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[sū. 2. 3. 15. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 405 (We reply ) “no”, because the above text is not concerned with a specific order, and because the text: ‘From him arise the vital- breath, the mind and all sense-organs’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) (is concerned with laying down only) “the non-difference” of the origin of knowledge and mind as well as of the ether and the rest from Brahman alone.¹ In the text under discussion, viz.: ‘From this soul, verily, the ether originated’ (Tait 2.1²), establishing the order of the creation of ele- ments,—in between the soul and the ether, the categories of the unmani- fest, mahat and ahaṁkāra, well-known from texts concerned with the orders of creation and dissolution and figuratively implied by the phrase “knowledge and mind” (in the sūtra), are to be known,—so much in brief. Vedānta-kaustubha With a view to encouraging meditation, and generating reverence for Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, the place from which the world emanates and into which it enters; as well as for generating an aversion to the world, the orders of creation and dissolution have been determined Now, the order of the origin of knowledge and mind, which promote meditation, is being established in harmony with the order of the origin of elements. If it be objected: The above-mentioned order of the origin of elements is set aside by the order of the origin of knowledge and mind. Thus, knowledge is that through which a thing is known, i.e. sense- organ. The sense-organs and the mind must be in between Brahman and the elements. Why? “On account of its indication.” An indication (liṅga) or a mark is that through which something is painted,³ i.e. known, an indication of that, i.e. of creation, on account of that; ⁴ that is, on account of the scriptural text indicating their creation, viz. ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all sense- organs, the ether, the air, the fire, water and the earth, the support of all’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). Hence the above-mentioned order is set aside by it —

¹ I.e. the above Mund text simply shows that just as the ether, etc. rise from Brahman, so exactly do the sense-organs, the mind, etc. too,—but does not lay down a definite order of creation. See V.K. below. ² Not quoted by others in this connection. ³ Root √ling = to paint. ⁴ This explains the compound “tal-liṅgāt”.

[sū. 2. 3. 15 406 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 6.] (We reply.) “No”. Why ? “On account of non-difference,” i.e. because of the non-difference of the origin of knowledge and mind, as well as of the ether and the rest, from Brahman alone. The text: ‘From him arise the vital-breath’ (Muṇḍ. 2 1 3) and so on simply points out that there is the origin of all from Brahman, and is not set aside by the above-mentioned order. In the very same manner, scriptural texts like: ‘He created the vital-breath, from the vital- breath reverence, the ether, the air, the fire, water, the earth, the sense- organs, the mind, food’ (Praśna 6.4) and so on, designate that every- thing arises from Brahman, and do not set forth a particular order. The meaning of the word ‘vital-breath’ in the passage. ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all sense-organs’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) will become clear later on.¹ And, thus it is established that in the aphorism. “But there is” (Br. Sū. 2 3 2), only a portion (of the real order of creation) has been mentioned by the author of the aphorisms. So, in the abridged texts designating the order of the origination of elements, such as: ‘From the soul the ether originated’ (Tait. 2.1) and so on, the portions not mentioned, viz. prakṛti, mahat and the rest, established by other texts concerned about creation and dissolu- tion, and figuratively implied by the phrase “knowledge and mind” (in the sūtra), are necessarily understood; but there is no contradiction whatsoever of the texts designating the order of the origination of elements by other texts. Here ends the section entitled “Knowledge which intervenes” (6). COMPARISON Śaṃkara The interpretation of the word “aviśeṣāt” different, viz. “On account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements)”. That is, the organs being of the same nature as the elements, the origination of the former is the same as that of the latter, and not different.² ¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.4.9. ² Ś.B. 2.3.15, p. 602.

