द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

126 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE The Anglo-Indian papers of Calcutta, The Statesman, and The Englishman (now defunct), came out with statements to the effect that I was the brain of the revolutionary conspiracy. My solicitors at once filed legal proceedings against both the papers for defamation. The proceedings dragged on for months and in the meantime attempts were made to secure the help of the Government in the suit in the matter of obtaining proofs to substantiate the charges made against me in the Press in support of the Government. As the Govern- ment did not agree to help in the matter, an attempt was made to secure the assistance of the India Office in London. By that time there had been a change in the Cabinet in England. A General Election had taken place in October and as a result of the scare created by the Zinovieff letter, there had been a landslide in favour of the Conservative Party. Following the defeat of the Labour Party at the polls, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, had made room for the Conservative Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead. Though the India Office was inclined to help the Anglo-Indian papers in the suit brought against them for defamation, they were unable to find any documentary evidence to prove my complicity in a revolutionary conspiracy. For- ward, the Swarajist paper of Calcutta, happened to get hold of and publish a letter, written to Calcutta from London on the subject, in which an agent of the India Office was reported to have said that I had been arrested on the verbal testimony borne against me by certain people, but that there was no documentary evidence against me. The publication of this letter further embarrassed the Government. No one in India felt these persecutions more than Desh- bandhu Das did. In a magnificent speech delivered from the Mayoral chair of the Calcutta Corporation, he gave vent to the deep indignation which stirred the public at the time. He accepted full responsibility for what the Chief Executive Officer had done and challenged the Government to arrest him. The Government did not accept the challenge but replied in a different way. They opened negotiations with him for settlement of the entire Indian question. At that time, Mahatma Gandhi was politically a back-number. He had

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 127 confined himself to the Khadi campaign, having retired from the political movement which was under, the control of the Swarajist leaders. The memory of the negotiations in December 1921, had left an impression on the official mind that it was possible to come to an understanding with the Deshbandhu if the major issues were tackled in an earnest and sincere manner. Lord Lytton personally had a very high appreciation of him as a man. And at the time no official felt the pressure of the popular movement more than the Governor of Bengal did. In those days, to settle with the Congress, meant to settle with Deshbandhu C. R. Das. Therefore, unknown to the outside world, negotiations between the Deshbandhu and the Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, went on for some months. With his shrewd political instinct, the Deshbandhu thought of making use of the public feeling roused by the arrests of October 1924. He appealed at once for a fund to be used for national reconstruction. The economic situation in the country was not favourable and many people thought that the response to the appeal would be disappointing. But the leader knew better. In spite of unfavourable forecasts, he had a very good response and that was a further proof of public confidence in him. At the end of the year, the annual session of the Congress was held at Belgaum in Bombay Presidency. This Congress was presided over by Mahatma Gandhi and it was the last Congress attended by the Desh- bandhu. The proceedings were marked by extreme cordiality between the Mahatma and the Swarajists. The principal programme of work adopted for the coming year was the extension of home-spinning and home-weaving and it was enjoined on every member of the Congress to produce a certain quantity of yarn as his membership subscription. The only other significant fact about the Belgaum Congress was the attempt of Mrs. Annie Besant to get her Commonwealth of India Bill ratified by the Congress. This Bill, which was to confer Home Rule on India, had been drafted by her and her intention was to have it introduced in the British Parlia- ment as a private Bill. She felt that her hands would be considerably strengthened if the Congress gave the stamp of

128 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE approval to her pet constitution, but none of the Congress leaders would be drawn into her net. She therefore had to leave the Belgaum Congress disappointed. The political situation remained unchanged when the year 1925 was ushered in. Deshbandhu Das continued in power. In the early part of 1925, there was a further trial of strength between the Government and the Swarajists in Bengal. The Ordinance which the Governor-General had promulgated in October 1924, conferring on the Bengal Governor powers of summary arrest and imprisonment without trial, was to expire in April 1925. Thereafter, if the Bengal Government desired to have those powers, they would have to introduce legislation to that effect in the Bengal Legislative Council. A Bill was therefore duly introduced and the Government strained every nerve to have it passed into law. As the Swarajists were really in a minority in the Legislative Council, the Government felt hopeful that they would be able to carry the legislation through. The Deshbandhu was then taking rest at Patna as he had been suffering from a nervous break- down. But in spite of his ill-health, he resolved to inflict a crushing defeat on the Government in person. On the appointed day he arrived at the Council Hall in time and had actually to be carried in an invalid-chair. Once again the laurels of the day were his. The Bill was thrown out, but by virtue of the extraordinary powers given to the Governor under the Constitution, he was able to certify the Bill as law. Soon after this incident the annual conference of Bengal Congressmen was summoned at Faridpur and in view of the critical situation in the country, Deshbandhu Das was elected President. Against all medical advice, he resolved to go there and preside over the deliberations. People did not understand at the time why he was so insistent on attending this con- ference. Anything that he said would have drawn the same amount of attention even if it happened to be a Press state- ment. The real reason, however, as to why he wanted to go there was that he had to give a public indication of his demands, for the benefit of the Government. Moreover, he wanted to demonstrate to the Government that his views

