द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

242 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE fight. The question that stirred me at the time was as to how he would utilise the unique position he had been able to attain. Would he be able to move from one victory to another, or would the anti-climax begin? The first shock came when the news was announced that the Working Committee on April 2nd, had selected Mahatma Gandhi as the sole represen- tative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference and that he had accepted that decision. What really was behind that decision I have never been able to understand. Was it due to the vanity of the Mahatma who wanted to appear before the world as the sole representative of the dumb millions of India? Or was it merely one more error of judgment on the part of the Working Committee? Or was there some other motive behind the decision? It is impossible to accept the first explanation. Whatever the real explanation may be, the decision itself was a thoroughly wrong one. Alone in an assembly of about one hundred men, with all kinds of non-descripts, flunkeys and self-appointed leaders arrayed against him like a solid phalanx, he would be at a great disadvantage. Moreover, he would have nobody at his side to back him up in the fight that he would have with the reactionary Moslem leaders. But there was no help for it. The blind followers of the Mahatma could not be expected to criticise him and those who were not his orthodox followers had no influence on him regardless of their character, wisdom, or experience. While the first move of the Mahatma after the Karachi Congress was not a wise one, the second move was a positive blunder. In private and in public, he began to say that his going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made a united demand on the question of representation, electorate, etc., in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand. The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After the Delhi Pact, the reactionary Moslems had been somewhat overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately