द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

106 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE who were anxious to demonstrate that the Gandhi method had not become sterile and was still capable of stirring up the country. While the Swarajists represented the main body of rebels against orthodox Gandhiism in 1923, the same year saw the birth of another revolt against Gandhiism which was to acquire greater importance in the years to come. Being dis- satisfied with the Gandhian ideology, a small group in Bombay under the leadership of Mr. Dange,¹ took to study- ing Socialist literature. They had a club of their own and published a weekly journal for preaching Socialism. Among the Congress leaders the only patron they had at the time was the late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel. They soon took up labour organi- sation in Bombay and before many years elapsed, they became the first group of Communists in India. Following Bombay, a similar group was started some time later in Bengal under the name of the "Workers and Peasants' Party"—but it was never able to acquire as much importance or make as much headway, as the Bombay Group. The reason is not far to seek. Bengal, of which Calcutta is both the heart and the brain, has for a very long time been one of the strongholds of the nationalist movement. There the movement is based on an influential and patriotic petit-bour- geois class. Moreover, Bengal does not possess an indigenous and influential capitalist class, as does Bombay. Consequently, class-differentiation has never appeared in Bengal in that sharp and acute form in which it has appeared in Bombay. The petit-bourgeois element is not so strong or influential in Bombay as it is in Bengal and the national movement there is of more recent growth than in Bengal. In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual revolt against Gandhiism in Bombay should take a Socialist or Communist turn. In Bengal, on the other hand, the revolt against Gandhiism took a revolutionary more than a Communist turn. This phenomenon we shall consider in a later chapter on 'the Bengal Situation.' ¹ Mr. Dange was convicted in 1925 in connection with the Cawnpore Bolshevik Conspiracy Case and again in connection with the Meerut Communist Conspiracy Case in 1933, after a trial lasting nearly four years.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 107 We have already seen in the previous chapter that when in March, 1922, Mr. Montagu resigned from the Cabinet, the forces of reaction got the upper hand both in England and in India. The Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George soon came to an end and a General Election took place in October 1922, which brought the Conservatives into power. In November 1922, Sir Basil Blackett was appointed Finance Member to the Government of India. One of his first deeds was to double the Salt Tax in February, 1923, when he produced his first budget. Now the Salt Tax is traditionally unpopular in India—partly because the people are prevented by law from making salt out of the soil or the water given them by nature and partly because the Salt Tax hits the poor hardest. The doubling of the Salt Tax therefore, was the worst move which the Government could have taken. The Indian Legislative Assembly promptly threw out this provision of the Finance Member but the Viceroy, Lord Reading, as promptly restored it by virtue of his power of certification. In June, the Government gave further offence by appointing a Commission—called the Lee Commission—to inquire into the status, position and grievances of the All-India services which are manned mainly by Britishers. Everyone felt at the time that the only result of the appointment of this com- mission would be to enhance the pay and emoluments of Britishers in India.¹ Thus, while the Government showed a readiness to incur more expenditure in order to please Britishers—they showed reluctance in curtailing unnecessary expenditure, though the Inchcape Committee had made several useful recommendations in this behalf.² In addition to this measure, the Government of India took another step which was severely criticised at the time and which roused resentment in certain parts of the country. This was the deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha from his throne (or Guddee). Though the Government made certain allegations ¹ This apprehension was fully justified when the Lee Commission sub- mitted its report and the Government of India gave effect to the recom- mendations in a lavish manner. ² A Retrenchment Committee presided over by Lord Inchcape had been appointed by the Government for suggesting possible lines of economy. This Committee submitted its report in March, 1923.