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 129 were acceptable to the bulk of Congressmen so that the Government would feel that in the event of a settlement being arrived at, the Deshbandhu was in a position to deliver the goods. At that time the Government attached great value to the Bengal Provincial Conference, because Bengal was then the storm centre and contained some of the most radical elements in the Indian National Congress. Therefore a proposal which was carried in Bengal, would in all probability be acceptable to Congressmen elsewhere. Deshbandhu Das made a speech which was regarded as rather tame for a Bengal audience. He discussed the question of Dominion Status versus Independence as the goal of the Congress, and declared that he stood for the former. Moreover, he spoke in condemnation of terrorism. The speech as a whole appeared to be an appeal to the Government and to the more extreme elements among Indians to adopt a compromising attitude so that the ground could be prepared for a settlement. It was, however, not welcomed by the youthful section of the audience and there was a possibility that he would be defeated when the matter was put to the vote. Nevertheless, so great was his personal influence at the time and so transparent his sincerity of purpose that he carried the day. The delibera- tions of the Faridpur Conference were on the whole satis- factory to the authorities with whom the Deshbandhu was engaged in negotiating. Soon after this, Lord Reading left India for London, as the Conservative Cabinet and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, wanted to consult him. By that time it was in the air that negotiations had been going on between Deshbandhu Das and the Government, though hardly anyone knew any details. It was announced that after consulting Lord Reading, Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India. Everyone in India awaited this speech with the greatest interest and eagerness. Then came a sudden bolt from the blue. In June 1925, when Deshbandhu Das was having a rest in the hill-station of Darjeeling, the summer capital of the Bengal Government, he fell seriously ill. After a brief attack he suddenly died. The whole country was at once plunged in grief. He was at I

130 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the height of his glory and was expected to achieve great things for his country. While in memoriam meetings and processions were going on in the country, the British Cabinet in London made up their mind as to what they should do. Their arch-enemy was dead; therefore, things would settle down now for a while. They would accordingly not decide anything in a hurry but would watch developments. But it had already been announced that Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India on July 7th, 1925. Therefore, the announcement carefully prepared on behalf of the Cabinet had to be entirely suppressed and in its place Lord Birkenhead, on the previously announced date, made an uninteresting speech. Besides talking about plati- tudes, he merely endorsed Lord Reading's panacea for India's ills in the form of development of industry and the stabilisa- tion of finance. The death of the Deshbandhu on June 16th, 1925, was for India a national calamity of the first magnitude. Though his active political career consisted of barely five years, his rise had been phenomenal. With the reckless abandon of a Vaishnava devotee, he had plunged into the political move- ment with heart and soul and he had given not only himself but his all in the fight for Swaraj. When he died, whatever worldly possessions he still had, were left to the nation. By the Government he was both feared and admired. They feared his strength, but admired his character. They knew that he was a man of his word. They also knew, that though he was a hard fighter, he was none the less a clean fighter and further, he was also the man with whom they could bargain for a settlement. He was clear-headed, his political instinct was sound and unerring and unlike the Mahatma he was fully conscious of the rôle he was to play in Indian politics. He knew more than anyone else, that situations favourable for wresting political power from the enemy do not come often and when they do come, they do not last long. While the crisis lasts, a bargain has to be struck. He knew also that to sponsor a settlement, when public enthusiasm is at its height, needs much courage and may involve a certain amount of unpopularity. But he was nothing if not fearless. He was

