वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

|sū. 2. 1. 5. 276 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered' (Muṇḍ. 3 1 2, Śvet 4 7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord, is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on. COMPARISON Baladeva Interpretation absolutely different He takes this sūtra as forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this sūtra as representing a prima facie view. Thus, this sūtra means,— according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the Sāṁkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them), (i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṁkhya and the rest), (its) being so (i e its eternity) (is known) from the text '.¹ PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded) SŪTRA 5 "BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES) ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "But" in the texts. 'The earth spoke' (Tait Saṁ 5 5 2, 3²), 'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma' (Bṛh. 6 1 7 ³) and so on, there is the designation of their presiding' ⁴ deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage. '"Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd. 6 3.2 ⁵); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait. 2.4 ⁶). Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz : From the scriptural texts: 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Saṁ 5.5 2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

¹ G.B 2.1.4, p 18, Chap. 2. ² P. 76, line 9, vol. 2. ³ Ś, R, B. ⁴ C.S.S. ed. reads 'tat-tat', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24. ⁵ R, ŚK, B. ⁶ Ś, R, Bh, SK

[sū. 2. 1. 5. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 277 6 1 3, 4¹), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6 1.3, 2²), 'These sense- organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh 6 1 7), 'They said to speech "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh 1.3.2) and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence they have no difference from the material cause— We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection. There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Sam. 5.5.2, 3) and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i e. on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word 'deity' in the passage "'Very well, let me enter into these three deities'" (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages 'These deities, verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities, verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ 2 14), as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e on account of the scrip- tural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes (Ait. 2 4) Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman is not its material cause. COMPARISON Baladeva Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a prima facie view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according to him "(If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering into)".³ ¹ P. 505, line 12. ² Op. cit., line 9. ³ G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 6-7. 278 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 3 ] CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7) SŪTRA 6 “ BUT (IT) IS SEEN.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha With regard to it, we reply: “It is seen” that there is the origin of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause. Vedānta-kaustubha The author points out that such a prima facie view is based on a fallacious reason (viz. ‘on account of difference’). The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view The statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it “is seen” that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of this,—this is the sense. COMPARISON Baladeva Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. ————— (CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)) SŪTRA 7 “ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE) NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A NEGATION MERELY ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause, it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply.) No such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation

{SŪ. 2. 1. 7} ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 279 merely ”, in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected : Having admitted an absolute similarity between the material cause and its effect in the aphorism : ‘(There is) no (having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference ’ (Br. Sū 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the aphorism. ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br Sū. 2.1 6) that there can be a cause- effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non- different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion ? If you say, Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest from gold ? If you say : Different,—then, the world must have a material cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts. ‘Brahman ¹ is one only, without second’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘There was, verily, Nārāyana, the one’ (Mahā. Up. 1 2), ‘Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’,—there is the mention of a single reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent prior to creation. (Here ends the original prima facie view) (Author’s conclusion.) (We reply :) ‘No’. Why ? “On account of there being a negation merely.” The aphorism ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br. Sū. 2.1.6) negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz. that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

¹ The word ‘Brahman’ is not included in the original text.

280 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 8. ADH. 3.] respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in every respect Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the universe is existent even during its causal state. Or an alternative explanation of the phrase "On account of there being a negation merely". The statement, viz 'The universe is non-existent' is a negation merely, i e without any meaning, in accordance with the scriptural text. ' "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning" ' (Chānd. 6 2.1) COMPARISON Śaṁkara Interpretation different, viz · 'If it be said that (the effect) is non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it) is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)'. That is, the negation by the opponent, viz. . 'The world is non-existent' has no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its cause, whether before or after its actual creation 1 PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8) SŪTRA 8 “ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING) LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause, like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe is “inconsistent”. Vedānta-kaustubha An objection is raised once more. It is objected. “Inconsistent”, indeed, is the view which admits Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who 1 Ś.B. 2.1.7, 'Pratiṣedham hīdam nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti', p. 453.

[sū. 2. 1. 9. ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 281 possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts 'Brahman is truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless, deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5, 8 7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1 1.9, 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolu- tion." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption, non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e as on the part of the effect The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an order reverse to that of creation, i.e merged into Brahman, possessing the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10) SŪTRA 9 "BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL IN- STANCES." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (be- coming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman, also does not. Vedānta-kaustubha The author refutes the objection. "But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

