पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

32 PANIPAT: 1761 of the French jagirs by Colonel Forde was made possible by Maratha for- bearance and the Peshwa's pressure on the Nizam Salabat Jang, the grantor of these jagirs. Naturally the Peshwa was thinking himself as suzerain in all these parts of India occupied by the English, for both the Deccan and Bengal as well as Arcot were paying chauth to the Marathas and the English had still not remonstrated against or interfered with this right. Bussy who had been recalled from the court of Hyderabad by Lally, had left for Pondicherry in July 1758. The result was that the fruit of his occupation of Daulatabad and of the assassination of Shah Nawaz Khan who was a protege of the Peshwa had been snatched away by others after his de- parture. Thus ended the French influence at the Nizam's Court. The Peshwa had succeeded in detaching Ibrahim Khan Gardi, pupil of Bussy, from the Nizam's service and engaging him himself.⁹ Thus strengthened, the Peshwa sent his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, with forty thousand troops to occupy Ahmad- nagar as promised by the Nizam. He was saved the trouble of besieging that strong fort as Kavi Jang, its keeper, agreed to deliver it to the Marathas in con- sideration for a jagir with an annual revenue of Rs. fifty thousand.¹⁰ Visaji Krishna took possession of it on 9th November, 1759. Thence Sadashivrao Bhau proceeded towards Beed and Dharur and commenced hostilities with the Nizam by fomenting and strengthening internal quarrels amongst the Nizam brothers. Basalat Jang separated himself from the Nizam and marched towards the south. The Maratha sardars of the Nizam, Nimbalkars and Khan- dagle, were sitting sulkily at home and not joining their forces with those of Nizam Ali, who had taken the lead after the departure of the French. Sadashivrao hoped for a quick decision in the campaign and after its suc- cessful termination intended to send Raghunathrao into the north to help Dattaji. But Nizam Ali would not part with the territories demanded by the Peshwa without a trial of strength. Skirmishes began from the 20th January, 1760, and gradually the Maratha armies surrounded the Nizam and his brother. The Nizam wanted to reach the fort of Dharur and make a stand there, but the Marathas would not allow him to escape from Udgir and con- tinuously followed close at his heels. By forming a hollow square, the Nizam marched out in the French fashion from Udgir and slowly moved towards Ausa, skirmishing all along the way. When the fort of Dharur remained some fifteen miles ahead, the Marathas held up his march by completely surround- ing him on all sides and attacking him in the rear. In the battle of 3rd Febru- ary, 1760, the Nizam was completely defeated and hemmed in, and there- fore sued for peace. By the terms of the peace, the Nizam ceded to the Marathas practically the half of his remaining dominions. Nizam Ali, the chief instigator, was to go back to his jagir in Berar and the Nizam Salabat Jang was to remain in Hyderabad. His Maratha sardars¹¹ were to leave the Nizam's service. The foreign relations of the Nizam were to be guided by the ⁹ Purandare 1.382. ¹⁰ Ibid. 1.382. ¹¹ Raj. 1.165.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 33 Maratha policy, especially his dealings with the French.¹² Bijapur, Ahmad- nagar, Burhanpur and Daulatabad, all four former capitals of the Muslim dominions, were surrendered together with the important forts of Asher and Mulher.¹³ Sadashivrao Bhau had become the hero of the day. He writes that but for the new danger in the north, the whole of the south would have come under the rule of the Peshwa. Unfortunately he reckoned without his host. Already the English had stolen a march politically, and now militarily also they loomed large on the horizon. Bussy had already been made a prisoner by them, and Haider Ali had so firmly set foot in Mysore as never to be ousted. While the Peshwa had just then taken possession of Underi and Kansa from the Sidi,¹⁴ Janjira and Surat never became Maratha possessions. Even the Nizam brothers, though de- feated with heavy loss and deprived of half their dominions, were only biding their time. They had given their consent to the treaty because they had to, but there was no intention in their mind of fulfilling the terms in the real spirit.¹⁵ By the treaty they had merely played for time to reshuffle their mat- ters, gain over their disaffected Maratha sardars to their side, seek help from the Pathans of Karnool, the Bedars of Surapur and also Murarrao Ghorpade. Their whole army had not been completely crushed and, in fact, they had sought peace at once to keep it intact. All these points had been placed before Bhau and he should have thought of them seriously. But the Peshwa thought more of recovering the prestige lost in north India as a result of the fall of Shinde Consequently he ordered preparations to be made for despatching a strong force to the north to drive out Abdali. Throughout the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa who had stopped at Ahmadnagar, and directed the movements from that place, now proceeded to- wards Paithan on his way to Patdur, southeast of Jalna, where he had sum- moned the Bhosle brothers from Nagpur to settle their quarrels. Sadashivrao Bhau himself proceeded north to that place, after crossing the Godavari, to meet him and thrash out the future policy through corsultations with all. They met there in the first week of March 1760, and first celebrated their vic- tory by playing the Rangapanchami festival with zest. Then began the dis- cussions. All the three cousins were there, and it was the declared intention of the Peshwa and also of Bhau to send Raghunathrao to the north as originally arranged. It should be remembered that up to that time the final route of Mal- harrao Holkar by Abdali at Sikandrabad, which took place in the first week of March, had not been reported to the Peshwa, as news travelled very slowly in those days. If the news had reached the Peshwa's camp at Padtur in time, that would have perhaps given a different turn to the whole affair. It seems that the discussions assumed the form of family bickerings in the Peshwa's family. Personal opinions, long cherished prejudices, partiality and selfish- ¹² SPD 40.123. ¹³ Raj. 1.166. ¹⁴ Ibid. 1.157 ¹⁵ SPD 1.86. P. F.—3