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 131 conscious of his exact rôle, namely that of a practical politician and he was therefore never afraid of courting unpopularity. In contrast with the Deshbandhu, the rôle of the Mahatma has not been a clear one. In many ways he is altogether an idealist and a visionary. In other respects, he is an astute politician. At times he is as obstinate as a fanatic; on other occasions he is liable to surrender like a child. The instinct, or the judgment, so necessary for political bargaining is lacking in him. When there is a real opportunity for a bargain as in 1921, he is liable to stick out for small things and thereby upset all chances of a settlement. Whenever he does go in for a bargain, as we shall see in 1931, he gives more than he takes. On the whole, he is no match in diplo- macy for an astute British politician. After the death of Deshbandhu Das the Mahatma spent several months in Bengal trying to raise a memorial fund in honour of the departed great and helping to reorganise the Congress machinery in the absence of the leader. His public activities, nevertheless, continued on the whole to be non-political in character and the political mantle of the Deshbandhu therefore fell on Pandit Motilal Nehru, the Swarajist leader in the Assembly. While Lord Reading was still in England and Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, was acting as the Governor-General of India, the Pandit attempted to resume the threads of the negotiations which the Deshbandhu had been carrying on with the Government. But the Government in London had already decided to drop the negotiations for the time being and watch developments. Nothing therefore came out of this attempt of Pandit Motilal Nehru. June 1925 proved to be a turning point in the recent history of India. The disappearance of the towering personality of the Deshbandhu from the political arena was for India a colossal misfortune. The Swaraj Party, which owed so much to him, was paralysed after his death and dissensions gradually arose within the Party. Nevertheless, the Party at the time of his death was an institution of which anyone would be proud. The Capital of Calcutta, the organ of British com- mercial interests, writing after his death, compared the Swaraj

132 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Party with the Sinn Fein Party of Ireland and remarked that during forty years of its existence, it had seen nothing like it before. The discipline of the Party, according to the paper, was German in character. The weakening of the Swaraj Party served to strengthen the forces of reaction in India and in England, while it let loose a flood of communal strife in India which had, up till then, been held back by the superior forces of Nationalism. To-day, as we look back on the year 1925, we cannot help feeling that if Providence had spared the Deshbandhu for a few years more, the history of India would probably have taken a different turn. In the affairs of nations, it often happens that the appearance or dis- appearance of a single personality often means a new chapter in history. Thus has been the influence of Lenin in Russia, of Mussolini in Italy and of Hitler in Germany in recent world-history.

CHAPTER VI THE SLUMP (1925-27) CONSIDERING the influence of Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 and 1922, the rise of the Swaraj Party must be regarded as some- thing unaccountably remarkable. Though the leaders and the rank and file of the Party had the highest respect for the personality of the Mahatma, the Party was frankly an anti- Gandhi Party and it was strong enough to force the Mahatma to voluntary retirement from politics. This retirement con- tinued virtually till the Calcutta Congress in December 1928. Now what was the secret of the Swaraj Party’s success? To understand that one must know more about the practical shape which Gandhiism took, and as to how the mass mind reacted to the personality of the Mahatma, during the period 1920-22. Though Hindu society has never had an established church like Europe, the mass of the people have been pro- foundly susceptible to the influence of Avatars,¹ priests and ‘gurus.’² The spiritual man has always wielded the largest influence in India and he is called a ‘Sant’ or ‘Mahatma’ or ‘Sadhu.’ For various reasons, Gandhiji came to be looked upon by the mass of the people as a Mahatma before he became the undisputed political leader of India. At the Nagpur Congress in December 1920, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, who was till then a Nationalist leader, addressed him as ‘Mr. Gandhi’ and he was shouted down by thousands of people who insisted that he should address him as ‘Mahatma ¹ According to many Hindus, God incarnates Himself from age to age in order to save the good and destroy the wicked and in order to establish the reign of Truth on earth. These incarnations are called Avatars. Ac- cording to other Hindus, these Avatars are not divine incarnations but human souls in the highest stage of development—that is, when they have realised their oneness with Godhead. According to popular belief there have been nine Avatars up till now—and the tenth is to come at the end of the present wicked age. ² ‘Guru’ is a religious preceptor. In India only a truly spiritual man can be a religious preceptor. 133