108 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE against the Maharaja as a justification for their action—the popular feeling in the country was that the Maharaja was neither better nor worse than the general run of Maharajas in India and that he was deposed solely because of his avowedly nationalistic views. Since the Maharaja was a Sikh and he was reported to have cherished sympathy for the Akali movement, his deposition roused a great deal of indignation among the Sikh community. While the forces of reaction were gaining in strength in official circles and the Swarajists were preparing their great onslaught on the bureaucratic citadel, the Indian Legislative Assembly, even without the nationalists, was neither tame nor inactive. During the year, resolutions demanding a speedy constitutional advance were passed twice. Moreover, towards the end of its term, the Assembly passed a Reciprocity Bill which was introduced by Dr. (now Sir) H. S. Gour. This Bill was aimed at the Dominions and Colonies of the British Empire where Indians were not given equal rights and it provided for retaliation against all those countries, which placed disabilities on Indians, inflicting on their nationals in India the same disabilities which Indians had to suffer there. This Bill was the result of the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. In Kenya where the Indian settlers outnumbered the white settlers by three to one, the latter wanted to usurp all political power and exclude the former altogether. In the Kenya legislature they had a law passed giving the vote to all white settlers above twenty-one. They refused at first to extend the vote to Indian settlers, but ultimately offered them a separate electorate with a more limited franchise. This offer was declined by the Indians because it would put the stamp of second-class citizenship on them. The Kenya Indians appealed to India for help and in April 1923 the Rt. Hon. V. S. Sastri¹ led a deputation to England to plead their cause before the authorities at Whitehall. A fairly satisfactory agreement was drawn up between the India Office and the Colonial Office . ¹ Mr. V. S. Sastri who became the head of the Servants of India Society after Mr. Gokhale's death had been made a Privy Councillor, while Mr. Montagu was Secretary of State for India.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 109 —called the Wood-Winterton¹ Agreement but the Tory Cabinet did not give effect to it. Mr. Sastri therefore had to return disappointed. After his return to India, the Recipro- city Bill was introduced in the Assembly by Dr. H. S. Gour. The above picture of India in 1923 would not be complete without reference to some of the communal dissensions which appeared in 1923 and which were to assume a more ugly shape in the years to come. Punjab was the scene of most of the troubles in 1923. Early in the year there was a Hindu-Moslem riot at Multan and this was followed by a similar riot in Amritsar, near the scene of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in 1919. About this time, Mr. (now Sir) Mian Fazli Hussain became a minister in the Punjab and his extreme partiality for Moslems in the matter of appointments to public services caused considerable heart-burning among Sikhs and Hindus. Later in the year, a movement was started among Indian Moslems in opposition to the Indian National Congress—called 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh'—which aimed at organising the Moslems as a strong and virile community. This movement gained adherents for some time but before long it fell into disfavour and was replaced by communal or sectarian organisations of a different kind. While the above movement was going on among the Moslems, the Hindus were not altogether idle. Their communal organi- sation—called the Hindu Mahasabha—sought to strengthen itself by deciding at its annual meeting in August to admit the depressed classes to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by high-caste Hindus. Corresponding to the 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh' movement among the Moslems, a 'Sangathan' move- ment was started among the Hindus. Further, in order to reclaim those Hindus who for some reason had left the Hindu fold in the past, the 'Suddhi' (or Purification) movement was started. By performing the Suddhi ceremony, it was made possible for a non-Hindu to become a Hindu. The apostle of this movement was Swami Shraddhananda,² a highly- ¹ The Hon. Edward Wood, better known as Lord Irwin and now as Lord Halifax was the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies—while Lord Winterton was the Under-Secretary of State for India. ² Swami Shraddhananda was subsequently murdered by a Moslem fanatic probably out of his resentment at the Suddhi movement.

110 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE respected leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, through whose influence thousands of non-Hindus, including Moslems and Christians, were converted to Hinduism. About this time, the Swami was endeavouring to reconvert the Malkana Rajputs who had originally been Hindus but had subsequently embraced the Islamic faith and this attempt caused annoyance to many of the Moslem leaders. While the communal storm was brewing in India, the Ali brothers remained true to their nationalist creed. Moulana Mohammed Ali, the younger brother, was elected to preside over the annual session of the Congress at Coconada in Madras Presidency. There was no heated controversy as at Gaya and the deliberations took place in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. There was, however, a breeze over the Hindu-Moslem question which fortunately did not develop into a storm. Deshbandhu Das had drawn up a Hindu- Moslem Pact for settlement of the communal question in Bengal and he desired the Congress to put the seal of approval on it. The Coconada Congress, however, did not do so and the Pact was rejected on the alleged ground that it showed partiality for the Moslems and violated the principles of Nationalism. Another Pact which had been drawn up by Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. M. A. Ansari for the settlement of the communal question was referred by the Coconada Con- gress to the All-India Congress Committee for consideration. These pacts indicated that the better minds among the Con- gress leaders had begun to realise the possibility of a communal rift and the necessity for making some sort of settlement before the breach widened. But sufficiently speedy or suffi- ciently drastic action was not taken, with the result that the differences did become more acute and grave and the country had to face a communal storm as soon as the political tension created by the Swaraj Party subsided after the death of Deshbandhu Das in June, 1925. From the Nationalist point of view, the year 1923 had begun badly but it ended well. In January, there was division and depression. In December, there was hope and confidence. Despite signs of communal disturbance here and there, the political barometer had once again begun to rise. In England

