द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 117 rejected altogether, in which case no ministers could be appointed at all—or votes of no-confidence in the ministers would be moved repeatedly so that no set of ministers could continue in office long. At the same time attempts would be made to throw out the Budget of the transferred departments which could not be restored by certification. By such tactics, the Governor of the province would be forced to suspend the working of the transferred departments, take over the administration into his own hands and go on ruling as he would in the pre-reform days. In the Central Provinces Legislative Council where the Swarajists had an absolute majority—the entire Budget was thrown out without any difficulty and no ministers could therefore be appointed. In Bengal the situation was somewhat similar to that in the Central Provinces. The salaries of the ministers were rejected and repeated attempts to restore them proved unavailing. The ministers had therefore to lay down their office. Thus, in the Central Provinces and in Bengal, the working of the constitution was rendered impossible. It is not possible to describe the enthusiasm of the public when diarchy was overthrown in these two provinces. It was regarded as a great triumph for the Swarajists and this victory brought a sense of elation all over the country. In 1920, the Congress had tried to paralyse the new constitution, by boycotting the polls but this attempt had failed, because not a single seat had remained vacant and undesirable men had flooded the legislatures. In 1924, on the other hand, the Swarajists, by carrying the fight inside the legislatures, were able to wreck the constitution, in at least some of the provinces. People belonging to the Liberal Party and even 'No- Changer' Congressmen have not sometimes been able to under- stand the utility of the Swarajist policy of constitutional obstruction. They argue that if ministers are allowed to continue in office they could do more good than if those departments are taken over by the Governor and his officials. As against that, the Swarajists argue that three years' exper- ience (from 1920 to 1923) has shown that there is hardly any scope for useful work for a minister under the Constitution of 1919. All the more important departments, like public

118 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE security, justice, prisons, finance, etc., are in the hands of officials and the budget allotments for these departments are made first. What is left is handed over to the ministers and this amount is so inadequate that it barely suffices for their minimum establishment, rendering it quite impossible to undertake nation-building work on a decent scale. Moreover, the principal officials working under the Ministers, including their secretaries, cannot be subjected to disciplinary action by them and being quite independent of the legislature in the matter of their pay and emoluments, they are not respon- sive to popular sentiment. In these circumstances, the the unhampered working of the constitution cannot benefit the country in any way—whereas successful obstruction not only brings pressure to bear on the Government by putting obstacles in its path, but also develops a spirit of resistance in the country as a whole. As a matter of fact, when the constitution of the Swaraj Party was first drawn up in March 1923, it was explicitly stated in the preamble that the object of the Swarajist policy was to create an atmos- phere of resistance to the bureaucracy, without which the Government could never be made to respond to popular demands. While the Swarajists were enjoying the first flush of victory, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, in a striking speech delivered in the House of Lords, analysed the causes which led to the birth of Swarajism in India. Among the causes he mentioned were—firstly, the resolution passed by the House of Lords supporting General Dyer, the author of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre; secondly, the 'steel-frame speech' of the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, in 1922, eulogising the Indian Civil Service; thirdly, the doubling of the Salt Tax by the Government of India, in 1923, in the teeth of intense popular opposition and despite the adverse vote of the Indian Legislative Assembly; and fourthly, the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. This clever and sympathetic analysis of the causes of the Indian unrest leading to the birth of the Swaraj Party, showed that for once at least the India Office in London was able to appreciate public sentiment

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 119 and public opinion in India. It is to be regretted, therefore, that this understanding was not followed up by appropriate action. Not content with his activities in the legislature, the Municipality and in other directions, the Deshbandhu launched another important movement at this time—the Tarakeswar Satyagraha movement. Not far from Calcutta, at a place called Tarakeswar, there is an old temple of 'Baba Taraknath' or 'Shiva.' As in the case of other holy shrines, there was considerable property attached to the temple, which had been endowed in order to provide for its upkeep. Fol- lowing the Hindu custom, there was a trustee, called the Mohunt, in charge of the temple and the attached property. Though the Mohunts are expected to live a chaste and abstemious life, there were allegations against the Mohunt of Tarakeswar with regard to his personal character and to his administration of the endowed property. As Tarakeswar happens to be one of the most holy places of pilgrimage in Bengal and is visited every year by people from all parts of the province, the allegations made against the Mohunt were widely known. After the success of the Akali movement in the Punjab, pressure was brought to bear on the Bengal Congress Committee for starting a similar movement at Tarakeswar. Notices were served on the Mohunt calling upon him to mend his ways but as these attempts were of no avail, in April 1924, the Deshbandhu launched a movement for taking peaceful possession of the temple and the attached property, with a view to placing them under the administra- tion of a public committee. The Mohunt appealed to the Government for help and as soon as volunteers began to move towards the temple and the palace of the Mohunt—the police appeared on the scene. The usual Satyagraha scenes were re-enacted at Tarakeswar—peaceful volunteers moving up from one side and the police attacking them mercilessly on the other and occasionally making arrests. Owing to the intervention of the Government, the issue became a political one. Once again, in order to set an example to the people, the Deshbandhu sent his son to prison at the head of the volunteers. Within a short time, the movement became

