वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

438 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 43-44. ADH. 12.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara Literal interpretation same, although as usual Śaṃkara holds that the soul is not a real part of Brahman, but a part as it were.¹ The same remarks apply to the following two sūtras. SŪTRA 43 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDING OF A SACRED TEXT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the wording of the sacred text,” viz. ‘A foot of him are all beings’ (Ṛg. V. 10 90.3 ²; Chānd. 3.12.6), the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Vedānta-kaustubha The individual soul is nothing but a part of the Supreme Soul. Why? Also “on account of the wording of the sacred text”: ‘A foot of him are all beings, three feet of him are immortal in the heaven’ (Ṛg. V 10.90.3, Chānd. 3.12.6) A ‘feet’ means a ‘part’. SŪTRA 44 “AND, MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is declared by Smṛti also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman thus: ‘“A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’”’ (Gītā 15.7 ³).

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.43, p. 636. ² P. 349, line 19. Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 45. ADH. 12 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 439 Vedānta-kaustubha It has been declared in a Smṛti passage by the Highest Person Himself that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, thus: “ ‘A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’ ’ (Gītā 15.7). COMPARISON Rāmānuja He omits the “ca”.¹ ――――― SŪTRA 45 “BUT LIKE LIGHT AND THE REST, NOT SO THE HIGHEST.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Though the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, just as “light and the rest” are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. then the virtue or vice pertaining to the individual soul may belong to the Supreme Soul too, seeing that a part has no separate existence from the whole,—the author replies here. “The Highest,” i.e. the Supreme Soul, does “not” become “so”, i.e. does not come to share the virtue and vice pertaining to the individual soul. The author states a parallel instance: “Like light and the rest”, i.e. just as “light”, i e. the sun and the rest, are not touched by the attributes of their rays which are their parts, i.e by their contact and the rest with pure and impure objects. By the phrase: “and the rest”, the ether and the like are understood; i.e. just as the ether and the like are not touched by the good qualities found in the sound of conch-shell, cuckoos and so on, nor by the bad qualities found in the sound of crows and the like. The term “but” is suggestive of the absence of an intermixture of the attributes of the part and the whole. The objections, resulting from the apprehension ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.44, p. 161, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 45. 440 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.] that the Highest Being is subject to karmas by reason of His connec- tion with the hearts of individual souls which are subject to karmas, have been disposed of, on the ground that the Lord is not subject to karmas, under the aphorism: "Enjoyment results" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8). Under the aphorism: "Not even on account of place" (Br. Sū 3 2.1), we shall dispose of (the objection based on Brahman's being connected with 'places', viz. the hearts) on the ground that the Lord, having the 'places' by nature, is yet not subject to karmas. Here, on the other hand, it should be known that the objections raised on the ground of His own parts are disposed of.¹ COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. The general import of the sūtra, as well as the interpretation of the phrase: i e. "prakāśādivat" different. He develops his doctrine of upādhi here. Thus, the sūtra means, according to him: Just as the light of the sun and the moon, pervading the entire expanse of the other, appears to be straight or bent accordingly as the limiting adjunct with which it is in contact, viz. finger, etc. are straight or bent, but does not become so really; or just as the ether, though imagined to move when jars are moving, does not really move; or just as the sun does not really tremble when its images on water tremble, so although the individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain, Brahman does not, since the soul is but a fictitious part of Brahman, due to limiting adjuncts, and not a real part.² Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They too develop here their peculiar theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus, the sūtra means, according to them: "(The individual soul is a part of Brahman) as light and the rest (of the sun, etc. is of the sun and so on), not so the highest (i.e. Brahman is not of the same nature ¹ I.e. there is no repetition here. Under Br. Sū. 1.2.8, it has been shown that Brahman, though connected with the hearts of individual souls is not subject to their pleasures and pain. In this sūtra it is shown that Brahman, though connected with the individual souls as their whole, is not yet subject to their pleasure and pain. And under Br. Sū. 3.2.1, it will be shown that Brahman, though the inner controller, is not subject to the states and faults of souls. ² Ś.B. 2.3.46, pp. 638-639.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 46. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 441 as the soul)”. That is, the soul is a part of Brahman in the sense of being an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of Brahman; and just as the attribute and its substratum are not identical, so the soul and Brahman are not ¹ They continue the same topic in the following two sūtras. Baladeva This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different He begins a new adhikarana here (five sūtras) concerned with the question of the Lord’s incarnations. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: “But supreme (incarnations of the Lord are) not so; (i.e parts of the Lord as the individual souls are), as in the case of light”. That is, just as though the sun and the fire-fly are both called ‘light’, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the sun, so though the incarnations and ordinary individual souls are both called ‘parts’ of the Lord, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the incarnations, i.e. it means then the entire Lord.² SŪTRA 46 “AND SMṚTIS DECLARE” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “And Smṛtis declare”: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.³ The active self, on the other hand, is something different, who is subject to bondage and release’ (Mahā. 12.13754-13755 ⁴). Vedānta-kaustubha The sages also declare that the part alone is subject to the fruits of action done by itself, but not the whole, thus: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus- leaf is not touched by water.—The active self, on the other hand, 1 Śrī. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Part 2; Śk B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Parts 7 and 8. 2 G.B. 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, Chap. 2. 3 One line omitted. 4 P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 47. 442 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12] is something different, who is subject to bondage and release. He is subject to seventeen rāśis (Mahā. 12.13754–56a). It has been declared by Scripture, too, thus ‘Of the two, one eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating looks on’ (Śvet. 4.6, Muṇḍ. 3.1.1). COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They quote from Smṛti to show that the soul is the attribute of the Lord.¹ Baladeva He quotes from Smṛti to show that the incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the individual souls are.² SŪTRA 47 “INJUNCTION AND PROHIBITION (FIT IN) ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOULS’) CONNECTION WITH BODIES, AS IN THE CASE OF FIRE AND SO ON.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “Injunction and prohibition” like ‘One who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait Sam. 2 5 5³), ‘A Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1⁴) and so on do indeed fit in, on account of the connection of the individual souls with different bodies, in spite of their being an equality among them as parts of Brahman; just as fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya,⁵ but not from the crematory; or just as water and the like, touched by clean persons, pots and so on are accepted and not others. Vedānta-kaustubha If the individual souls be all equal as parts and the rest of Brahman, then to whom can the injunctions and prohibitions refer? Listen! In spite of their sameness, injunctions and prohibitions like: ‘One ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.46, p. 162, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.46, p. 160, Parts 7 and 8. ² G.B. 2.3.45. ³ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Not quoted by others. ⁴ P. 241, line 21, vol. 2. Not quoted by others ⁵ A Brāhmaṇa versed in the Veda.

[sŪ. 2. 3. 48. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 443 desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait. Sam 2 5.5), ‘Hence a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1) fit in on account of their connection with different bodies, “as in the case of fire and so on”, i.e just as in spite of being the same, fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya, but one from crematory and the like is rejected; and just as the urine and excrement of cows and the like are enjoined as holy, but those very things of different animals are rejected. COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara He develops in this connection his doctrine of Adhyāsa.¹ Bhāskara too speaks of his peculiar doctrine of Upādhi. Baladeva This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He continues the same theme,—viz. the distinction between incarnations and ordinary individuals. He interprets the sūtra thus: (In the case of individual souls there are) injunctions and prohibitions, on account of (their) connection with bodies, as in the case of light (i e. the eye).² That is, the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is yet connected with nescience and a body, and is as such under the control of the Lord for its activity and inactivity and so on. But an incarnation, though a part of the Lord, is not under His control; just as the eye or the power of vision, though a part of the sun, depends upon the per- mission, i.e. the presence, of the sun for its activity or otherwise, but a ray of the sun, as a part of the sun, is identical with it, and does not depend upon any permission and the like of the sun. SŪTRA 48 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-EXTENSION THERE IS NO EXTENSION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha In spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the all-pervasive Being, and in spite of the fact that they themselves are 1 Ś.B. 2.3.48, pp. 640 ff , Bh. B. 2.3.48. p. 142. 2 G B. 2.3.46. pp. 226-27, Chap 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 49 444 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.] all-pervasive by reason of their (all-pervasive) attribute (of knowledge),¹ the individual souls, being atomic by nature, are not all-pervasive; and as such there is no confusion among karmas Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. On your view, too, on account of being parts of the all-pervasive Being, as well as on account of possessing an all-pervasive attribute, all the souls come to experience the pleasures and the like in all the bodies; and as such a confusion among karmas, as well as a confusion among the enjoyments of their fruits will result. Hence, as the view that the soul is a part of the all- pervading Brahman, is atomic by itself and is all-pervasive by reason of its attribute, involves unnecessary complications, so Kapila's doctrine of the soul, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive by itself, is more acceptable,—the author replies here. "On account of the non-extension," i.e non-all-pervasiveness of the souls,—mutually distinct by reason of being atomic, and distinct also from the Whole (i.e. the Lord) by being predicated as parts,— "there is no confusion". The term "and" indicates the contraction of the soul's knowledge during its state of bondage. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. The same topic continued: "And on account of the non-extension (i.e. incompleteness of the individual soul, there is) no (possibility of) a confusion (between it and an incarnation)". That is, the soul is atomic and not full and perfect like an incarnation, hence different from him ² SŪTRA 49 "AND (THE DOCTRINES OF THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS OF THE SOUL) ARE FALLACIES MERELY." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of the opponents like Kapila and others are "fallacious merely", since, 1 Vide V.P.S. 2.3.28 2 G.B. 2.3 47, p. 227, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3. 49. ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 445 on those views, there results a confusion (among karmas and so on of the souls). Vedānta-kaustubha But the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of Kapila, Kaṇāda and so on are "fallacious merely", as they have no (scriptural) basis, and as, on these views, there a confusion among all practical transactions will result. By the term "and" it is indicated that such teachers simply delude people. COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He reads "ābhāsaḥ" in place of "ābhāsāḥ". Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "(The indivi- dual soul is) only a reflection (of Brahman)". Thus, here he develops his doctrine of Pratibimba.¹ Rāmānuja He reads "ābhāsaḥ", and interprets the sūtra thus: "(The view that Brahman is obscured by limiting adjunct or nescience) is simply a fallacy". He accepts the alternative reading "ābhāsāḥ" too and points out that in that case the sūtra will mean: "(The various reasons advanced by the supporters of the above doctrine) are simply fallacies".² Bhāskara This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He substitutes "vā" in place of "ca". He, also, like Rāmānuja, directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, thus: "(Nesciences are) simply fallacies".³ Śrīkaṇṭha He too directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, interpreting it like Rāmānuja's second interpretation.⁴ Baladeva This is sūtra 48 in his commentary He reads "ābhāsaḥ". The same topic continued, viz. "(The reason adduced by the prima facie ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.50, pp. 642. ² Śrī. B. 2.3.49, p. 163, Part 2. ³ Bh. B. 2.3.50, p. 142. ⁴ Śk. B. 2.3.49, p. 101, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 50. 446 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12 ] objector to prove the similarity of the soul with the incarnation) is a mere fallacy". That is, the argument: The soul is a part of the Lord. The incarnation is a part of the Lord ∴ the soul is equal to the incarnation, evidently involves the logical fallacy of undistributed middle.¹ SŪTRA 50 "BECAUSE OF THE NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE UNSEEN PRINCIPLE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, confusion is unavoidable even if recourse be taken to the unseen principle, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle". Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. there is no confusion among all practical transactions on our view too, since the unseen principle is the regulator, —the author replies: Confusion results indeed on the view of the opponents, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle", viz. to whom may the unforeseen principle, generated in the vicinity of all the all-pervasive souls, belong and to whom not. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha Interpretation same, only they direct this and the remaining sūtras to the refutation of the Śaṁkarite view, and not to the view of Kapila and others. Baladeva This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with proving the mutual difference among the individual souls. Thus, this sūtra means, according to ¹ G.B. 2.3.48, p. 228, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3 51. ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 447 him "(The individual souls, though similar in their essential nature, are yet different from one another) on account of the non-determinate- ness (i e. non-similarity) of (their) destinies".¹ SŪTRA 51 “AND IT IS SO EVEN WITH REGARD TO DETERMINATION AND THE LIKE ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no restriction "even with regard to determinations and the like", such as: 'I shall do this and not that'. Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. A restriction is possible, viz. the unseen principle belongs to one who has the determination: 'I shall do this and not that',—the author replies here: “Determination” means resolution. By the phrase “and the like” reverence and so on are understood. There is, indeed, no restriction with regard to the unseen principle even in the case of resolution, reverence and the rest COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. He continues the same theme, viz. “And thus (the individual souls are different) with regard to (their) desire and the rest also”. That is, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the ultimate cause which determines the difference between the souls, and not their desires, inclinations and the like, which are only the secondary causes.² 1 G.B. 2.3.49, p. 229, Chap. 2. 2 G.B. 2.3.50, p. 230, Chap. 2.