34 PANIPAT 1761 ness had played their role in what should have been purely political discus- sions. The Peshwa had always shown his predilection towards his brother Raghunathrao, and had somehow formed a good opinion about his ability Sadashivrao Bhau, for all his ability and wisdom, was still a cousin and there- fore not on a par with Raghunathrao He could have no legal share in the Peshwa's dominions and estates, and was only the first servant of the state. Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, was supposed to be the chief instigator against the superior claims of Sadashivrao to high office due to his ability When Raghunathrao was ordered¹⁶ to take the command of the north, he put in a plea that he would not accept the responsibility¹⁷ unless provided with ample funds Sadashivrao Bhau who was a strict accountant and auditor gen- eral held Raghunathrao responsible for the debts of the Panjab campaign and he strongly resented the charge Raghunathrao had taken the past lesson to heart and, therefore, wished to absolve himself from the results of the forth coming campaign After much recriminative discussion, the Peshwa ordered Bhau him self to shoulder the responsibility and lead the campaign ¹⁸ The Peshwa was rather unwilling to spare such a consummate, able and all round administrator as Bhau for a long time, but there was no help for it, as Bhau had been stung to the quick by a challenge from his cousin to prove his own valour and ability to add ample funds to the central treasury by going on the campaign himself But Gopikabai feared the consequence of Bhau's going to the north, accom- panied by his wife and with a big army His prestige had already risen very high by the Udgir campaign If he became equally successful in the north and were to establish a separate kingdom for himself, who was there to check him? It was necessary, therefore, to keep some constitutional check on his conduct and with this view Vishwasrao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, was placed at the head of the forces, with Bhau acting as his deputy From the correspondence in the whole Panipat campaign, it is clear that Bhau was not free to settle anything on his own responsibility Every time he referred the matter to and sought the previous sanction of the Peshwa. This was a false position in the then circumstances for a supreme authority like Bhau It appears to have had a dilatory and derogatory effect on Bhau's conduct of affairs, making it im- possible for him to free himself from the entanglement at Panipat later on, when need for a quick, decisive step arose This point should constantly be borne in mind when reading the forthcoming account of Panipat. While the suspicions and the prejudices of the Peshwa and his personal circle affected the Maratha policy throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau's personal predilections also shaped it to a great extent If Raghunathrao was always dependent on his assistants for shaping his policy, Bhau had a tendency towards the other extreme of acting on his own responsibility after abruptly cutting short the discussion on any subject and dictating the final thing him 16 Ibid 40 129 17 KHARE 1 14 For the previous debts contracted by him the Peshwa had been obliged to impose a new debt-contribution on all his jagirdars. Vide Satara 2.292. 18 RAJ 1 168.

self. The result was that he seemed, which he was actually not, proud or even haughty. This was a virtue as far as administrative efficiency—which depends upon quick and final decision—was concerned, but it cannot be said to be helpful when policy is to be shaped amongst equals. Over-riding opinion is always possible for a higher authority, but it is not always conducive to the best results, as ultimately the working out of the decisions devolves upon the subordinates. A commander-in-chief can scarcely act against the combined opinion and will of his generals. Bhau selected his own assistants and corps from amongst the as- semblage gathered in the Nizam's dominions. To begin with, his army was not more than twenty-five thousand strong, besides the infantry under Ibrahim Khan, which was nine thousand. Though Raghunathrao did not join, some of the corps subordinate to him were included in the army which accompanied Bhau to the north. The Maratha army was made up of the feudal divisions under the main sardars. These sardars employed subordinate corps under indi- vidual captains. The sardar was responsible for the conduct, training, equip- ment and payment of the corps employed by him. Certain revenue districts were assigned to him as jagirs for the expenditure thereof. Not all the noted captains in the Maratha army were sardars. Certain corps were directly em- ployed by the Peshwa who paid them from the central treasury. There was no one fixed scale of payment, certain sardars being paid more favourably than 'others. The bigger sardars, like Shinde and Holkar, were treated more as partners in the state than as mere subordinates. They had specified per- centages of the total revenues in certain regions permanently assigned to them as their inalienable share. It should be particularly noted that throughout the Panipat campaign, the payment of the whole army did not devolve on Sa- dashivrao Bhau. The divisions of Shinde and Holkar and also of a few other sardars were expected to be paid by the sardars themselves. Bhau was re- sponsible for the payment of the Peshwa's own troops, called "Huzarat," and directly paid corps like those under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The inconvenience felt by the non-receipt of revenues called in by Sadashivrao Bhau from men like Govindpant Bundele mainly affected the Peshwa's own divisions and not the divisions under Shinde and Holkar. The normal Maratha practice was for the moving army to subsist on its own earnings in the regions through which it passed. When the army was warring in a foreign territory, it would automati- cally subsist on tributes, ransoms and spoils, but when passing through its own dominions or the dominions of its allies, it had to buy everything it needed. In the Panipat campaign this was the condition in the main. Khandesh, Malwa, the Jat country, the Delhi region, were all non-belligerent territories. Besides, due to the continuance of almost constant war in the territories sur- rounding Delhi for almost a decade, the regions had become depopulated, non- agricultural and insecure. Unless there was good cash in one's pocket and one could keep the line of communication safe for caravans bringing supplies, it was impossible to go on for any length of time. There was no government commissariat department giving free rations or selling things at fixed prices in those days. The bazar which accompanied a moving army was chartered, guaranteed and given the necessary protection by the army commander no

36 PANIPAT 1761 doubt, but the merchants were not responsible for the continuous supply as such, nor were the prices fixed This was a constant source of difficulty for a moving army There was no assurance of supply nor certainty about the cost, which led not only to slackness and even obstruction in the war effort, but to the bankruptcy of the soldiers and the authorities as well Sadashivrao Bhau's progress was very slow if he had the intention of joining Shinde and Holkar before the rains These generals had been prac- tically driven out of the Delhi area, and were then camping at a safe distance from the Durrani forces behind the Jat principality, using Surajmal as a mid dleman in their diplomatic negotiations 19 Ahmad Shah Abdali had sent emissaries to both Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, ordering them to unite their forces with his and send monies to aid him in his work of driving out the Marathas,21 but both pleaded their inability to do anything in the mat- ter and tried the game of procrastination and equivocation Surajmal was the more cunning of the two He would always call himself a mere zamindar, or even a tenant, and not a prince He replied that he would pay the ac- knowledged Emperor the revenues due to him If Ahmad Shah would him- self assume that position and remain permanently in India, he would pay him as the legal sovereign Till then he could not possibly do what he had been asked, especially as his territories had been ravaged by the movements of both the Maratha and the Durrani armies 22 As the Indian summer advanced, Abdali encamped in the vicinity of Ramgad in the mid Doab, exhausted by the three months' incessant running after the elusive Marathas of the Shinde- Holkar contingents Each party now expected the other to renew the fight first, and would not start it themselves This stalemate could have been broken only by the junction of the forces under Sadashivrao Bhau and the exhausted generals in the north Bhau started from Patdur on the 14th of March, 1760, but had only crossed the Narmada after a month, covering a distance of not more than two hundred miles The delay was due to the preparation and joining in of the various corps with equipment for a long and distant campaign Sadashivrao Bhau's Panipat campaign was, in fact, on the model of the Mughal Emperors and not like that of Shivaji or Bajirao I The Maratha army had large tents, screens for women's apartments, and the various departments to look after the convenience of the leaders and the army The chiefs rode on superb Arab or Central Asian chargers and wore gorgeous dresses of gold brocades Their weapons and other equipment were also of the best type, and the brigades under Ibrahim Khan Gardi, trained after the French model, were the envy of Indian potentates of those times The presence of these infantry corps with their cannon, regulated the whole movement of the army, and the daily marches would cover but a few miles The heavy siege-guns which accom- panied the army, together with the light field artillery, slowed the rate of progress, as the long rows of bulls necessary to draw them would move but slowly over the rugged country and narrow passes in the Satpura and Vindhya 19 SPD 2 121 21 Ibid 21 186. 22 Ibid.