282 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ 2. 1. 10. ADH. 3.] defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers. CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 10 "AND ON ACOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The Sāṁkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda, cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his own view as well. Vedānta-kaustubha The author points out that the Sāṁkhya cannot even object that there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda. There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture. It has been alleged by the Sāṁkhya, unacquainted as he is with the settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a difference between the cause and the effect in this case, secondly, that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation, and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the world during the time of dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the Sāṁkhya doctrine as well. The sense is. The origin of the effect,— which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pra- dhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence, a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappro- priate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect. There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes gross. COMPARISON All others, except Baladeva, read. "sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" ¹ ¹ Ś B 2.1.10, p. 357; Śrī. B 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91; ŚK. B. 2.1 10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 11 ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 283 SŪTRA 11 “IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY ) IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON- RELEASE ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if pradhāna and the rest be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning, then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally strong reasoning. As there will be the “consequence of non-release thus also”, owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable—this is established. Vedānta-kaustubha The word ‘api’ means ‘and’. There is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency in the Sāṁkhya conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the stated objections apply thereto, “on account also of reasoning having no solid ground”, i.e on account of the instability of reasoning. The sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the Vedānta in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by hundreds of reasonings If it be objected. Even though reasonings like ‘on account of difference’ ¹ be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer, in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects, like the ether and the rest— (We reply:) “in that way too”, the primacy of reasoning is upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the Veda is regarded as but of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result owing to the mutual opposition among Kapila, Kaṇāda and the rest It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,— ¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1 4

284 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 12. ADH 4] it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious. If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view; so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda. Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is established. Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (3). COMPARISON Śamkara He reads: “Vimokṣa-prasaṅga” instead of “Anirmokṣa-pra- saṅga”.¹ Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They break it into two different sūtras—viz. “Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād api” and “Anyathā . . . prasaṅgaḥ”.² Adhikaraṇa 4. The section entitled “The Non- acceptance of the rest”. (Sūtra 12) SŪTRA 12 “HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT (THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “Hereby”, i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṁkhya view, the remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to the Veda, “too”, are refuted. Vedānta-kaustubha Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining views. “Hereby”, i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pra- dhāna as the cause of the world, “the remaining (persons) who do not ¹ Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458. ² Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2, ŚK B., p. 14; Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2 1. 13. ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 285 accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted The word "śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e persons other than Kapila ¹ and Patañjali ². The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept the Veda.³ It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not contradicted by their views as well. Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of the rest" (4) COMPARISON Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doc- trines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise ⁴ Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13) SŪTRA 13 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY, IT MAY BE AS IN ORDINARY LIFE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction ¹ The founder of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. ² The founder of the Yoga doctrine. ³ This explains the compound: "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ". ⁴ Hence they explain the compound as "Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahāḥ" and not as śiṣṭhāś ca aparigrahāś ca", as done by Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa, Rāmānuja and Baladeva. Vide ŚB. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 13. 286 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.] between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz. Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,— (We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the wave, and between the sun and its ray. Vedānta-kaustubha Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author is disposing of that here. If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? “On account of becoming the enjoyer” That is, all effects whatsoever being non- different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body, the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known, thus ‘The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the objects enjoyed’, and in the Veda too, thus: “Eats the sweet berry” (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures and pains as dependent on the Lord, and in the Veda too; thus: “He alone makes one do good deeds” (Kauṣ. 3.8), “The soul which is without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer” (Śvet. 1.8) and so on. Thus, “on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non- distinction”; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman cannot be accepted,— The author states the correct conclusion in the words “It may be, as in ordinary life”. That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed, be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as between the enjoyer and the controller, “as in ordinary life”. In

[sū. 2. 1. 13 ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 287 ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause, bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular effects themselves In exactly the same manner, there may be a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction, there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller , just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.¹ Here ends the section entitled “Becoming the enjoyer” (5). COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīni- vāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word “bhoktrā- patteḥ” to mean ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller and vice versa’, they understand it to mean only ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa’. Each develops his own peculiar theory in connection.² ¹ Note the different interpretations given by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa. ² Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 et seq.; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

288 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 14. ADH. 6.] Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "The begin- ing" (Sūtras 14-19) SŪTRA 14 "(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT (VIZ THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts. '"The effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 ¹), '"All this has that for its soul. That is true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3– 6.16.3 ²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd 3.14.1 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non- difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the part of the former), has been established under the aphorism. "If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent, (we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br Sū. 2.1 7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵ The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows: There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect, or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from ¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ³ R. ⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1 18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc. K S.S. ⁵ This is the doctrine of Asat-kāryya-vāda.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 14. ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 289 Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that, viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms, and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "āram- bhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is, on account of the texts. '"The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd 6.1.4), '"The exis- tent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate" He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul. That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity. Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word 'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows. The Chāndogas, having made an initial statement to the effect that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"' (Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage: '"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since 1 The passage is "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttikēty eva satyam". 19