448 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 52. ADH. 12.] SŪTRA 52 "IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF INCLUSION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that "on account of the place" of the self, situated within its own body, everything is consistent,—(we reply:) "no". "On account of the inclusion" therein of the places of all the souls. Here ends the third quarter in the second chapter of the Vedānta- pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: A definite restriction is possible with regard to determinations and the rest, "on account of place", i.e. it is in the region of the soul, situated within its own body alone, that the conjunction of the mind (with the soul) takes place,—on account of such a place of the soul,—(we reply:) "no", "on account of the inclusion" therein of the places of other souls too. The sense is this: Since all the souls are connected with one and the same mind, the determinations and the rest, due to the conjunction of the mind (with the soul), must be common to all; and hence the unseen principle, due to them, must indeed be common to all. This being so, the confusion among all practical transactions remains as before. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, is atomic in size, knowledge by nature, possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being a knower' and so on and different in every body. Here ends the section entitled "A part" (12). Here ends the third quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus- feet of the holy Nimbārka.

[sū. 2. 3 52. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 449 COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. The same topic continued : "If it be objected (that the difference among the individual souls is) due to the difference of (their) environments, (we reply :) no, because (the difference of environments, such as heaven, hell, and different lots in the world) are included under (i.e. due to) adṛṣṭa". That is, finally, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the cause of the difference among the souls.¹ Résumé The third quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka ;
2. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara ;
3. 52 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja ;
4. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara ;
5. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha,
6. 51 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva. Śaṃkara and Bhāskara break each of the sūtras 3 and 26 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different ones, and omit sūtra 11. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha break sūtra 5 in Nimbārka's com- mentary into two different sūtras, and take sūtras 33 and 34 in it as one sūtra, reversing the order. Baladeva omits sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary.

¹ G.B. 2.3.51, p. 230, Chap. 2. 29

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya) FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda) Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “The origin of the sense-organs”. (Sūtras 1–4) SŪTRA 1 “LIKEWISE THE SENSE-ORGANS.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The origin of the organs is being considered. The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha In the preceding quarter, the absence of any contradiction among the scriptural texts regarding the ether and the rest has been shown. Now, the author is showing the non-contradictory nature of the scriptural texts regarding the organs of the individual soul. On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs originate or not, the prima facie view is as follows: In the discussions about origin, e.g. in the scriptural text: ‘From this soul the ether has originated’ (Tait. 2.1), there is no mention of the origin of the sense-organs; and in the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning”. Then they said: “What was that non-existent”? “The sages, verily, were the non-existent in the beginning.” Then they said: “Who were those sages”. “The sense-organs, verily, were the sages”’ (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1¹), the sense-organs are declared to exist prior to creation; hence they do not originate. With regard to it, we reply: Just as the elements like the ether and the rest, mentioned in the passage: ‘From him arise the vital- breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, fire’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), originate, “so the sense-organs”, too, originate.

¹ P. 499, lines 1-2.

[SŪ 2. 4. 2. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 451 COMPARISON Śrīkaṇṭha Interpretation different, viz. he takes it to be setting down the prima facie view thus: ‘(Just as the individual soul is eternal) so are the sense-organs ¹ (as declared by Scripture ²)’. SŪTRA 2 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SECONDARY (ORIGIN)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot be said also that in the section concerned with creation, e.g. in the passage: "From the self the ether has originated" (Tait 2 1), there being no mention of the origin of the organs, the text regarding the origin of the organs is secondary,—"on account of the impossibility of a secondary" (origin). That is, the sense-organs must have origin, as the majority of scriptural texts designate such an origin, and as, otherwise, the initial proposition that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one will come to be con- tradicted Vedānta-kaustubha Having rejected the doubt,—viz. by reason of its opposition to the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning”’ (Tait. 2.7), the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs is secondary,—the author states the reason for the view that the sense-organs, too, originate. The compound "gauṇyāsambhava" is to be explained as ‘impos- sibility of a secondary (origin)’, i.e. the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs cannot be secondary. Hence the sense- organs do originate. If it be asked: Why impossible?—(we reply:) Because the scriptural text about origin can be understood literally, because there are numerous scriptural texts regarding such an origin, and because otherwise the initial proposition will come to be con- tradicted, i.e. because there are numerous scriptural texts designat- ing origination, such as: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the ¹ Śk. B. 2.4.1, p. 168 ² I.e. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1—quoted by Śrīnivāsa.