[sū. 2. 3. 16. ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 407 Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled “The soul”. (Sūtras 16-17) SŪTRA 16 “BUT THAT DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS BEING BORN OR DYING) MUST DEPEND ON (I.E. REFER TO) THE MOBILE AND IMMOBILE (BODIES), (IT IS) METAPHORICAL (IN REFERENCE TO THE SOUL), BECAUSE (THERE IS) THE EXISTENCE (OF BIRTH AND DEATH) IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF THAT (I E. THE BODY).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The nature of the individual soul is being determined now. “The designation” like: ‘Devadatta is born and dead’ is metaphorical, and as such “depends on the mobile and the immobile”,—there being the “existence” of birth and death when there is the “existence” of the body. Vedānta-kaustubha It has been pointed out above that the ether and the rest originate from Brahman, the unborn, the highest. Now the problem is being considered, viz. whether like them the individual soul, too, is some- thing to be produced or not. The word ‘soul’ is to be supplied from the immediately following aphorism. On the doubt, viz. whether the ‘soul’, i e. the individual soul, originates or not, the prima facie view, viz. In conformity with the designation, viz. ‘Devadatta is born and dead’, the soul is born and dies,—is disposed of by the term “but”. This conventional designation of the origination and dissolution of the soul “must be metaphorical”, i.e. is figurative in reference to the individual soul. To the enquiry: In reference to what then is it literal?—(the author) replies· “Dependent on the mobile and the immobile”, i.e. it refers to the bodies of the movable and the immovable. Why? “Because (there is) existence, if there be the existence of that,” i.e. because there can be origination and dissolution only if there be the existence of that, i e. the body, in accordance with the scriptural text· ‘This person being born and obtaining a body . . . He departing and dying’ (Bṛh. 4.3.8) COMPARISON Rāmānuja This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but concludes the topic of the order of evolution.

[sū. 2. 3. 17. 408 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.] He reads both "bhākta" and "abhākta" and gives two explanations accordingly. Thus (1) But the designation which depends on (i.e. refers to) the movable and the immovable must be secondary, because of being permeated by the being of that (viz. Brahman). (Here he reads "bhākta".) That is, all the words denoting movable and immovable objects are only secondary with regard to those objects, but really denote Brahman, since all objects are modes of Brahman, (2) or, all the terms denoting movable and immovable objects are primary with regard to Brahman, because the denotative power of all terms depends on the being of Brahman. (Here he reads "abhākta".) ¹ Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 17 in his commentary as well. He reads "abhākta", takes this sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets it exactly like Rāmānuja.² Baladeva This is sūtra 15 in his commentary. He also reads "abhākta", takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets on the whole like Rāmānuja. Only the interpretation of the word "tad-bhāva- bhāvitvāt" is different; viz. "But the designation dependent on (i.e. referring to) the movable and the immovable must be primary (with regard to the Lord), because that fact (tad-bhāva) (viz. the fact that all words really denote the Lord) is something that follows in future (i.e. is not directly known at once, but is a matter which one comes to know after studying Scripture)".³ SŪTRA 17 "THE SOUL (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON- MENTION IN SCRIPTURE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF ETERNITY (KNOWN) THEREFROM (I.E. FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXTS)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The individual "soul" does not originate. Why? Because there is no text about its having origin by nature; and because from 1 Śrī. B. 2.3.17, pp. 132-33, Part 2. 2 Śk. B. 2.3.17, pp. 138-39, Parts 7 and 8. 3 G.B. 2.3.15, pp. 181-82, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 17. ADH 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 409 the scriptural texts: ‘A wise man is neither born nor dies’ (Kaṭha 2.18 ¹), ‘Eternal among the eternal’ (Kaṭha. 5 13 ²), ‘An unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying’ (Śvet. 4 5 ³) and so on, the eternity of the individual soul is known. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued In conformity with the texts: ‘One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait Saṁ. 2 5 5 ⁴), etc , which lay down the means to attaining lordship in the next world, let the designa- tion: ‘Devadatta is born and dead’ refer to the birth and death of the body. But like the ether and the rest, birth and death must pertain to the individual soul as well at the time of creation and dissolution (respectively). Thus there is no conflict whatsoever with any text.— We reply: “Not, the soul, on account of non-mention in Scripture”. The singular number ‘soul’ implies the class,⁵ in accordance with the scriptural text teaching the plurality of souls, viz. ‘Eternal among the eternal, conscious among the conscious’ (Kaṭha. 5.13, Śvet. 6.13), and in accordance with the aphorism, to be mentioned hereafter, viz. “And on account of non-continuity, there is no confusion” (Br. Sū. 2 3 48). The soul is not born, nor dies. Why? ‘On account of non-mention in Scripture’, i.e. because there are no scriptural texts designating the birth and death (of the soul) at the time of creation and dissolution; and, because on the contrary, “the eternity” of the soul is known “therefrom”, i e. from the scriptural texts like: ‘“Imperishable, verily, O ! is this soul, possessing the virtue of being indestructible”’ (Bṛh. 4.5.14), ‘A wise man is neither born, nor dies’ (Kaṭha. 2.8), ‘Eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious, the one among the many, who bestows objects of desires’ (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), ‘The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord’ (Śvet 1.9), ‘One unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying Another unborn one leaves her who has been enjoyed’ (Śvet. 4.5) and so on; as well as from the following Smṛti passages, viz. ‘“Nor at any time, verily, was