134 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Gandhi.' The asceticism of Gandhiji, his simple life, his vegetarian diet, his adherence to truth and his consequent fearlessness—all combined to give him a halo of saintliness. His loin-cloth was reminiscent of Christ, while his sitting posture at the time of lecturing was reminiscent of Buddha. Now all this was a 'tremendous asset to the Mahatma in com- pelling the attention and obedience of his countrymen. As we have already seen, a large and influential section of the intelligentsia was against him, but this opposition was gradually worn down through the enthusiastic support given by the masses. Consciously or unconsciously, the Mahatma fully exploited the mass psychology of the people, just as Lenin did the same thing in Russia, Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. But in doing so, the Mahatma was using a weapon which was sure to recoil on his head. He was exploiting many of the weak traits in the character of his countrymen which had accounted for India's downfall to a large extent. After all, what has brought about India's downfall in the material and political sphere? It is her inordinate belief in fate and in the supernatural—her in- difference to modern scientific development—her backward- ness in the science of modern warfare, the peaceful content- ment engendered by her latter-day philosophy and adherence to Ahimsa (non-violence) carried to the most absurd length. In 1920, when the Congress began to preach the political doctrine of non-co-operation, a large number of Congressmen who had accepted the Mahatma not merely as a political leader but also as a religious preceptor—began to preach the cult of the new Messiah. As a consequence, many people gave up eating fish and meat, took to the same dress as the Mahatma, adopted his daily habits like morning and evening prayer and began to talk more of spiritual freedom than of political Swaraj. In some parts of the country the Mahatma began to be worshipped as an Avatar. Such was the madness that seized the country at the time that in April 1923 in a politically-minded province like Bengal, a resolution moved at the Jessore Provincial Conference to the effect that the goal of the Congress was not spiritual Swaraj but political Swaraj —was defeated at the end of a heated debate. In 1922, when

THE SLUMP 135 the writer was in prison, Indian warders in the service of the Prisons' Department would refuse to believe that the Mahatma had been cast in prison by the British Government. They would say in all seriousness that since Gandhiji was a Mahatma, he could assume the shape of a bird and escape from prison any moment he liked. To make matters worse, political issues would no longer be considered in the cold light of reason, but would be unnecessarily mixed up with ethical issues. The Mahatma and his followers, for instance, would not countenance the boycott of British goods because that would engender hatred towards the British. Even so intel- lectual a personality as the celebrated poetess, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, in her speech at the Gaya Congress in December, 1922, condemned the Swarajist policy on the ground that councils were places of ‘Maya’¹, where Congressmen would be tempted by bureaucratic overtures. And worst of all was the tendency on the part of the orthodox followers of the Mahatma to regard everything that he said as gospel truth without reasoning or arguing and to accept his paper Young India as their Bible. For a people so prone to mysticism and supernaturalism, the only hope of political salvation lies in the growth of a sane rationalism and in the modernisation of the material aspect of life. It was therefore distressing to many sober Nationalists to find that through the conscious or unconscious influence of the Mahatma, some of the above weak traits in the Indian character were again becoming prominent. Thus there arose a rationalist revolt against the Mahatma and his Philosophy. As the Swaraj Party headed this revolt, elements from the Right and from the Left that were tired of the irrationalism of the Mahatma—were drawn towards it. Among the Right elements were those who preferred constitutional action to civil disobedience and the Deshbandhu by virtue of his social position and his vocation as an advocate, was able to com- mand their confidence. Among the Left elements was the younger generation of Congressmen who did not find the ideology and method of the Mahatma to be sufficiently radical for the modern world and who looked upon the Deshbandhu as a more radical (or revolutionary) force in Indian Politics. ¹ ‘Maya’ means an illusion or something false that charms and tempts.

136 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE It was the unique personality of Deshbandhu Das that was able to combine into one party such dissimilar elements, to wrest the Congress machinery from the hands of the orthodox 'No Changers' and to carry on a fight against the bureaucracy on many fronts. But in his absence, there was no one com- petent enough to continue his many-sided activities or to keep together the diverse elements that composed the Swaraj Party. The result was that the Swaraj Party remained in power only so long as the Mahatma did not emerge from his voluntary retirement. When he did emerge in 1929, the Swarajist leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, surrendered without even the show of a fight. The death of Deshbandhu C. R. Das may be regarded as the beginning of a period of all-round depression in the country. If Mahatma Gandhi had come out of his retirement exactly at this juncture, things might have taken a different course, but unfortunately for India, he did not do so. The Deshbandhu's personality was, among other things, a power- ful cementing factor within the Swaraj Party and also in the domain of Hindu-Moslem relations. It served, moreover, to tone up the attitude of the Party to an extremist pitch. In his absence, dissensions began to appear within the Party. The most important of these was the revolt of the Mahrash- trian Swarajists led by Mr. M. R. Jayakar of Bombay and Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona. The Maharashtrian Swarajists had never fully believed in the 'uniform, continuous and con- sistent' opposition of the Swaraj Party, but they had never- theless followed the Deshbandhu and his policy with unques- tionable loyalty. They believed in the theory of 'responsive co-operation' propounded by Lokamanya Tilak at the time of the Amritsar Congress in December 1919. This theory implied that there should be co-operation with the Government in so far as they adopted measures calculated to benefit the country, but non-co-operation or opposition, in so far as their policy was harmful to the public interest. The Maha- rashtrian Swarajists looked upon the Deshbandhu as their leader since the time of Lokamanya's death and had therefore given their support and allegiance to his policy, regardless of their personal views. When Pandit Motilal Nehru assumed

