पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

78 PANIPAT: 1761 by Sir Jadunath,⁴⁴ but at the end on 30th December,⁴⁵ and ended within three weeks Bhau had expected this raid into Shuja's territory to have the effect of diverting his forces from Panipat, but it could not have had that effect be- cause the campaign began very late, and ended simultaneously with the battle of Panipat In joining Abdali, Shuja had insured against any possible attack by Abdali and his allies, the Ruhelas, but had not neglected the defence of his dominion either Bhau's information on these points seems to be de- fective Miscalculation of enemy forces and over-confidence in his own troops led Bhau astray in the whole Panipat campaign From the dates of the let- ters giving the news of the campaign, it cannot be said that the rout of Barve's army took place after the news of the Panipat disaster had reached him, or was an outcome of it It seems, however, that Barve could not rally his dis- persed troops to another effort because, by that time, the news had definitely reached him

I PANIPAT LOCALITY The Panipat locality did not prove favourable to the Marathas on ac- count of its being nearer to the home-land of the Ruhelas Panipat itself was —and is—practically a Muslim town and the areas to its east had a larger proportion of Muslim population when compared to the southern tracts of the United Provinces The road from Panipat to Kairana, Shamli and Muzaf- farnagar across the Jamuna farther on, leads to Sukartal, the stronghold of Najib Khan on the Ganges, and crossing the Ganges to the actual home-land of the Ruhelas, in a straight line In fact it looks as if any place south of Delhi would have been a better locality for the Marathas and worse for the Ruhelas Their food supply was assured with the least inconvenience to them Suraj- mal Jat's advice was correct on this point, because he knew the local human environment. Bhau's original plan of crossing over into the Doab in the vicinity of Agra was correct, but, on account of procrastination, it was spoiled, and the campaign was unnecessarily lengthened by the four months of the rainy season This had a disastrous effect from the financial, physical and moral point of view Shuja would not have gone over to Abdali had Bhau placed himself between Abdali and Shuja's dominions The miscarriage of that project was the first set-back in the Panipat campaign Shakir Khan Ansari's description¹ of the sad condition of Panipat under Maratha occupation must be true as far as it goes That the Marathas must have felled all the trees in the vicinity irrespective of any consideration for the fruit-trees in the gardens, appears true when we take into account the neces- sities of the Maratha camp, military as well as personal Many houses in the city were inevitably demolished by cannon-balls and their residents had to shift to other places The wonder is not that such things occurred, but that the Marathas had left the inhabitants comparatively free without imposing any conditions on them. Most of the inhabitants were allowed to remain where 44 Fall 2.313 45 Ait Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda 3, No 263 1 Fall 2.309

PANIPAT 79 they were and carry on their lives as best as they could under the circumstances We believe that the presence of such a hostile element at their back must have helped the Afghan side much in various ways Spying and sending news dis closing the Maratha position was easy for this population. Besides these, the two sons of Nejabat Khan Ruhela of Kunjpura were captives in the Maratha camp What happened to them is nowhere recorded, and there is no ground for thinking that they were beheaded. Perhaps, in the turmoil just after the defeat, they might have freed themselves and joined the populace in destroying the Maratha camp followers in revenge That the Marathas had not destroyed any edifice wantonly is clear from the undamaged condition of the splendid tombs of the Saint Bu Ali Qalandar and Ibrahim Lodi with the ancient mosques adjoining. This is a clear proof of the mildness of Maratha rule even under the stress of war Their civil manners and inoffensive attitude have cost the Marathas not a little in history. That Bhau, in his Panipat campaign, created a tremendous impression in the Panipat locality is clear from many legends about Bhau, Parvatibai, Janakoji Shinde and Vishwasrao. The Bhau ballad current in the surround- ing area, and still sung by itinerant Jogis, Muslim and Hindu, is a living proof of the impress so created, and this was natural. The camping of lakhs of men in the locality for about three months was a thing that had never before oc- curred even in those war-like times. The earlier battles in the Panipat-Karnal- Thanesar locality had been bloody and decisive from the political point of view, no doubt, but they were never fought to the last in the proper sense of the word, nor was there such a massacre of camp followers after the event The result is seen in the creation of legends. The Jogi, who copied the Bhau ballad for us (published in the Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Insti- tute, 4.3 of 1943), does not record Bhau's death, following in this respect the Maratha chronicles, and says that he went to the village of Bhaopur, some twelve miles to the south-west of Panipat. There he lived for a long time with a Fakir, evidently incognito, hiding his identity. Thence he went to Kairana across the Jamuna after some years, his further life being not known to the men in the Panipat locality. That Bhau did not die on the battle field and lived long afterwards became the traditional belief throughout India, giving rise to imposters who gave themselves out as the real Bhau, and created politi- cal problems adversely affecting the Maratha history. We think that the bal- lad singer's account of Bhau living in Bhaopur is a transparent attempt to con- nect the already existing village of Bhaopur (founded and named after some Bhaosingh, a name common in the locality) with the name of Bhau, the Mara- tha general Such a legend is recorded about another place in the Muzaffar- nagar Gazetteer on page 9 (1920, Reprint) of the U P Series: "The Jamuna in the extreme north of the district appears to occupy much the same place as formerly, and on the south also, it washes the high mound on which stood a Maratha fort still connected with the name of Sadasheo Bhau It may fur- ther be safely conjectured that the channel of the river has not changed much at this point since Panipat Between these two extreme points, however, the bed of the river is tortuous and uncertain" We have seen the mound ourselves near the village of Isapur on which now stands not a fort but a bairagi's ashrama