120 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE extremely popular and there was a warm response from every corner of the province.¹ In May, 1924, the annual conference of Bengal Congress- men, called the Provincial Conference, was held at a place called Sirajganj. Prior to this the Deshbandhu had drawn up an agreement between Hindus and Moslems, covering religious as well as political questions, but it had been rejected by the Coconada Congress in December 1923, on the ground that it conceded too much to the Moslems. This agreement, known as the Bengal Pact—was placed before the Sirajganj Conference for ratification. There was a stormy debate and the political opponents of the Deshbandhu, joined by some reactionary Hindus, put up a formidable opposition. Never- theless, the passionate eloquence of the leader carried the day and the Bengal Pact was adopted by a large majority. After this, another resolution was discussed and passed which was to stir up a hornet's nest in the days to come. This was the Gopinath Saha resolution. Some months earlier, a young student, named Gopinath Saha, had attempted to assassinate the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta, Sir Charles Tegart. Through mistaken identity, he shot at and killed another Englishman, Mr. Day. At the trial before the High Court of Calcutta, Saha made a statement which created a sensation at the time. He stated in effect that he really had intended to murder the Police Commissioner and expressed his sincere sorrow for having killed the wrong person. He was glad to pay with his life and hoped that every drop of his blood would sow the seeds of freedom in every Indian home. Saha was sentenced to death by the High Court and duly hanged. But, after his death, resolutions were passed in several meetings in Bengal appreciating his courage and spirit of sacrifice, while condemning his action. A similar ¹ The Satyagraha Campaign went on for several months. The Mohunt ultimately was forced to come to a compromise with Deshbandhu C. R. Das and an agreement was drawn up whereby the temple and the major portion of the property was to be handed over to a public committee. This agreement had to be placed before a court of law but at this stage a third party, under the name of the Brahman Sabha, raised objections. While the whole matter was under consideration, the Deshbandhu died. After his unfortunate death, the agreement was set at nought and the result of the Satyagraha Campaign was nullified,

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER ' 121 resolution was unanimously passed at the Sirajganj Con- ference and it caused considerable annoyance to the Govern- ment. While these stirring events were happening in Bengal, interesting developments were taking place elsewhere. Mahatma Gandhi, as we have already seen, was released on February 5th. He went to a seaside resort near Bombay for rest and change of climate. After some weeks he was able to take interest once again in public affairs and gradually to assume his normal activities. Speculation at once arose as to what attitude Gandhiji would take up with regard to the Swaraj Party. On principle he was of course bitterly opposed to the Swarajist policy of ‘Council-entry,’ nevertheless, he did not adopt a hostile attitude. It may be that he found the position of the Swarajists to be too strong in the country to be able to overthrow them and so he bowed to the inevitable. Or it may be that he felt that the changed circumstances in the country warranted a change in tactics. Be that as it may, he met the Swarajist leaders, Deshbandhu Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru and arrived at an understanding with them. This agreement, known as the Gandhi-Das Pact, was to the effect that the Mahatma was to devote himself to the Khadi Campaign, while the Swarajists were to be in charge of the political campaign. In order to carry on his work without any interference on the part of the Congress or the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma was empowered to organise an autonomous body to be called the All-India Spinners’ Association. This body was to have its own funds and its own Secretariat. The Swaraj Party, on the other hand, was to carry on its work as an autonomous body independently of the Congress and to have its own Secretariat.¹ The alliance thus struck between the Mahatma and the Swaraj Party soon ripened into friendship as a result of conciliatory statements made by the former from time to time. On one occasion, for instance, he said in his characteristic style, ‘My political conscience is in the keeping of the Swarajists.’ On another occasion he is ¹ This agreement was ratified at the annual session of the Congress held at Belgaum in December, over which Mahatma Gandhi presided.

