पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

66 PANIPAT: 1761 camp he changed between the 26th and the 30th of November as a result of Bhau's cannonading as stated above, when he retreated to the riverside, the centre of the battlefield between the two armies lying along the village of Chhajpur. The reputed wooden war-pillar¹³ erected by the Marathas and found described in the Bakhar was somewhere on the plain of Chhajpur, and here the fight on the 7th of December took place, resulting in the death of Balvantrao Mehendale. For a month Abdali remained in the second camp till he moved to Pasina on 30th December, and his line spread across the im- perial road to Dimana. The main site of the final battle was between Risalu and Nimbdi This last move on the part of Abdali obliged Bhau to change his final plan of battle to suit the new disposition by Abdali. During the first month, or almost for five weeks, the Maratha army was on the aggressive. Every day they came out with their field guns, supported by some sardar's contingent, to the front and tried to cut off anyone from the Afghan side who had come out of his camp for skirmishing, or was loitering on the plain. The Pendharis on the Maratha side wandered round Abdali's camp and carried away horses, camels and even elephants which had been let loose for grazing outside. Still nobody from Abdali's side would come out and try to protect their animals and men The discipline in Abdali's camp was of the strictest type and he had issued orders to his army not to stir out of the camp and offer battle themselves. This seems to be due to the superiority of the long-range fire on the Maratha side. The big guns placed advantageously on the mud ramparts surrounding the Maratha camp were able to mow down anyone coming within their range for some two miles. The Marathas cap- tured more than a thousand horses, four hundred camels and four elephants during the first three weeks.¹⁴ The guns on the Afghan side were also not less effective though somewhat shorter in range, and their shots also could reach and kill men in the Maratha trenches. Krishna Joshi met his death from one such shot while he was sitting in his kitchen behind the trenches.¹⁵ But Abdali had probably taken the decision of not attacking in order to economise his powder and shot, which he thought could be used more effectively in an open battle. On the 22nd November there was a lunar eclipse and the Maratha camp was rather inactive on account of this. No one had possibly come out of the camp that day as usual. Abdali's Wazir Shah Wali Khan had come out to watch the Marathas that day. Seeing no danger nearby, he ventured to go very near the Maratha lines in the course of his patrol. As he was wait- ing near a well, the Maratha troops on the opposite side saw him and came out suddenly to take advantage of his unprotected state. A desperate battle ensued and the Wazir had great difficulty in holding his ground. But the Afghans in the rear were also watchful and ran to his rescue. Shinde's men drove them all back to their lines and inflicted considerable loss on them The Wazir lost four hundred of his troops and double that number were wounded.¹⁶ The loss on the Maratha side was forty dead and one hundred and fifty. —————————————— 13 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 15; BDCRI 4.179 verse 36 14 SPD 21.197. 15 Ibid. 16 JADUNATH.SARKAR, op. cit., 2.302; Aitihasika Patra Vyavahar p. 97.

PANIPAT 67 wounded.¹⁷ The Marathas were able to capture more than a hundred horses and but for the nightfall the result would have been still more decisive, as men from that part of the Abdali camp which was attacked by the Marathas had begun to run away from their posts. There was again a similar skirmish after a few days, with no decisive result. The tone of the rank and file in the Maratha army, as well as of the commander-in-chief himself, is found to be all optimistic for over a month, and there is no ground for taking Kashiraj as a correct reporter for this period. Not only are Kashiraj's forebodings incor- rect, but the tone also of his narrative is vitiated by his personal predilections. As Abdali had to retreat from his first position to the riverside, it is proved thereby that the Marathas were in the ascendant till then. Kashiraj describes with awe all the actions of Abdali. He praises his arrangement to guard his camp and to watch the other side day and night. As no such vivid description is forthcoming from the Maratha side, a wrong impression is created in the mind of the reader, and he thinks that there was no such system followed by the Marathas. This is absolutely wrong. Just as parties of thou- sands were appointed to guard the camp on the Afghan side, similarly the Marathas were also mounting guard and patrolling around their camp at night. Kashiraj says that the Afghan monarch was in the habit of going round not only his own camp and that of his allies, but he also took a round about the entire Maratha camp from a distance, and every day returned by noon after having ridden fifty kos in person with a small escort. This seems a gross exaggeration of Kashiraj. We do not think that the Maratha watch- men and patrols were so slack as not to see even once the Afghan monarch go- ing round their camp during a period of more than two months, and one can guess that it was impossible for the daily rounds of Ahmad Shah to go un- seen, at whatever distance he might be encircling the Maratha camp. We also think that it was geographically not possible. The canal on the west side of the Maratha camp was a great impediment to such a movement, and on the east side also the land was not very favourable for such an excursion. The river on the north-east side coming very near and the bogs and the zils, which exist to this day, do not make such a supposition look feasible. Only during the last fortnight, when the Maratha army had become quite despondent and taken to heart the lesson of cold massacre, the Afghan monarch might have indulged in his rounds, though at great risk even then to himself. Kashiraj was perhaps remembering this last period when he wrote nineteen years after, and made it applicable to the whole period of two and a half months. A fortnight after the Wazir's discomfiture, a major engagement took place between the two armies. As we have noted above, Abdali had moved to the riverside by then. As the Afghan camp had now gone far beyond the range of Maratha fire and in a somewhat difficult terrain, and as the Afghans would not come out of their own accord to offer a battle, it became a teasing problem for the Marathas to pass the days in futile inactivity. The Marathas, therefore, hit upon a plan to call them out. At some distance from 17 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 24