¹ Ś, R, Śk, B. ² R, Śk, B. ³ Not quoted by others. ⁴ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. ⁵ And not that there is only one soul.

410 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 17. ADH. 7.] I not, nor you, nor these lords of men; nor, verily, shall we ever not be hereafter' " (Gītā 2.12), ' "Unborn, eternal, constant and ancient, he is not killed when the body is killed' " (Gītā 2 20), ' "Who knows him to be imperishable, eternal, unborn and immutable, how can that man kill one, O Pārtha, or cause one to be killed?"' (Gītā 2.21) and so on. If it be objected: There are scriptural texts designating the origin of the world together with the sentient, such as, 'All come forth from this soul', 'Born of whom, the progenitress of the universe let loose the souls with water on the earth' (Mahānār. 1.4), 'The lord of beings created beings' (Tait Br. 1.1.10, 1 ¹) ' "All these beings, my dear, have Being as their root, Being as their abode, Boing as their support"' (Chānd. 6.8.4), '"From whom, verily, these beings arise, through whom they live when born, to whom they go and enter"' (Tait. 3.1) and so on. Hence, the denial of birth and death of the individual soul is not reasonable. For this very reason, the initial proposition that through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all, is established,— (We reply:) "No", because the quoted texts teach that individual soul has an origin, which (is not actual origin, but simply) consists in the expansion of its knowledge, caused by its connection with the body, subsequent to its giving up its real nature at the time of dissolution. If this be so, then the individual soul too being an effect of Brahman, the above initial proposition is established. And hence, it is established that Brahman, who in His causal state possesses the non-divided names and forms as His powers and is without an equal or a superior,—in accordance with the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1),—comes Himself, as possessed of the manifest names and forms as His powers at the time of the production of effects, to abide as three- fold, viz. in the forms of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit), the object enjoyed (i.e. the acit) and the controller (i e. Brahman). There is no con- tradiction here by any text whatever. Here ends the section entitled "The soul" (7). 1 P. 23, line 16, vol. 1.