122 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE reported to have remarked: 'I shall cling to the Swaraj Party as a child clings to its mother.' After establishing peace within the Congress camp through his understanding with the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma turned to another acute problem. Since 1923, Hindu-Moslem dissensions had appeared in different parts of India and Mahatma Gandhi was far-sighted enough to realise that if the evil was not nipped in the bud, it would soon grow into a national calamity. The communal storm might not break while the Swarajist Campaign, supported by both Hindus and Moslems, was in full swing—but the moment there was a lull in the campaign, the evil was sure to rear its head. So in September, 1924, at his instance, a Unity Conference was convened at Delhi. The Conference was largely attended, even the Anglican Metropolitan of India and representatives of the Britishers in India, participating in it. At the time of the Conference the Mahatma embarked on a three weeks' fast as a self-imposed penance for the wrongs committed by members of different communities who by their action dis- turbed intercommunal peace in India. The Conference was a successful one. A formula was devised for promoting unity between the different communities in India and a Conciliation Board of fifteen members was set up which was to intervene whenever and wherever any communal trouble arose. In spite of the success of the Unity Conference, practical results did not follow. In March 1924, Mustapha Kemal Pasha took the extraordinary step of abolishing the Khalifate altogether. Those Moslems who had been drawn towards the Indian National Congress owing to the desire to secure support for the Khilafat Campaign, no longer felt any urge to remain friendly towards the Congress. The Khilafat Committees themselves went out of existence in most parts of India and many of the erstwhile members of those organisations were absorbed into reactionary mushroom organisations. About this time the All-India Moslem League came back to life again. This body had been the premier organisation for Moslems in India till 1920. Since that year it had been practically replaced by the All-India Khilafat Committee which had succeeded in drawing most of the active elements

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 123 among the Indian Moslems. The abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks themselves, struck at the root of the Khilafat Committees in India and indirectly helped the revival of the All-India Moslem League. In December 1924, when the All-India Moslem League met once again, the Khilafatists were defeated for the first time since 1920. The newly- revived All-India Moslem League, as we shall see later, became more sectarian and reactionary than it had been prior to 1920. About the middle of 1924, matters began to approach a crisis once again. This crisis was of course different in character from that of 1921-22. The Government felt hard- pressed from all sides. Not only in Bengal, but throughout the country, the local bodies (municipalities, district boards, etc.) were coming under the control of the Nationalists and to that extent, official power and influence were being eliminated. In all the legislatures, a stiff fight was being waged and in two provinces, Central Provinces and Bengal, the working of the new constitution was paralysed. In Bengal, the Tarakes- war Satyagraha, though it began as a movement for the reform of the temple administration, soon developed into a political movement and gradually assumed serious propor- tions. Over and above this, according to the Government, there was a strong undercurrent of revolutionary activity and the Government were particularly annoyed by public resolu- tions, praising the revolutionary Gopinath Saha, though the appreciation was of a qualified and conditional character. In August, when the influence of the Swaraj Party was at its height, the annual conference of the Party was held in Cal- cutta. Leaders from the different provinces were present on the occasion. The attendance was large and the enthusiasm very great. That was the signal for the Government to strike. During the last twelve months they had not been altogether inactive and had been closely following events. Soon after the Delhi Congress in September 1923, a number of Congress workers belonging to the Swaraj Party of Bengal had been suddenly arrested and put in prison without any trial under an old regulation called 'Regulation III of 1818.' The explanation given by the Government at the time was that