68 PANIPAT. 1761 the Maratha camp, and to the south east of it, they began to clear the jungle so as to make easy approach possible $^{18}$ They cut down the thick bushes of short palasa (dhak) trees and prepared a somewhat level battle field and planted a pillar there The site of this new battle field seems to have been, from the description in the ballad,$^{19}$ at Chhajpur, beyond which a big nullah separated it from the Afghan camp They began to drag out their movable cannon to this place and, standing behind them, to challenge the other side to come out and dare battle Cut to the quick by these challenges, the Ruhelas one day came out and began an engagement by firing from a distance The Marathas advanced a little but by this time it was about sunset Seeing that the Marathas would take some time to reach back to their camp, Najib's brother came out to deliver a flank attack as the Maratha army turned its face in the direction of their camp At this unexpected attack the Marathas had to leave their guns and run pell mell, which again drew the Ruhelas far- ther on, close on their heels They almost reached the edge of the Maratha camp when soldiers from the camp came out, finding their comrades in danger The Ruhela cavalry fled away, taking advantage of the pitch darkness of that new moon night, but their infantry was closed in from all sides They fought with their usual bravery and created havoc in the Maratha camp by their marksmanship They were well nigh defeated, with great slaughter of fifteen hundred Ruhelas, and pursued upto a distance But in the midst of this vic- tory, Balvantrao Mehendale received a bullet shot and came down from his horse Seeing that he was a sardar of some consequence, the Afghans tried to cut off his head so as to carry it as a trophy back to their camp, but some Maratha horsemen, noticing it, turned back to snatch it away just when it was being cut Khanderao Naik Nimbalkar was responsible for dragging back the corpse of Balvantrao Mehendale by the feet in the thick of that fight, though himself wounded Both parties then returned to their camps Though the Marathas were victorious, the death of Balvantrao had taken away the zest out of it from them There was a great wailing in the Maratha camp on that night of the 7th December, 1760 Balvantrao's wife, Lakshmibai, was one of the few women who had accompanied their husbands to that famous battlefield Her son, Krishnarao, alias Appa Balvant of later fame, a boy of fourteen or so, was also with them in the camp, still she at once took the decision of of- fering herself as a Sati on her husband's funeral pyre No dissuasion by Bhau himself or by the mother of Nana Fadnis, who was Balvantrao's sister, was able to change her decision She courageously made over her son to Bhau's care and faced immolation, making that incident the most dramatic in the whole Panipat campaign The seventh of December is taken as a turning point in the Panipat campaign No doubt it deprived Bhau of a most intimate lieutenant. The biased Maratha Bakhars and, following them, some Persian chronicles, have shown Balvantrao as the villain of the piece The Kaifiyat merely depicts the difference of opinion between Bhau's advisers from the south, and the north $^{18}$ Ibid. 14-5 $^{19}$ BDCRI 4.179

TO FACE PAGE 68 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 1ST DEC. TO 30TH DEC 1760. SCALE 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES GOHANA JIND ROAD SHAH NAHAR (W. JUMNA CANAL) PANIPAT KALA AM RAJA KHERI BABAIL HABLA JUMNA RIVER UGRA KHERI CHANDPUR KHURD CHANDPUR KALAN JALALPUR BARALIPUR BATTLE FIELD OLD JUMNA BED SEHLA (VAJIRPUR) D. G. SANTURNE D. 1945

70 PANIPAT 1761 over a month ²⁵ That most of the letters sent were intercepted by Abdali is clear from Nana Fadnis' letter²⁶ to Ramchandrapant Natu at Delhi, which shows that this work of stopping the Maratha correspondence had begun from the third week of November, though occasionally a messenger was lucky enough to elude Abdali's patrols This should also have something to do with the Maratha distress, as the possibility of the outsiders knowing the real condition of the Maratha camp was lessened But there is no mention of any distress in the Maratha camp in the above mentioned letter of 12th December, from which it would not be wrong to conclude that Abdali had not upto that point succeeded in completely cutting off the Maratha supply from the north On that side the Sikhs and the Jats were quite well disposed towards the Marathas Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, living at that time at Manuk, seems to have been actually helping²⁷ the Marathas as he was grateful for being relieved from the exactions of the Afghan soldiers of fortune like the chief of Kunjpura and the infamous Mian Qutb Shah The Sikhs were di- rectly interested in the result of the contest and even after the disaster were the chief beneficiaries of it Sir Jadunath's harping on the disaffected Jat villagers seems a figment of the brain There is no ground for such a supposition, though the Marathas suffered before, during and after the war by the vindictiveness of the Muslim population, who were equally numerous in those regions and incomparably more powerful than the submerged Jats and Gujars Bhau is still a hero in their ballad²⁸ and fire side stories, for whom they have the liveli- est admiration Within a fortnight of Balvantrao's death, Govindpant Bundele also met the same fate Throughout the Panipat campaign, nay, even before starting for it, Bhau had demanded money of Govindpant ²⁹ The latter sent two lakhs in the first instance and now at the beginning of December he came to Delhi with four lakhs and twenty thousand This was all he could possibly bring, though it was not even a fourth of what Bhau demanded from the beginning. Handing over the treasure to Naro Shankar, Govindpant sallied forth with his contingent and crossed over into the Doab He began to cut off Abdali's supplies coming from the trans Ganges districts and passing through the Meerut district to Abdali Bhau had intimated to Govindpant that there were none now to oppose him in the Doab as the Ruhelas had been tied up to the camp of Abdali So, leisurely and unguardedly, he continued his march, chastising the refractory local zamindars on the way He seemed to have been collecting grain also for carrying it to Bhau's camp across an upper ghat on the Jamuna, to Panipat But news of Govindpant's depredations soon reached Abdali's camp The Ruhelas became apprehensive of the safety of their homes The regu- larity of the food convoy reaching Abdali s camp through these regions had ²⁵ RAJ 3.210 ²⁶ Satara 2 300 Letter dated 12th December 1760 ²⁷ SPD 27.262, Purandare 1 416 ²⁸ BDCRI 1 ²⁹ SPD 40 129