[sū. 2. 3. 18. ADH. 8.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 411 COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva They read "śruteḥ" instead of "aśruteh"¹. Interpretation same. Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The knower". (Sūtra 18) SŪTRA 18 "(THE SOUL IS) A KNOWER, FOR THAT VERY REASON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The soul, which is an ego, is a knower. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been pointed out that the soul does not originate like the ether and the rest, since it is eternal, as established by Scripture. Now, incidentally, its nature, etc. are being determined. The word 'soul' is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. By the phrase "for this reason", the reason mentioned by the term 'therefrom' (in the preceding sūtra) is referred to. On the doubt, viz. whether the soul is non-sentient by nature, but possessed of the attribute of knowledge or mere consciousness, or knowledge by nature yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower,—the Vaiśeṣikas ² and the like hold that it is non-sentient, yet possessed of the attribute of knowledge; while the Sāṁkhyas and the rest hold that the soul is mere consciousness. With regard to it we reply: "A knower", i.e. the individual soul is nothing but a knower, i.e. nothing but knowledge by nature, yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts, viz. 'Here this person becomes self-illuminating' (Bṛh. 4.3.9, 14), 'The person who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light in the heart' (Bṛh. 4.3.7), 'There is no annihilation of the knowledge of ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.18, p. 136, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.16. ² Vide V. Sū. 3.1.18, and Śaṁkara Miśra's commentary, p. 161.

412 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 3. 18. ADH. 8.] the knower, because of his imperishability' (Bṛh. 4.3.30), ' “ Whereby should one know, O ! the knower ? ' ” ' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5 15), 'This person simply knows', 'For he is the one who sees, .1 hears, smells, .2 thinks, conceives, does, the intelligent self ' (Praśna 4 9) and so on. The doctrine of the non-sentient soul, on the other hand, is to be rejected,—because then the attribute of knowledge by itself, being the effector of all practical transactions, will come to attain primacy, and hence the non-sentient substratum of the attribute (viz. the soul), being non-liable to salvation or bondage, virtue or vice, will come to be non-primary or useless like the nipple on the neck of a goat; 3 and finally, because of its opposition to Scripture. The doctrine of mere consciousness, too, is to be rejected, because if consciousness be all-pervading, then there will be no perception of the pleasure and the like pertaining to the entire body; but if it be atomic in size, then there will be no experience of the pleasure and the like pertaining to hands, feet and so on. Hence it is established that this soul, known through self- consciousness, is knowledge by nature and a knower. Here ends the section entitled “The knower” (8). COMPARISON Śaṁkara Interpretation different—viz. he interprets the word “jña” as eternal consciousness and not as a knower.4 1 Touches. 2 Tastes. 3 An emblem of any useless or worthless object or person. 4 Ś.B. 2 2.18, p. 609.

[SU. 2. 3. 19. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 413 Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Depar- ture". (Sūtras 19-31) SŪTRA 19 "(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ATOMIC ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION) OF DEPARTURE, GOING AND RETURNING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The individual soul is atomic, because in the texts: 'By that light this soul departs through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body' (Bṛh. 4.4 2¹), 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2²), 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4 4 6³) and so on, there is the mention "of departure, going and returning". Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, it has been proved that the individual soul is eternal and a knower. Now its size is being determined. On the doubt, viz. whether this soul is of a middle size,⁴ or of an all-pervading size, or of an atomic size,—if it be suggested: It must be of a middle size, since pleasure and the rest are experienced all over the body. Or, it must be of an all-pervading size,— We reply: The individual soul is capable "of departing, going and returning". These three are not possible if it be all-pervading. Moreover, if it be all-pervading, then experiences of pleasure and the like will result everywhere. If, on the other hand, it be of a middle size, then it must be non-eternal. Hence, the atomicity of the soul is the only remaining alternative. In the passage: 'When he departs from this body, he departs together with all these' (Kauṣ. 3.3⁵), its departure is mentioned. In the passage: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2), its going is mentioned. And, in the passage: 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4.4.6), its returning is mentioned. ¹ R, Śk, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk. ³ Ś, R, Śk, B. ⁴ I.e. of the size of the body. ⁵ Note that Nimbārka quotes a different text here.