124 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the revolutionary movement was raising its head again and it was therefore necessary to resort to speedy suppression. Though the arrests created considerable resentment at the time, it was not followed by any further developments and the excitement gradually subsided. After a year, the Government decided to repeat those tactics again. They did not know how to suppress the Swaraj Party otherwise. The activities of the Party, except in the case of the Tarakeswar Satyagraha and similar campaigns, were carried on within the bounds of the law, but they caused considerable embarrassment to the Government; nevertheless the Government could not take any legal proceedings against the Swarajists. All attempts to suppress the Tarakeswar Satyagraha campaign had not only failed but had served to evoke greater enthusiasm on the part of the people. In sheer desperation the Government therefore decided to strike at the root of the organisation and since that was not possible through a trial in a court of law, they resolved to imprison some of the principal organisers of the Swaraj Party without trial. On October 25th, 1924, in the early hours of the morning, they made a clean sweep of a large number of Congressmen in Calcutta and other places in Bengal. These arrests were made partly under Regulation III of 1818, and partly under an emergency ordinance (called the Bengal Ordinance) pro- mulgated by the Viceroy at midnight on October 24th. This ordinance conferred on the Government of Bengal powers of arrest and imprisonment similar to those conferred on the Government of India by Regulation III of 1818, and the ordinance was issued in order to help the Government of Bengal to order arrest and imprisonment without trial of persons in Bengal, without any reference to the Government of India. Among those arrested were two prominent Swarajist members of the Bengal Legislative Council, Mr. Anil Baran Roy and Mr. S. C. Mitra,¹ and myself. Some of the warrants as in the case of three of us, had been issued under the Regulation, whereas in the case of the others, they had been ¹ Mr. Ail Baron Roy has since retired from politics and joined the Ashrama of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh at Pondicherry. Mr. S. C. Mitra has since joined the Assembly and been a prominent member of the Opposition between 1928 and 1934.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 125 issued under the newly-promulgated Bengal Ordinance. The warrants under the Regulation had been signed as early as July last, the day after the Government were finally defeated in their attempt to retain the ministers in office and work the diarchical constitution. It has not been explained yet as to why the warrants had not been executed for nearly three months. The conjecture generally made is that the Bengal Government waited for sanction to a larger number of arrests and also for the promulgation of the Bengal Ordinance. Moreover, the whole matter had to be placed before the then Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, and so the delay was unavoidable. With regard to the raison d'être of these arrests, the public notion at the time was that the pressure of the Swarajists in the local bodies (especially the Calcutta Municipality), in the legislatures and at Tarakeswar had unnerved the Government. And the reason why they struck only in Bengal, was that the anti- Government forces were strongest in that province. The large number of arrests made so suddenly and unexpectedly on October 25th, created tremendous excite- ment in the country. Official circles came out with the excuse that a revolutionary conspiracy was on foot and the arrests had to be made before anything serious happened. But it was hard to persuade the public that those who had been arrested were engaged in a revolutionary conspiracy. Public clamour against the arrests continued to be very strong and one month after my arrest, Government began to think seriously of releasing me. But the prestige of the police, at whose instance the arrests had been made, stood in the way and the proposal had to be dropped. The agitation over my arrest was the strongest at the time because the public thought that the object of the Government was to strike at the Swarajist administration of the new Corporation. Everyone knew, including the extreme loyalists, that I was engaged day and night in my municipal duties and had been forced to give up Politics altogether, since I was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation. Official and semi-official circles were therefore at pains to put forward an excuse for the arrests which would find some credence among the public.

126 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE The Anglo-Indian papers of Calcutta, The Statesman, and The Englishman (now defunct), came out with statements to the effect that I was the brain of the revolutionary conspiracy. My solicitors at once filed legal proceedings against both the papers for defamation. The proceedings dragged on for months and in the meantime attempts were made to secure the help of the Government in the suit in the matter of obtaining proofs to substantiate the charges made against me in the Press in support of the Government. As the Govern- ment did not agree to help in the matter, an attempt was made to secure the assistance of the India Office in London. By that time there had been a change in the Cabinet in England. A General Election had taken place in October and as a result of the scare created by the Zinovieff letter, there had been a landslide in favour of the Conservative Party. Following the defeat of the Labour Party at the polls, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, had made room for the Conservative Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead. Though the India Office was inclined to help the Anglo-Indian papers in the suit brought against them for defamation, they were unable to find any documentary evidence to prove my complicity in a revolutionary conspiracy. For- ward, the Swarajist paper of Calcutta, happened to get hold of and publish a letter, written to Calcutta from London on the subject, in which an agent of the India Office was reported to have said that I had been arrested on the verbal testimony borne against me by certain people, but that there was no documentary evidence against me. The publication of this letter further embarrassed the Government. No one in India felt these persecutions more than Desh- bandhu Das did. In a magnificent speech delivered from the Mayoral chair of the Calcutta Corporation, he gave vent to the deep indignation which stirred the public at the time. He accepted full responsibility for what the Chief Executive Officer had done and challenged the Government to arrest him. The Government did not accept the challenge but replied in a different way. They opened negotiations with him for settlement of the entire Indian question. At that time, Mahatma Gandhi was politically a back-number. He had