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT III too, the forces of reaction had received a temporary setback. In May, 1923, Mr. Baldwin replaced Mr. Bonar Law as Premier and in November of the same year he appealed to the country on the issue of Protection versus Free Trade. The Conservatives were thrown out of office as a consequence and the beginning of 1924 saw a Labour Government installed in office for the first time in British History. The Near East policy of the previous cabinets had failed. Before the end of 1922, Mustapha Kemal Pasha had succeeded in driving the Greeks out of Anatolia. Before the end of 1923 he succeeded in driving the Allied troops out of Constantinople. And by March 1924, he felt sufficiently strong to abolish the Khalifate altogether and bring into existence a new and powerful Turkey.

CHAPTER V DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER (1924-25) THE year 1924 opened with an outlook hopeful in every direction, but the Swarajists had no time to rest. The elections to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the largest municipality in India, were to be held in March. Thanks to the Minister for Local Self-Government, Sir Surendranath Bannerji, the Calcutta Municipal Act had been amended in 1923. Therein, larger powers had been conferred on the municipality, the franchise had been considerable enlarged and the elective element strengthened. Under the con- stitution, it was possible for the Swaraj Party to capture the municipal administration if they were successful at the polls. An intensive campaign was therefore started early in 1924 with the object of capturing the elected seats. So great was the enthusiasm of the people who attended in their thousands the meetings addressed by the Swarajist leaders that the election forecast was a very favourable one. As a matter of fact the Swaraj Party was returned with a very safe majority, a large number of the successful Swarajist candidates being Moslems. This result was all the more creditable because the elections were held on the basis of separate electorate, whereby Hindu voters alone could vote for Hindu candidates and Mos- lem voters for Moslem candidates. At the first meeting of the newly-elected municipal councillors, Deshbandhu Das was elected Mayor and Mr. Shaheed Suhrawady, a Moslem gentleman, Deputy-Mayor. The Corporation soon after appointed me as the Chief Executive Officer, that is, the head of the municipal administration.¹ Though my appointment to this important post at the age of twenty-seven was generally ¹ Under the new constitution of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation there was a division of function—the Chief Executive Officer being the head of the administration and the Mayor being the head of the Corporation as a whole. Under the old constitution both these functions were combined in the ‘Chairman’. 112

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 113 approved in Swarajist circles, it did not fail to cause a certain amount of heart-burning in some circles within the Party. To the Government it gave great annoyance and it was not without a great deal of hesitation that they decided to give their approval, as they were required to do under the Statute. The election of the Deshbandhu as the first Mayor under the new constitution symbolised our capture of the Calcutta Municipality and was attended by popular demonstrations. Under the new regime, new measures calculated to benefit the citizens, were set in motion in quick succession. The newly- elected Swarajist Councillors and Aldermen, including the Mayor, all came dressed in home-made Khadi. Among the employees of the Municipality, Khadi became the official uniform. Many of the streets and parks were renamed after India’s greatest men. For the first time an Education Depart- ment was started and a distinguished Indian graduate of Cambridge¹ was put in charge. Free primary schools for boys and girls sprang up all over the city. Health-Associations, financed by the Municipality, were started in every ward of the city by public-spirited citizens for carrying on health propaganda among the people. Dispensaries were opened by the Municipality in the different districts for giving free medical treatment to the poor. In purchasing stores, pre- ference was given to Swadeshi (i.e., home-made) goods. In making new appointments, the claims of Moslems and other minorities were recognised for the first time. Infant clinics were established in different parts of the city and to each clinic was added a milk-kitchen for supplying milk free to the children of the poor. Last, but not least, the Municipality arranged to give civic receptions to Nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. V. J. Patel, when they visited the city and the previous custom of giving civic receptions to Viceroys, Governors and officials was dis- continued once for all. The above measures adopted for promoting the welfare of ‘¹ K. P. Chattopadhyaya who has continued to hold office till the present day. At present there are about 40,000 boys and girls in the Municipal Schools. H