PANIPAT 71 been taken away. Abdali, therefore, despatched a select force of some five thousand horsemen under impetuous Atai Khan, the Durrani Wazir's nephew, who had recently come from Afghanistan. A few thousand Ruhelas also joined him to show him the way and properly guide him in their home lands. Cross- ing the Jamuna at Baghpat and covering some fifty miles in a day and night, they suddenly alighted upon Govindpant as he was somewhere between Ghazi- ud-din-nagar (now Ghaziabad) and Meerut. It seems that one Jeta Gujar, a robber-chieftain in that area, had promised a ransom to Govindpant, and Govindpant was stopping to recover it. Jeta communicated the news to Abdali and he sent this force. It is also said that the Ruhelas had assumed different colours, seeing which Govindpant thought the army from a distance was that of Naro Shankar.30 While Govindpant was preparing to take a bath and to dine in the afternoon after a day's hard work, he was overtaken by Atai Khan's cavalry. He suddenly snatched a horse and began to run with his army. In the hurry of flight twice he came down from his horse, as he was not properly seated on a saddle, but reseated again by others. But when he fell for the third time, none returned to save him, even his son who was accompanying the army having fled away to a distance. Govindpant's head was cut off and his whole camp looted. The Maratha loss was some four hundred.31 The rest of the Maratha army with Govindpant's son Balaji after first having fled to the south, afterwards returned to Delhi. Atai Khan returned with the loot which con- tained a good quantity of grain, and Najib presented Govindpant's head to Ahmad Shah. He sent it to Bhau, announcing his triumph in the undertaking. The news had already reached Bhau by 23rd December,32 though the head reached Bhau's hands two or three days later, from which it appears that the attack on Govindpant must have taken place on 20th December or so, and not on the 17th as assumed by Sir Jadunath.33 Govindpant had atoned for all his past sins of commission and omission with his life, and, therefore, the gravamen of accusations against him is taken away. He might be called slovenly and not up to the mark in military matters; but none can say that he was disloyal. After Govindpant's death, when the plan of cutting off Abdali's sup- plies and directing these to the Maratha camp had failed, the real difficulties of the Maratha camp began. The Maratha camp was short of not only food and fodder, but also of coined money necessary to make cash payments for any supplies brought to the camp from the Panjab. Bhau found it difficult to fetch money from Delhi where it had been deposited by Govindpant. The first batch of soldiers from Payagude's troops under the leadership of Krishnarao Ballal, carrying with them one lakh, ten thousand, started on 22nd December and seems to have reached the Maratha camp in safety.34 But the second batch under Parashar Dadaji carrying one and a half lakhs with them, which started on 2nd January, 1761, was cut off by Abdali, as Abdali had shifted his camp for the last time on 30th December, and was now lying astride the imperial road

30 Bhau Bakhar 129 31 RAJ 1376. 32 Ibid. 1.272. 33 Fall 2.311. 34 RAJ. 1.281.

72 PANIPAT: 1761

from Delhi to Panipat.³⁵ The news of this shifting had not reached Delhi, and so the Maratha troops were passing along the road in the dead of night as usual. There were with him three hundred soldiers each carrying five hun- dred rupees. In the severe cold of January, with their bodies benumbed by night exposure, they unsuspectingly entered the Afghan camp five miles to the south of Panipat, thinking it to be the Maratha camp. They alighted from their horses and tried to warm themselves by the burning fire sides. Some took out their pipes and began to smoke. As they had entered from the back of the Afghan camp without fear, none at first seems to have recognised or obstructed them, the Afghans taking them probably as a batch of their allies. But when the Marathas began to converse, the Afghans got the clue and raised a hue and cry. Only one escaped from the tussle and returned back to Delhi.³⁶ The rest were deprived of their cash and horses and put to the sword according to Kashiraj,³⁷ while the Bhau Bakhar and the Ka fiyāt say that they reached the Maratha camp safely after the mishap.³⁸

As more than five lakhs of people were living in that small area from Panipat to Samalkha for more than two months (in the two camps together), all the wood and fodder in the vicinity had disappeared and the whole area had become one vast barren plain. Some ten villages had left their sites and gone to live elsewhere. The citizens of Panipat had to remain confined in the small walled area, with no space left for movement. Their farms and gar- dens had disappeared from the scene. Naturally they had become hostile to the Marathas and being Muslims for the most part, seem to have acted treacherously from behind in giving news to Abdali and carrying on nefarious activities in collusion with the Afghans of Kunjpura and the surrounding area. The civil behaviour of the Marathas with such people has cost the Marathas very dearly in history.