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 127 confined himself to the Khadi campaign, having retired from the political movement which was under, the control of the Swarajist leaders. The memory of the negotiations in December 1921, had left an impression on the official mind that it was possible to come to an understanding with the Deshbandhu if the major issues were tackled in an earnest and sincere manner. Lord Lytton personally had a very high appreciation of him as a man. And at the time no official felt the pressure of the popular movement more than the Governor of Bengal did. In those days, to settle with the Congress, meant to settle with Deshbandhu C. R. Das. Therefore, unknown to the outside world, negotiations between the Deshbandhu and the Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, went on for some months. With his shrewd political instinct, the Deshbandhu thought of making use of the public feeling roused by the arrests of October 1924. He appealed at once for a fund to be used for national reconstruction. The economic situation in the country was not favourable and many people thought that the response to the appeal would be disappointing. But the leader knew better. In spite of unfavourable forecasts, he had a very good response and that was a further proof of public confidence in him. At the end of the year, the annual session of the Congress was held at Belgaum in Bombay Presidency. This Congress was presided over by Mahatma Gandhi and it was the last Congress attended by the Desh- bandhu. The proceedings were marked by extreme cordiality between the Mahatma and the Swarajists. The principal programme of work adopted for the coming year was the extension of home-spinning and home-weaving and it was enjoined on every member of the Congress to produce a certain quantity of yarn as his membership subscription. The only other significant fact about the Belgaum Congress was the attempt of Mrs. Annie Besant to get her Commonwealth of India Bill ratified by the Congress. This Bill, which was to confer Home Rule on India, had been drafted by her and her intention was to have it introduced in the British Parlia- ment as a private Bill. She felt that her hands would be considerably strengthened if the Congress gave the stamp of

128 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE approval to her pet constitution, but none of the Congress leaders would be drawn into her net. She therefore had to leave the Belgaum Congress disappointed. The political situation remained unchanged when the year 1925 was ushered in. Deshbandhu Das continued in power. In the early part of 1925, there was a further trial of strength between the Government and the Swarajists in Bengal. The Ordinance which the Governor-General had promulgated in October 1924, conferring on the Bengal Governor powers of summary arrest and imprisonment without trial, was to expire in April 1925. Thereafter, if the Bengal Government desired to have those powers, they would have to introduce legislation to that effect in the Bengal Legislative Council. A Bill was therefore duly introduced and the Government strained every nerve to have it passed into law. As the Swarajists were really in a minority in the Legislative Council, the Government felt hopeful that they would be able to carry the legislation through. The Deshbandhu was then taking rest at Patna as he had been suffering from a nervous break- down. But in spite of his ill-health, he resolved to inflict a crushing defeat on the Government in person. On the appointed day he arrived at the Council Hall in time and had actually to be carried in an invalid-chair. Once again the laurels of the day were his. The Bill was thrown out, but by virtue of the extraordinary powers given to the Governor under the Constitution, he was able to certify the Bill as law. Soon after this incident the annual conference of Bengal Congressmen was summoned at Faridpur and in view of the critical situation in the country, Deshbandhu Das was elected President. Against all medical advice, he resolved to go there and preside over the deliberations. People did not understand at the time why he was so insistent on attending this con- ference. Anything that he said would have drawn the same amount of attention even if it happened to be a Press state- ment. The real reason, however, as to why he wanted to go there was that he had to give a public indication of his demands, for the benefit of the Government. Moreover, he wanted to demonstrate to the Government that his views