80 PANIPAT 1761 and a temple of his household gods, but there was no trace of the fort at least in 1935—nor was the fact of its previous existence known to the in- habitants there. The Gazetteer writer, we take it, must have copied the infor- mation from some local report, or the description given by some previous traveller in the locality. As the mound in question is a prominent object in that low-lying river basin, it could have been very effectively used militarily by placing long-range guns on it and guarding or attacking the passage of the Jamuna near that point. As Ahmad Shah Abdali had moved his camp along the river front just opposite to this mound on the other side of it during the second stage of the Panipat beleaguerment, the military use of such a promi- nent height is not an impossibility. But the idea of the Marathas making use of it during the Panipat beleaguerment presupposes that the Maratha line of communication into the Doab was intact during the earlier part of the Panipat siege, or alternately, the Maratha contingents detached by Bhau for cutting off Abdali's line of supply through the Doab, had approached up to this point, though there is very little likelihood of such a thing happening. As the data on which the Gazetteer writer based his statement are not before us, it is not pos- sible for us now to decide the point. II WAS THE IMPERIAL CANAL TO THE WEST OF PANIPAT FLOWING DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN? Most of the historians, depending upon the information supplied by such sources as Gazetteers whose information is not historically sifted, have taken the Imperial Canal as having stopped flowing eighty years before 1820, when it was again repaired by the British. Imp. Gaz. Vol. XIV, p. 234 (1908), under the heading "Jumna Canal (Western)," supplies the information that there were ancient bridges over the canal at Karnal and Safidon and that the Delhi branch ceased to flow sometime during 1753 to 1760. This informa- tion the Gazetteer has copied from the Persian chronicles, giving an account of the civil war between the Emperor Ahmad Shah and his Wazir Safdar Jang. The canal formed the property of the Wazir and with a view to stopping his income from that source, the canal was broken up by his enemies. But what has been overlooked by the Gazetteer has been now brought to light by the deep researches of Dr. T. G. P. SPEAR of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Writ- ing in the Journal of Indian History (Vol. XIX, Pt. III, No. 57, p. 326, Dec. 1940), he says that the canal was broken up in 1754 in the civil war no doubt,* but was repaired by Ahmad Shah. But thereafter sometime, somehow, it was neglected. Taking into consideration the position of Bhau's camp, the major portion of which was situated to the north-west of Panipat, and the descrip- tion found in the local Bhau ballad,¹ which supplies the information that Bhau's 700 elephants were stationed at the village of Gharaunda, ten miles to the north of Panipat, we assume that the canal was definitely flowing during this period. For elephants require a copious water supply which would be available only in a place like the bank of a river or a flowing canal. That it was flowing can also be guessed from the fact of the mention of the sojourn of ¹ BDCRI 4.173.

PANIPAT 81

the various conquerors in the Shalimar Garden (which depended upon the canal water) to the north-west of Delhi Raghunathrao Peshwa lived there in 1754,² Ahmad Shah Abdalı in 1756-7,³ and Sadashivrao Bhau in September, 1760⁴ They would not have preferred the place unless a copious supply of water was available in the vicinity for a big army We think this to be sufficient proof for taking the canal as flowing during this campaign When Ahmad Shah succeeded in terrorizing the Maratha troops into huddling themselves in the cramped camp at Panipat during the last fortnight before the great bat- tle, the Marathas seem to have lost their access to the canal water to the west of their camp, for Kashıraj says that Ahmad Shah was able to make a circuit round the Maratha camp from a distance, which we think to be correct for the last fortnight only On account of this, the Maratha army seems to have suffered terribly for want of water, in addition to want of food This fact is found mentioned only in the ballad published by us in the Deccan College Bul- letin Vol IV, p 184 If their access to the canal water was not cut off, we think the canal to have been cut higher up in the vicinity of Karnal or Kunj- pura at the head of the canal The ground for such supposition rests on the fact of the reconquest⁵ of Kunjpura by the Afghans during the Panipat siege For the first month and a half, the Marathas were receiving their food supply from the vicinity of Karnal on account of their friendship with Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, but a new army from Afghanistan under Atai Khan came along that route to the help of Ahmad Shah early in December Dılir Khan Ruhela made common cause with these new Afghan troops and took back Kunjpura from its small Maratha garrison, thus closing the Maratha supply from that side Taking into consideration the Afghan tactics it is not unlikely that he might have cut the canal at the head after this event so as to cut the water supply of the Maratha camp at Ahmad Shah's behest Lest it be forgotten, it should be noted that the old Imperial Canal was flowing in those days along a different channel than the present New Delhi branch of the western Jamuna canal It began lower down on the river Jamuna to the north of Kunjpura It flowed to the east of Karnal and not to the west as at present Then it did not take a loop to the west before com- ing to Panipat as at present, but flowed parallel to the west of the Imperial Road at a distance of three or four miles Dr SPEAR in his article referred to above, page 327, supplies the following information "The canal on its old alignment ran along a depression in the apparently flat Jamuna plain In some places the bed of the canal was above the level of the land at a great seepage, and waterlogging was the result The distance between Panipat and Karnal suffered most from this fact" (P 328) 'Then the alignment was altered to correspond with the lie of the land, and it now sweeps in a great curve from Karnal to Panipat " This discussion should convince the reader that the old canal—Shah Nahar—was flowing along to the west of Panipat at a distance of some three to four miles during the Panipat campaign