In their two and a half months' beleaguerment at Panipat, the Mara- thas must have spent practically every pie they possessed for buying the vic- tuals at ten fold prices. The system adopted for fetching grain from a distance was to send an escort of some thousands to accompany the caravan from Karnal to Panipat, and while returning to see them back with their pack- bullocks to Karnal again. But after a time this source also dried up, either because there was no grain to sell, or more probably because the Afghans had recovered their posts like Kunjpura and Karnal in the north. Abdali was fur- nished, some time in the second week of December, with fresh troops from Afghanistan to the extent of eight thousand. Atai Khan was their leader. Before joining Abdali, he seems to have followed not the direct route to Pani- pat, but the safer route across the Jamuna by the Budhia or the Andhera Ghat north and south of Kunjpura. Before entering the Doab, he could not but have driven out the small Maratha out posts at Karnal and Kunjpura with the help of his splendid troops. Diler Khan, the only son of Nejabat Khan, left

³⁵ Shinde 1.229 ³⁶ Raj. 1.231. 333 ³⁷ Battle of Panipat 19^6 p. 21 ³⁸ Bhau Bakhar p 132. Kaifyat p. 21

TO FACE PAGE 72 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 31ST DEC 1760 TO 14TH JAN 1761 SCALE N SHAH NAHAR OR JUMNA CANAL PANIPAT JUMNA RIVER GOELA KALĀN GOELA KHURD M. G. BARTAKKE

PANIPAT 73 free, now recovered Kunjpura with Atai Khan's help and made it impossible for the caravans to move on that side Added to this, fire started, either pur- posely or by random cannon shot, and destroyed the big haystacks heaped in the Maratha camp 39 This misfortune turned the situation from bad to worse and finally into utter helplessness As a result of this mishap, twenty thousand followers issued from the Maratha camp one night to gather firewood and fodder in the neighbouring woods, but they were overtaken, surrounded and massacred piece-meal by a body of five thousand horse under Shah Pasand Khan who was patrolling that area After this slaughter, terror struck the Maratha camp and nobody seems to have ventured out In the terrible cold of December and January, the Marathas, with their scanty clothing meant only for the cold in the Deccan, suffered terribly in addition to the want of sufficient quantities of good food and firewood As if this was not enough, it rained heavily that winter, generating biting winds in their wake 40 Thousands of bullocks, horses, mules and even men died of this calamity The unburied animals and corpses on the intervening battle field putrified the air 41 The crowded camp where within a small area men had to perform all their physical duties made it terribly dirty and full of noxious air Nana Fadnis vividly describes these conditions in his auto- biography Such was the condition of the Maratha camp and the state of the men and animals who were to offer battle to the strong, stalwart, efficient and un- perturbed Afghans who were well supplied with necessities and fully inured to these climes and circumstances As we have said above, we are completely in the dark as to Bhau's aim in not sallying out for battle three weeks earlier when he received the news of Govindpant's death Such a step would have appreciably reduced the suf ferings which the Maratha camp had to endure in the last period The men and animals would have been found in better condition for a march or a fight, before their reduction by starvation and misery for three weeks more Even their morale would have been found better and still Bhau would not take such a step A casual remark in the Bakhar (p 136) also supports the view that "had the Marathas started the next day after the heavy massacre of the Ruhelas in the intervening daily fights, the Afghans had no strength then to overpower the Marathas" "But," so remarks the chronicler, "the fate had ordained otherwise and so the Marathas remained inactive, carrying on the waiting game!" We do not know whether this was a case of fortune first taking away the wit and then striking hard afterwards Our wonder increases still more when we find the chronicles reporting the discussion in the Maratha camp previous to the battle While Bhau, judging that the army could not pull on even for a day more, wanted to offer battle the next day, Malharrao and Janakoji were proposing to postpone the 39 RAJ 6 406 40 Sardesai Commemoration Volume p 259 41 BDCRI 4 181

event by four days 42 If their argument has any sense in it, we must think the state of the Maratha camp not as bad as it is depicted, otherwise how could they have waited for four days more? Their confidence is curiously found sup- ported by a rare letter of Janakoji, written only ten days prior to the battle, and reaching its destination without being intercepted by Abdali's patrols 43 He does not betray any sign of fear or hopelessness He assures his revenue collector not to be troubled at the local pin pricks of the Rajput princes, as after the chief enemy (Abdali) is defeated, others will fall in the line with- out effort As we have said elsewhere, the tone of the men who escaped from the battle field was different from their own earlier writing They charged Bhau with being obstinate, not listening to milder and saner counsels, and casting his last die thoughtlessly and in a haphazard manner We take these to be afterthoughts only Had there been not even a thirty per cent chance of bettering their position—and not the hope of defeating Abdali decisively—how the Maratha chieftains could have consented to march out with a hollow square formation, we are not able to comprehend Let it not be forgotten also that notwithstanding the starvation of the Maratha camp, the Marathas were able to charge so effectively in the forenoon part of the battle that they seemed to carry everything before them On this central point, all the authorities on the battle are unanimous This clearly proves that but for some serious disobedience of orders issued after the final decision before the start, or for the sudden demoralisation due to Vishwasrao being shot down, there would not have been that debacle and that stampede which actually took place even to the dismay of such on lookers as Kashiraj and other reporters of the battle We have thought it necessary to put down all these facts before the description of the actual battle, because up till now it has been treated by his- torians in a faulty, not to say malignant, manner According to the chronicles, the rank and file of the Maratha army, perturbed at the prospect and desperate on account of starvation, proceeded to the tent of Bhau and besought him not to allow them to die of starvation and disease but to lead them to the battle, whatever be the destiny awaiting them We have said already that Bhau should have anticipated such a clamour and forestalled it with some continuous preparation spread over a number of days All the men, high and low, combatants and non combatants, in the Maratha camp, should have been completely made aware and tutored of their re- sponsibility and actual part in the battle which was to ensue Clear instruc- tions about the methods of self-protection in the event of a sudden disaster— we do not think inevitable and certain—ought to have been circulated Nana Fadnis says in his autobiography that Bhau had anticipated all possibilities in the conduct of war and provided for them as best he could, and we do not think that Bhau could have failed to take these obvious precautions, consum- mate master of affairs as he was The divergence in the military counsels of the Maratha chiefs was the basic cause for the opposite manner of acting on the 42 Kaifiyat 0.21 Bakhar 0 141 43 Shinde 1.222