THE SLUMP 137 the leadership of the Swaraj Party, differences broke out between him and his Maharashtrian followers. The breach gradually widened until in an unlucky moment the Pandit lost his patience with them and in a fit of temper, charac- teristic of him, declared that 'the diseased limb (viz., the Maharashtrian group) of the Swaraj Party should be ampu- tated.' This statement so offended the Maharashtrians that they resolved to sever all connection with the Pandit and the Swaraj Party and to start the Responsivist Party. Other dissensions also appeared within the Swaraj Party later on. These developments indicated that while Pandit Motilal Nehru had superior intellectual qualities and a personality that could draw admiration and respect, he lacked that emotional appeal which alone can keep a party together through fair weather and foul. In the domain of Hindu-Moslem relations, too, the Desh- bandhu was a unifying force. His 'Bengal Pact' which had been rejected by the Coconada Congress in December 1923, but had been ratified by the Provincial Conference in May 1924, had served to convince all Moslems that he was their real friend. That such a man was at the head of the Swaraj Party helped to rally Moslem support for that Party and as a matter of fact, the Swaraj Party in the Bengal Legislative Council had a large number of Moslem members who had been elected on a basis of separate electorate. With the death of the Deshbandhu, the Moslem community no longer retained their former confidence in the Swaraj Party. More- over, the political tension created by the Swaraj Party which had served to hold back the rising tide of communalism, subsided after his death and the country was then plunged in inter-communal strife which usurped the field for about two years. There was another unfortunate development following the death of the Deshbandhu—namely the weakening of the extremist attitude of the Party. When the Swaraj Party first came into existence, it had drawn elements both from the Right and from the Left. During the lifetime of the leader the Left elements had the upper hand because he himself belonged to the Left. But in his absence the Right elements were able to raise their head. The emergence of inter-

138 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE communal strife also helped to bring to the fore, people who generally fought shy of politics and who were averse to doing anything which involved suffering and sacrifice. In Bengal the Left Wing was at a disadvantage for some time, because a large number of Congressmen belonging to that group were in prison either under Regulation III of 1818 or under the Bengal Ordinance. From the middle of 1925 onwards there was a gradual watering down of the original Swarajist policy of undiluted opposition. In June, Pandit Motilal Nehru accepted a seat on the Skeen Committee appointed by the Government to report on the Indianisation of the Army. Not long after this, Mr. S. B. Tambe,¹ a prominent member of the Swaraj Party of the Central Provinces, accepted an appointment as a member of the Governor's Executive Council and this step was approved of by Mr. N. C. Kelkar and other prominent Maharashtrian Swarajist leaders. About this time the Indian Legislative Assembly was given the right of electing its own President and Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel, one of the most thorough-going obstructionists in the Swaraj Party, stood as a candidate and was duly elected to this office. Though the acceptance of that office involved a certain amount of co- operation with the Government, Mr. Patel performed his functions with remarkable ability and conspicuous success—so much so that though he always acted within the limits of the Constitution and with scrupulous fairness, he came to be dreaded by the Treasury Benches for his independent and impartial rulings. The popularity which the Swaraj Party gained during the period of its existence, was due in no small measure to his work as President. Working with a wretched Constitution and without any parliamentary precedents to back him, Mr. Patel was, nevertheless, able to maintain the rights and privileges of the members of the House of which he became the custodian and gave to the Opposition Party and its leader the status they would be entitled to in a free country enjoying a democratic Constitution. In September 1925, the report of the Reforms Enquiry ¹ Mr. Tambe later on became the Acting Governor of the Central Pro- vinces when the Governor went home on leave for some months.

