महाराणा सांगा: द हिन्दूपत (हरविलास सारदा - मेवाड़ साम्राज्य एवं खानवा महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Maharana Sāngā. alarmed, for he knew that Sāngā, as he says in his Memoirs, was a very powerful king, and that "the high eminence he then held, he had attained by his valour and his sword." He knew very well that the Afghan chiefs in India were all at heart his enemies. He therefore made overtures for peace through Raja Silhiddi Tuar of Raisen, a feudatory of the Maharana, but the Maharana rejected the overtures, and after taking the strong fort of Kandar from Hasan Makan,¹ who in vain applied to Bābur for help, advanced to Byana. Hasan Khan of Mewat who, along with other chieftains "looked to Sāngā for aid," did not take the bait offered by Bābur through Nahar Khan, but joined Sāngā with ten thousand horse. The Maharana attacked and took Byana, the governor, Mehdi Khwaja, fleeing to Bābur with the remnant of his troops. The Maharana's army advanced and fell on Bābur's advanced guard on 21st February 1527 (Chaitra Bad 6th, S. 1583 = 20 ¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I., p. 448. 129

Maharana Sāngā. Jamadi ul Avval H. 933). This advanced guard was "entirely destroyed, the fugitives carrying to the main body the accounts of the disaster, which paralysed their energies, and made them entrench for security instead of advancing with the confidence of victory. Reinforcements met the same fate and were pursued to the camp." ¹ Mr. Erskine says: "They had had some sharp encounters with the Rajputs, in which they had been severely handled and taught to respect their new enemy. A party from the garrison had some days before in- cautiously advanced too far from the fort, when the Rajputs fell upon them and drove them in. All the troops engaged in this affair united in bestowing unbounded praise on the gallantry and prowess of the enemy (Rajputs). Indeed the Jaghtai Turks found that they had now to contend with a foe more formidable than either the Afghans or any of the natives of India to whom they had yet been opposed. The Rajputs, energetic, chivalrous, fond of battle and ¹ Tod's Rajasthan, Vol. I., p. 303. 130

Maharana Sāngā. bloodshed, animated by strong national spirit and led on by a hero, were ready to meet, face to face, the boldest veterans of the camp, and were at all times prepared to lay down their life for their honour.” Mr. Stanley Lane Poole says : “Their chivalry and lofty sense of honour inspired nobler feats and sacrifices than any that were conceived by Bābur’s less highly-wrought soldiers.” ¹ Mir Abdul Aziz, who was in charge of the advance, had pickets pushed on for seven or eight miles. A body of Rajputs fell upon him and “many of his men were killed, others taken prisoners and carried off the field on the very first onset.” “ The minister’s son, Mohib Ali Khalifa, pushed forward to his assistance, and numbers of separate horse- men, as fast as they were equipped, were sent off at the best of their speed. Mohib Ali found everything in disorder, Abdul Aziz’s standard taken and many excellent officers slain. Not only was he unable to turn the ¹ Stanley Lane Poole’s Bābur, p. 176. 131

Maharana Sāngā. tide of success but was himself unhorsed, though finally brought off by a desperate charge of his followers. Bābur's troops were then pursued for about two miles." ¹ To detach Hasan Khan Mewati from the Maharana, Bābur had sent a predatory force into Mewat with orders "to plunder the country, to carry off the inhabitants into captivity, and to leave nothing undone to ruin the province. The ravages were extended into many of the neighbouring districts, but the results of this diversion did not answer his expectations." "The repeated successes of the Rajputs, the unexpected valour and good conduct they displayed, and their numbers, for they are said to have amounted to an hundred and twenty thousand horse, had begun to spread a visible discouragement among the troops."² Bābur again opened negotiations for peace, and employed the time thus gained to strengthen his position and give his men time to recover their confidence. In order ¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 465. ² Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 465-6. 132

Maharana Sāngā. to reassure the drooping spirits of his troops, he threw up entrenchments, in which he placed his artillery, connecting his guns by chains, and in the more exposed parts, chevaux de frise, united by leather ropes. These operations were continued for 3 or 4 weeks, during which time the army remain- ed blockaded in this encampment. About this time he received a reinforcement of 500 volunteers from Kabul, who were accompanied by a noted astrologer, Muhammad Sharif. Even the astrologer instead of being of assis- tance, “added to the depression and panic which prevailed in the camp by declaring his opinion that the planet Mars, being in the west, whoever engaged, coming from the opposite direction, would be defeated.” ¹ Feelings of extreme uneasiness and dis- may crowded the mind of Bābur when he was thus forcibly cooped up in his entrenched camp, while the Rajputs were in possession of the open country. His introspective spirit was quickened, and reviewing his past ¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 466. 133