114 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the citizens brought about a new civic consciousness.¹ People for the first time began to look upon the Municipality as their own institution and upon Municipal officers and employees as Public Servants and not bureaucrats. But the British vested interests in the city felt that they were losing their importance and that they could no longer dominate the Municipality. At that time nearly all the departmental heads were Britishers, but with one or two exceptions, I had no difficulty whatsoever, in dealing with them. The majority of them were quite loyal to the new Swarajist administration and some of them were even enthusiastic in praising it. Though within a few months the efficiency of the administration was considerably raised and citizens' complaints were attended to more promptly than before, the official bloc in the Corporation, as also the Government, continued their policy of opposition, with the result that constant friction used to take place. In the matter of appointments, they were opposed to the Swarajist policy of doing justice to the minorities. With regard to the drainage problem of the city, they were also in conflict with the Swarajists. The scheme sponsored by the Government for the new drainage works was rejected by the Swarajists as being unscientific and useless. In this they had the support of the Drainage Engineer of the Municipality, the late Mr. O. J. Wilkinson and of the Director of Public Health, Dr. C. A. Bentley, while the Chief Engineer, Mr. J. R. Coats, was on the side of the Government. The drainage controversy between the Municipality and the Government continued for a long time and it took the Government ten years to give in to the Municipality on the drainage question.² The doings of the Swaraj Party in the Calcutta Corporation would not have embarrassed the Government so much but for the fact that there was a simultaneous pressure on the latter from many quarters. In the Indian Legislative Assembly the Swaraj Party was fairly strong and on behalf of the Party, notice of a resolution was given demanding the release of Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi had fallen seriously ¹ To give expression to this new consciousness, a weekly journal, called the Calcutta Municipal Gazette was started by the Municipality. ² The drainage scheme which has been adopted now was drawn up by the Indian Chief Engineer, Dr. B. N. Dey, who is still holding that office.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 115 ill on January 12th and had been operated upon. This news had caused anxiety and alarm from one end of the country to the other and there was a very strong public demand for his release. On the morning of February 5th, the day on which the above resolution was to be moved, the Mahatma was quietly released. A few days later, on February 8th, Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the Swaraj Party in the Assembly, moved a resolution demand- ing that a Round Table Conference be convened for drawing up a Constitution for India, establishing full responsible Government and that the new Constitution be placed before a newly-elected Indian Legislature and be submitted before the British Parliament for being embodied in a statute. Reply- ing to this resolution on behalf of the Government of India, Sir Malcolm Hailey, promised an investigation into the complaints against and criticism of, the Constitution. If after the investigation it was found that there was possibility of constitutional advance within the four corners of the Act, the Government would have no objection in making recom- mendations to the British Cabinet to that effect. But if on the other hand, further constitutional advance involved an amendment of the Government of India Act, 1919, then the Government could not promise any action at that stage. This reply was extremely disappointing and as a retort, the Assembly threw out some of the demands for grants and refused leave to introduce the entire Finance Bill. The Finance Bill had therefore to be restored with the help of the special powers of certification vested in the Viceroy. The debate over the demand for a Round Table Conference was followed by the appointment of a Committee with the following terms of reference—to inquire into the difficulties arising from or the defects inherent in the working of the Government of India Act, 1919; to investigate the feasibility and desirability of securing remedies for such difficulties and defects, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of the Act, either by action taken under the Act and the rules or by such amendments of the Act as appear necessary to rectify any administrative imperfections. This Committee was presided over by the Home Member, Sir Alexander Muddi-