TO FACE PAGE 36 MAP SHOWING PÂNIPAT ROUTE MARCH ABDALI'S ROUTE ···· MAHRATHAS' ROUTE –––– SCALE Foot-note:—Baghpat to the west of Meerut on the bank of the Jamuna and the village of Gauripur five miles to the north of Baghpat have been inadvertently omitted from this map. Ahmad Shah crossed the Jamuna at Gauripur and went to Sonepat.

38 PANIPAT: 1761 lessened his expenditure. There was rumour of his personal return to Afghan- istan³³ after appointing Shuja as the Wazir, Najib as Mir Bakshi and pro- claiming the fugitive Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor, thus doing away with the puppet Shah Jahan III, brought on the throne by the regicide Ghazi-ud- din. The Panjab would, of course, be surrendered to Abdali, who would be of help to the Delhi Emperor in times of difficulty. The Dowager Empress, Malika Zamani, had been specially deputed to induce Shuja by a personal in- terview, but she does not seem to have succeeded in her efforts. Shuja's mother was still alive and influenced the affairs of Oudh with prescience and wisdom. She knew that there was nothing common between the Sunni Afghans and the Irani Shias to which group her family belonged. The old officers of Safdar Jang's time knew the difficulties of the Delhi politics and feared to antagonise the Marathas, who surrounded the Oudh territory. Shuja was thinking of giving the slip to Abdali without directly saying "no" by proceeding towards Bihar to back up the Emperor Shah Alam II. But Najib Khan was support- ing Abdali and directing all his affairs. He himself proceeded towards Oudh with Jahan Khan, the Durrani general. With a suavity equalled by his cun- ning, he impressed the Oudh Court by discussing threadbare the pros and cons of Oudh policy, and finally prevailed upon Shuja to put in his lot on the side of Abdali. Najib Khan personally stood surety against any possible harm to Shuja in the Afghan camp. The unsteadiness of Maratha policy in its dealings with Safdar Jang had now borne fruit. The Peshwa and his sardars had forsaken Safdar Jang in his need, and gone over to the side of his opponent, Ghazi-ud-din. The late Wazir had been left to die of a broken heart after his discomfiture before Delhi and his son Shuja had always to be on his guard lest the attention of the Marathas be directed against his dominions, which contained the chief holy places of the Hindus, namely, Benares, Al- lahabad and Ayodhya. In his dealings with Shuja, Sadashivrao had put his chief confidence in Govindpant Bundele as he was a near neighbour, having known the ins and outs of the Oudh Court for a long time. This man had kept himself out- wardly on good terms with Shuja and was credited with a sweet tongue, use- ful in prevailing upon an acquaintance. Sadashivrao Bhau had begun³⁴ to write to Govindpant from the Nizam's dominions long before the result of Udgir. When it was finally decided to send him to the north, he at once wrote to Govindpant to bring over Shuja to the Maratha side in the im- pending struggle against Abdali.³⁵ From his first letter of the 15th of March, 1760, up to the last disaster of Panipat, ten months later, Bhau is found put- ting too much faith in the goodness of Shuja. After coming to know his final decision to join Abdali in the first week of July, Bhau should have left the matter at that point and should have completely stopped his correspondence with Shuja. The only result of Bhau's importunities seems to have been to convince Abdali and Najib of the Maratha weakness. This conviction strength- ened their resolution of fighting to the last. The Maratha diplomacy during 33 Raj. I.191, 222, 236, 246 34 Ibid. I 154. 35 Ibid. I,167.

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 39 Balaji Bajirao's rule is always inexplicable, and it was much more so during the Panipat campaign Looking to the political condition then existing in India, and the strength of the Marathas, it was a first rate mistake to have left the south Indian tangle to take its own shape, and proceed to north India after Udgir, especially after knowing the complete defeat of the Shinde Holkar forces There were at least four fronts on which the Maratha attention was necessary then The Abdali front in the north, the Haider Ali front in the south, the Nizam front in the Deccan and the English front—for such it was though the ,Peshwa was completely unaware of it—along the whole Indian coast The Maratha power seemed to be at its zenith at the end of 1758,³⁶ but the funda- mental weakness of their unplanned spreading became apparant soon By the end of 1759 they were completely driven out of the Panjab and suffered a major defeat owing to the death of Dattaji soon after In the south, Haider Ali who was strengthening himself silently, had slyly set aside the all conquer- ing Marathas, establishing himself, finally in September 1759 by defeating Nanjraj³⁷ and imprisoning him with the puppet Mysore ruler The English had established their power in Bengal equally firmly, and had, taking advan- tage of the Maratha support, occupied the best districts in the Nizam's dominion on the eastern sea board by driving out the French What Sadashivrao Bhau could conquer from the Nizam after his far famed victory of Udgir, the Brit- ish had taken away from the Nizam by merely marching a few thousand troops, under Colonel Forde,³⁸ from Bengal to the Northern Sarkars' The result of Bhau's going to the north at this juncture after the French defeat at Wandiwash in January 1760, was exemplified not only in the far reverberat ing defeat of Panipat on 14th January, 1761, but, simultaneously or quickly fol- lowing on its heels, in the occupation of Pondicherry by the English on 16th January, 1761, and the defeat of the Emperor Shah Alam by Colonel Car- nack in Bihar on 15th January, 1761, that is, a day after the Panipat disaster ³⁹ By these events, little noticed or thought of then, the future of India was decided, more than by the defeat at Panipat Sadashivrao Bhau was fighting for the preservation of the Mughal Empire for the descendant of Taimur who actually became a prisoner and a tool in the hands of the English' Bhau thought that but for Abdali the whole south would have come into the pos- . session of the Marathas'⁴⁰ But by the defeat of the French in the south and the occupation of the Northern Sarkars, the English became powerful enough in the south to defy all others The Peshwa had planned the capture of Janjira from the Sidi this year (1760), but by the covert action⁴¹ of the English it never came to pass' Even the lands conquered from the Nizam at the be ginning of 1760 had to be returned when he threatened Poona after Panipat. How can a historian account for these results but on the one supposition that 36 BISM (Persian Mss ) No 696, dated 20-12 1758, No 699, dated 15-4-1^759 37 RAJ 1 138. 38 Cambridge History of India 5 162 39 Fall 2.542 40 RAJ 1 166. 41 SPD 40.136