Maharana Sāṅgā. life, he felt that he had grossly and openly violated one of the chief principles of his faith, being firmly addicted to drinking wine. He now determined "to renounce this besetting sin in order to merit superior aid to extricate him from his peril." Bābur says in his Memoirs : "On Monday, the 23rd of Jamadi ul Awwal, I had mounted to survey my posts, and in the course of my ride was seriously struck with the reflection that I had always resolved one time or another to make an effectual repentance, and that some traces of the hankering after a renunciation of forbidden works had ever remained in my heart : I said to myself : ' Oh my soul, How long wilt thou continue to take pleasure in sin, Repentence is not unpalatable—taste it.’ “Having withdrawn myself from such temptation, I vowed never more to drink wine. Having sent for the gold and silver goblets and cups, with all the other utensils used for drinking parties, I directed them to be broken, and renounced the use of wine, purifying my mind. The fragments of the goblets and other utensils of gold and silver 134

Maharana Sāngā I directed to be divided amongst dervishes and the poor." Bābur also vowed not to cut the beard, but to allow it to grow like a true Mussalman. Nearly 300 of his men, great and small, made such vows of reformation. “The dejection and alarm of Bābur’s troops,” says Erskine, “had at this time reached their extreme point. The contagion had infected even his highest officers.” “The destruction of the wine flasks,” says Tod, “would appear only to have added to the existing consternation.” In his despair, as a last resort, Bābur determined to make an appeal to the religious feelings of his follow- ers, “so powerful with all Moslems.” Bābur says in his Memoirs: “At this time, as I have already observed, in conse- quence of preceding events, a general consternation and alarm prevailed among the great and small. There was not a single person who uttered a manly word, nor an individual who delivered a courage- ous opinion. The Vaziers whose duty it was to give good counsel and the Amirs who 135

Maharana Sāngā. enjoyed the wealth of kingdoms, neither spoke bravely nor was their counsel or deportment such as became men of firmness." "At length," continues Bābur, "observing the universal discouragement of my troops and their total want of spirit I came to a resolution. Having called a general assembly of my Amirs and officers, I addressed them : ‘Noblemen and soldiers! Every man that cometh into this world is subject to dissolu- tion. When we are passed away and gone God survives, One and Unchangeable. Who- ever sits down to the feast of life must, before it is over, drink of the cup of death. He who arrives at the inn of mortality, the world, must one day, without fail, take his departure from that mansion of sorrow. How much better then is it to die with honour than to live with infamy. ‘Give me but fame, and if I die I am contented, ‘If fame be mine, let death claim my body.’ ‘The most High God has been propi- tious to us. He has now placed us in such a crisis that if we fall in the field we die the death of martyrs; if we survive, we rise victorious, the avengers of His sacred cause. 136

Maharana Sāngā. Let us, therefore, with one accord swear on God’s holy word, that none of us will for a moment think of turning his face from this warfare; or shrink from the battle and slaughter that ensue, till his soul is separat- ed from his body.’ Master and servant, small and great, all with emulation seizing the blessed Qoran in their hands, swore in the form that I had given.” Though twenty thousand soldiers of Bābur swore on the Qoran to win or die in the battle but not to leave the field alive, yet Bābur was not assured of success, and conscious of the grave consequences of a defeat at this juncture, he renewed¹ the negotiations with the Maharana through Silhiddi, the Chief of Raisen. He offered to make Peela khal near Byana the boundary of their respective dominions and give an annual tribute to the Maharana on condition of being left Delhi and its dependencies.”² ¹ The Tabqati Akbari says that at this Council the grandees advised Bābur to retire to the Panjab. ² Tod’s Rajasthan, Vol. I., p. 305: “We can well believe,” says he, “that in the position Bābur then was, he would not scruple to promise anything”—p. 306. 137

Maharana Sāngā. The advisers of the Maharana, with whom Silhidi was not at all popular, dissuaded Sāngā from accepting these terms, and the negotiations finally came to an end. Colonel Tod says that though the arrangement was negatived, treason had effected the salvation of Bābur. Silhidi, seeing that though the Maharana had been offered more than what he had started from Chitor to fight for, the overtures were rejected only because he was the medium. He took it to heart and deter- mined to stand in the way of victory. This ill-advised inactivity of the Maha- rana while Bābur was cooped up in his encampment, though partly explained by the protracted negotiations for peace made by Bābur, was most deplorable. If he supposed that Bābur was in the toils and that every day’s delay brought with it increased danger to him, he should also have considered that delay is always fatal to the cohesion of a heterogenous mass like that by which he was surround- ed, all parts of which owned neither the same patriotic feelings by which he 138