· THE SLUMP 139 Committee better known as the Muddiman Committee, was placed before the Assembly. The Home member, Sir Alexander Muddiman, moved the acceptance of the Majority Report of the committee and as an amendment to that, the Swarajist leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, put forward what has been called the 'National Demand'. The National Demand, as formulated by the Pandit, was the result of a compromise with non-Swarajist members of the Assembly and represented the Greatest Common Measure of agreement among the non-official members. The National Demand was to the effect that constitutional reforms practically amounting to the immediate grant of Dominion Status should be conceded by the British Parliament and that a Round Table Conference between British and Indian representatives should meet in order to discuss the ways and means for implementing those reforms. The reply given to the demand by the official spokesman in the Assembly at the time and later on by the Viceroy, amounted to a refusal. Before the end of the year, Lala Lajpat Rai, joined the Assembly as a Swarajist and was elected Deputy-Leader of the Party. About this time the Responsivist Party, headed by Mr. M. R. Jayakar and Mr. N. C. Kelkar, the erstwhile Swarajist leaders, was launched. It differed from the Swaraj Party on two main points. It advocated discriminate opposi- tion, as opposed to the Swarajist policy of indiscriminate opposition to the Government in the Legislatures. Further, it did not approve of the pro-Moslem attitude of the Swaraj Party or of the Indian National Congress and on the contrary, it allied itself more with the Hindu Mahasabha. The accen- tuation of Hindu-Moslem differences in 1925 and after, threw more Hindu Congressmen into the arms of the Hindu Maha- sabha and the politics of the Hindu-Mahasabha was, generally speaking, identical with that of the Responsivist Party. Both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Responsivist Party thought that the Moslem community by co-operating with the Government was able to strengthen its position and further its interests, to the detriment of Hindu interests—while the Indian National Congress through its policy of indiscriminate opposition was unable to do anything for the Hindus. This feeling was

140 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE strengthened as a result of the conduct of Mr. (now Sir) Mian Fazli Hussain, who by accepting the office of Minister in the Punjab, was able to promote Moslem interests in that province to the exclusion of Hindu and Sikh interests. The position of the Hindu Mahasabha and of the Responsivist Party received further support from the Hindu community through the reactionary and communal attitude adopted by the Moslem League at its sitting at Aligarh in December, 1925, in which prominent leaders like Moulana Mohammed Ali, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Sir Abdur Rahim and Sir Ali Imam participated. The next elections to the Legislatures being due in 1926, the 1925 session of the Congress held at Cawnpore had to decide the attitude to be adopted by the Congress on the occasion. It was considered desirable that the Indian National Congress should itself take up the task of running the elec- tions, instead of leaving it to the Swaraj Party. The Cawnpore Congress, presided over by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu,¹ arrived at this decision without much controversy, because by then the opposition of the Mahatma and his orthodox followers had been disarmed, but the question that raised a storm was as to the policy to be followed in the Legislatures. Should it be a policy of unmitigated opposition, or non-co-operation, as originally advocated by the Swaraj Party, or should it be a policy of discriminate opposition—or responsive co-operation —as urged by the newly-formed Responsivist Party? In sup- port of the Swarajist policy, there stood Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, whereas opposed to them were Pandit M. M. Malaviya, Mr. Jayakar and Mr. Kelkar. The former won the day but before a year passed, Lala Lajpat Rai left the Swarajist fold and together with Pandit Malaviya² formed. ¹ Mrs. Naidu was the second woman to be elected President of the Con- gress, the first being Mrs. Besant who presided over the Calcutta Congress in 1917. A distinguished poetess, she had been closely associated with the Mahatma in the non-co-operation movement since 1920. She con- tinues till to-day as one of his closest adherents and has been a member of the Congress Working Committee with hardly any break. ² Pandit Malaviya, though a veteran Congressman and an ex-President of the Congress, did not accept the Swarajist policy. During the period 1923-26, he was a member of the Assembly but did not belong to the Swaraj Party. After the general election of 1926 he continued as an Independent. The change in the politics of Lala Lajpat Rai was due to the Hindu-Moslem tension in the Punjab and the influence of the Hindu Mahasabha.