116 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE man and among the members were Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (Allahabad), Sir Sivaswami Aiyer (Madras), Mr. M. A. Jinnah (Bombay) and Dr. Paranjpye (Poona)—all of them being Liberal (Moderate) politicians—who submitted a minority report. The Committee as a whole reported that there were serious defects in the Constitution and in the manner in which it had been worked. The majority of the members, consisting mostly of officials, recommended a number of minor modifications which would help the working of the Constitution. The minority reported that such modi- fications would be of little avail and that a satisfactory opera- tion of the Constitution would be possible only when it was revised with a view to introducing responsible government in the provinces and at least a measure of responsibility in the Central Government. It should be noted in this con- nection that the Swaraj Party in the Assembly did not co-operate with the Muddiman Committee in any way and the report of the Committee was altogether disappointing from the Swarajist point of view. While the major issues were being tackled by its members in the Assembly, the Swaraj Party was following obstructive tactics in all the provincial legislatures. In the Assembly there was hardly any room for obstruction or deadlock be- cause the Viceroy could easily override the legislature by his special powers of ‘veto’ and ‘certification.’ Moreover, all the departments of the Central Government were adminis- tered by members who were under the full control of the Viceroy and were neither elected members of the Assembly nor removable by a vote of that body. In the provinces, on the other hand, the departments called ‘transferred’ depart- ments were administered by ‘ministers’ who were elected members of the provincial legislature and were subject to the vote of that body—while the other departments called ‘reserved’ departments, were administered by members who were quite independent of the vote of the legislature.¹ The Swarajist tactics in the provincial legislatures therefore con- sisted in attacking the ministers and their ‘transferred’ departments. The salaries of the ministers would be either ¹ Because of this dual system, the constitution was called ‘diarchy’.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 117 rejected altogether, in which case no ministers could be appointed at all—or votes of no-confidence in the ministers would be moved repeatedly so that no set of ministers could continue in office long. At the same time attempts would be made to throw out the Budget of the transferred departments which could not be restored by certification. By such tactics, the Governor of the province would be forced to suspend the working of the transferred departments, take over the administration into his own hands and go on ruling as he would in the pre-reform days. In the Central Provinces Legislative Council where the Swarajists had an absolute majority—the entire Budget was thrown out without any difficulty and no ministers could therefore be appointed. In Bengal the situation was somewhat similar to that in the Central Provinces. The salaries of the ministers were rejected and repeated attempts to restore them proved unavailing. The ministers had therefore to lay down their office. Thus, in the Central Provinces and in Bengal, the working of the constitution was rendered impossible. It is not possible to describe the enthusiasm of the public when diarchy was overthrown in these two provinces. It was regarded as a great triumph for the Swarajists and this victory brought a sense of elation all over the country. In 1920, the Congress had tried to paralyse the new constitution, by boycotting the polls but this attempt had failed, because not a single seat had remained vacant and undesirable men had flooded the legislatures. In 1924, on the other hand, the Swarajists, by carrying the fight inside the legislatures, were able to wreck the constitution, in at least some of the provinces. People belonging to the Liberal Party and even 'No- Changer' Congressmen have not sometimes been able to under- stand the utility of the Swarajist policy of constitutional obstruction. They argue that if ministers are allowed to continue in office they could do more good than if those departments are taken over by the Governor and his officials. As against that, the Swarajists argue that three years' exper- ience (from 1920 to 1923) has shown that there is hardly any scope for useful work for a minister under the Constitution of 1919. All the more important departments, like public

118 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE security, justice, prisons, finance, etc., are in the hands of officials and the budget allotments for these departments are made first. What is left is handed over to the ministers and this amount is so inadequate that it barely suffices for their minimum establishment, rendering it quite impossible to undertake nation-building work on a decent scale. Moreover, the principal officials working under the Ministers, including their secretaries, cannot be subjected to disciplinary action by them and being quite independent of the legislature in the matter of their pay and emoluments, they are not respon- sive to popular sentiment. In these circumstances, the the unhampered working of the constitution cannot benefit the country in any way—whereas successful obstruction not only brings pressure to bear on the Government by putting obstacles in its path, but also develops a spirit of resistance in the country as a whole. As a matter of fact, when the constitution of the Swaraj Party was first drawn up in March 1923, it was explicitly stated in the preamble that the object of the Swarajist policy was to create an atmos- phere of resistance to the bureaucracy, without which the Government could never be made to respond to popular demands. While the Swarajists were enjoying the first flush of victory, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, in a striking speech delivered in the House of Lords, analysed the causes which led to the birth of Swarajism in India. Among the causes he mentioned were—firstly, the resolution passed by the House of Lords supporting General Dyer, the author of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre; secondly, the 'steel-frame speech' of the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, in 1922, eulogising the Indian Civil Service; thirdly, the doubling of the Salt Tax by the Government of India, in 1923, in the teeth of intense popular opposition and despite the adverse vote of the Indian Legislative Assembly; and fourthly, the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. This clever and sympathetic analysis of the causes of the Indian unrest leading to the birth of the Swaraj Party, showed that for once at least the India Office in London was able to appreciate public sentiment