Maharana Sāngā. was actuated, nor were bound by the same common interest. For the success of the operations of a leader of such a coalition, swift action is a sine qua non! Delay gives scope to the play of disruptive forces which bring certain ruin on the whole body. Such forces inhere in com- posite masess and are only held in check by concentrating the attention of all on one definite aim, by means the most direct and easily understood by all. The Maha- rana was surrounded by a number of chiefs whose interests never coincided, who came from different provinces, who belonged to different and often hostile communities who even differed in faith, whose aims in life were different and in several instances conflicting ; whose only common tie was admiration for and confidence in the heroic personality of the Maharana. In such a situation, the leader to achieve success, must possess energy and courage more than caution and patience; bold aggressiveness more than humanity and forbearance. He must keep the various elements of his army fully employed, and their energies directed 139

Mahārāṇa Sāngā. to achieving as speedily as possible the common aim. Halting action, faltering attitude, waiting upon time to do the work of the sword are fatal, and entail certain defeat. If the Maharana had possessed the restless energy of his elder brother, the ever-memorable, the "winged" Prithviraj, or if he did possess it, had shown it in a speedy attack on the entrenched camp of Bābur; or if, with Rana Hammir’s energy, he had fallen on the dejected, panic- stricken followers of the brave adventurer from Samarkand, the Turk (Moghul) dy- nasty would probably never have occupied the throne of Delhi,¹ and the history of India would have run a different course from what it has done. The Maharana’s delay in coming to an action gave time to Bābur to instil some of his own courage of despair, some of his own heroic ardour into his dejected followers, as well as ¹ Mr. Elphinstone in his History of India, page 373, says: "Bābur’s advanced guard was immediately attacked; and though reinforced from the main body, was defeated with heavy loss. If the Raja had pressed on during the first panic, he would have obtained an easy victory. 140

Maharana Sāngā. to give a start to the disruptive forces in the Maharana's army and set treason to work. Losing finally all hope of a peaceful settlement with the Maharana, Bābur determined to make the most of his resources and give battle. Taking advant- age of the excitement and the exhilara- tion produced by his appeal to the religion of his followers, and their practical response to it, and in order to keep up their newly- acquired spirit, he broke up the camp to which he had been confined for nearly a month and marched in order of battle to a position two miles in advance. And he had no time to lose. The dangers were thickening around him. “Insurrec- tion and revolt had appeared on every hand. The towns and forts, of which he had gained possession with so much labour, were fast slipping out of his hands. Rābera and Chandwar on the Jumna, Koel (Aligarh) in the Doab, and Sambhal beyond the Ganges, but all of them near Agra, had been retaken by the Afghans. 141

Maharana Sāngā. His troops had been obliged to abandon Kanauj. Gwalior was blockaded by the Rajputs of the vicinity. Alam Khan, who was sent to relieve it, instead of excuting his orders, had marched off to his own country. Many Hindu chiefs had deserted the cause of the emperor. Indeed the previous conquests and present success of Rana Sāngā, had inspired all his countrymen with hopes that a change of dynasty was about to take place."¹ On the 12th of March, Bābur drew forward his guns and a kind of defensive cover that moved on wheels, and which served as a breast work, supporting them by his matchlocks and all his army. He himself galloped along the line animating his troops and officers and giving them instructions. He threw up other trenches further in advance, near the spot which he fixed upon as favourable for a general action, and when they were finished, advanced ¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 469. 142

Maharana Sāngā. to occupy them, dragging forward his guns. As soon as they reached the ground the Rajputs were seen advancing. All were ordered to their posts. Bābur mounted, and drew up his troops, riding cheerfully along the ranks and assuring them of victory. He took the centre to himself, assisted by Chin Timur Sultan. The right wing he committed to Humayun, who had under him Kasim Husain Sultan, Hindu Beg, and Khusrau Kokil- tash; the left he entrusted to his son-in-law, Sayad Mehdi Khwaja, and Muhammad Sultan Mirza, Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Ali Jeng-jeng. He appointed strong reserves to carry succour wherever it was required, and on the right and left placed two flanking columns composed of Moghul troops to wheel round the flank and rear of the Rajputs in the heat of the battle on a signal given. This arrange- ment he had learned in his wars with the Uzbeks. His artillery, under Ustad Ali Kuli, was placed in the centre, in front, connected by chains and protected by movable defences, behind which were 143

Maharana Sāngā. placed matchlock men, and in the rear a body of chosen troops ready to repel any attack from behind or to rush for- ward and charge whenever possible. The Maharana's army consisted of his own and that of the great chieftains who acknow- ledged his supremacy or followed his lead. Raja Silhidi, the Rajput Chief of Bhilsa and Raisen, commanded 35,000 horse; Rawal Udai Singh of Dungarpur and Hasan Khan Mewati, 12,000 each; Raja Medni Rai of Chanderi, 10,000 horse; Narbad Hada of Boondi, 7,000; Khinchi Shatru- deva of Gagrone, 6,000; Bhar Mal of Idar, Rao Viramdeva of Merta and Chauhan Narsinghdeva, 4,000 each. Sultan Mahmud Lodi, a son of Sikandar Lodi, commanded 10,000 adventurers; various other chiefs had each from 4,000 to 7,000 men. Rai Mal Rāthor, Commander-in-chief of Jodhpur, and Kanwar Kalyan Mal, heir of Bikaner, com- manded 3,000 each. Prithviraj of Amber,¹ Rawat Bagh Singh of Deolia (Pratapgarh), ¹ Many historical records do not mention his presence at the battle. 144

Maharana Sāngā.