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 129 were acceptable to the bulk of Congressmen so that the Government would feel that in the event of a settlement being arrived at, the Deshbandhu was in a position to deliver the goods. At that time the Government attached great value to the Bengal Provincial Conference, because Bengal was then the storm centre and contained some of the most radical elements in the Indian National Congress. Therefore a proposal which was carried in Bengal, would in all probability be acceptable to Congressmen elsewhere. Deshbandhu Das made a speech which was regarded as rather tame for a Bengal audience. He discussed the question of Dominion Status versus Independence as the goal of the Congress, and declared that he stood for the former. Moreover, he spoke in condemnation of terrorism. The speech as a whole appeared to be an appeal to the Government and to the more extreme elements among Indians to adopt a compromising attitude so that the ground could be prepared for a settlement. It was, however, not welcomed by the youthful section of the audience and there was a possibility that he would be defeated when the matter was put to the vote. Nevertheless, so great was his personal influence at the time and so transparent his sincerity of purpose that he carried the day. The delibera- tions of the Faridpur Conference were on the whole satis- factory to the authorities with whom the Deshbandhu was engaged in negotiating. Soon after this, Lord Reading left India for London, as the Conservative Cabinet and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, wanted to consult him. By that time it was in the air that negotiations had been going on between Deshbandhu Das and the Government, though hardly anyone knew any details. It was announced that after consulting Lord Reading, Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India. Everyone in India awaited this speech with the greatest interest and eagerness. Then came a sudden bolt from the blue. In June 1925, when Deshbandhu Das was having a rest in the hill-station of Darjeeling, the summer capital of the Bengal Government, he fell seriously ill. After a brief attack he suddenly died. The whole country was at once plunged in grief. He was at I

130 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the height of his glory and was expected to achieve great things for his country. While in memoriam meetings and processions were going on in the country, the British Cabinet in London made up their mind as to what they should do. Their arch-enemy was dead; therefore, things would settle down now for a while. They would accordingly not decide anything in a hurry but would watch developments. But it had already been announced that Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India on July 7th, 1925. Therefore, the announcement carefully prepared on behalf of the Cabinet had to be entirely suppressed and in its place Lord Birkenhead, on the previously announced date, made an uninteresting speech. Besides talking about plati- tudes, he merely endorsed Lord Reading's panacea for India's ills in the form of development of industry and the stabilisa- tion of finance. The death of the Deshbandhu on June 16th, 1925, was for India a national calamity of the first magnitude. Though his active political career consisted of barely five years, his rise had been phenomenal. With the reckless abandon of a Vaishnava devotee, he had plunged into the political move- ment with heart and soul and he had given not only himself but his all in the fight for Swaraj. When he died, whatever worldly possessions he still had, were left to the nation. By the Government he was both feared and admired. They feared his strength, but admired his character. They knew that he was a man of his word. They also knew, that though he was a hard fighter, he was none the less a clean fighter and further, he was also the man with whom they could bargain for a settlement. He was clear-headed, his political instinct was sound and unerring and unlike the Mahatma he was fully conscious of the rôle he was to play in Indian politics. He knew more than anyone else, that situations favourable for wresting political power from the enemy do not come often and when they do come, they do not last long. While the crisis lasts, a bargain has to be struck. He knew also that to sponsor a settlement, when public enthusiasm is at its height, needs much courage and may involve a certain amount of unpopularity. But he was nothing if not fearless. He was

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 131 conscious of his exact rôle, namely that of a practical politician and he was therefore never afraid of courting unpopularity. In contrast with the Deshbandhu, the rôle of the Mahatma has not been a clear one. In many ways he is altogether an idealist and a visionary. In other respects, he is an astute politician. At times he is as obstinate as a fanatic; on other occasions he is liable to surrender like a child. The instinct, or the judgment, so necessary for political bargaining is lacking in him. When there is a real opportunity for a bargain as in 1921, he is liable to stick out for small things and thereby upset all chances of a settlement. Whenever he does go in for a bargain, as we shall see in 1931, he gives more than he takes. On the whole, he is no match in diplo- macy for an astute British politician. After the death of Deshbandhu Das the Mahatma spent several months in Bengal trying to raise a memorial fund in honour of the departed great and helping to reorganise the Congress machinery in the absence of the leader. His public activities, nevertheless, continued on the whole to be non-political in character and the political mantle of the Deshbandhu therefore fell on Pandit Motilal Nehru, the Swarajist leader in the Assembly. While Lord Reading was still in England and Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, was acting as the Governor-General of India, the Pandit attempted to resume the threads of the negotiations which the Deshbandhu had been carrying on with the Government. But the Government in London had already decided to drop the negotiations for the time being and watch developments. Nothing therefore came out of this attempt of Pandit Motilal Nehru. June 1925 proved to be a turning point in the recent history of India. The disappearance of the towering personality of the Deshbandhu from the political arena was for India a colossal misfortune. The Swaraj Party, which owed so much to him, was paralysed after his death and dissensions gradually arose within the Party. Nevertheless, the Party at the time of his death was an institution of which anyone would be proud. The Capital of Calcutta, the organ of British com- mercial interests, writing after his death, compared the Swaraj