40 PANIPAT. 1761 the Peshwa had miscalculated the forces and had attempted a wrong solution of the problems? From Sironj, Bhau proceeded towards Gwalior via Arun,⁴² Malan,⁴³ Pohari and Kaledhar,⁴⁴ arriving there on the 30th of May, 1760 He took stock of the Maratha forces and tried to strengthen them in every possible way But his efforts were wasted on men whom he wished to propitiate The fault was not Sadashivrao's but of the times By the middle of the 18th century, the dissolution of the Mughal Empire was practically complete and what an English historian has called "The Great Anarchy" began This anarchy which lasted almost for a century, ended finally after the great mutiny of 1857 The various fragments of the Mughal Empire, great and small, powerful and weak, had entered into a general scramble for power and pelf, and none was think- ing in terms of principles, nor was anyone in a mood to think of Indian unity Only the Peshwa was thinking in terms of the whole of India ruled from one centre and following a common policy But Sadashivrao Bhau's appeal fell on deaf ears and hence produced no result All the previous sins of commission and omission by the three Peshwas raised their heads as ghosts from their graves Everybody who had once been helped by the Marathas forgot all moral obligation to show gratitude or at least sympathy, while all who had any sense of having been badly treated sit on the fence in expectancy of the Mara- thas receiving a good drubbing at the hands of the Durrani king The con- sciousness of having all the surrounding people against the Marathas must have had a demoralising influence on the Maratha army Great battles are never won by despondent soldiers! The Marathi Chronicles of Sadashivrao Bhau report that Bhau had sought the opinion of Malharrao Holkar and Janakoji Shinde, and they had advised Bhau not to come personally, but to send armies for their help on the strength of which they would defeat Abdali Their opinion was based on the idea that the prestige of a nation is lowered when the chief himself is obliged to enter the arena of the battle, because it is thought as a sort of comment on the (in)capacity of his subordinates and if by chance or through ill luck the chief is defeated, it becomes difficult for the army to hold out afterwards On the other hand, the authors of the chronicles report the discussions in the privy council of Sadashivrao Bhau Therein Bhau's supporters, like Balvantrao Mehendale, saw more than was obvious in the advice of Holkar and Shinde " "Because these sardars and mamlatdars in the north had up till then lived in perfect freedom without feeling the pressure of the chief's control, and feared that their misdeeds would be revealed in the presence of a strict man like Sadashivrao Bhau, they are advising Bhau not to advance any farther," they thought When Bhau proceeded in spite of these remonstrances, the veteran Malharrao Holkar was reported to have let loose his tongue in wild rage at his advice being brushed aside with scant respect, and abused the advisers of Bhau He wrote again that Bhau should at least stop at Gwalior and not cross the ⁴² Raj 1 186 ⁴³ Ibid 1 188 ⁴⁴ Khare 1.22

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 41

Chambal, at which Bhau's councillors laughed again and said, "Shinde and Holkar, Antaji Manakeshvar, Govindpant Bundele, Vitthal Shivdeo and Naro Shankar who had acted as officers with full powers in these parts, are now ill at ease at our coming and can never feel happy at the event" We reproduce these lines not because we believe in their truth but because they show an un- dercurrent of thought diametrically opposite to that of Bhau's policy There was a good substratum of truth in Holkar's advice To proceed against Abdali with heavy camp equipage and the encumbrances of women and chil- dren with a paraphernalia of private servants on a lavish scale, was certainly a mistake Delhi could never have been a secure base for the Marathas in the circumstances then existing In all previous campaigns of the Marathas in the Delhi region, they had suffered from want of food and fodder, not to say money The circumstances had grown even worse now, as Bhau experienced to his cost later on There was no valid reason to believe that the circumstances would have been different in the present campaign But Bhau felt confident of overcoming any difficulty and crossed the Chambal to Dholpur,⁴⁵ which in those times was not a Jat capital but a place of pilgrimage

The Maratha army crossed the Chambal on 8th June, and encamped near the Muchakunda tirth⁴⁶ near Dholpur The whole army went through the ceremony of a holy bath and sojourned for a few days there An eclipse of the sun on the 13th of June⁴⁷ added to the merit of the pilgrimage in this holy place The delay caused by the performance of the rites of pilgrimage frustrated Bhau's original plan of crossing over the Jamuna before the rains near Agra into Govindpant Bundeles districts and attacking Abdali from that base Agra was only some twenty five miles distant from the Maratha camp between the Chambal and the Gambhira, alias Banaganga, river But Bhau was unable to cross that small river and reach Agra for about a month more The monsoon had set in somewhat early that year, and the small river was in spate On his left hand was the Parvati, in front the Gambhira and at the back the Chambal The region is extremely uneven At every hundred yards there is a ravine, a continuous up and down The land is sandy and the rivers and streams, though shallow, spread over for miles across the banks It is dif- ficult to set foot in the bed of the river and there is not enough water for boats to cross In fact, no boats are available on those streams, for after a few days the water is completely drained away and only level sands, yellow and white in colour, are left to act as witnesses for the temporary floods The whole camp must have suffered terribly because camping in those regions looked almost impossible

Though Sadashivrao Bhau could not cross the insignificant river Gambhira, he was able to meet Shinde and Holkar and discuss with them the future problems and line of action, as both of them were encamping on the same side of the Gambhira in the vicinity of Keraoli The first to see Bhau was Gangoba Chandrachud, Holkar's Diwan, on 15th June ⁴⁸ Gangoba be

45 Raj 1 199 46 Bhau Bakhar p 113 47 13th of June was 30 Jyestha, Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, K. Patre Yadi 192. 48 Raj 1.203

42 PANIPAT 1761 longed to that generation of the Marathas which grew up with Bajirao's con quests in Malwa He was the confidential man of Malharrao and had perfect faith⁴⁹ in the wisdom of his master Malharrao Holkar seems to have purposely sent Gangoba to meet Bhau first and sound him in respect of his future policy and temper Malharrao him- self met Bhau along with Janakoji Shinde, a week later, on the 22nd of June ⁵⁰ No difference of opinion is reported at this meeting which seems to have ended amicably, thus belying the purposive colourful writing of the Marathi chroni- cles At the end of the month, Surajmal Jat and the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din saw Sadashivrao Bhau and discussed the future line of action ⁵¹ The plan at the beginning of July was still to cross over the Jamuna into the Doab by build- ing a bridge of boats But even this plan failed because of the rising waters of the Jumuna In fact Bhau's slow march from the Deccan added four addi- tional months of the monsoon to the Panipat campaign, and lowered the vitality and morale of the Maratha army thereby From the tone of a letter written at this juncture, there does not seem to be any difference of opinion between Bhau and his sardars or Surajmal Jat ⁵² The total strength of the Maratha army is given as seventy to eighty thousand while Abdali-Ruhela strength is reported as sixty thousand The balance was to be decided by the joining in of Shuja ud daulah to either side Shuja's army is reported as twenty thousand, with a very strong park of artillery Besides, his army was one on permanent footing and therefore best trained, best equipped and al together more efficient than that of the others It was regularly well paid and therefore contented Naro Shankar and Ramaji Anant Dabholkar,⁵³ Jana- koji's Diwan, had been despatched as special ambassadors to Shuja as a last resort to induce him to come over to the Maratha side by offering him any terms he would choose to ask ⁵⁴ But he finally decided against the Marathas and proceeded to meet Abdali at Ramgad Bhau at once changed his plan of crossing into the Doab and arrived at Gau Ghat to the north east of Sikandara where the great Akbar lies buried This place is some ten miles to the north west of Agra on the bank of the Jamuna There the Maratha army halted and bathed in the holy waters on the new moon day of Ashadha, which fell on 12th July, 1760 ⁵⁵ Thence Bhau proceeded to Mathura where he encamped on the 15th of July ⁵⁶ Thence he sent advanced troops to lay siege to Delhi, then commanded by Yakub Ali Khan, a cousin of the Durrani Wazir Shah Wali Khan ⁵⁷ He had only a small force, not more than two thousand strong The rest of the camp with women in it went on performing the pilgrim's rites at Mathura and Brindavan Nana Fadnis, who was accompanying Bhau with his wife and mother, indulged in the holy pilgrimage to his heart's content, ⁴⁹ SPD 2 116 ⁵⁰ Raj 1 217, SPD 2 127 ⁵¹ Purandare 1.387 ⁵² Ibid ⁵³ Raj 1 208 ⁵⁴ Purandare 1 387 ⁵⁵ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 ⁵⁶ Raj 1.217 ⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.222, 223