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 119 and public opinion in India. It is to be regretted, therefore, that this understanding was not followed up by appropriate action. Not content with his activities in the legislature, the Municipality and in other directions, the Deshbandhu launched another important movement at this time—the Tarakeswar Satyagraha movement. Not far from Calcutta, at a place called Tarakeswar, there is an old temple of 'Baba Taraknath' or 'Shiva.' As in the case of other holy shrines, there was considerable property attached to the temple, which had been endowed in order to provide for its upkeep. Fol- lowing the Hindu custom, there was a trustee, called the Mohunt, in charge of the temple and the attached property. Though the Mohunts are expected to live a chaste and abstemious life, there were allegations against the Mohunt of Tarakeswar with regard to his personal character and to his administration of the endowed property. As Tarakeswar happens to be one of the most holy places of pilgrimage in Bengal and is visited every year by people from all parts of the province, the allegations made against the Mohunt were widely known. After the success of the Akali movement in the Punjab, pressure was brought to bear on the Bengal Congress Committee for starting a similar movement at Tarakeswar. Notices were served on the Mohunt calling upon him to mend his ways but as these attempts were of no avail, in April 1924, the Deshbandhu launched a movement for taking peaceful possession of the temple and the attached property, with a view to placing them under the administra- tion of a public committee. The Mohunt appealed to the Government for help and as soon as volunteers began to move towards the temple and the palace of the Mohunt—the police appeared on the scene. The usual Satyagraha scenes were re-enacted at Tarakeswar—peaceful volunteers moving up from one side and the police attacking them mercilessly on the other and occasionally making arrests. Owing to the intervention of the Government, the issue became a political one. Once again, in order to set an example to the people, the Deshbandhu sent his son to prison at the head of the volunteers. Within a short time, the movement became

120 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE extremely popular and there was a warm response from every corner of the province.¹ In May, 1924, the annual conference of Bengal Congress- men, called the Provincial Conference, was held at a place called Sirajganj. Prior to this the Deshbandhu had drawn up an agreement between Hindus and Moslems, covering religious as well as political questions, but it had been rejected by the Coconada Congress in December 1923, on the ground that it conceded too much to the Moslems. This agreement, known as the Bengal Pact—was placed before the Sirajganj Conference for ratification. There was a stormy debate and the political opponents of the Deshbandhu, joined by some reactionary Hindus, put up a formidable opposition. Never- theless, the passionate eloquence of the leader carried the day and the Bengal Pact was adopted by a large majority. After this, another resolution was discussed and passed which was to stir up a hornet's nest in the days to come. This was the Gopinath Saha resolution. Some months earlier, a young student, named Gopinath Saha, had attempted to assassinate the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta, Sir Charles Tegart. Through mistaken identity, he shot at and killed another Englishman, Mr. Day. At the trial before the High Court of Calcutta, Saha made a statement which created a sensation at the time. He stated in effect that he really had intended to murder the Police Commissioner and expressed his sincere sorrow for having killed the wrong person. He was glad to pay with his life and hoped that every drop of his blood would sow the seeds of freedom in every Indian home. Saha was sentenced to death by the High Court and duly hanged. But, after his death, resolutions were passed in several meetings in Bengal appreciating his courage and spirit of sacrifice, while condemning his action. A similar ¹ The Satyagraha Campaign went on for several months. The Mohunt ultimately was forced to come to a compromise with Deshbandhu C. R. Das and an agreement was drawn up whereby the temple and the major portion of the property was to be handed over to a public committee. This agreement had to be placed before a court of law but at this stage a third party, under the name of the Brahman Sabha, raised objections. While the whole matter was under consideration, the Deshbandhu died. After his unfortunate death, the agreement was set at nought and the result of the Satyagraha Campaign was nullified,