THE SLUMP 141 the Independent Party which played the same rôle in Northern India as the Responsivist Party did in Central and Western India. By the time Lala Lajpat Rai left the Swaraj Party, another prominent personality joined that Party. He was Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar, former Advocate-General¹ of Madras and the leader of the Madras Bar. Mr. Iyengar on being returned to the Assembly in 1926 was at once elected Deputy-Leader of the Party and soon after, was elected President of the 1926 session of the Congress held at Gauhati in Assam. The general attitude of the Government after the death of Deshbandhu Das was on the whole reactionary. The only exception was in the matter of the abolition of the Excise Duty, which welcome event took place in December 1925.. The Excise Duty was first imposed as a tax on Indian mill- made cloth in 1894. The ostensible object of this duty was to obtain revenue for the Government but the real object was to help the British textile industry, which did not view with equanimity the growth of an indigenous textile industry in India. Though since 1916 the duty on textile imports had been kept at a higher level than the Excise Duty on Indian mill products, the latter was keenly resented by Indian Nationalists and especially by the Indian business community. The abolition of the duty was therefore meant as a sop to the Indian textile interests. Beyond this Act, no other friendly gesture was made by the Government in India or in England. The Labour Party, however, made a friendly move by adopting the Commonwealth of India Bill drafted by Mrs. Besant for conferring Home Rule on India and authorised Mr. George Lansbury to introduce it as a Private Bill in the House of Commons. The Bill received its first reading in December 1925, but it proved to be still-born. Nevertheless, it had some value as a gesture. The history of 1926 is largely a history of Hindu-Moslem strife. As happens everywhere, the slackening of the Nationalist movement diverted the energies of the people to internal questions and disputes. The abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks in 1924 led many of the Nationalist Moslems in India ¹ The position of the Advocate-General of Madras would correspond to the position of the Solicitor-General in England.

142 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE to give up the Khilafat movement and to divert their whole attention to the Nationalist cause. But some of the Nationalists as well as the more reactionary Moslems continued to keep up the Khilafat Committees, as Moulana Shaukat Ali did in Bombay, and where that was not possible, they started other organisations of a sectarian and reactionary character, under different names. This reactionary movement among the Moslems called forth a similar reactionary movement among the Hindus and branches of the Hindu Mahasabha began to grow up all over the country. The Hindu Mahasabha, like its Moslem counterpart, consisted not only of erstwhile Nationalists, but also of a large number of men who were afraid of participating in a political movement and wanted a safer platform for themselves. The growth of sectarian movements among both Hindus and Moslems accentuated intercommunal tension. The opportunity was availed of by interested third parties who wanted to see the two com- munities fight, so that the Nationalist forces could be weakened. The causes which generally led to intercommunal rioting were the slaughter of cows which outraged Hindu feelings and the playing of music before mosques at prayer- time, which gave offence to Moslem feelings. Friction would also be caused if a Moslem mosque or a Hindu temple was defiled in any way. Once there was a mental tension between the two communities in a particular locality, such incidents could easily throw the spark to light the flame of communal passion and it was not difficult for third parties to employ agents to do this dirty work. The worst episode in the events of 1926 was the Hindu- Moslem riots in Calcutta which broke out in May and again in July. The trouble arose through an Arya Samajist¹ proces- sion playing music while passing before a mosque. The Arya Samajists claimed that they had been having the procession for many years without any trouble. The Moslems declared on the contrary that the music was interfering with their worship inside the mosque. Fighting went on for many days and many were killed on both sides. Ultimately when both parties ¹ As explained in Section III of the Introduction, the Arya Samaj is a reformist sect of the Hindus with a large following in Upper India.

THE SLUMP 143 were exhausted, they made peace. Though matters did not reach a crisis elsewhere as it did in Calcutta, there was con- siderable tension all over the country. For the Congress Party the hour was dark. The elections to the Legislatures were due in November and they were going to be held under the shadow of Hindu-Moslem riots. The field would not be as open to Congressmen as it had been in 1923. New organisations representing reactionary Hindus and reactionary Moslems had come into existence and they would put up their own candidates. During the elections of 1926 a strong propaganda was carried on by a section of the Moslems to the effect that if the Hindus were going to carry on their non- co-operation with the Government, the Moslems should have nothing to do with them, but should endeavour to work the Constitution. On the other side the Hindu Mahasabha raised the cry that if the Hindus non-co-operated while the Moslems secured the help of the Government, they would be placing themselves at a serious disadvantage as compared with the Moslems. The Hindu Mahasabha therefore urged the modi- fication of the Swarajist policy of non-co-operation. Never- theless, among the Hindu electorate the influence of the Congress was much greater than that of the Hindusabha, though among the Moslem electorate, the influence of reactionary and sectarian organisations proved to be stronger than that of the Congress at the General Election of 1926. The General Election of November 1926, being contested by Nationalists in the name of the Congress, there was a great improvement in their strength in many of the Provincial Legislatures, e.g., in Madras and Bihar. The whole-hearted co-operation of all sections of Congressmen, which was not forthcoming in 1923 when the Swaraj Party ran the elections, was responsible for the improvement. But in one respect the election results were worse than in 1923. In 1923 a large number of Nationalist Moslems had been elected as Swarajists but in 1926 their places were generally taken by their reac- tionary co-religionists. In provinces like Bengal and Punjab with a large Moslem population, the situation inside the Legislatures was not favourable for the Congress Party. In the Central Provinces which had been the stronghold of