132 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Party with the Sinn Fein Party of Ireland and remarked that during forty years of its existence, it had seen nothing like it before. The discipline of the Party, according to the paper, was German in character. The weakening of the Swaraj Party served to strengthen the forces of reaction in India and in England, while it let loose a flood of communal strife in India which had, up till then, been held back by the superior forces of Nationalism. To-day, as we look back on the year 1925, we cannot help feeling that if Providence had spared the Deshbandhu for a few years more, the history of India would probably have taken a different turn. In the affairs of nations, it often happens that the appearance or dis- appearance of a single personality often means a new chapter in history. Thus has been the influence of Lenin in Russia, of Mussolini in Italy and of Hitler in Germany in recent world-history.

CHAPTER VI THE SLUMP (1925-27) CONSIDERING the influence of Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 and 1922, the rise of the Swaraj Party must be regarded as some- thing unaccountably remarkable. Though the leaders and the rank and file of the Party had the highest respect for the personality of the Mahatma, the Party was frankly an anti- Gandhi Party and it was strong enough to force the Mahatma to voluntary retirement from politics. This retirement con- tinued virtually till the Calcutta Congress in December 1928. Now what was the secret of the Swaraj Party’s success? To understand that one must know more about the practical shape which Gandhiism took, and as to how the mass mind reacted to the personality of the Mahatma, during the period 1920-22. Though Hindu society has never had an established church like Europe, the mass of the people have been pro- foundly susceptible to the influence of Avatars,¹ priests and ‘gurus.’² The spiritual man has always wielded the largest influence in India and he is called a ‘Sant’ or ‘Mahatma’ or ‘Sadhu.’ For various reasons, Gandhiji came to be looked upon by the mass of the people as a Mahatma before he became the undisputed political leader of India. At the Nagpur Congress in December 1920, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, who was till then a Nationalist leader, addressed him as ‘Mr. Gandhi’ and he was shouted down by thousands of people who insisted that he should address him as ‘Mahatma ¹ According to many Hindus, God incarnates Himself from age to age in order to save the good and destroy the wicked and in order to establish the reign of Truth on earth. These incarnations are called Avatars. Ac- cording to other Hindus, these Avatars are not divine incarnations but human souls in the highest stage of development—that is, when they have realised their oneness with Godhead. According to popular belief there have been nine Avatars up till now—and the tenth is to come at the end of the present wicked age. ² ‘Guru’ is a religious preceptor. In India only a truly spiritual man can be a religious preceptor. 133

134 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Gandhi.' The asceticism of Gandhiji, his simple life, his vegetarian diet, his adherence to truth and his consequent fearlessness—all combined to give him a halo of saintliness. His loin-cloth was reminiscent of Christ, while his sitting posture at the time of lecturing was reminiscent of Buddha. Now all this was a 'tremendous asset to the Mahatma in com- pelling the attention and obedience of his countrymen. As we have already seen, a large and influential section of the intelligentsia was against him, but this opposition was gradually worn down through the enthusiastic support given by the masses. Consciously or unconsciously, the Mahatma fully exploited the mass psychology of the people, just as Lenin did the same thing in Russia, Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. But in doing so, the Mahatma was using a weapon which was sure to recoil on his head. He was exploiting many of the weak traits in the character of his countrymen which had accounted for India's downfall to a large extent. After all, what has brought about India's downfall in the material and political sphere? It is her inordinate belief in fate and in the supernatural—her in- difference to modern scientific development—her backward- ness in the science of modern warfare, the peaceful content- ment engendered by her latter-day philosophy and adherence to Ahimsa (non-violence) carried to the most absurd length. In 1920, when the Congress began to preach the political doctrine of non-co-operation, a large number of Congressmen who had accepted the Mahatma not merely as a political leader but also as a religious preceptor—began to preach the cult of the new Messiah. As a consequence, many people gave up eating fish and meat, took to the same dress as the Mahatma, adopted his daily habits like morning and evening prayer and began to talk more of spiritual freedom than of political Swaraj. In some parts of the country the Mahatma began to be worshipped as an Avatar. Such was the madness that seized the country at the time that in April 1923 in a politically-minded province like Bengal, a resolution moved at the Jessore Provincial Conference to the effect that the goal of the Congress was not spiritual Swaraj but political Swaraj —was defeated at the end of a heated debate. In 1922, when