PANIPAT 75 field of battle. But that was no fault of Bhau, but a national misfortune. All the various units and classes in the vast Maratha camp spread over miles were not equally affected by the dearth of grain or money, and that seems to be the reason why some still wanted, and thought it possible, to wait, while others less fortunate had reached the sinking point. Ultimately the clamour of the starved decided the day of the battle and not the convenience or forethought of the commander! This was a calamity, but perhaps there was no help for it. In any case, had the battle been fought a fortnight earlier, it would have been better in all respects, for the Marathas. The actual plan decided and adopted by Bhau in consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi and others was, however, made possible by Abdali's change of camp-site and could not have been devised prior to 30th December, 1760. A battle before that date would have been only a frontal attack or a march with a hollow-square formation liable to be disturbed on the flanks which is the weakest point in such a formation. The direction would have been from north to south and not north-west to south-east. The plan envisaged by Kashiraj and put down in a memory drawing of the field of battle, is cor- rect as far as it goes. Only the direction of the Maratha front he was un- able to make out. Kashiraj mistook the longer side of the rectangle on the right-hand side for a front, because guns had been judiciously placed on that side also, and these were pointed towards the Abdali front. The strategy was to march past the right-hand corner of Abdali's camp to the river side with the whole formation, so as to take the river at the back in the evening and then to meet the Afghan army from the right-hand side, which would then become the battle-front. The advantage in this move would have been that the camp-followers would have remained always safe at the back and would have found it possible to run away to the south towards Delhi or to the east across the Jamuna into the Doab in case of a defeat. Had the plan succeeded, the major battle would have come not on the day of the start but on the days following. This would have given double advantage to the Marathas. They would have found the much needed rest, as also time to refresh and recoup at night, and would have been attacking the Afghans on their flank, thus ex- posing their camp to loot. But the hollow square formation with a long rectangular side made up of mutually antagonistic generals was at best a precarious device, as was proved to their cost the next day. THE TRANS-GANGES RAIDS OF THE MARATHAS DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN At the beginning of July 1760, Shuja-ud-daulah finally made up his mind and went over to Abdali's side. From that date Sadashivrao Bhau began writing his letters to Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar and Gopalrao Bapuji, to foment rebellions in Shuja's dominions beyond the Ganges, and raid them. Many of the big zamindars un- der Shuja were small chieftains themselves with armies made up of their per- sonal retainers. Balawant Singh of Benares was the biggest and the most refractory amongst them, though there were others like Balabhadrasingh of

76 PANIPAT. 1761 Tiloi and Hindupat of Pratapgarh In fact, the times and the surroundings were such that no potentate could be taken as fully established and free from internal rebellions Shuja had placed Veni Bahadur with full powers in charge of his dominions during his absence in Abdali's camp The major portion of Shuja's troops he kept behind him for guarding his dominions, fully knowing the risks to which his dominions would be exposed once he antag- onised the Marathas In fact, his direct help to Abdali was his fine park of artillery and the moral prestige of his name only Sadashivrao Bhau appears from his letters to be unaware of this important fact Shuja's troops are found estimated at 20,000 at the beginning of July, but how many of these he took with him to Abdali's camp is doubtful, as none seem to give very reliable figures But if we take Kashiraj's figures as correct, Shuja had at Panipat 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 20 guns with him, thus leaving 16,000 to guard his dominions All these troops were well disciplined and well equipped They were engaged on a permanent footing and very well paid with the re- sult that they had no cause to grumble and go against their master This was possible because Shuja possessed the most fertile lands in India and he could collect his revenues without any hitch The only possible loop hole in Shuja's dominions was the danger from his big zamindars who were always ready to rebel and would have liked to become independent When Bhau is found ordering Govindpant to invade the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges and Gopalrao Barve to attack Shuja's dominions, he seems to be talking of something which he could not understand Abdali had sent many of the Ruhelas back to their homes during the rains to lessen the pressure on his scanty supplies of grain and possibly with a view to protect their province, thus making it impossible for Govindpant to move in the matter Govindpant occupied Ahmad Khan Bangash's lands in Farukhabad adjoining his, because these were on his side of the Ganges But beyond the river he could not go Similarly, Gopalrao found it impossible to move in the face of Veni Bahadur guarding the Ganges in full force The combined troops of the Marathas under all their captains in this region, are found estimated at only ten to twelve thousand troops Many of these were possibly infantry corps only, and not very well disciplined They were fit for collecting revenues from refractory zamindars hiding in their fortalices, but not fit to face regular troops under Veni Bahadur The rainy season passed in mere manœuvring without any actual invasion In the mid- dle of November, Govindpant turned towards Delhi on account of Bhau's ex- press orders, with his contingent of some 5,000 troops, and only Gopalrao Barve was left behind in the lower Doab, facing Shuja's dominions Sadashivrao had ordered Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar to join his forces with those of Barve, but he does not seem to have crossed the Jamuna from the south at all Be- sides, Shuja's wise mother and Veni Bahadur had by this time quelled the rebel- lions of the zamindars and brought them over to their side by lavish expen- diture on them Gopalrao had written to Bhau in his letter of 22nd November, 1760 that he was presently crossing over into Oudh, actually he was unable to cross before 30th December, 1760, as a part of his army had been sent to Govindpant's help under Bajirao Barve, Ramchandra Krishna and Ghanashyam Pandurang, which he was expecting back But Bhau could not spare these