414 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 20-21. ADH. 9.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara He takes sūtras 19–27 as laying down the prima facie view. Literal interpretation same. SŪTRA 20 “AND (THERE IS POSSIBILITY) OF THE SUBSEQUENT TWO (VIZ. GOING AND RETURNING) THROUGH ONE’S SELF.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Sometimes departing may be possible on the part of even one who is not moving, as in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village ¹ But, since there is possibility “of the subsequent two through one’s self” alone, the individual soul is atomic. Vedānta-kaustubha As in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village, departing, which consists in the cessation of the rulership of the body, may sometimes be possible on the part of the soul even when it is not moving. But, since there can be the accomplishment “of the subsequent two”, viz. going and returning”, “through one’s self” alone, it is established that the individual soul is atomic. SŪTRA 21 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE SOUL IS) NOT ATOMIC, BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF WHAT IS NOT THAT, (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC BEING SOMETHING ELSE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected : In accordance with the text, referring to the individual soul and designating “what is not that”, viz. : ‘He, verily, is the great’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22 ²), the individual soul is “not atomic”,— ¹ I.e. when somebody ceases to be the ruler of a village, he may be said to ‘go out’. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 22. adh. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 415 (we reply:) “no”, because in the middle, the topic is the Supreme Soul. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: The individual soul is “not atomic”. Why? “Because of the scriptural mention of what is not that,”—“that” means atomicity, “what is not that” means non-atomicity, on account of the scriptural mention of that,¹—i.e. because in connection with the discourse on the individual soul, viz. ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the soul’ (Bṛh. 4.3.7), there is the mention of greatness in the scriptural text: ‘He, verily, is the great, unborn soul’ (Bṛh. 4.4 25),— (We reply:) “No”. Why? “On account of the topic being something else,” i.e. because the topic is here something other than the individual soul referred to in the beginning, i e the Supreme Soul, who is the topic to be established in the middle of the section, in the text: ‘By whom the soul has been found and realized’ (Bṛh. 4 4.13) SŪTRA 22 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ITSELF AND OF MEASURE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the word itself (viz. ‘atomic’) and of measure,” mentioned (respectively) in the texts: ‘This atomic soul’ (Muṇḍ. 3 1.9²), ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold’ (Śvet. 5.9³), the individual soul is atomic. Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase: “the word itself” means the word which is denotative of its own atomicity. The word “measure” means the measure which is separated from⁴ all gross measures, i.e. an intensely minute measure. On account of these two, the individual soul is atomic. The word itself is mentioned in the text: ‘This atomic soul in which the five-fold vital-breath has entered is to be known by means of thought’ (Muṇḍ. ¹ This explains the compound “atacchruteḥ”. ² Ś, R, B, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, B. ⁴ Uddhṛtya mānam = Unmānam.

416 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 23-24. ADH. 9.] 3.1.9). The measure is mentioned in the text: ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundred- fold’ (Śvet. 5.9) ‘For the lower one is seen to be like the point of the spoke of a wheel only’ (Śvet. 5.8). SŪTRA 23 “NON-CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SANDAL-PASTE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though occupying one spot of the body, refreshes the entire body, so exactly does the soul illuminate. Hence, the experience of pleasure and the like over the whole body is not inconsistent. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: If the soul be atomic in size, then how can pleasure and the like be experienced over the whole body?—we reply: There is no such contradiction. Just as one drop of yellow sandal- paste, occupying one spot of the body, produces, through its own quality, a pleasurable sensation extending over the entire body, so the soul too, occupying one spot of the body, experiences, through its own quality, the pleasure and the like extending over the entire body, in accordance with the Smṛti passage: ‘This soul, though only atomic, abides pervading its own body, as does a drop of yellow sandal-paste, pervading the body’. For this very reason it has been said by the Lord too: ‘“Just as one sun illuminates this entire world, so the field-owner (i.e. the soul) illuminates the entire field (i.e. the body), O Bhārata!”’ (Gītā 13.33). SŪTRA 24 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TWO CASES ARE NOT PARALLEL) ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF ABODE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION (OF AN ABODE, VIZ.) IN THE HEART CERTAINLY.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected: The example of the sandal-paste is not appropriate, “on account of the speciality of abode”,—it is directly