² SPD 27 74 ³ Ibid 21 106. ⁴ RAJ 6 404 ⁵ Fall 2.307

82 PANIPAT 1761 III ESTIMATE OF THE CONFRONTING ARMIES AT PANIPAT The chief trustworthy authority on the numbers of fighting soldiers engaged in the Panipat campaign is Bhausahebanchi Kafiyat. It never gives inflated figures. When Sadashivrao Bhau came to Sironj in Malwa and halted there for a week in April 1760, the estimated strength of the Maratha cavalry is given as 27,000, besides Ibrahim Khan's trained infantry which is stated to be 10,000. This figure of the chronicle is testified as correct by figures in some contemporary letters. Khare I 14 gives 25,000 cavalry, starting with Bhau from Patdur. The Maratha army under the Peshwa belonged mainly to the Hujrat division i.e. Peshwa's personal cavalry. Khare I 21 gives a slightly dif- ferent estimate. It gives the figure of the Telinga Gardis of Ibrahim Khan at 8,000 and the cavalry at some 33,000 total. This figure was made up of the personal squadrons of Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's son, and the nominal Com- mander-in-Chief of the whole army, the troops of Bhau himself and more than half the troops generally serving under Raghunathrao, who would not lead the campaign himself and remained in the Deccan. The Maratha chiefs of note serving as officers in these regiments were Samsher Bahadar (the Muslim half brother of the Peshwa), Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar, Manaji Paygude, Antaji Manakeshwar, Damaji Gaikwad, Khanderao Raste, Subhanrao Mane, Mahadaji Naik Nimbalkar, Balwantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare. This letter written by Gopalrao Patwardhan, a noted general, estimates the numbers on Abdali's side at 50,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry including the Ruhelas. When the Maratha army had not as yet separated from the main body collected in the Nizam's Dominion, the total strength was estimated at 75,000. Out of this, 10,000 were sent to Karnatak under Visaji Krishna Bini- wale, and 25,000 remained with Raghunathrao to check the Nizam. The rest, it seems, were appointed to accompany Bhau to the north. But out of this number some troops probably remained with the Peshwa as his personal guard, and some others lagged behind or would not go as ordered, thus making the figure which went with Bhau near about 35,000. When this army crossed the Chambal at the beginning of June and joined forces with Shinde and Holkar with the remnants of their broken armies, the total number is estimated at 70,000 to 80,000, including the contingents of Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din.¹ The same letter written on 1st July, 1760, estimates Abdali's side at 60,000 troops, besides the contingent of Shuja-ud-daulah which is esti- mated at 20,000. When estimating the figures engaged in the final battle of 14th January, 1761, we have first to deduct the Maratha casualties in the capture of Delhi at the beginning of August 1760 and the sack of Kunjpura in the middle of October 1760. The Maratha loss before Delhi was only a few hundreds, and before Kunjpura also not much, though the number of wounded was considerable.² In short, we need not take the total losses in these two actions at more than 1,000. In the three considerable battles fought during the two months of beleaguerment at Panipat, the loss of the Maratha side was similarly very small, not going beyond 1,000 dead.³ 1 Purandare 1.337 2 SPD. 21.193 3 Aitihasik Patra Vyavahar 97

PANIPAT 83 (1) Thus, to calculate the figures left for the final action, we shall have to deduct first the Jat-Wazir contingents which left the Marathas at the beginning of September, numbering possibly not more than 5,000 (2) The troops left in charge of Delhi under Naro Shankar estimated at about 7,000 in all⁴ (3) The total loss at Delhi, Kunjpura and the three skirmishes at Pani- pat—3,000, leaving 55,000 out of the combined total estimated at 70,000 near Agra at the beginning of July Out of this also some thousands will have to be deducted for those who died as a result of wounds received in the five actions, as also some disabled on account of serious wounds and starvation Thus we shall not be far off the mark if we say that the Maratha fighting troops at Panipat were 50,000 only A writer from Panipat, writing before the three skirmishes, estimates the Maratha number at 60,000, while he reports Abdali's troops at 40,000 only Perhaps he omits the infantry on Abdali's side, because the word “Fauj” in Marathi is generally used for cavalry only Abdali is said to have received additions to his troops during the Panipat beleagurement estimated at 8,000 Kashiraj's figures given at the beginning before crossing over the Jamuna to Panipat, are 40,000 horse and 40 000 foot, including the troops of Abdali and his allies For Bhau he gives the figures as 55,000 horse, 15,000 foot (including 9,000 Gardis under Ibrahim Khan), besides 15,000 Pendhari horsemen As against this the irregulars on Abdali's side are estimated by Kashiraj at four times the number of the Durrani horsemen on the muster roll of the Shah Even if we take the actual Afghan cavalry at 33,000 only, this estimate would give one lakh and twenty thousand as the figure of ir regulars, which we think very much overestimated It is true that there pos s bly would be more soldiers from amongst the camp followers on Abdali's side than there would be on the Maratha side, on account of the very character of the two peoples and their usual mode of life An average Afghan camp fol lower would be a good horse rider even when he had no horse of his own Similarly, he would be more adept in using arms than possibly an average camp-follower in the Maratha army But it is incorrect to think that none of the camp followers and non combatants following the Maratha army would have horses of their own, we rather think that many of them had the Dec- can ponies with them serving as baggage carriers for their masters Unfor- tunately for the Marathas, most of these ponies seem to have perished of starvation during the beleagurement of Panipat, due to want of fodder, while the irregular horses on Abdali's side were still serviceable Satvoji Jadhav, writ- ing after the battle of Panipat,⁵ definitely says that many a cavalryman had lost his mount before Panipat, and even the rest had become unserviceably weak If we deduct 20 per cent on this account, then Sir Jadunath's estimate⁶ of 40,000 horsemen actually present in the field seems to be a tolerably cor- rect figure, though arrived at in a different manner Kashiraj's estimates of the two armies given in round figures seem to be based on heresay reports, and not on official figures as he would make us believe by his mode of writing His only strong point is that he clearly distinguishes between trained government 4 Raj 6 406 5 Ibid. 1 406. 6 Fall 2.287