PANIPAT 77

troops, and so Barve engaged new troops. Ganesh Sambhaji kept on writing that he would come after settling matters in Bundelkhand. Finally, Barve crossed with his new troops and matchlockmen, about 10,000 strong. After crossing, he kept 5,000 infantry for guarding the ghats on the Ganges at his back, and with 5,000 matchlockmen and 1,500 sowars he began his campaign. A thousand horsemen joined him from the lower Doab. With these he at- tacked Bhojpur (sixteen miles to the north-west of Dalmau higher up the Ganges) which was defended by the Ruhelas by forming a square in the European way. But the impetuous attack of the Maratha cavalry broke their formation and they ran back into their fortalice. In this action, the Marathas killed some fifty matchlockmen, ten horsemen and captured the enemy's flags, themselves losing three horses and one trooper with seven wounded. Next day, the Ruhelas were pursued into the neighbouring thicket where they had taken shelter near the village of Dhuremau, five miles to the north-east of Bhojpur, by the fortalice. When attacked, they again ran away after a little skirmish in which the Marathas captured five horses, losing two of their own. Gopal- rao next proceeded to the important fort of Dalmau, which was built on the bank of the river on a prominent hillock. The Marathas first attacked the town adjoining the fort when Haji Beg, the Commandant of the fort, sallied forth two miles with two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, con- sisting of Ruhelas. The attacking Marathas pressed them back into the fort after losing ten horsemen killed and twenty-five wounded. Two hundred enemy Ruhelas were cut off and their fifty horses were killed. The Marathas cap- tured seventy-five horses with the iron drum. The whole town was looted and the Marathas began their march forward, because, had they laid siege to the fort, they would have had to sit there for a long time. Their next camp was at the village of Gaura, on the road to Rai Bareli on the 8th of January, 1761. In this campaign, Balabhadrasingh accompanied Barve, and later on Krishna- nand Pant, Faujdar of Karra, joined them near Manikpur in the Pratapgarh district. Many local Rajput landlords joined them with their retainers so as to take part in the loot, if possible. They carried fire and sword throughout the region till they reached Nawabganj, ten miles north-west of Allahabad, to which they set fire after looting it. Next they proceeded to Fulpura to the north-east of Allahabad, and there repeated their performance. Thus, after they had carried their depredations for more than a hundred miles along the northern bank of the Ganges, retribution descended upon them from behind. Veni Bahadur had sent a strong army at their heels, coming into contact with which the rabble, collected in the Maratha camp, broke at once and zamindars, like Balbhadrasingh, who had joined for loot, fled back. The Maratha army under Gopalrao was dispersed and they ran back in small parties by different roads. Gopalrao personally crossed back with some seven horsemen into the Mirzapur district near the famous temple of Vindhyavasini, and then, taking a westerly route along the southern bank of the Jamuna, returned to his seat at Korah-Jahanabad in the Doab. All his broken troops also returned with- out much mishap. These events took place between 10th to 20th January, 1761. This campaign did not start at the beginning of December as taken

78 PANIPAT: 1761 by Sir Jadunath,⁴⁴ but at the end on 30th December,⁴⁵ and ended within three weeks Bhau had expected this raid into Shuja's territory to have the effect of diverting his forces from Panipat, but it could not have had that effect be- cause the campaign began very late, and ended simultaneously with the battle of Panipat In joining Abdali, Shuja had insured against any possible attack by Abdali and his allies, the Ruhelas, but had not neglected the defence of his dominion either Bhau's information on these points seems to be de- fective Miscalculation of enemy forces and over-confidence in his own troops led Bhau astray in the whole Panipat campaign From the dates of the let- ters giving the news of the campaign, it cannot be said that the rout of Barve's army took place after the news of the Panipat disaster had reached him, or was an outcome of it It seems, however, that Barve could not rally his dis- persed troops to another effort because, by that time, the news had definitely reached him

I PANIPAT LOCALITY The Panipat locality did not prove favourable to the Marathas on ac- count of its being nearer to the home-land of the Ruhelas Panipat itself was —and is—practically a Muslim town and the areas to its east had a larger proportion of Muslim population when compared to the southern tracts of the United Provinces The road from Panipat to Kairana, Shamli and Muzaf- farnagar across the Jamuna farther on, leads to Sukartal, the stronghold of Najib Khan on the Ganges, and crossing the Ganges to the actual home-land of the Ruhelas, in a straight line In fact it looks as if any place south of Delhi would have been a better locality for the Marathas and worse for the Ruhelas Their food supply was assured with the least inconvenience to them Suraj- mal Jat's advice was correct on this point, because he knew the local human environment. Bhau's original plan of crossing over into the Doab in the vicinity of Agra was correct, but, on account of procrastination, it was spoiled, and the campaign was unnecessarily lengthened by the four months of the rainy season This had a disastrous effect from the financial, physical and moral point of view Shuja would not have gone over to Abdali had Bhau placed himself between Abdali and Shuja's dominions The miscarriage of that project was the first set-back in the Panipat campaign Shakir Khan Ansari's description¹ of the sad condition of Panipat under Maratha occupation must be true as far as it goes That the Marathas must have felled all the trees in the vicinity irrespective of any consideration for the fruit-trees in the gardens, appears true when we take into account the neces- sities of the Maratha camp, military as well as personal Many houses in the city were inevitably demolished by cannon-balls and their residents had to shift to other places The wonder is not that such things occurred, but that the Marathas had left the inhabitants comparatively free without imposing any conditions on them. Most of the inhabitants were allowed to remain where 44 Fall 2.313 45 Ait Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda 3, No 263 1 Fall 2.309