[sū. 2. 3 25. ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 417 observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body; but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of such a difference of abode between the two,— (We reply :) “No”. Why ? “On account of the admission,” viz. that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. “in the heart”, by the scriptural text: ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The meaning of the term “certainly” is that it is the attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides in the whole body. SŪTRA 25 “OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the soul),—(the author) replies : The term “or” is for disposing of the objection. The sense is that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading “As in ordinary life.” In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination) may be disjoined as: “as in the case of light”, i.e. like the light of gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, has been disposed of above.¹ COMPARISON Śaṁkara reads “lokavat”, all others “ālokavat”. ¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.18. 27

418 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 26-27. ADH. 9.] SŪTRA 26 "THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20 1) "shows" the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute. Vedānta-kaustubha "The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul, its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body- hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending over a larger space. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".² Rāmānuja He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into two sūtras. —————— SŪTRA 27 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and 1 Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141. 2 Ś.B., pp. 615-16, Bh. B., p. 136.

[sū. 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 419 attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," viz : "Having mounted the body by means of intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6 ¹). Vedānta-kaustubha Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author) replies here. "On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of there being no distinction between the two in respect of being know- ledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both being equally light,—there is still a difference between them. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in Scripture to that effect)".² SŪTRA 28 "BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S) HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTELLIGENT BEING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the 1 Ś. 2 G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

420 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9 ] ground of etymology thus) ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great qualities,¹ so the soul has been designated as “Eternal, all-pervading” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 ²), because of possessing great attributes. In the first case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is the distinction Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature, then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be con- tradicted, such as. ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle’ (Muṇḍ. 1 1.6), ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile’ (Gītā 2.24) and so on,—the author replies· No. The term “but” is for disposing of the objection. On account of having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, “that designa- tion”, viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as: ‘Eternal, all-pervasive’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. “As in the case of the intelligent being.” Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accord- ance with the saying: ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great attributes. The Intelligent Being being great by nature as well, the example holds good only partially.³ Similarly, there is this designation of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive attribute only, and not by nature. This should be understood here: Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Nothing is observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him’ (Śvet. 6.8). The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute). There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the declarations by the Lord Himself: “ ‘Knowledge is enveloped by ¹ Bṛh+man. ² Not quoted by others. ³ I.e. the case of Brahman and the individual soul are not parallel in all respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes. Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of the first as evident.

[sū 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 421 nescience. Thereby beings are deluded ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.15), ‘ “ In whom that nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines forth like the sun, O Bhārata ! ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.16 ¹). COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to the prima facie view set forth in ten sūtras above Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: “But there is that designation (of the atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being”. That is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all- pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of buddhi.² Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27 in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out “tu”. Inter- pretation different—viz “But there is that designation (i e the designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one” That is, just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as know- ledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same. Bhāskara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

¹ Correct quotation: “Prakāśayati tatparam”. Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303. ² Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff. ³ Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147. Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 29. 422 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9.] form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all- pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode, viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through its attributes of passion and the rest.¹ SŪTRA 29 "ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attri- bute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";² i.e. because it is found in the passage: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, indeed. O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4 3 30 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes, and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections —(the author) replies: The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections, because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting as long as the soul does, such as: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, verily, O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137. ² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the sūtra itself. The other edition retains it. ³ Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 3. 30. ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 423 COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different. Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹ Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess the generic character of cowness).² Bhāskara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different, viz. like Śaṃkara's.³ Baladeva This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the illuminator.⁴ SŪTRA 30 "BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND SO ON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood. 1 Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff. 2 Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8. 3 Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38. 4 G.B. 2.3.28.

424 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 31. ADH. 9.] Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul, be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies. The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent indced", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,— just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on" which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like are to be understood. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in the state of waking.¹ SŪTRA 31 "OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettored or eternally free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the other". Vedānta-kaustubha This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is 1 Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.