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 43 and rapturously describes it in his "Autobiography" 58 Bhau's wife Parvati- bai, Mehendale's wife Lakshmibai, and some other women of high status had accompanied the army mainly with a view to perform the pilgrimages in the great safety of big camps fully provided with every necessity of life. The time of Maratha encampment at Mathura coincided with the Hindu intercalary month of Shravana, deemed the most holy especially near the scene of Krishna's childhood. As discussed previously, Surajmal Jat and Ghazi-ud-din were of the same opinion as that of Malharrao Holkar in not proceeding to Delhi with the whole camp, but to keep the base of operations behind and to carry on the campaign against Abdali with unencumbered troops. But Bhau had decided, probably with the full concurrence of the Peshwa, to follow the new mode of warfare based on infantry tactics. He prepared to take Delhi and make it a base. Surajmal was not against the idea of occupying Delhi but he wanted it to be handed over to him as a keeper, and wished Ghazi ud din to be made a Wazir. After the assassination of Alamgir II, his son, the fugitive prince Ali Gauhar had crowned himself as Emperor in Bihar. He had naturally dis- missed Ghazi ud din from the chancellorship and offered it to Shuja, for he could not allow his father's murderer to continue in the high office. Ghazi ud- din had tried to strengthen his hands by the expedient of taking a young prince out of the imperial prison and crowning him Emperor with the title of Shah Jahan Sani and getting himself appointed as his Wazir. But his plan was miscarried by Dattaji's defeat and death in the preceding year, and he was now a fugitive at Surajmal's Court. Bhau had to act cautiously and take into account the general voice of the populace in the Mughal dominions. The Peshwa had not directly protested against Ghazi ud din's acts of foul murder and to that extent tried not to antagonise him as he had been a creation of the Marathas. But it was necessary to guard against Najib's propaganda and, therefore, Bhau could not approve of Surajmal's proposal to acknowledge Ghazi ud din as Wazir. Bhau also wanted to keep the office open in order to tempt Shuja to the Maratha side, if he could by any means be won over. Bhau, therefore, asked the Jat Raja and Ghazi ud din to accompany him to Delhi and help him in conquering and settling it. He sent Janakoji Shinde, Balvantrao Mehendale and Malharrao Holkar with eight thousand troops in advance on 21st July, 1760. This party reached Delhi on the 25th and at once took possession of the city without firing a shot. In the first surprise on- slaught some fifty Marathas even succeeded in entering the inner citadel by scaling the walls, but instead of at once proceeding to the gates and trying to open them so as to make the whole army enter in, they foolishly engaged in loot and therefore gave time to Yakub Ali Khan, Abdali's keeper, to bring his forces to the scene and drive them out. Balvantrao's pride and impetuous- ness are illustrated in this event. He seems to have at once despatched a courier to Bhau who was following, with the main Maratha camp, to inform him of his victory, and Bhau rewarded the camel rider for bringing in the good news. At the end of the day, however, Balvantrao had to retreat to his camp. 58 Autobiography of Nana Phadnis, Patre Yadi, 192.

44 PANIPAT: 1761 outside the city and place guns around the citadel. Bhau himself had ad- vanced by this time from Mathura and was encamping at the famous serai at Chhatah Now he advanced in haste via Hodal and Palwal and reached Delhi on 31st July By this time the small party of Afghans under Yakub Ali Khan had been battered in the citadel and now with the coming of Ibrahim Khan's park of artillery, they found it impossible to continue the struggle and sued for peace. They were allowed to march out and go back to Abdali with their arms and baggage Their number was only eight hundred.⁵⁹ The Mara- thas occupied the Red Fort on the 1st of August and celebrated their first vic- tory amidst jubilations Bhau himself seems to have sojourned there for a few days to arrange for the administration of the palace, city and the fort till he moved to Shalimar Gardens to the north-west of Delhi. He appointed Naro Shankar as the guardian of the palace and the city with six thousand troops made up of cavalry and infantry. Baloji Palhande was made the keeper of the fort. Sadashivrao Bhau's camp at Delhi after the first fortnight was near the Shalimar Gardens watered by the famous Ali Mardan Khan canal. The place is still very charming, filled with the fragrance of the blossoms of the lucat trees during September and October. The water pavilions of the lux- urious Mughal Emperors are still to be seen there with their mural paintings of birds and flowers, though in a dilapidated condition. Already three con- querors, namely, Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah and Raghunathrao, had lived in them during two decades Now Bhau had occasion to halt there. Though from the military point of view the possession of Delhi was no great gain, it restored the prestige of the Maratha name. Ahmad Shah was, at this time, camping at Anupshahar on the Ganges but he was unable to send any succour to his nominee, Yakub Ali Khan.⁶⁰ Shuja-ud-daulah was ac- tually encamping just on the opposite side of the Jamuna⁶¹ but he was also helpless to do anything in the matter. Perhaps they knew that it was impos- sible to face Ibrahim Khan's artillery and therefore remained silent. In the popular mind, however, the Maratha prestige, lost and lowered by the previous year's events, was completely restored. Shuja, who had willingly joined Abdali, began to waver in his resolution.⁶² He began to exert himself in the peace- move. The Indian allies of Ahmad Shah Abdali in this campaign had joined their forces with his as a lesser evil only. The trans-Gangetic Ruhelas under the leadership of the sagacious Hafiz Rahmat had no love lost for Najib Khan, whose faithlessness and unscrupulous dealings they would not approve. The lame Ahmad Khan Bangash was always shaky in his resolution, never being sure which side to choose. His situation was always precarious as his district of Farukkhabad was situated amidst the more powerful states of Oudh, the Ruhelas, the Marathas and the Jats. Though weak, Ahmad Khan was not unselfish either. He would side with the Marathas with a view to gain some ⁵⁹ Bhau Kaifiyat p 9 Raj. 1.223 ⁶⁰ Illiot. 8 147 ⁶¹ Raj. 1.224. ⁶² Ibid. 1.191