PANIPAT 79 they were and carry on their lives as best as they could under the circumstances We believe that the presence of such a hostile element at their back must have helped the Afghan side much in various ways Spying and sending news dis closing the Maratha position was easy for this population. Besides these, the two sons of Nejabat Khan Ruhela of Kunjpura were captives in the Maratha camp What happened to them is nowhere recorded, and there is no ground for thinking that they were beheaded. Perhaps, in the turmoil just after the defeat, they might have freed themselves and joined the populace in destroying the Maratha camp followers in revenge That the Marathas had not destroyed any edifice wantonly is clear from the undamaged condition of the splendid tombs of the Saint Bu Ali Qalandar and Ibrahim Lodi with the ancient mosques adjoining. This is a clear proof of the mildness of Maratha rule even under the stress of war Their civil manners and inoffensive attitude have cost the Marathas not a little in history. That Bhau, in his Panipat campaign, created a tremendous impression in the Panipat locality is clear from many legends about Bhau, Parvatibai, Janakoji Shinde and Vishwasrao. The Bhau ballad current in the surround- ing area, and still sung by itinerant Jogis, Muslim and Hindu, is a living proof of the impress so created, and this was natural. The camping of lakhs of men in the locality for about three months was a thing that had never before oc- curred even in those war-like times. The earlier battles in the Panipat-Karnal- Thanesar locality had been bloody and decisive from the political point of view, no doubt, but they were never fought to the last in the proper sense of the word, nor was there such a massacre of camp followers after the event The result is seen in the creation of legends. The Jogi, who copied the Bhau ballad for us (published in the Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Insti- tute, 4.3 of 1943), does not record Bhau's death, following in this respect the Maratha chronicles, and says that he went to the village of Bhaopur, some twelve miles to the south-west of Panipat. There he lived for a long time with a Fakir, evidently incognito, hiding his identity. Thence he went to Kairana across the Jamuna after some years, his further life being not known to the men in the Panipat locality. That Bhau did not die on the battle field and lived long afterwards became the traditional belief throughout India, giving rise to imposters who gave themselves out as the real Bhau, and created politi- cal problems adversely affecting the Maratha history. We think that the bal- lad singer's account of Bhau living in Bhaopur is a transparent attempt to con- nect the already existing village of Bhaopur (founded and named after some Bhaosingh, a name common in the locality) with the name of Bhau, the Mara- tha general Such a legend is recorded about another place in the Muzaffar- nagar Gazetteer on page 9 (1920, Reprint) of the U P Series: "The Jamuna in the extreme north of the district appears to occupy much the same place as formerly, and on the south also, it washes the high mound on which stood a Maratha fort still connected with the name of Sadasheo Bhau It may fur- ther be safely conjectured that the channel of the river has not changed much at this point since Panipat Between these two extreme points, however, the bed of the river is tortuous and uncertain" We have seen the mound ourselves near the village of Isapur on which now stands not a fort but a bairagi's ashrama

80 PANIPAT 1761 and a temple of his household gods, but there was no trace of the fort at least in 1935—nor was the fact of its previous existence known to the in- habitants there. The Gazetteer writer, we take it, must have copied the infor- mation from some local report, or the description given by some previous traveller in the locality. As the mound in question is a prominent object in that low-lying river basin, it could have been very effectively used militarily by placing long-range guns on it and guarding or attacking the passage of the Jamuna near that point. As Ahmad Shah Abdali had moved his camp along the river front just opposite to this mound on the other side of it during the second stage of the Panipat beleaguerment, the military use of such a promi- nent height is not an impossibility. But the idea of the Marathas making use of it during the Panipat beleaguerment presupposes that the Maratha line of communication into the Doab was intact during the earlier part of the Panipat siege, or alternately, the Maratha contingents detached by Bhau for cutting off Abdali's line of supply through the Doab, had approached up to this point, though there is very little likelihood of such a thing happening. As the data on which the Gazetteer writer based his statement are not before us, it is not pos- sible for us now to decide the point. II WAS THE IMPERIAL CANAL TO THE WEST OF PANIPAT FLOWING DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN? Most of the historians, depending upon the information supplied by such sources as Gazetteers whose information is not historically sifted, have taken the Imperial Canal as having stopped flowing eighty years before 1820, when it was again repaired by the British. Imp. Gaz. Vol. XIV, p. 234 (1908), under the heading "Jumna Canal (Western)," supplies the information that there were ancient bridges over the canal at Karnal and Safidon and that the Delhi branch ceased to flow sometime during 1753 to 1760. This informa- tion the Gazetteer has copied from the Persian chronicles, giving an account of the civil war between the Emperor Ahmad Shah and his Wazir Safdar Jang. The canal formed the property of the Wazir and with a view to stopping his income from that source, the canal was broken up by his enemies. But what has been overlooked by the Gazetteer has been now brought to light by the deep researches of Dr. T. G. P. SPEAR of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Writ- ing in the Journal of Indian History (Vol. XIX, Pt. III, No. 57, p. 326, Dec. 1940), he says that the canal was broken up in 1754 in the civil war no doubt,* but was repaired by Ahmad Shah. But thereafter sometime, somehow, it was neglected. Taking into consideration the position of Bhau's camp, the major portion of which was situated to the north-west of Panipat, and the descrip- tion found in the local Bhau ballad,¹ which supplies the information that Bhau's 700 elephants were stationed at the village of Gharaunda, ten miles to the north of Panipat, we assume that the canal was definitely flowing during this period. For elephants require a copious water supply which would be available only in a place like the bank of a river or a flowing canal. That it was flowing can also be guessed from the fact of the mention of the sojourn of ¹ BDCRI 4.173.