84 PANIPAT: 1761 paid soldiers and camp-followers or irregulars. The figures given by Shamlu and others are inflated because they include all the camp-followers also. An average of four camp-followers for each professional soldier would make a fair estimate⁷ of persons gathered in the two camps, and on that basis it looks as if each camp had two and a half lakhs of people in it. The Maratha camp had many pilgrims also in its entourage. Some sardars had brought their fam- ilies for this very purpose with them, so as to facilitate their travel in comfort and safety. Many priests had gathered in the camp from Benares and Prayag with the hope of getting good fees and alms by plying their trade. Many can- didate clerks had joined with the hope of getting some temporary work or civil appointment in the newly conquered territories. This was almost a normal and permanent camp-following class in the Maratha armies ever since the days of Shivaji, as is attested by Martin, the French Governor of Pondicherry. In- cidentally it shows the nature of the Maratha camp. The chartered bazar accompanying the army supplied all the needs of the people in it. People felt “so little danger in following their camp that life in camp is spent as happily there as in towns.” (MALET’S Memoranda Relative to the Maratha Army at Kharda, Maratha-Nizam Relations, No. 202, p. 272.) Major DIROM writes that the Maratha army on march “resembles more the emigration of a nation guarded by its troops than the march of an army only to subdue an enemy.”⁸ The women camp-followers in the Maratha army were a necessary element for doing certain duties which men thought it derogatory to perform in those days. Cooking their food and cleaning the vessels could be done by males, but grind- ing the corn was thought to be an exclusive duty of the female sex, for per- forming which a number of them accompanied the army. It is difficult to estimate the number of females in the Maratha army, but we think there were some 20,000 all told. Most of these were slaves of their masters, who served in various capacities and also as concubines. Very few married women had accompanied their husbands in this long-drawn-out campaign. Because Bhau, Balvantrao Mehendale, Nana Fadnis and possibly a few others had taken their wives with them, a wrong impression is formed about the total number of such women accompanying the army. Mirat-i-Ahmadi states that 12,000 women in good position among whom 700 travelled in palkis, were taken prison- ers.⁹ We think this statement a gross exaggeration. There could not be more than 100 women carried in litters, nor could the 12,000 women belong to the married class. A few other sardars had also taken their women-folk with them, no doubt, for pilgrimage along the route, but their number was not more than a few hundred at the most.¹⁰ The rest of the women belonged to the slave- concubine class. Nuruddin Hasan’s mention of “handsome Brahman women” being sold after the defeat can only be treated as a figment of the brain, and as to the “rose-limbed slave girls” mentioned by Sir Jadunath,¹¹ their number could be infinitesimally small, if such were to be found there at all. Had the 7 Dirom p. 242. 8 Dirom p. 243. 9 Sardesai Commemoration Volume (English) p. 260 10 Purandare 3.209. 11 Fall 2.348.

PANIPAT 85 Peshwa's army been going on after Shivaji's pattern, there would have been no impediment like this in the camp at all. But Shivaji led few campaigns lasting more than a few months at a stretch or far away from the homes. The Peshwa's army was modelled after the Mughal pattern with all its draw- backs, which proved fatal here as they had proved fatal to Aurangzib in his campaigns against the Marathas. IV. IMPERFECT SENSE OF TIME AND DIRECTION Indians of pre-Panipat days had no maps before them to judge properly of the directions of places, etc, and so we have to take their descriptions of events cautiously. Bhau writes "Abdali has come to the south by crossing the Jamuna at Baghpat." Nana Purandare takes Kunjpura as situated on the south bank of the Jamuna. "Panipat lies 40 kosa from Delhi towards the west." With these examples from contemporary documents before us, we have to ac- cept Kashiraj's directions with correct visualisation. Sir Jadunath has bungled in his attempt to connect Kashiraj's translation with the Browne's map of the battle. This is also due to his non-visualisation of the path of the sun during the days of its highest southern declination. A man from the Maratha camp talking of Abdali's position or Kashiraj writing from the Abdali's camp about the Marathas was sure to confuse correct direction during December-January. Kashiraj has naturally taken the Maratha army as facing eastwards and so de- scribed the Afghans facing westwards on the day of the battle. Another thing incorrectly calculated by Sir Jadunath is the hours of the day. The sun rose at Panipat (latitude 29° 23' 30'' North, longitude 76° 58' 30'' East) on 14-1-1761 at 7 A.M. and set at about 5.20 P.M. (local time). The day thus consisted of about 10 hours and 20 minutes and the battle has to be described accordingly. The day was, in lunar calendar, 8th of the bright half of the month. The moon would set about mid-night on such a day and not at 9.15 P.M. as taken by Sir Jadunath. (Vide Fall 2, pp. 369, 346, etc.)

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE

FINALLY, as decided at night, the Maratha army rose in the early hours of Wednesday, the 14th January, 1761, and prepared itself to march out of the beleaguered camp at Panipat. After going through the morning round of physical duties, Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao bathed, worshipped the gods, had a hurried breakfast and then dressed themselves in full armour for the ensuing battle. The whole camp was agog throughout the previous night. They had collected all their little belongings and tied them in bundles to be carried away by securing them to their backs or on the bullocks and other pack animals which had survived. Some carts and other heavy goods, found either difficult to arrange properly or as absolutely unnecessary on the march, were left behind in the camp in order to facilitate the march. With the first call of the trumpets, the whole camp started and arranged itself in marching order as best it could.¹ To the front were placed the heavy cannon, behind it the infantry of Ibrahim Khan followed in triangular formation so as to make the artillery in front, the spear head of the march. To their rear were placed Damaji Gaikawad, Yashwantrao Pawar, Vitthal Shivdeo, Antaji Manakeshwar, Samsher Bahadar and other small units. Then followed Bhau and Vishwas- rao with their personal troops. After them came non combatants and bag- gage. On the right flank of the rear were appointed the Shinde and Holkar contingents. The lighter artillery was placed mainly on the right of the march- ing square, though a few were placed on the left and at the back also, to scare away any surprise attack on those sides. The hollow square thus formed marched out step by step and stood three miles in front of Abdali. Their posi- tion at nine o'clock (local time) was: Ibrahim Khan's infantry in the village of Nimbdi to the south-west of Panipat, Bhausaheb with the centre one mile be- hind him to the north of Ugrakhedi, Malharrao Holkar at the rear directly one mile to the south of Panipat. The non combatants and camp followers were standing between Panipat and Ugrakhedi, their left-hand side reaching the out- skirts of Rajakhedi to the north. The distance between Malharrao Holkar's rearmost contingent and Abdali's left under Shah Pasand Khan was more than three miles, his contingent probably standing in the field to the east of Siwa. The Afghan army when arranged stood roughly in a crescent shaped curved line from Siwa to Chhajpur Khurd. Barkhurdar Khan's Risala was standing there with the nullah at their back. Dunde Khan and Hafiz Rahamat Khan were standing between Chhajpur Kalan and Ujah. Ahmad Shah was somewhere between Risalu and Dhadaula, while Wazir Shah Wali Khan's cavalry stood ready between Risalu and Ujah. Ahmad Shah's baggage and camp were between Dhadaula and Nurpur. Najib ud daulah and Shuja ud

¹ The front originally was spread from Kabuli Bagh to the north-east of Panipat, to Chandani Bagh to the west of it, where Ibrahim Khan's corps were camping. This was the head of the Maratha march in order. The direction it took was to the south-east of Panipat.