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 45 portion of Shuja's dominions or the land of the Ruhelas. When not threatened by Shuja and when the Maratha armies were not in his neighbourhood, he would not shirk from invading and occupying the Maratha districts in the lower Doab.⁶³ He would never offend any party by his words and always tried to keep himself on speaking terms with all. Ahmad Khan had come to Abdali's camp but seeing that there was no work there for three months of the rains he and also the Ruhelas, except Najib, left for their homes with Abdali's permission.⁶⁴ From their homes they kept on writing to Bhau that they had joined Abdali under duress. Bhau seems to have misjudged their motives as they were always keeping up a correspondence with Bhau and promising to join him under certain conditions. It is difficult to say whether they actually feared the consequences of joining Abdali as against the Mara- thas or were merely fooling him this time so as to save their dominions from the armies of Govindpant Bundele and Gopalrao Ganesh Barve. But Bhau was trying his best to take advantage of the enforced delay and hoping to separate some of his allies from Abdali. Many Afghan sardars wrote to Bhau that they would detach themselves from Abdali as soon as they found an opportunity to do so. But Abdali kept a strict watch over them and never once allowed them to move away from his camp. Bhau even tried to detach some of the Afghan tribes who were accompanying Abdali with the hope of loot but were not directly employed by him, and were actually starving. Ahmad Shah's Durrani troops were at this time living on loot. Najib was supplying Abdali with 200 maunds of grain and 15,000 rupees cash every day for his aid. But this was sufficient for his personal slaves only. Bhau had ordered Govindpant to engage them if they came over to his side and to send them to Bhau's camp if necessary.⁶⁵ He had asked Govindpant to remain where he was and try to move in such a way as to make Shuja and the Ruhelas leave Abdali's camp for defending their threatened territories.⁶⁶ But the terror of Abdali's forces was such that it made any move on Govindpant's part well-nigh impossible. The Maratha officials in the Doab seem to have been completely demoralised by the experience of the past four years, and no one was ready to take any risk in the matter. This is clear from Sadashivrao Bhau's order to Govind- pant in the middle of August to forbid any Maratha employed under him to send back his effects to the Deccan, as Bhau had come to know of such a move.⁶⁷ It meant that the Marathas living in those regions were not very sanguine about the outcome of the war and feared the worst. This explains the cause of the non-compliance of Sadashivrao Bhau's orders by Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve. They were unable to do anything vigorously or enthu- siastically because the overwhelming majority of the Maratha employees had completely lost heart. Notwithstanding such sombre atmosphere Sadashivrao Bhau was going on with his plans of meeting Abdali after the rains. Though the hope of solv- ing the political problem of the governance of India without resort to arms was ⁶³ Ibid. 1.236. ⁶⁴ Ibid. 1.237. ⁶⁵ Ibid. 1.257 ⁶⁶ Ibid. 1.242 ⁶⁷ Ibid. 1.223.

46 PANIPAT 1761 very remote, still peace parleys continued throughout. Najib Khan's proposal forwarded through Shuja was to hand over the regions beyond Sarhind to Abdali and hand over the Delhi affairs into his hands Shuja wanted the Chancellorship as well as the command over the army of the Mughal Em pire ⁶⁸ But Najib would never allow the military command to pass out of his hands Bhau's idea was to fix the boundary at Attock, leaving Peshawar and Kabul to Abdali, while the imperial defence would be left as it was, meaning through the agency of the Marathas But Bhau was not obstinate on any point. He knew that no one could have everything his own way In diplo macy "give and take" is necessary and inevitable, and therefore he still hoped to find a via media out of the impasse The condition in the middle of September was as follows There was no money left in the government treasury nor was any forthcoming from the revenue collectors like Govindpant Bundele Bhau knew the economic con dition of the region surrounding Delhi very well and understood the difficulties of recovering government dues in the then conditions of northern India Be sides the military trouble due to war with Abdali, nature also had some say in the affair Hail storms and certain pests had that year destroyed the crops in many parts and there was a consequent deficit in revenue collection ⁶⁹ The dismissal of old collectors like Naro Shankar and his brother and recently of Mahadaji Govind Kakirde⁷⁰ appointed in his place, had adversely affected the Maratha revenues in Bundelkhand Bhau also suspected the sincerity of the collectors who, he thought, were withholding payments with a view to take advantage of the difficulties of the government ⁷¹ They would pay after the event instead of before it, as they were not sure of the result of the war and hoped to profit thereby As the army was starving and not even a week's payment out of the month could be made to them, Bhau had recourse to the politically disastrous action of taking out the silver ceiling of the Diwan i khas, and minting it into money He was able to secure only nine lakhs by this process and thereby feed his army for one month only It seems this action was tom tomed as insulting to the Mughal throne by the Muslim partisans of Najib, and it inflamed the Muslim population in the surrounding regions against the Marathas As a matter of fact, the Wazir Ghazi ud din had already taken out a part of that very ceiling previously when he was in need of money, and Bhau was not the first vandal to touch it as made out by partisan his- torians ⁷² But none seemed to have noticed the Wazir's act while all flared up against Bhau's behaviour When the famous peacock throne of Shah Jahan was taken away by Nadir Shah or when the whole palace and its inmates were completely stripped of their effects by Abdali, none seemed to have thought these as an insult to the Mughal throne then, possibly because the spoliators were devout Muslims 68 Purandare 1.389 69 Shinde 1.222 Purandare 1.386. 70 Satara 2.291 Dabholkar Mss. 152. 71 SPD 27.234. 72 Ibid 27.257