144 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Swarajism and in a portion of the Bombay Presidency, the Nationalist strength was divided, because of the formation of the Responsivist Party. With the formation of a Respon- sivist Party in the Central Provinces Legislative Council and of a Moslem bloc in the Bengal Legislative Council, it became possible for the Government to appoint Ministers in these two provinces, where none had existed for three years. In the Indian Legislative Assembly also, the Nationalist strength being somewhat weakened by the formation of a Responsivist bloc on the one side and by a Moslem bloc on the other, the Government had a comparatively easier time than they had in the previous Assembly. Apart from the Legislatures, a certain amount of disintegration was also visible in the rank and file of the Congress. In provinces like Punjab, Bombay Presidency and the Central Provinces, this was due to the activities of the Responsivist Party. In provinces like Bengal where the Responsivists had little influence, the disintegration was caused by warring factions within the Congress Party. In Bengal after the death of Deshbandhu Das, through the influence and support of the Mahatma, the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta had succeeded to the leadership. He had not been in office for a year before opposition to his leadership appeared. The opposition ultimately crystallised under the leadership of Mr. B. N. Sasmal, at one time a most popular figure in Bengal Congress circles. The fight went on till 1927. For some time there were two rival Provincial Congress Commit- tees in Bengal and in the elections to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, held in March 1927, two sets of Congress candidates were set up. Mr. Sasmal’s party was defeated in this fight and that led to his temporary retirement. In the face of dissensions outside and inside the Congress, the leaders had a trying time in 1926. For a time it looked as if nothing could stem the rot that had set in. The brunt of the responsibility had to be borne by Pandit Motilal Nehru who was deprived of the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, who had retired from active politics, and of Deshbandhu Das who had died the year before. The National Demand put forward by him in the Assembly in September 1925, had been turned down by the Government. In the circumstances what

THE SLUMP 145 could he do? He was not in a position to start a campaign of civil disobedience in the country. Therefore he decided to withdraw from the Assembly as a protest against the attitude of the Government. Much adverse criticism was made of this decision at the time—nevertheless, there is hardly any doubt that there was no alternative to this step except one of abject acquiescence in the policy of the Government. In March 1926, after a speech exceedingly dignified but somewhat defeatist in its tone, Pandit Motilal Nehru walked out of the Assembly followed by all the Swarajist members. Following this move in the Assembly, the Swaraj Party also withdrew from the Provincial Legislatures. But the dark clouds of 1926 had a silver lining. In spite of inter-communal dissensions and disturbances, the production of Khadi was going up by leaps and bounds. Freed from other distractions, the Mahatma was able to concentrate on this work. Under his leadership the All-India Spinners' Association was extending its branches all over the country. Through this organisation, the Mahatma was once again building up his own party which was to be of invaluable service to him when he desired to recapture the Congress machinery once again. To make up partly for the many defections in the Congress Party, Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar joined the party wholeheartedly about this time. He had great reputation and prestige in the Madras Presidency and this he placed at the disposal of the Congress. Through his help the movement in the Madras Presidency was greatly strengthened and a strong Congress Party was set up in the Madras Legislative Council. In the Assembly he performed with great ability the duties of the Deputy-Leader of the Congress Party. After presiding over the Gauhati Congress in December 1926, he spent a very busy time in going round the country for restoring inter-communal unity. In this task he was assisted by the Ali brothers who were actively associated with the Congress till 1928, though their estrange- ment with the Mahatma began in 1926.¹ ¹ It is generally believed that the estrangement between the Ali brothers and the Mahatma took place over the Hindu-Moslem riots at Kohat in Beluchistan. In this dispute the Ali brothers took the side of the Moslems and complained that the Mahatma had taken the side of the Hindus. K