[ 86 ]

TO FACE PAGE 87 BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 FIRST STAGE 10 A.M. SCALE

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDIA
3. HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER
4. DAMANJ VITHAL SHIV VYT SHYAT PUJE & ANTAJI MANKESHWAR
5. IBRAHIM GARDJ
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU Foot note — Shah Pasand khan was standing with five thousand troops at the left flank of Abdali's line of battle across the Mughal Road to the northeast of Siwa

daulah were on the plain between Risalu and Siwa. We do not think that the Afghan army was standing in a continuous line along the whole front between Chhajpur and Siwa.² There were gaps between the various contingents which were ordered to the front, though none so wide as to allow a Maratha corps safely to thrust itself between. Najib-ud-daulah had to cover full three miles before he could come into contact with the Shinde division to the west of Ugrakhedi. The army was spread on a front some seven miles in length from Chhajpur Khurd to the west of Siwa The right-hand side of the Maratha square was not more than three miles in length, and spread from Nimbdi to Chandni Bagh (to the east of Panipat) in almost a straight line. The battle began with a cannonade as usual. Within an hour Ibrahim Khan's corps touched the Abdali front at the point where the trans-Ganges Ruhelas were massed in front of the village of Chhajpur Kalan. On the right-hand side of these Ruhelas Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg were stand- ing ready to cover the Maratha flank on that side. Ibrahim Khan ordered two corps to stand in front of them so as to stop their advance with a view to cut off the gunners in front of the corps of Ibrahim Khan. The rest of his in- fantry engaged with the Ruhelas. His quick firing muskets soon began to have their effect on the opposite side. The infantry advanced step by step fighting for each inch of ground, but the heavy siege-guns seem not to have kept up the march and soon lagged behind. This was probably due to the difficulty of dragging them on an uneven ground, and also to the advance of the Ruhela cavalry to cut off the gunners as is usual in this kind of battle. For three hours the combat went on, and the Ruhelas were pressed back with heavy slaughter. Only a few hundred match-lockmen remained with their chiefs Hafiz Rahmat and Dunde Khan. This was the result of the battle at twelve o'clock. But before this the Maratha cavalry, detailed for supporting Ibrahim Khan and standing half a mile at his back, had acted injudiciously, not understanding the kind of battle they were engaged in. In their impetuosity they seem to have acted on their own initiative and broken the marching order absolutely neces- sary when the army is to advance in a square formation. They advanced rapidly at a trotting pace and soon overmarched the infantry corps of Ibrahim Khan. But they met with the sharp fire of the Ruhela infantry and had to run back with broken spirits. Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar then galloped back and stood behind the heavy guns fixed in the ground and pos- sibly chained together so as to obstruct the advance of the enemy cavalry to cut off the gunners. Damaji Gaikawad also met with a similar check from the Durrani cavalry to his left, and he, too, returned back and stood behind as at the beginning. This disobedience of orders was the chief cause of the Pani- pat disaster. Before starting, Bhau had clearly placed his plan before his of- ficers and asked them to march straight without breaking the order by swerving to the right or left. The aim of the march was to gain ground and reach the river Jamuna before evening and not to offer battle. If the enemy would step aside and allow the Marathas to press forward with their whole mass, then the Marathas were not to engage with them at all. Only if and when the ² IHQ 10.259, 60.

THE BATTLE 89 self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the camel-swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it, Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops

88 PANIPAT 1761 enemy would not allow them passage in their march, the cavalry was to charge and press forward, beating the enemy back so as to break their order As at the very beginning this breach of order occurred, it had a disastrous moral ef- fect on the frontal troops The first cause of the break in the ordered march was due to the heaviness of the Maratha guns which, on account of their long range, fired their shots in a faulty manner so as to fall at the back of the enemy Thus their ammunition was wasted without gaining the desired ef- fect of breaking the enemy line of battle and creating a gap in it for the troops to advance Ibrahim Khan had then to cease fire and order his infantry to march with bayonets in their hands to break the enemy line and make a breach The Telinga infantry under Ibrahim Khan was formed of well trained corps with experience of such battles Their resolute advance made the Ruhelas fall back, leaving few soldiers with the chiefs as stated above But in this ef- fort Ibrahim Khan lost half his troops in killed or wounded, and then the preponderating number of Ruhelas began to tell The Ruhelas were in the proportion of three to one of Ibrahim Khan's musketeers Their match locks fired heavier bullets and were even more effective on account of their steady aim due to their long barrels Their range also exceeded that of the com- paratively light muskets of French make used in Ibrahim Khan's infantry If, at this psychological moment of apparent stale mate, the Maratha cavalry had advanced again, galloping to support him, there would have been no further slaughter amongst them, and the battle would have been carried on in the intended order But, as said above, the cavalry ordered for his support had foolishly advanced first, and then coming back stationed themselves behind the chained heavy guns, with their strength exhausted and spirits broken Damaji Gaikawad who was to the left of the Maratha thrust—thus adjoining Barkhurdar Khan's out flanking cavalry—behaved better than Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar He supported the two corps left by Ibrahim Khan to meet the enemy on that side As there was no infantry facing them, they repulsed the Ghilzais on that side as often as they advanced with their scathing fire But Damaji was himself wounded in the action and he also returned to stand in the company of Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar Until now we have said nothing about the Maratha centre under Bhau He was standing to the right of the (middle) centre of the Maratha march Behind him to the left were standing the non combatants and camp followers The attack on Bhau's side seems to have been begun not by Bhau himself but by the Durrani Wazir who advanced farther than the main line, firing his camel swivels manned by Persian bombardiers ³ The Maratha light artillery placed on the right of their march and facing the Durrani line obliquely was gradually receding back from the Durrani line Its fire would not reach the Durrani line at all, except at the front under Ibrahim Khan At nine o'clock the dis- ance between Bhau's right hand side and the Durrani Wazir's front was a mile or so According to the Maratha plan, Bhau would not swerve to his right unless it was attacked by the enemy The Wazir on whom naturally the main responsibility fell and who was stationed at the centre, advanced him ³ MUNDY p. 215 (note)

