भारतकोश
द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

The Indian Struggle 1920-1934 by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose

नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस द्वारा

DevanagariHindipublished339 पृष्ठ

पृष्ठ 239, कुल 339 में से

संदर्भ में पढ़ें
पृष्ठ 239

THE GANDHI-IRWIN PACT AND AFTER 241 Gandhi would not necessarily be binding on them and that if 'His Excellency desired a real settlement of the Indian question, the Government should come to a separate understanding with the Revolutionary Party. This letter reached the Viceroy’s hands through a prominent Indian politician.¹ This representation was not altogether useless, because a few months later, the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson, made an effort to come to an understanding with the revolu- tionaries. At his instance the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta went to Buxa Detention Camp in North Bengal and interviewed some of the leaders. The result was not unsatisfactory. The inter- viewed prisoners said that they were prepared to discuss terms, but they insisted that the negotiations should be carried on direct with the Government and not through any police- officer. They also gave a preliminary outline of the terms which the late Mr. Sengupta duly conveyed to the Governor. Thereafter, a reference was made by the Government to the prisoners through the Superintendent of the Camp, who was a police-officer. But they refused to move further in the matter, if the negotiations were not carried on direct with them. As the Government were not agreeable to that, the negotiations fell through. In spite of all that has been written above, to the un- sophisticated masses, the Delhi Pact appeared to be a victory for the Mahatma. Only with the lapse of time were they to be gradually disillusioned. Many intelligent people seriously believed that besides the written, there were other unwritten terms which would be disclosed later on and many of those who were against the Pact maintained that the Mahatma should be given a free hand till the end of the Second Round Table Conference. The Karachi Congress undoubtedly represented the pinnacle of the Mahatma’s popularity and prestige. I travelled with him for some days and was able to observe the unprecedented crowds that greeted him every- where. I wonder if such a spontaneous ovation was ever given to a leader anywhere else. He stood out before the people not merely as a Mahatma but as the hero of a political ¹ I came to know these facts after my release from prison in March 1931. Q