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER ' 121 resolution was unanimously passed at the Sirajganj Con- ference and it caused considerable annoyance to the Govern- ment. While these stirring events were happening in Bengal, interesting developments were taking place elsewhere. Mahatma Gandhi, as we have already seen, was released on February 5th. He went to a seaside resort near Bombay for rest and change of climate. After some weeks he was able to take interest once again in public affairs and gradually to assume his normal activities. Speculation at once arose as to what attitude Gandhiji would take up with regard to the Swaraj Party. On principle he was of course bitterly opposed to the Swarajist policy of ‘Council-entry,’ nevertheless, he did not adopt a hostile attitude. It may be that he found the position of the Swarajists to be too strong in the country to be able to overthrow them and so he bowed to the inevitable. Or it may be that he felt that the changed circumstances in the country warranted a change in tactics. Be that as it may, he met the Swarajist leaders, Deshbandhu Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru and arrived at an understanding with them. This agreement, known as the Gandhi-Das Pact, was to the effect that the Mahatma was to devote himself to the Khadi Campaign, while the Swarajists were to be in charge of the political campaign. In order to carry on his work without any interference on the part of the Congress or the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma was empowered to organise an autonomous body to be called the All-India Spinners’ Association. This body was to have its own funds and its own Secretariat. The Swaraj Party, on the other hand, was to carry on its work as an autonomous body independently of the Congress and to have its own Secretariat.¹ The alliance thus struck between the Mahatma and the Swaraj Party soon ripened into friendship as a result of conciliatory statements made by the former from time to time. On one occasion, for instance, he said in his characteristic style, ‘My political conscience is in the keeping of the Swarajists.’ On another occasion he is ¹ This agreement was ratified at the annual session of the Congress held at Belgaum in December, over which Mahatma Gandhi presided.

122 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE reported to have remarked: 'I shall cling to the Swaraj Party as a child clings to its mother.' After establishing peace within the Congress camp through his understanding with the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma turned to another acute problem. Since 1923, Hindu-Moslem dissensions had appeared in different parts of India and Mahatma Gandhi was far-sighted enough to realise that if the evil was not nipped in the bud, it would soon grow into a national calamity. The communal storm might not break while the Swarajist Campaign, supported by both Hindus and Moslems, was in full swing—but the moment there was a lull in the campaign, the evil was sure to rear its head. So in September, 1924, at his instance, a Unity Conference was convened at Delhi. The Conference was largely attended, even the Anglican Metropolitan of India and representatives of the Britishers in India, participating in it. At the time of the Conference the Mahatma embarked on a three weeks' fast as a self-imposed penance for the wrongs committed by members of different communities who by their action dis- turbed intercommunal peace in India. The Conference was a successful one. A formula was devised for promoting unity between the different communities in India and a Conciliation Board of fifteen members was set up which was to intervene whenever and wherever any communal trouble arose. In spite of the success of the Unity Conference, practical results did not follow. In March 1924, Mustapha Kemal Pasha took the extraordinary step of abolishing the Khalifate altogether. Those Moslems who had been drawn towards the Indian National Congress owing to the desire to secure support for the Khilafat Campaign, no longer felt any urge to remain friendly towards the Congress. The Khilafat Committees themselves went out of existence in most parts of India and many of the erstwhile members of those organisations were absorbed into reactionary mushroom organisations. About this time the All-India Moslem League came back to life again. This body had been the premier organisation for Moslems in India till 1920. Since that year it had been practically replaced by the All-India Khilafat Committee which had succeeded in drawing most of the active elements

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 123 among the Indian Moslems. The abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks themselves, struck at the root of the Khilafat Committees in India and indirectly helped the revival of the All-India Moslem League. In December 1924, when the All-India Moslem League met once again, the Khilafatists were defeated for the first time since 1920. The newly- revived All-India Moslem League, as we shall see later, became more sectarian and reactionary than it had been prior to 1920. About the middle of 1924, matters began to approach a crisis once again. This crisis was of course different in character from that of 1921-22. The Government felt hard- pressed from all sides. Not only in Bengal, but throughout the country, the local bodies (municipalities, district boards, etc.) were coming under the control of the Nationalists and to that extent, official power and influence were being eliminated. In all the legislatures, a stiff fight was being waged and in two provinces, Central Provinces and Bengal, the working of the new constitution was paralysed. In Bengal, the Tarakes- war Satyagraha, though it began as a movement for the reform of the temple administration, soon developed into a political movement and gradually assumed serious propor- tions. Over and above this, according to the Government, there was a strong undercurrent of revolutionary activity and the Government were particularly annoyed by public resolu- tions, praising the revolutionary Gopinath Saha, though the appreciation was of a qualified and conditional character. In August, when the influence of the Swaraj Party was at its height, the annual conference of the Party was held in Cal- cutta. Leaders from the different provinces were present on the occasion. The attendance was large and the enthusiasm very great. That was the signal for the Government to strike. During the last twelve months they had not been altogether inactive and had been closely following events. Soon after the Delhi Congress in September 1923, a number of Congress workers belonging to the Swaraj Party of Bengal had been suddenly arrested and put in prison without any trial under an old regulation called 'Regulation III of 1818.' The explanation given by the Government at the time was that

