opposite banks of the swollen Jamuna. It was seven months since Bhau had started to meet Abdali, and here he was at last. But for a final decision by arms, two and a half months had still to pass. From the first of November 1760 to 14th January, 1761 the two sides in the struggle for power put their faith in strategy and manœuvring, living in entrenched camps. ²⁴ RAJ. 1.261.

60 PANIPAT 1761 grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart ment, and they are dying in hundreds " To escape from this dilemma, the Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with the consequence noted above When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north of Delhi in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad we have copied down from the bard of Siwa ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru-

²³ BDCRI 4.3 stanza 33

CHAPTER V PANIPAT To JUDGE from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹ from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's splendid corps which, as Kashīrāj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of Bhau like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is found writing in the same tone for a month more Only during the last fort- night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³ —writing no doubt to the revenue collector—does not betray any sign of hope lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles, though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sır Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that, because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith in quite a different strategy—that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak- ing them fall on his well fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy 1 SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391 2 SPD 2.134 3 Shinde 1.222. [ 62 ]

TO FACE PAGE 62

PĀNĪPAT VICINITY AT PRESENT SCALE FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES

मानचित्र पर प्रमुख अंकित विवरण / Prominent Text on Map:

• मुख्य स्थल / Major Town: PĀNĪPAT (पानीपत)
• नदियाँ एवं नहरें / Rivers & Canals:
  • JUMNA RIVER (यमुना नदी)
  • W. J. CANAL / WESTERN JUMNA CANAL (पश्चिमी यमुना नहर)
• दिशानिर्देश / Direction: North Indicator (उत्तर दिशा सूचक चिन्ह)
• अक्षांश एवं देशांतर / Coordinates:
  • 29° 25' N — 29° 20' N
  • 76° 55' E — 77° 10' E

CHAPTER V PANIPAT To judge from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹ from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic- tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's splendid corps which, as Kashiraj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of Bhau, like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is found writing in the same tone for a month more. Only during the last fort- night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³ --writing no doubt to the revenue collector--does not betray any sign of hope- lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles, though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sir Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that, because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com- munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith in quite a different strategy--that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak- ing them fall on his well-fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy ¹ SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391 ² SPD 2 134 ³ Shinde 1.222 [62]

TO FACE PAGE 62 PĀNĪPAT VICINITY AT PRESENT SCALE FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES PĀNĪPAT KALKA RAILWAY TO DELHI WESTERN JUMNA CANAL JUMNA RIVER

PANIPAT 63 Bhau was depending upon the activities of Govindpant Bundele and Naro Shankar. Had they succeeded in cutting off Abdali’s supplies and making him move from his camp, Abdali would have had only two alternatives before him, either to run away to his home without offering a battle, or attacking the Mara- thas in their strong positions. We do not think that it would have been dif- ficult for him and his allies to disperse to their homes, as suggested by Krishna Joshi in his letter,⁴ though ostensibly his road to Afghanistan was blocked by the Maratha camp at the very onset. But Govindpant was scarcely a fit man to carry out the orders of Bhau, because primarily he was not a soldier but a civilian. The military circumstances in the regions surrounding his area have also to be taken into account. Not only were the Rajput zamindars, with their strong fortalices, disaffected towards the rule of the Marathas internally, but externally also the Ruhela chiefs and Shuja’s nominee, Veni Bahadur, were vigilant and bent on taking advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas Shuja had taken only a small part of his army to the battlefield, leaving the main portion under Veni Bahadur⁵ to defend his dominions in his absence. Shuja himself had only willynilly gone to Abdali under strong pressure for avoiding the invasion of his own territories by Abdali and his Ruhela allies, and never took any important part in the whole campaign or in the final bat- tle. By his behaviour he was insuring his safety between two powerful rivals. When Bhau blames Govindpant for not devastating Shuja’s dominions so as to exert a pressure on him to return to his dominions for defence, he seems to be unaware of the fact that there was sufficient army on the spot to defend it. Govindpant’s leaving his dominions meant exposing them to an invasion by Veni Bahadur, as was found to his cost by Gopalrao Govind Barve⁶ in his attempt.⁷ But sometimes it is necessary to take the risk of completely exposing one’s dominions in order to gain a necessary military advantage. Only a man like Frederick the Great of Prussia or a Madhavrao Peshwa could dare it and reap the harvest. It was too much to expect such an action from Govindpant, and when he tried to perform it for escaping the charge of disobedience, he had to pay for the attempt with his life and complete defeat. This exposition should convince the reader that Bhau’s strategy was based on precarious means, and he was misguided in depending on a man of Govindpant’s calibre. There were other means of gaining his end, but Bhau never seems to have tried these. In the last resort, why Bhau should have waited up to the breaking point of the 14th of January, completely passes our understanding. Bhau knew of Govindpant’s death on 23rd December, and we can find no excuse for Bhau to defer the attack for three weeks, thus weak- ening still further the Maratha side during this long interval by starvation, exposure and disease. The only suggestion that might explain Bhau’s delay is the idea of his waiting for the coming of Nanasaheb from the Deccan so as to catch Abdali between two grind-stones. This suggestion finds no conclusive evidence in documents. The Peshwa seems to have been informed by his son, ⁴ Raj. 1.265. ⁵ A. L. Shrivastava, op cit., pp. 94, 111. ⁶ Ibid. 111. ⁷ See the section on The Trans-Ganges raids further on.