self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the camel swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it, Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops surrounding Bhau belonged to the select group and were possibly in the best of condition. Working under the eye of the commander in chief himself, and themselves possessing a high sense of duty with patriotic fervour for the name of the Marathas, they came sweeping down and would not stop even in the face of the sharp fire from the swivel guns. Now a cavalry battle fought with lance and sword on the Maratha side and musketry and archery on the other side began in good earnest. It is certain that the Afghan cavalry under Ahmad Shah had more musketeers, match lockmen and archers amongst them than were to be found in the Maratha army.⁴ Each Maratha of note had possibly a hand gun by his side but he had neither love for it nor expertness at its use. He pre- ferred lance and spear at a short distance to the clumsy bow and arrow or heavy, long matchlock of those days. 'The fighting was so violent that earth and sky could not be seen and the eye of heaven became dazzled at beholding this spetacle. (Kashiraj.) The Afghan army was composed of 12,000 horse- men and 8,000 foot soldiers, besides 1,000 camel guns. 'The Marathas drank them up like the water of a river.' Atai Khan, the son of the Wazir's paternal uncle, (who had carried the raid against Govindpant Bundele and slaughtered him) was slain. 3,000 Durranis were put to the sword and the rest fled back at the fury of the Maratha charge. Only 200 troops stood surrounding the Grand Wazir with fifty camel guns in his front. He was clad in full armour from head to foot, still dismounting from his horse he sat down on the ground, saying to his followers, "Comrades! Vilayat is far off, whither are you going?" He asked Kashiraj (who himself reports this) to take a message to Shuja ud- daulah that he was dying and that Shuja should come to his aid. Shuja did nothing of the kind, however, excusing himself with the plea that it was not proper to break the line of battle at that stage and thus allow the Marathas a possible chance to pierce past the Afghan line through the gap. As a mat- ter of fact, though Shuja stood ready with all his troops and guns throughout the day, none moved from the Maratha side against him. This clearly shows that the oblique Maratha line never came by itself into direct contact with the Afghan line at the left throughout the main fight, a distance of more than a mile still intervening between the two armies. But though Shuja would not come to the Durrani Wazir's aid, Ahmad Shah was not unaware of his plight. By this time it was twelve noon, and it seemed for a moment at the centre that the Marathas were triumphing. Ahmad Shah who was some three miles to the back, received intelligence of ⁴ Even in 1795 match-lock seemed to be daily gaining ground of the long spear ac- cord ng to MALET. In 1760 it must have been comparatively rare. (Poona Residency Cor- respondence 4.2 0)

90 PANIPAT 1761 the dispersion of his troops from the right flank to the centre As a precau- tionary measure he asked his zenana to mount on horses and camels so as to be ready to run away in case of emergency At the same time he took the stern measure of beating back his run away troops who had now crowded themselves in the Afghan camp He called in his nasaqchs (military provosts) and ordered 500 of them to go to his camp and striking with their axes all the camp followers great and small, drive them back to the battle field caring for nothing else By this method he brought within an hour 8,000 armed men, mostly foot soldiers to fill in the gap created at the back of the trans Ganges Ruhelas The remaining 1,500 military provosts were sent to the battle field with orders to kill every man who ran away from the battle and refuse to return to the charge This order they executed so effectually that after killing a few they compelled the rest to stand in battle array again behind the Grand Wazir's line Ahmad Shah sent some 4,000 fresh troops to reinforce the Wazir from his retinue Thus, within an hour, by one o'clock, 10,000 horsemen stood ready behind the Wazir to charge again, while on the right hand side of the Afghan line 8,000 soldiers supported the Par Ruhelas in their efforts to stop the march of Ibrahim Khan's successful Gardi troops Let us now take stock of the military position at noon At the very beginning the Maratha cavalry under Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had acted impetuously and gone beyond their orders, attacking the Ruhelas before Ibrahim Khan had created a gap in their ranks by the fire of his artillery and the attack of his musketry The result was they had to run back exhausted and stand behind the chained heavy artillery to escape an attack from the enemy Thus their fighting power was neutralized when it was most necessary to take advantage of the gap created by Ibrahim Khan Gardi two hours later Damaji Gaikawad, on the other hand, had succeeded, for the time being, in warding off the flank attack on Ibrahim Khan's troops by Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg, by supporting the two Gardi corps left by Ibrahim Khan on his left side In the centre, Shah Wali Khan's quick advance had obliged Bhau to break the line of the marching square and advance to meet the Wazir, with what result we have already seen Twelve noon to one o'clock was the most crucial period of the battle Had the beaten horsemen under Vitthal Shivdeo, Yashwantrao Pawar and Damaji Gaikawad courageously rushed out and marched past the chained guns in front of them to support Ibrahim Khan, it is very likely they would have succeeded in marching past the Ruhela line with the help of the Gardi troops, and outflanked them But they do not seem to have done anything of the kind Perhaps there was a distance of one mile or so intervening by now between the advanced corps of Ibrahim Khan and the heavy artillery behind which their troops stood, with the result that no correct news of the condition at the front was available to them For the time being they stood safe behind the chained guns, Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg finding it impossible to assail them Perhaps these Persian Mughals did not advance from their flanking position, with a view to cut off the ad- vancing Marathas if they tried to create a breach on that side Thus it so happened that the Maratha troops reaped no tactical advantage from the an-