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 47 Bhau’s difficulties were increased by the Peshwa’s ignorance of northern Indian affairs. It was customary for the Maratha army to subsist on the land they marched through; but, after experience, the people of the regions through which they marched had become wiser than before, and left nothing on the spot to be carried away by the Marathas. Bhau had himself taken Raghunath- rao to task for not being able to defray the expenditure of his campaign, and now he could not possibly ask for funds from the Deccan. The stress of cir- cumstances, however, obliged even the proud Bhau to beg for funds. The Peshwa first ordered the revenue collectors in the north to pay half the revenues to Bhau. This order only facilitated equivocation by the delaying collectors They would write to the Peshwa that Bhau had taken the whole revenue from them and write to Bhau that they had sent the whole money to the Deccan. Bhau, therefore, over-riding the Peshwa’s orders, asked the collectors to send the whole amount to him only. Still no money was forthcoming from anybody Bhau had received two lakhs’from Govindpant and eighty thousand from Babu- rao Koner of Jhansi. This was all he was able to receive at Delhi. While Bhau was besieged at Panipat, Govindpant brought four lakhs and twenty thousand to Delhi at the beginning of December, only a quarter of which reached Bhau’s camp in safety. Besides Govindpant, some other collectors like Gopal Keshav of Bhander (SPD, 29-12) also seem to have forwarded their collections to Delhi after Bhau’s move to Kunjpura. The capture of Delhi had placed an additional burden on Bhau’s depleted treasury because he had now to provide for the palace-expenditure which came to more than a lakh per month. There is some ground for suspicion that Bhau’s plans were being ob- structed by certain forces in Poona, antagonistic to him. Gopikabai, the wife of the Peshwa, always feared, it seems, the complete usurpation of power by Bhau as he was already the sole administrator. The Peshwa was every day growing weaker and weaker both physically and morally. This fact also en- hanced the lady’s fears. She, as well as the Peshwa’s advisers in Poona, espe- cially the wily Sakharam Bapu, who it should be noted, was with the Peshwa in the Deccan and had not accompanied Vishwasrao to the north, as wrongly stated by Sir Jadunath,⁷³ seem to have been responsible for advising the Peshwa to withhold any more help to Bhau for fear of his increasing power. Sakharam Bapu was perhaps the cleverest brain in the Poona Court of those times. He was from very early days a sort of rival to Bhau in diplomatic matters. The Peshwa seems to have used Bapu as a tool to keep a balance of power at the Poona Court. Bhau’s ways were open and straightforward. Bapu’s conduct was exactly the reverse. The two could not go together with these contrary dispositions. Sakharam Bapu had, therefore, always sided with the party opposite to Bhau. He accompanied Raghunathrao in his north Indian campaigns as his chief adviser and administrator. Though Raghunath- rao as the master cannot be absolved from the blame, the chief responsibility for the financial mismanagement of his campaigns should be properly placed on Sakharam Bapu’s shoulders. Being conscious of his share in the guilt, ⁷³ Fall 2.240 (foot note)

48 PANIPAT 1761 Bapu naturally must have come to loggerheads with Bhau when the final ac- counts of the campaigns came to be settled Peculation was quite rampant in those days in official circles and the Maratha state was no exception to the rule Profiteering at the cost of govern- ment was thought to be no sin and was a normal part of a wise man's living While some of the generals and diplomats and administrators waxed fat, the state languished for want of money The Peshwa's government perhaps suf- fered more than the other governments through this mischief, because the ruder Maratha generals were more grabbing and the selfish and brainy Brahmin ac- countants and collectors were clever at figures To spite Bhau now, Bapu must have taken full advantage of his difficulties in tutoring the Peshwa against him Bhau's advisers and assistants in this campaign were also rivals of Bapu at the Poona Court Trimbak Sadashiv alias Nana Purandare and Balvantrao Mehendale were not well disposed towards him, Nana Purandare was on al- most inimical terms with Bapu 74 In short Sakharam Bapu belonged to the party of critics of Sadashivrao's policy One is, therefore, led to believe in the truth of that one line commentary copied and reproduced in Khare I,75 which also explains to some extent the attitude of the Peshwa towards the Delhi campaign of Sadashivrao Bhau as reported by Naro Gangadhar from the Peshwa's camp in the Deccan 76 Sadashivrao Bhau, writing from Delhi in the middle of September 1760 to his intimate friend, Dhondo Malhar Purandare, states that there is no dif- ference of opinion between him and the two sardars Shinde and Holkar It means that the dramatic episode of Surajmal described in detail in the Bakhar is all imaginary and an after thought Honest difference of opinion about the policy to be followed against Abdali might be there, but the cause of his ab- ruptly leaving Delhi without taking leave of Bhau must be his disappointment Bhau would not place the city in the charge of the Jat, but appointed Naro Shankar as the guardian of the city and the palace, instead Surajmal was, no doubt, very shrewd and cautious His advice to keep the main camp with its heavy encumbrances back in the Gwalior region was sound But he was personally very selfish and always tried to secure his ends under the cloak of humbleness. This time he wished to follow the same path and set himself up as a regent in Delhi with the help of the Marathas His past behaviour towards the Marathas was neither very honest nor consistent After Raghu- nathrao's campaign against him in 1754, he occupied the lands in the Doab surrounding Kol Ramgad during their absence from the north in 1755 77 In 1756 he would not risk his troops against Abdali by joining Antaji Manakesh- war, though he took full advantage of Antaji's cover to guard his dominions and save his forts When Raghunathrao again returned to the north, he still kept himself studiously aloof and saved his skin Meanwhile he had reaped the harvest out of Maratha weakness due to Jayapa's assassination He sud- denly descended upon the strong imperial hill fort of Alwar which guarded 74 Purandare 3.82. 75 Khare, 1.25 6 SI D 2.133 77 Hingne 1.159.

SADASHIVRAO’S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA . 49 the route from Delhi to Jaipur, and occupied it without much trouble. When Dattaji returned in 1758 with a strong force he again assumed humbleness and tried to make a common cause with him in the spoliation of the Mughal em- pire. He had kept on good terms with the Shinde family since the time he was saved by Jayapa Shinde against Malharrao's fury at Kumbher, and thus shielded himself against Malharrao's exactions. But he respected neither friend nor foe when it was a question of aggrandizing himself at the cost of others. For the present he had made common cause with Shinde and Holkar, fully knowing that they would not be troublesome to him after their late defeats at the hands of Abdali. On the other hand they were useful to him in meet- ing the calls of Sadashivrao Bhau on his resources. Now finding himself un- able to fulfil his life's ambition of governing Delhi, he silently walked away from Bhau's camp with a show of anger at Bhau's policy. Bhau certainly felt the loss of his help at this crucial time and tried to recall him. Mahipatrao Chitnis, Gangoba Chandrachud and Ramaji Anant were sent after him to bring him back.⁷⁸ This proves that Bhau had no intention of insulting him as is made to appear in the Bhau Bakhar. Nor was he remiss in trying to win him over with assurances. But it looks as if the Jat Raja was thoroughly selfish and left the Maratha camp, ostensibly on account of a difference in out- look on matters of policy, but really to save himself from Bhau's demands and importunities due to the starving condition of his men and animals Throughout the Panipat campaign, Bhau was never once suspicious of the Jat's attitude towards the Marathas, but always hoped for good behaviour from him Though he had openly consented not to help⁷⁹ Bhau in his diplomatic talks with Najib and Shuja as Abdali's emissaries, with a view to excuse himself from paying tribute to the Afghan monarch, Surajmal did not do anything antagonistic to the Maratha interests, but on the other hand considerably helped them by allowing provisions and money to pass through his territory unmolested.⁸⁰ There seems to have been talk of Surajmal's son, Jawahirmal, coming to Bhau's help with the Jat forces at the beginning of October. When Prince Javan Bakht was proclaimed on 10th October and the seals of his father were brought into use, the Jat Raja became finally reconciled to the Maratha side.⁷⁹ All these facts refute the criticism of Bhau's behaviour in his dealings with Surajmal Jat. His humane behaviour and the monetary help he afforded to the Maratha fugitives after Panipat completely belies the story so dramatically related in the chronicle. As related above, the peace parleys were dragging on all along, but without sincerity on either side. Ahmad Shah had changed his camp of thatched huts at Anupshahar on the Ganges at the beginning of August.⁸¹ This was first a countermove to Bhau's occupation of Delhi, and was also due to the unhealthiness of the place. Thousands of his horses and camels succumbed to the heavy monsoon in the low-lying Gangetic valley.⁸² His first thought was ⁷⁸ SPD 27.258. ⁷⁹ Parasnis Persian Akhbars Mss ⁸⁰ Raj. 1.259. ⁸¹ Ibid. 1.226-7, 246. ⁸² SPD 2 131; Raj 6 404 P. F.—4