290 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 1. 14. ADH. 6.] they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes 'has its beginning in speech', i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two kinds: 'effect', i e. meaning, and 'name', i.e word. The function of speech rests on these two, viz meaning and word, e.g. we say: 'Fetch water by the pot'. Hence, 'the truth' is that the evolute, characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, having the name 'pot', and conducive to the function of fetching water and so on, is 'just clay'. That is, the view that the effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind and the rest which are different from clay.¹ If the effect is to originate from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of the agent. So desist from further arguments COMPARISON Śaṃkara Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection. Śaṃkara understands the word "Ananyatva" as absolute identity, interprets the word 'vācārambhaṇa' to mean 'that which begins from speech only, but does not exist in reality', and thereby develops his theory of Vivarta at great length ² Rāmānuja He understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference, like Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body relation between Brahman and the universe.³ He interprets the phrase: "vācārambhaṇa" as follows: 'vācā' means: on account of speech, i.e on account of activity preceded by speech; 'rambhaṇa' means: what is touched. Hence the text means. On account of speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of ¹ If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and every- thing, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so. ² "Vācaiva kevalaṁ asti . . . . na tu vastu-vṛttena vikāraḥ kaścid asti", etc. Ś.B. 2.1 14, p. 464. ³ Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

[Sū. 2. 1. 15. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 291 water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.¹ Bhāskara He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference. He criticizes the Śaṁkarite view at length and insists on the reality of difference,² and interprets the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” like Śrīnivāsa. Śrīkaṇṭha He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.³ He explains the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” in the next sūtra, and gives two alternative explanations, viz. “That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity”.⁴ Hence, the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions ‘Fetch water in a pot’ and so on. The second explanation is: “That which has speech for its beginning”.⁵ Hence the text means that an effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: ‘This is a pot’, i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes, but is not a separate substance from the clay. SŪTRA 15 “AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent. 1 “Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśate,” etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2. 2 Bh. B. 2 1.14, pp. 93 et seq. 3 ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8. 4 “Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārasya niṣpādakaṁ bhavati.” Op. cit. 2.1 16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8. 5 Vāgārambha-viṣaya-mātram. Op. cit.

292 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1 16. ADH. 6.] Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause between the effect and the cause Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect and the cause ? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text '"These beings, my dear, have the existent as their root"' (Chānd. 6.8 4). COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. "And because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)" That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and not the clay.¹ SŪTRA 16 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account of the existence" of the effect,—belonging to a pos- terior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence in the text: "Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning" (Bṛh. 1 4.10 ²), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause. "On account of the existence" of the effect,—which is "posterior" and denoted by the term 'this',—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence, in the texts '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "Brahman, verily, was this ¹ Śrī B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2 1 16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B 2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2. ² Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 1. 17. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 293 in the beginning” (Bṛh 1 4.10), the non-difference between the effect and the cause is definitely ascertained COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 17 in both They read “aparasya” in place of “avarasya” and take it to mean ‘an effect’.¹ SŪTRA 17 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER TEXT” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent” in the passage. “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ²), the effect does not exist prior to creation,— (We reply:) “no”. There is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known? “From the complementary passage,” viz. “That was existent” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ³), “from the reasoning”, viz. if a previously non- existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley- sprout from fire? “and from another text”, viz. ‘The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning’ (Chānd 6.2.1 ⁴). Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected· The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its ¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8. ² Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: “Asad eva”. Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175. ³ Ś, Bh. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

294 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2 1. 17. ADH. 6.] non-existence prior to creation, in the text · "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19 1),— (We reply ·) "no", why ? Because there is "such a designation" "on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having name and form unmanifest is different from the attibute of having name and form manifest, and it is because of this different attribute that the world is designated thus in the text · "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd 3 19.1), but is never denoted to be non-existent by nature If it be asked Whence is this known ? We reply · 'From the complementary passage.' For the complementary passage · "That was existent" (Chānd. 3 19 1), refers to the topic of our discussion, viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with name and form unmanifest. The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the effect, viz "From reasoning" That is, the existence of the effect is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained ? We reply: On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay that is existent Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,— (we reply .) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest, hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before ¹ It should be known that, on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not un- precedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand, does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,— for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight, ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Vide V.K 1.3 28–30.

[sū. 2. 1. 17. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 295 a different weight is never found.¹ Likewise, the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect ² is unreasonable. The activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz. digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz the pot and the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the conse- quence will be the origin of the pot through mere activity, even in the absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the wise. The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable. The author states once more another reason for the existence of the effect, thus "And from another text". The other text is the text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz. " 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' " (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is other than the above quoted text, viz: 'The non-existent, verily, was the beginning" (Chānd 3.19.1) Because of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense COMPARISON Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asad- vyapadeśāt . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".³ Interpretation same. ¹ I e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different. ² Asat-kārya-vāda. ³ Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17 and 18.