TO FACE PAGE 90

BATTLE OF PĀNIPAT 1761 SECOND STAGE 1 PM

SCALE

1 MALHĀR JĪ HOLKAR 2 SINDHIĀ 3 HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER 4 DĀMĀJĪ, VITTHAL SHIVDEV & YESHVANT PUĀR, ANTĀJĪ MĀNKESHWAR 5 IBRĀHĪM GĀRDĪ 13 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU

6 BARKHURDĀR & AMĪR BEG 7 RUHELĀS 8 SHĀH WALĪ 9 SUJĀ 10 NAJĪB 11 SHĀH PASAND 12 ABDALĪ'S RESERVED TROOPS OF SLAVES 14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLĪ

Foot note —Ahmad Shah was viewing the Maratha line, it seems, with a telescope (dur bīn, vide Irvine p 246, note 1)

THE BATTLE 91 nihilation of their five Gardi troops, nor could they succeed in reinforcing Ibrahim Khan in his time of need and distress The right centre under Bhau also could not, or rather would not, reap a tactical advantage, being encumbered with the women folk. There was a distance of about a mile between Ibrahim Khan's vanguard troops at the left of the Maratha line and the centre under Bhau It is not clear from the scanty descriptions of the actual battle whether a line of communication was maintained from the one end of the line to the other, whether Bhau knew the condition of Ibrahim Khan's corps or the behaviour of Vitthal Shivdeo and others Had he with his remaining victorious troops galloped at full speed for one mile to the left and stood behind Ibrahim Khan's hard pressed mus keteers confronting the broken Ruhelas, it is certain that he would have suc ceeded in creating a breach there, and run behind the Ruhela camp Had he cared to save his life together with that of Vishwasrao and his nearest women folk, he would have possibly taken such a line of action, and escaped along the river Jamuna past the Abdali camp But that would have meant a breach of promise he had entered into with Ibrahim Khan The previous night he had told on oath to Ibrahim Khan that he would under no circumstances flee away from the battle field forsaking the Gardi infantry under Ibrahim Khan, but would rather stand as if entrenched behind him and take the risk of being cut to pieces rather than leave the field Secondly, it would have meant a break of the marching square formation, leaving the non combatants, camp followers and the bazar people to the tender mercy of the Afghan troops Looking to the result, however, it seems as if that would have been a better alternative, because, after all, the camp was left to be looted and slaughtered by the Afghans at the end of the day By it the Maratha defeat would have been felt less, as it would have resulted in the survival of politi cally and militarily the most important people in the army The behaviour of the Maratha rear guard under the Shinde and Holkar contingents is not known When, actually, Malharrao Holkar and the cap tains in the Shinde cavalry left the field is not recorded But we take it that they never came in contact with the enemy throughout the main period of the battle from 9 A M to 3 P M Exception must, however be made for the • personal troops under Janakoji, Tukoji and Mahadji Shinde They kept their eye on the movements of the centre under Bhau and after Vishwasrao's accidental death ran to his rescue It was an unfortunate necessity of the plan that these veteran troops practically did nothing in this final battle They merely neutralised the opposite camps under Shah Pasand Khan, and Shuja But many of them escaped the last slaughter by taking to their heels just in time to get their way westwards The main difference in the position of the two armies was created by the necessity of the Marathas They had, if they wished to move from Pani pat, to come out in a body all together, leaving no base with reserves behind Ahmad Shah's position was the reverse He stood on his ground well en- trenched He was not out to carry his bag and baggage with womenfolk past

92 PANIPAT 1761 the enemy line, as the Marathas had to do His defensive position was now as strong as that of the Marathas at Panipat Ahmad Shah took full ad vantage of this situation Only the fighting force was first sent to the front, the rest doing all their duties in the usual manner They could cook their food and have their meals before the Maratha onslaught could reach them The Shah s personal troops had, as usual, been kept as a reserve Ahmad Shah seems to have taken the precaution to keep his main body of troops in tact in all his battles and not only at Panipat He would make the second rate troops face the enemy first and wear them out Later on, at the critical juncture, he would rush in with his fresh, unexhausted troops and complete the victory His methodology was thus quite different from the Indian practice since the days of the Mahabharata battle In all the noted Indian battles in history, the chief general was always at the fore front, and at his fall the bat- tles ended in a rout The battles were fought for the general, and with his fall no motive remained for the troops to fight any longer Ahmad Shah, in fact, was the precursor of the European mode of warfare, wherein a general seldom takes a personal part in the fight In a composite fight he would make his allies face the brunt of the battle and expose them to severe casualties He himself would come in last when the result hung in the balance, thus leaving a preponderating force with him to take charge of the spoils and not leave an upper hand to others in case of a dispute later on The original Hindu prac- tice of fighting with a general at the head of the army had been handed down even to the Muslim rulers of India They also followed the same mode The Marathas revolutionised the old system by their guerilla mode in which a face to face battle was to be avoided But Sadashivrao Bhau had now again brought the original vogue into fashion with the help of the trained infantry and its park of artillery Unfortunately for him he had to practise this mode under very adverse circumstances now Thus the critical hour of the battle, when the Marathas could pos- sibly have given a different turn to it, passed away with the army standing ex- hausted and bewildered by the very first effort Sir Jadunath thinks⁵ that be- cause 'Bhau had no squadron of cavalry in heavy armour and mounted on powerful horses ready to charge in close order and cut its way like a solid wedge through the shaken Durrani ranks," he could not complete his initial success He also thinks that because the Maratha troops did not carry roast , meat and dry bread in their saddle bags and water in leather bottles to refresh and reinvigorate themselves easily in the field on account of their caste suscepti bilities with its dread of its defiling touch, they could not recoup themselves in time so as to follow their initial success with further advantage Though these causes are true so far as they go, we do not think that these decided the line of action taken by Bhau He knew that Ahmad Shah with his entrenched camp was behind the Wazir's line, and the possibility of marching through it was very remote At the same time he was neither prepared to expose his camp to Afghan butchery as long as he lived, nor would he break the square formation decided upon the previous night, and run past Ibrahim Khan's in- ⁵ Fall 233, See the appendix on food arrangements