50 PANIPAT 1761 to move north to the strong fort of Sukartal and remain there At the begin ning of October, he was reported to have left his camp at Sambharam Serai and moved to Ahmad Ganj 79 But soon after he came to Shahadra, opposite to Delhi on the bank of the Jamuna, and encamped there with Shuja and Najib A distant cannonade was also sometimes indulged in by both the armies from the two banks of the river It could not be very effective from a distance of more than a mile with the artillery of those times Besides, none of the parties was willing to waste its ammunition for merely terrifying without military effect Internal trouble was also brewing amongst Abdalis allies Shuja and Najib were strange bed fellows whom only destiny had brought together Najib had promised that no demands for money would be made on Shuja if he joined Abdalis camp This hope was belied, for the hungry and grabbing Afghans tried to make encroachments on him, knowing full well that he was rich This led to a quarrel between Shuja and the Durranis Shuja felt himself deceived by the false promise of Najib and was almost in a repentant mood 63 The Abdali troops, on the other hand, were reluctant to continue their stay in India amidst misery and destitution, with little hope of earning anything in the future Bhau had sent one Bhavanishankar as a Vakil to Shuja across the Jamuna and Shuja also sent his Vakil to Bhau in return 64 It seems from Kashiraj s account that he also accompanied Raja Devidatta, Shuja's envoy But there is no corroboration of the same in Marathi correspondence, a fact which makes one suspicious about the truth of his narrative As Bhau was not satisfied with Raja Devidatta, he sent him back with Bhavanishankar This Bhavanishankar is scarcely mentioned anywhere in the Marathi nar- rative as a person of importance Kashiraj says he was a native of Auranga bad and belonged to his caste As the Brahmins of Aurangabad had taken to Persian studies, they were in great demand at the courts of various north Indian potentates who had any dealings with the Marathas Knowing both Persian and Marathi, they were able to correspond and interpret between the Maratha and other courts, and settled in various capitals The Hingne family was also engaged by the Peshwa for the same qualifications Bhavanishankar first came in contact with the Peshwa in his dealings with Shah Nawaz Khan at the Nizam s court, and seems to have spread his influence over Bhau also 65 As Nana Fadnis in his Autobiography adversely comments on Bhavani shankars influence over Bhau and expresses himself in disapproving terms about his conduct it may be taken as a general opinion of the Maratha camp about the man Bhau over rode the opinions of intimates like Balvantrao Mehendale and Nana Purandare and completely put his faith in Bhavani shankars advice, which was also the main cause of Bhaus decision to follow Ibrahim Khan Gardis French tutored mode of warfare. Perhaps, even in the succes ful Udgir campaign, 66 Bhau had followed Bhavanishankars advice and the thundering success in it had established Bhavanishankar in Bhau's con fidence Whatever the fact, his conduct of peace parleys at this juncture did not prove succes sful as Najib-ud daulah threw every obstacle in the way Mal 63 Raj 1.235, 216 64 Samra 2.297

SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA 51 harrao and Surajmal were also keeping correspondence with Shuja and seek- ing his advice as to the future line of action. Shuja advised the Marathas to follow only the traditional mode of guerilla warfare, and to Surajmal he ad- vised to return to his own country. To Bhau, Shuja professed friendship, while declining to leave Abdali's camp, and promised to help the Maratha cause by giving his best advice. From Kashiraj's account it seems Bhau had receded back a great deal on his original terms one by one. As a last resort, he was ready to surrender the Panjab upto Sarhind, but wanted Abdali no more to in- terfere in the Delhi affairs. But, as mentioned above, nothing came out of this boring of the mountain, not even a mouse. Both sides seem to have put their final faith in a decision by arms. From the beginning, Bhau was ready to al- low Abdali to return to his own country if he so desired. But if he really had a mind to gain that end, it would have been better had he never crossed the Chambal. In that case Abdali would possibly have left India through sheer weariness. But with Bhau's big army advanced to Delhi, it was impossible for Abdali to retreat without offering a battle. From that point of view it would have been better for Sadashivrao Bhau to have turned his attention to Shuja's dominions and to have proceeded to Benares instead of Delhi. But unfortunately for the Marathas throughout their career, they had chosen the cockpit of Delhi as their fighting arena and ultimately lost their all in it. Meanwhile the condition of the Maratha army deteriorated day by day. The bullocks of the artillery department died by hundreds and there were not enough left with strength to drag the guns.⁸⁷ Bhau had also ordered⁸⁸ both Govindpant and Gopalrao Barve to cross over the Ganges and threaten Shuja's and the Ruhela's territories. But Govindpant was unable to move, firstly, on account of the rains, and secondly, because the zamindars in the Doab and Bundelkhand had become defiant and treacherous, and there was no safety for the Maratha posts in those regions. Bhau had taken possession of all the main ghats between Agra and Kunjpura and blocked the crossings for the enemy. He had kept small patrols to guard the ferry ghats and collected all the boats at Selimgad near Delhi. Though Bhau had now placed his main faith in the artillery of Ibrahim Khan,⁸⁹ still he could not recruit any Marathas for service in that department. He had to call the men from the enemy's ter- ritories to do such work.⁹⁰ Bhau seems to have called some European gun- ners from the eastern parts also. Many Portuguese, French, English and other European adventurers and renegades were at this time spread over India, ready to offer their services for good money. The war between the French and the English had detached a number of Frenchmen from Chandranagar and other places in Bengal. These were probably the persons Bhau was hop- ing to engage. But none of these projects materialized and only a certain number of Pathan followers of Ahmad Shah came over to the Maratha side only to create confusion and disaster in the last fight. 85 RAJ. 1.85 86 SPD 25.279 87 RAJ. 1.231 88 Ibid 1.233, 237 89 Ibid. 1.174 90 Ibid. 1.176, 235