452 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 4. 2. ADH. 1.] mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), 'Just as small sparks come forth from fire, so exactly do all the sense-organs from this soul' (Bṛh. 2.1.20), 'Seven sense-organs arise' (Muṇḍ 2.1.7). Having made the initial assertion, viz that there is the knowledge of one through the knowledge of all thus: '"What being known, sir, all this comes to be known?"' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the text goes on to declare, in order to prove it, that 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Mund 2 1 3) and so on. This initial proposition is proved only if all the effects, like the sense-organs and the rest, are admitted to have Him as their material cause. The scriptural text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), on the other hand, is to be explained as referring to the cause. Hence there is no contradiction. COMPARISON Rāmānuja He takes this and the next sūtra as one sūtra Interpretation different, viz. "(The plural number in the text ¹) is secondary, be- cause of impossibility", i.e. because prior to creation Brahman alone exists.² Śrīkaṇṭha He regards this sūtra as answering the prima facie objection. He too like Rāmānuja takes this and the next sūtra as forming a single sūtra, and interprets it just like Rāmānuja Baladeva Interpretation just like Rāmānuja's. ¹ Viz. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1. See Śrīnivāsa above. It has been stated under the previous sūtra that the words 'sense-organs' and 'sages' in that passage denote Brahman. But how then to account for the plural number?—to this question the present sūtra replies. ² Śrī. B. 2.4.2, p. 170, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 3-4. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 453 SŪTRA 3 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION (IN) THAT OF WHAT IS PRIOR." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account of the direct mention," in that text, of the verb,— used in its primary sense in connection with the ether and the rest,— in reference to the sense-organs as well, the origin of the sense-organs is primary. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the origin of the sense-organs is primary,— so says the author. "On account of the direct mention," in "that", i.e in the text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2 1 3), of the word 'arises',—used in its primary sense with reference to the ether and so on,—with reference to the sense-organs, mentioned even prior to the ether and the rest,— the scriptural text designating the origin of the sense-organs is, indeed, primary. It is not possible that one and the same word 'arises' is used in a secondary sense with reference to the sense-organs, and in a primary sense with reference to the ether and the rest. For this reason too, it is used in a primary sense alone in both the cases. COMPARISON Baladeva Interpretation exactly like Rāmānuja's second half of the preced- ing sūtra.¹ SŪTRA 4 "ON ACCOUNT OF SPEECH BEING PRECEDED BY THAT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest because of the mention of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food in the passage: " 'The mind, my dear, is ¹ G.B. 2.4.3, p. 234. Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 4. 454 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.] composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light’” (Chānd. 6.5.4 ¹) Vedānta-kaustubha To the allegation, viz. that in the section treating of creation, the origin of the sense-organs is not mentioned,—the author replies here: On account of the mention in the Chāndogya of speech, the vital- breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food respectively, having Brahman for their material cause, thus · ‘“The mind, my dear, is composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light”’ (Chānd 6.5 4), there is origin (of the sense-organs). Hence it is established that the sense-organs do originate on the ground of the following reasons, viz. there is the mention of the origin (of the sense-organs) in the section treating of origin too, there are also numerous texts designating the origin of the sense-organs, and, finally, the initial assertion too that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one is established only on this view. Here ends the section entitled “The origin of the sense-organs” (2). COMPARISON Rāmānuja This is sūtra 3 in his commentary. Interpretation different He continues the same topic, viz. that the word ‘prāṇa’ in the above passage does not stand for the sense-organs, but for Brahman. Hence the sūtra: “Because of speech (i.e. names of objects) being preceded by that (viz. the existence of those objects)”. That is, names of objects pre-suppose the existence of objects. But prior to creation there were no objects, and hence no speech or organs of speech and so on.² Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 3 in his commentary too. Interpretation similar to Rāmānuja’s, viz. “Because of speech (i e. names and forms) being preceded by that (i.e by the creation by the Lord).³ ¹ Ś, B. ² Śrī. B. 2.4.3, pp 170-71, Chap. 2. ³ Śk. B. 2.4.3, p. 167, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 5. ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 455 Baladeva He also continues the same topic thus. "Because of speech (i.e. Brahman) being prior to that (viz. pradhāna and rest) ".¹ Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The going of the seven". (Sūtras 5-6) PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 5) SŪTRA 5 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SEVEN, AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doubt, viz. whether they are seven or eleven, the prima facie view is as follows: Because of the going (of the sense-organs), mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out all the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2 ²), and because of their being specified as seven only in that very passage: 'He does not see,—does not smell,—does not taste,—does not speak,—does not hear,—does not think,—does not touch' (Bṛh. 4.4.2 ³), the sense-organs are seven only. Vedānta-kaustubha Now, desirous of determining the number of the sense-organs, the author is stating the prima facie view with a view to removing the contradictions among the texts about it. On the doubt, viz whether these sense-organs are seven or eleven, (the prima facie objector replies:) "Because of the going of seven", mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense- organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2), they are seven only. How is it known that seven alone go out? "Because of (their) being specified," i.e. because in the passage: "When the person in the sun moves about back, then he becomes non-knowing of forms, he becomes one, ¹ G.B. 2.4.4, p. 235, Chap. 2. ² B. ³ Not quoted by others. The phrase: "iti āhuḥ ekī-bhavati" is to be supplied in each dotted portion.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 6. 456 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2 ] he does not see, does not smell, does not taste, does not speak, does not hear, does not think, does not touch' (Bṛh 4.4.1-2), only seven, like the eye, etc., are specified. COMPARISON Śaṁkara According to him "gateḥ" = avagateḥ, i.e. because of under- standing.¹ CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 6) SŪTRA 6 "BUT (THERE ARE) HANDS AND THE REST, (THESE ADDITIONAL SENSE-ORGANS) BEING ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE (THAT) IS NOT SO." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The correct conclusion is as follows It being definitely ascertained from the passage: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense' (Bṛh. 3.2.8 ²) and so on, that there are more than seven, it is not to be thought there are only seven sense-organs. In accordance with the scriptural passage. 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4 ³), there are eleven sense-organs. Vedānta-kaustubha The author states the right conclusion. The term "but" intimates the blindness of the prima facie opponent. In the scriptural text: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense. It is seized by action as an over-sense-organ, for by the hands one performs action' (Bṛh. 3.2.8), "the hands and the rest", over and above the seven, are mentioned. "Therefore" the hands and the rest, over and above the seven, "being established", and in the pas- sage: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2) the going out of all the sense-organs being not specified, it cannot be thought that there are only seven of them. But the fact is that there are eleven sense- organs in accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'There 1 Ś.B. 2.4.5, p. 653. 2 Ś, Bh, B. 3 Op. cit.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 7. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 457 are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh’ (Bṛh. 3.2.8), ‘The sense-organs are ten and one’ (Gītā 15 5). Among these, five are organs of knowledge, viz ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. They have five objects, viz sound and the rest. Five are organs of action, viz. speech, hands, feet, organ of elimination and organ of generation. They have five objects like word and the rest. The internal organ is the mind, the cause of resolution and the rest In this way it is established that there are altogether eleven sense-organs Here ends the section entitled “The going of the seven” (2). COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 5 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 6 in the commentary of the last. Interpretation of the word “sthite” different, viz. “because of abiding (in the body and assisting the soul).¹ Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled “The atom- icity of the sense-organs”. (Sūtra 7) SŪTRA 7 “AND ATOMIC.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha In accordance with the scriptural text regarding going out, viz.: ‘All the sense-organs go out’ (Bṛh. 4 4.2²), the sense-organs are “atomic”. Vedānta-kaustubha Now the author is showing the size of the sense-organs. On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs are atomic or all- pervading, the Sāṁkhyas maintain that they are all-pervasive, being effects of the unlimited ahaṁkāra. In accordance with the scriptural ¹ Śrī. B. 2 4.5, p. 173, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.5, p. 169, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.4.6. ² R, Śk, B.