fantry through the gaps created by it and forsake him, going back on his promise Anyway, the possibility of saving the main centre with the most important personages on the Maratha side, passed away by one o'clock when the Wazir rallied his troops and began the fight again Now the battle entered its most desperate stage The fight was a close combat with sword, spear, lance, dagger and knife, both sides vehemently charging each other This went on for an hour or so, and then 'by Ahmad Sultan's good fortune" an arrow struck Vishwasrao, killing him outright He fell from his horse The news of Vishwasrao's death spread like wild fire throughout the Maratha camp in a very short time, and it had a very dis- astrous effect on the morale of the fighters thenceforward When Bhau heard of it, he also was very much affected He ordered that the corpse should be placed on an elephant so as to keep it safe from being trodden upon, and then ordered a last charge But by this time the news was beginning to have its effect Timid men, it seems, fell back and began to leave the field, saving them- selves as best as they could, and in a short time Bhau's flanks seem to have completely deserted Kashiraj writes that, all of a sudden, the field became clear, the Maratha army having vanished entirely, and none remained in the field except heaps of corpses here and there Besides the news of Vishwasrao's death, another cause which created panic in the Maratha camp was the behaviour of 2,000 Afghans, employed by the Marathas and working under Vitthal Shivdeo The sentiment and aim of the Marathas in this war under discussion is incidentally well illustrated thereby They were not fighting against the Muslims, not even the foreign Afghan Muslims, but against Ahmad Shah Abdali who wished to interfere in Indian politics and bring foreign pressure on the solution of Indian problems This existence of the Afghan troops serving under the Marathas is not men- tioned by Kashiraj at all But it is found in both the Ka fijat and Bakhar of Bhau in Marathi ⁵ᵃ It is also testified by Bhau's correspondence with Govind- pant Bundele ⁶ It is not clear to which of the Afghan tribes these dissatisfied, renegade troops belonged They may even be Indian Ruhelas Be that as it may, these troops, employed without forethought, became a source of great havoc at this critical juncture To distinguish them from the Afghans on Abdali's side, they had been given a badge of an ochre coloured headdress⁷ after the Maratha fashion They were standing behind Vitthal Shivdeo's troops to the left hand side of Bhau As soon as they heard of Vishwasrao's fall, they treacherously threw away their badges and began to loot the Maratha camp adjoining them, circulating the news of the Maratha defeat with exaggerated accounts The non combatants, consisting of two lakhs of persons, naturally thought that the Afghans had now penetrated the Maratha lines, and they took to their heels Vitthal Shivdeo also began to fall back as a result, in- stead of trying to check these Afghans in their nefarious activities Thus it was that Kashiraj found the Maratha side suddenly deserted and the field ⁵ᵃ Pp 23 and 143 respectively ⁶ RAJ 1.237, 242, 244 ⁷ Bhau Bakhar 143, Bhau Kaifiyat 23

94 PANIPAT 1761 cleared. Now only a few hundred troops surrounding Bhau remained at the front in the centre of the line. On the left hand side the Ruhelas now reinforced with fresh troops, began their attack simultaneously with that of the Wazir at the centre. In the consequent battle Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar and Yashwant rao Pawar fell back defeated unable to stand the heavy slaughter by the con- secutive rounds of match lock fire from the Ruhela side. They could not make a united stand in one place. Ibrahim Khan went forth and mixed his troops amongst the Ruhelas heavily firing his last salvoes but was himself wounded and carried a prisoner by the Ruhelas. His son and brother in-law died in the effort. Practically the whole of his corps seems to have died on the battle field fighting to the last. Yashwantrao Pawar also was cut to pieces. Damaji Gaikawad received three wounds but retreated safely with his im- mediate civil assistants.⁸ Antaji Manakeshwar also with his usual cautious- ness retreated just in time to save himself uncovering the left side of the Marathas. The Ruhelas now closed upon the left flank of Bhau's personal cavalry. On the left hand side of Bhau, Samsher Bahadar was standing. He behaved on that day as a worthy scion of the Peshwa family and fought to the last. To his right were standing the Shindes, Tukoji, Mahadji and Janakoji. Their opposites on the Abdali side were Shuja ud daulah and Najib Khan. At the beginning of the battle at 9 A. M. the distance between the Ruhela front and the Shinde line was more than three miles. Najib was the coolest brain on the Abdali side, never losing his head and never acting impetuously. On this day he seems to have acted with perfect calculation. As the Maratha plan of the battle was to march on to the river side before the evening and not to fight a battle, naturally no one from the Shinde side advanced to at- tack Shuja or Najib. Besides, there was a great distance intervening between them. Najib used this respite to act in a systematic manner. He turned all his troops into infantry, dismounting even his cavalry from their horses. Then with his 15,000 troops he slowly advanced on foot, throwing up earth works in front at each quarter of a mile. That is to say, the sappers and others raised a breast-work of sand and earth a few steps in front of the line, one cubit high, which afforded a shelter to the stooping infantry and prepared trenches where the Ruhela infantry advanced and crouched down. Najib had a vast quantity of rockets with him. He would fire a volley of 2,000 rockets all at once from his advanced trenches. This had the effect of darkening the ground and the sky with their smoke and their noise created a sort of terror very useful for frightening away any advancing force. Kashiraj says that the troops of the Shinde contingent wanted to attack Najib, but they got no chance on account of this fire. We think otherwise. Bhau had wisely kept the Shinde and Holkar contingents with their beaten troops—beaten by Abdali himself in three or four fights during the last two years—to the rear flanks of his advancing square so as not to demoralise other troops by their chicken-hearted behaviour in an *8 SPD 21.200