PANIPAT 81

the various conquerors in the Shalimar Garden (which depended upon the canal water) to the north-west of Delhi Raghunathrao Peshwa lived there in 1754,² Ahmad Shah Abdalı in 1756-7,³ and Sadashivrao Bhau in September, 1760⁴ They would not have preferred the place unless a copious supply of water was available in the vicinity for a big army We think this to be sufficient proof for taking the canal as flowing during this campaign When Ahmad Shah succeeded in terrorizing the Maratha troops into huddling themselves in the cramped camp at Panipat during the last fortnight before the great bat- tle, the Marathas seem to have lost their access to the canal water to the west of their camp, for Kashıraj says that Ahmad Shah was able to make a circuit round the Maratha camp from a distance, which we think to be correct for the last fortnight only On account of this, the Maratha army seems to have suffered terribly for want of water, in addition to want of food This fact is found mentioned only in the ballad published by us in the Deccan College Bul- letin Vol IV, p 184 If their access to the canal water was not cut off, we think the canal to have been cut higher up in the vicinity of Karnal or Kunj- pura at the head of the canal The ground for such supposition rests on the fact of the reconquest⁵ of Kunjpura by the Afghans during the Panipat siege For the first month and a half, the Marathas were receiving their food supply from the vicinity of Karnal on account of their friendship with Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, but a new army from Afghanistan under Atai Khan came along that route to the help of Ahmad Shah early in December Dılir Khan Ruhela made common cause with these new Afghan troops and took back Kunjpura from its small Maratha garrison, thus closing the Maratha supply from that side Taking into consideration the Afghan tactics it is not unlikely that he might have cut the canal at the head after this event so as to cut the water supply of the Maratha camp at Ahmad Shah's behest Lest it be forgotten, it should be noted that the old Imperial Canal was flowing in those days along a different channel than the present New Delhi branch of the western Jamuna canal It began lower down on the river Jamuna to the north of Kunjpura It flowed to the east of Karnal and not to the west as at present Then it did not take a loop to the west before com- ing to Panipat as at present, but flowed parallel to the west of the Imperial Road at a distance of three or four miles Dr SPEAR in his article referred to above, page 327, supplies the following information "The canal on its old alignment ran along a depression in the apparently flat Jamuna plain In some places the bed of the canal was above the level of the land at a great seepage, and waterlogging was the result The distance between Panipat and Karnal suffered most from this fact" (P 328) 'Then the alignment was altered to correspond with the lie of the land, and it now sweeps in a great curve from Karnal to Panipat " This discussion should convince the reader that the old canal—Shah Nahar—was flowing along to the west of Panipat at a distance of some three to four miles during the Panipat campaign

² SPD 27 74 ³ Ibid 21 106. ⁴ RAJ 6 404 ⁵ Fall 2.307

82 PANIPAT 1761 III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif- ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com- mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude, Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane, Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare. This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at 75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini- wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest, it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard, and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at 70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti- mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of 14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³ 1 Purandare 1.337 2 SPD. 21.193 3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97

PANIPAT 83 (1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani- pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse, 15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000 Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only, this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec- can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor- tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ- ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶ of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor- rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government 4 Raj 6 406 5 Ibid. 1 406. 6 Fall 2.287

84 PANIPAT: 1761 paid soldiers and camp-followers or irregulars. The figures given by Shamlu and others are inflated because they include all the camp-followers also. An average of four camp-followers for each professional soldier would make a fair estimate⁷ of persons gathered in the two camps, and on that basis it looks as if each camp had two and a half lakhs of people in it. The Maratha camp had many pilgrims also in its entourage. Some sardars had brought their fam- ilies for this very purpose with them, so as to facilitate their travel in comfort and safety. Many priests had gathered in the camp from Benares and Prayag with the hope of getting good fees and alms by plying their trade. Many can- didate clerks had joined with the hope of getting some temporary work or civil appointment in the newly conquered territories. This was almost a normal and permanent camp-following class in the Maratha armies ever since the days of Shivaji, as is attested by Martin, the French Governor of Pondicherry. In- cidentally it shows the nature of the Maratha camp. The chartered bazar accompanying the army supplied all the needs of the people in it. People felt “so little danger in following their camp that life in camp is spent as happily there as in towns.” (MALET’S Memoranda Relative to the Maratha Army at Kharda, Maratha-Nizam Relations, No. 202, p. 272.) Major DIROM writes that the Maratha army on march “resembles more the emigration of a nation guarded by its troops than the march of an army only to subdue an enemy.”⁸ The women camp-followers in the Maratha army were a necessary element for doing certain duties which men thought it derogatory to perform in those days. Cooking their food and cleaning the vessels could be done by males, but grind- ing the corn was thought to be an exclusive duty of the female sex, for per- forming which a number of them accompanied the army. It is difficult to estimate the number of females in the Maratha army, but we think there were some 20,000 all told. Most of these were slaves of their masters, who served in various capacities and also as concubines. Very few married women had accompanied their husbands in this long-drawn-out campaign. Because Bhau, Balvantrao Mehendale, Nana Fadnis and possibly a few others had taken their wives with them, a wrong impression is formed about the total number of such women accompanying the army. Mirat-i-Ahmadi states that 12,000 women in good position among whom 700 travelled in palkis, were taken prison- ers.⁹ We think this statement a gross exaggeration. There could not be more than 100 women carried in litters, nor could the 12,000 women belong to the married class. A few other sardars had also taken their women-folk with them, no doubt, for pilgrimage along the route, but their number was not more than a few hundred at the most.¹⁰ The rest of the women belonged to the slave- concubine class. Nuruddin Hasan’s mention of “handsome Brahman women” being sold after the defeat can only be treated as a figment of the brain, and as to the “rose-limbed slave girls” mentioned by Sir Jadunath,¹¹ their number could be infinitesimally small, if such were to be found there at all. Had the 7 Dirom p. 242. 8 Dirom p. 243. 9 Sardesai Commemoration Volume (English) p. 260 10 Purandare 3.209. 11 Fall 2.348.