THE SLUMP 135 the writer was in prison, Indian warders in the service of the Prisons' Department would refuse to believe that the Mahatma had been cast in prison by the British Government. They would say in all seriousness that since Gandhiji was a Mahatma, he could assume the shape of a bird and escape from prison any moment he liked. To make matters worse, political issues would no longer be considered in the cold light of reason, but would be unnecessarily mixed up with ethical issues. The Mahatma and his followers, for instance, would not countenance the boycott of British goods because that would engender hatred towards the British. Even so intel- lectual a personality as the celebrated poetess, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, in her speech at the Gaya Congress in December, 1922, condemned the Swarajist policy on the ground that councils were places of ‘Maya’¹, where Congressmen would be tempted by bureaucratic overtures. And worst of all was the tendency on the part of the orthodox followers of the Mahatma to regard everything that he said as gospel truth without reasoning or arguing and to accept his paper Young India as their Bible. For a people so prone to mysticism and supernaturalism, the only hope of political salvation lies in the growth of a sane rationalism and in the modernisation of the material aspect of life. It was therefore distressing to many sober Nationalists to find that through the conscious or unconscious influence of the Mahatma, some of the above weak traits in the Indian character were again becoming prominent. Thus there arose a rationalist revolt against the Mahatma and his Philosophy. As the Swaraj Party headed this revolt, elements from the Right and from the Left that were tired of the irrationalism of the Mahatma—were drawn towards it. Among the Right elements were those who preferred constitutional action to civil disobedience and the Deshbandhu by virtue of his social position and his vocation as an advocate, was able to com- mand their confidence. Among the Left elements was the younger generation of Congressmen who did not find the ideology and method of the Mahatma to be sufficiently radical for the modern world and who looked upon the Deshbandhu as a more radical (or revolutionary) force in Indian Politics. ¹ ‘Maya’ means an illusion or something false that charms and tempts.

136 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE It was the unique personality of Deshbandhu Das that was able to combine into one party such dissimilar elements, to wrest the Congress machinery from the hands of the orthodox 'No Changers' and to carry on a fight against the bureaucracy on many fronts. But in his absence, there was no one com- petent enough to continue his many-sided activities or to keep together the diverse elements that composed the Swaraj Party. The result was that the Swaraj Party remained in power only so long as the Mahatma did not emerge from his voluntary retirement. When he did emerge in 1929, the Swarajist leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, surrendered without even the show of a fight. The death of Deshbandhu C. R. Das may be regarded as the beginning of a period of all-round depression in the country. If Mahatma Gandhi had come out of his retirement exactly at this juncture, things might have taken a different course, but unfortunately for India, he did not do so. The Deshbandhu's personality was, among other things, a power- ful cementing factor within the Swaraj Party and also in the domain of Hindu-Moslem relations. It served, moreover, to tone up the attitude of the Party to an extremist pitch. In his absence, dissensions began to appear within the Party. The most important of these was the revolt of the Mahrash- trian Swarajists led by Mr. M. R. Jayakar of Bombay and Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona. The Maharashtrian Swarajists had never fully believed in the 'uniform, continuous and con- sistent' opposition of the Swaraj Party, but they had never- theless followed the Deshbandhu and his policy with unques- tionable loyalty. They believed in the theory of 'responsive co-operation' propounded by Lokamanya Tilak at the time of the Amritsar Congress in December 1919. This theory implied that there should be co-operation with the Government in so far as they adopted measures calculated to benefit the country, but non-co-operation or opposition, in so far as their policy was harmful to the public interest. The Maha- rashtrian Swarajists looked upon the Deshbandhu as their leader since the time of Lokamanya's death and had therefore given their support and allegiance to his policy, regardless of their personal views. When Pandit Motilal Nehru assumed