Chandra Bhan, Manik Chand Chauhan, Rai Dalip and others commanded large divisions.

The battle began about half-past nine in the morning by violent charges made by the Rajputs on Bābur’s right and centre, which began to give way. Bodies of the reserve were pushed on to their assistance, and Mustafa Rumi, who commanded one portion of the artillery, opened fire on the masses of Rajput cavalry rushing forward and falling on the Turks like falcons on their prey. This fire made large gaps amongst them; still new bodies of Rajputs pushed on un- dauntedly. The battle was equally desperate on the left. Just as the Turks began to show signs of wavering, the traitor Silhiddi, who commanded the van (herole) of the Maharana’s army, went over to Bābur with his 35,000 cavalry. This did not make much difference, but just at that time an arrow discharged by some one struck with such force on the forehead of the Maharana, who was seated on an elephant, as to make him lose consciousness. The chieftains around him considered it advisable to send him out

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Maharana Sāngā. of the battlefield, and appoint a person as his representative, to continue the battle. They placed him in a palanquin and sent him with an escort towards Mewat. They asked Rao Ratan Singh, the chief of Salumbar, to take the Maharana’s place and continue the battle. Ratan Singh replied that his ancestor had relinquished the throne of Mewar, which was by right his, and that he would not now accept it even temporarily. He added that he deemed it his duty to serve with zeal whosoever should occupy the royal elephant as the Maharana’s representative, and so long as a drop of blood was left in his body, never to allow the enemy to pierce the army under him. Then, Raj Rana Ajjaji, who held the first rank among the nobles of Mewar, and who had, like the great Chonda, out of chivalrous regard for his father’s wishes, relinquished his right to the throne of Halvad in Kathia- war in S. 1520 (A.D. 1463), but was adorned with all the ensigns of royalty (of Halvad), was unanimously voted to take the place of the Maharana. And Ajjaji, assuming all the ensigns of the sovereign of Mewar, occu- 146

Maharana Sanga. pied the vacant seat¹ on the royal elephant. A chattra (canopy) was held over him and the chanwar was waved over his head. For a little while the Rajputs continued fighting; but the rumour soon spread like wildfire, that the Maharana had been wounded and removed from the field. The bond which had tied the different sections of his forces together was thus broken, and various sec- tions of the Maharana's army, not finding their leader present, left the field.² Rawal Udai Singh of Dungarpur, Hasan Khan Mewati, Raja Manik Chand and Chandra Bhan the Chauhan chiefs of Mewar, Rawat Ratan Singh Chondawat of Salumbar, Raj Rana Ajja, Rao Ramdas Sonagarah, Gokal- ¹ A poet says:— रघु सुराजन राण, सिरधारे गजसिर चढे। काढे खल तुरकाण, ईस फत्ते किधीअजा॥ (Assuming on his head the ensigns of the family of Raghu (the great ancestor of Rana, the chief of the Solar dynasty of kings) ascends the elephant : cuts down the wicked Turks, such was the triumph achieved by Ajja). ² A bardic song says that the Turks lost 50,000 men in this battle, and that Ajja went to heaven with 9,000 brave Rajputs. पड़ धर सहस पचास मेघ घण मार न मंडे। नव सहस समट लेकर मडर सुरपुर दिसा सिधाबियो॥ 147

Maharana Sāngā. das Parmar, whose descandants hold Bijolian (Mewar), Rai Mal Rathor, heir-apparent of Marwar; the brave Mertia leaders Ratan Singh (the father of the celebrated Miranbai) and Rai Mal, and others were killed after performing deeds of valour.¹ The Rajputs lost the battle, not because they were inferior to the enemy, but because of one of those chances that have often decided the fate of kingdoms in India, irrespective of the intellectual and material resources of the parties engaged.. It was so with the powerful Raja Anandpal of the Panjab who, in spite of his unquestioned superiority over Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, lost the famous battle near Peshawar in 1008 A.D. owing to his elephant becoming unruly and turning back in the midst of the battle. It was so again in the case of Dara Shikoh, who was chiefly supported by the Rajputs and who lost the battle of Samugarh in A.D. 1658, owing to his transferring his seat in the ¹ Tod says that Mahmud Lodi was killed in this battle, but Mr. Erskine says that he fled to Gujarāt. Mehta Nainsi's Chronicles give the date of the battle as Katik Sud 5th, S. 1584. 148