124 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the revolutionary movement was raising its head again and it was therefore necessary to resort to speedy suppression. Though the arrests created considerable resentment at the time, it was not followed by any further developments and the excitement gradually subsided. After a year, the Government decided to repeat those tactics again. They did not know how to suppress the Swaraj Party otherwise. The activities of the Party, except in the case of the Tarakeswar Satyagraha and similar campaigns, were carried on within the bounds of the law, but they caused considerable embarrassment to the Government; nevertheless the Government could not take any legal proceedings against the Swarajists. All attempts to suppress the Tarakeswar Satyagraha campaign had not only failed but had served to evoke greater enthusiasm on the part of the people. In sheer desperation the Government therefore decided to strike at the root of the organisation and since that was not possible through a trial in a court of law, they resolved to imprison some of the principal organisers of the Swaraj Party without trial. On October 25th, 1924, in the early hours of the morning, they made a clean sweep of a large number of Congressmen in Calcutta and other places in Bengal. These arrests were made partly under Regulation III of 1818, and partly under an emergency ordinance (called the Bengal Ordinance) pro- mulgated by the Viceroy at midnight on October 24th. This ordinance conferred on the Government of Bengal powers of arrest and imprisonment similar to those conferred on the Government of India by Regulation III of 1818, and the ordinance was issued in order to help the Government of Bengal to order arrest and imprisonment without trial of persons in Bengal, without any reference to the Government of India. Among those arrested were two prominent Swarajist members of the Bengal Legislative Council, Mr. Anil Baran Roy and Mr. S. C. Mitra,¹ and myself. Some of the warrants as in the case of three of us, had been issued under the Regulation, whereas in the case of the others, they had been ¹ Mr. Ail Baron Roy has since retired from politics and joined the Ashrama of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh at Pondicherry. Mr. S. C. Mitra has since joined the Assembly and been a prominent member of the Opposition between 1928 and 1934.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 125 issued under the newly-promulgated Bengal Ordinance. The warrants under the Regulation had been signed as early as July last, the day after the Government were finally defeated in their attempt to retain the ministers in office and work the diarchical constitution. It has not been explained yet as to why the warrants had not been executed for nearly three months. The conjecture generally made is that the Bengal Government waited for sanction to a larger number of arrests and also for the promulgation of the Bengal Ordinance. Moreover, the whole matter had to be placed before the then Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, and so the delay was unavoidable. With regard to the raison d'être of these arrests, the public notion at the time was that the pressure of the Swarajists in the local bodies (especially the Calcutta Municipality), in the legislatures and at Tarakeswar had unnerved the Government. And the reason why they struck only in Bengal, was that the anti- Government forces were strongest in that province. The large number of arrests made so suddenly and unexpectedly on October 25th, created tremendous excite- ment in the country. Official circles came out with the excuse that a revolutionary conspiracy was on foot and the arrests had to be made before anything serious happened. But it was hard to persuade the public that those who had been arrested were engaged in a revolutionary conspiracy. Public clamour against the arrests continued to be very strong and one month after my arrest, Government began to think seriously of releasing me. But the prestige of the police, at whose instance the arrests had been made, stood in the way and the proposal had to be dropped. The agitation over my arrest was the strongest at the time because the public thought that the object of the Government was to strike at the Swarajist administration of the new Corporation. Everyone knew, including the extreme loyalists, that I was engaged day and night in my municipal duties and had been forced to give up Politics altogether, since I was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation. Official and semi-official circles were therefore at pains to put forward an excuse for the arrests which would find some credence among the public.